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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores Doris Lessing’s writing of evolution and genetics in her space 
fiction through two contexts: first, through a historical global crisis for capitalism 
in the 1970s following a temporary breakdown of post-war Euro-US financial 
hegemony; and second, through a philosophical shift in scientific discourse from 
an age of reductionism to an age of complexity or emergence. After almost two 
decades of writing realism, Lessing started writing what she calls ‘space fiction’ 
in the late 1960s in the final section of The Four-Gated City (1969), and she did 
not stop for over a decade, with The Sentimental Agents of the Volyen Empire 
(1983). Focusing on Memoirs of a Survivor (1974) and the Canopus in Argos series 
(1979-83), I argue that space fiction allows Lessing two modes of inquiry, the first 
based in realism and the second on speculation: first, to explore the human body 
as a political object, or the biopolitical; second, speculations on resistance to 
biopolitical governance through living ambivalently (not competitively), for the 
sake of metabolic survival, or biosociality. If biopolitics is enabled through 
reductionist constructions of ‘the body’ as a unit of analysis (‘bio’ signifying ‘type’ 
or collection of genes), then biosociality understands ‘bio’ as metabolic systems 
that extend between individuals, across species differentiations. The 
posthumanism of biopolitics leads towards transhumanism, while the 
posthumanism of biosociality is what Eugene Thacker calls ‘peripheral life’: ‘life 
that is perpetually going outside itself’. The vehicle of this critique is what I call 
‘epigenetic poiesis’. I develop this term throughout the thesis to describe literary 
and cultural representations of epigenetic changes, using ‘poiesis’ to describe 
how these changes emerge through responses to chance events which put 
subjects out of equilibrium, enabling or forcing fast adaptation to changed 
contexts (a forced displacement to another planet, an arranged marriage, an ice 
age). Lessing’s sf novels express modes of survival activated outside the 
restrictions of biopolitical control, chance responses to the end-game of a world-
system that exploits, determines and tracks the bio-energy of the living matter 
under its dominion for the sake of accumulation and expansion. The novels also 
anticipate biopolitics under neoliberalism as a matter of data control, rather than 
the discipline of individuals. Throughout, the narratives disturb the construction 
of a liberal subject under capitalist modernity by staging a broader speculation 
on the intricacy, interdependency and interpretative activity of ‘life itself’ with 
regard to all kinds of material relations. The texts are literary engagements with 
what Nikolas Rose calls ‘vital politics’, both a reflection on the governmental co-
option of life processes, and an exploration of the multifaceted dimensions of 
‘life itself’ loosened from anthropocentric categorisations.  
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We do not grow absolutely, chronologically. We grow sometimes in one 
dimension, and not in another; unevenly. We grow partially. We are relative. 
We are mature in one realm, childish in another. The past, present, and future 
mingle and pull us backward, forward, or fix us in the present. We are made up 
of layers, cells, constellations. 
 
~ Anaïs Nin, The Diary of Anaïs Nin 
 
 
 
I have dead ones, and I have let them go, 
and was astonished to see them so peaceful, 
so quickly at home in being dead, so just, 
so other than their reputation. Only you, you turn 
back: you brush against me, and go by, you try 
to knock against something, so that it resounds 
and betrays you. O don’t take from me what I 
am slowly learning. I’m sure you err 
when you deign to be homesick at all 
for any Thing. We change them round: 
they are not present, we reflect them here 
out of our being, as soon as we see them. 
 
~ Rainer Maria Rilke, Requiem for a Friend 
 
 
 
I'm gonna lay down my heavy load 
Down by the riverside. 
 
~ Anonymous Black Spiritual
INTRODUCTION 
 
Written in a decade of crisis for Western powers and renewed opportunity for 
the Soviet Union, Doris Lessing’s space fiction – which I read from Memoirs of a 
Survivor (1974) to the Canopus in Argos series (1979-83) – connects a reductionist 
framework of evolutionary and genetic theory, deployed as a justification for 
competitive imperialism, to a speculative construction of the ‘human’ subject out 
of the complexity of life itself. The novels represent the disintegration of imperial 
wealth and reconstitution of a liberal subject in the post-colonial world order as 
a repeated narrative of violence and exclusion on the grounds of biological 
predestination. Her ‘turn’ to science fiction (sf)1 enables Lessing to join up several 
realms of experience and to speculate on possible modes of change, not restricted 
to political action or socio-economic change. It also makes possible the 
simultaneous placement of different timescales – geological, meteorological, 
evolutionary, and historical – to depict fluctuating speeds of adaptation across 
different measurements of time with regard to material effects. The simultaneity 
of these timescales also enables the literary expression of what appears in the 
texts as ‘gene memory’: forgotten or silenced genetic material that is activated in 
moments of crisis out of a series of connected and interdependent responses 
between organism and environment. I call the literary representation of these 
responses ‘epigenetic poiesis’, developing the term throughout the chapters. 
                                                 
1 General references to speculative and science fiction will be written throughout as ‘sf’. Lessing’s 
use of the ‘space’ fiction comes out of an attempt to distance herself from the writing of 
theoretical physics in so-called ‘hard’ sf, characterised, among others, by Arthur C. Clarke’s sf. In 
the preface to The Sirian Experiments, she writes that while ‘readers yearn to “believe” 
cosmologies and tidy systems of thought [because] we live in dreadful and marvellous times 
where certainties of yesterday disappear as we live […] I don’t want to be judged as adding to a 
confusion of embattled certainties’ (SE 10). Calling Canopus ‘space’ fiction is partly a reaction 
against the expectation that she write about ‘Red and White Dwarves and their Remembering 
Mirror, their space rocket (powered by anti-gravity), their attendant entities Hadron, Gluon, 
Pion, Lepton, and Muon, and the Charmed Quarks and the Coloured Quarks’; ‘we can’t all be 
physicists,’ she reminds her reader, somewhat caustically (SE 12). I consider Lessing’s Canopus 
novels as sf but also adhere to Lessing’s description of them, understanding ‘space’ to refer to 
both ‘inner’ (mind/body) and ‘outer’ (extraterrestrial/environmental) space. She urges readers 
and reviewers to see Canopus as ‘a framework that enables me to tell a beguiling tale or two; to 
put questions, both to myself and others; to explore ideas and sociological possibilities’ (SE 12). 
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Lessing’s novels register a change in the philosophical foundation of 
ontology in the direction of what physicist Robert Laughlin calls the scientific 
paradigm shift from the age of reductionism to the age of emergence. The 
implications of this shift are manifold, and constitute the philosophical 
undertaking of this thesis. If the age of reductionism is characterised not only by 
the way in which scientific knowledge has been deployed in society since the 
Enlightenment, but also has conditioned the parameters for experimentation 
and experimental subjects, then the age of emergence opens the possibility of 
radically altering the framework within which life is understood and managed at 
the level of community, society and government. Wendy Wheeler suggests that 
this would oppose first, the neoliberal formulation of the individual and the 
family, and second, what she calls the ‘postmodern’ idea that ‘reality is 
constructed in language’ (Wheeler 26-7). Complex systems theory and science 
‘provides us with a new way of thinking, not only about how complex systems 
work, but about how, in their biological manifestations and beyond, they are 
inter-related’ (27). Following Wheeler’s description, I read Lessing’s space fiction 
as within this cultural paradigm shift in how ‘life itself’ is conceived. 
The novels stage debates of the period around the epistemological 
constitution of life itself. While biological determinism pre-dates genetics, over 
the course of the twentieth century, the concept of the gene came to mark the 
parameters of life itself. Evelyn Fox Keller notes the enormous cultural impact of 
Francis Crick and James Watson’s publication of the double helix as the structure 
of DNA, and life itself, in 1953. She writes that their announcement ‘convinced 
biologists not only that genes are real molecules but also that they are 
constituted of nothing more mysterious than deoxyribonucleic acid’, dispelling 
‘all remaining doubts about the material nature of the gene’ (The Century of the 
Gene 3). From this point, she argues, ‘the way was cleared for the gene to become 
the foundational concept capable of unifying all of biology’ (The Century of the 
Gene 3). This initiated a move in biology to molecular genetics, replacing the 
focus of classical genetics on phenotypic expression of traits at a somatic level 
with investigations of the structure and function of genes at a molecular one.  
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Yet reducing life itself to genetic programming has, from the start, been 
controversial. While the new language of molecular biology – sequence and code 
over trait and linkage – continued to reduce life itself to substance over process, 
with DNA as the blueprint determining the organism from the point of 
conception, this has been increasingly contested by more complex accounts of 
development and inheritance in living systems. The novels’ rendering of this shift 
is tied to social movements of the period: feminism, civil rights, anti-colonialism, 
radical science, and queer politics, exploring different modes of resistance to 
what seems like an immutable inheritance. They stage the difficulty of this 
resistance through, first, depicting the repeated constitution of power through 
the scientism of typological biopolitics, and second, at the incremental and near-
impossible work of undoing this inheritance.  
The novels also consider the social and political implications of 
unmooring the notion of a liberal individual from the essentialism of biological 
constitution. If the epistemological construction of the liberal subject has always 
been premised on the exclusion of others from participation or consideration in 
public affairs – human and non-human – then what might a re-conceptualisation 
of inheritance, property and adaptation imply for changing the parameters of 
what, in The Human Condition (1958), Hannah Arendt calls ‘action’, rather than 
mere existence (bios)? Lessing does not address these questions (only) at the 
level of ideology, but (also) across differentiated realms of experience. Resistance 
and change in the Canopus in Argos novels is not restricted to the domain of ‘will’ 
in the sense of collective or subjective determination or ideology; collective self-
determination emerges as a spontaneous, unforeseen response to adverse or 
extreme environmental conditions that require speedy adaptation.  
The imperial agents of the novels are always travelling from the core to 
the peripheries and semi-peripheries. By structuring their movement in such a 
way, Lessing effectively annihilates any narrative focus on the specific ambitions 
of the Canopeans, outside maintaining their own sovereignty and reproducing 
the technologies of their hegemony. The biopolitical determination and control 
over life itself, and the explicitly eugenic interests of her fictional ruling powers, 
represent the centrality of an ideal subject. The imperial core becomes what 
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Alvara Malainam, in a discussion of neoliberal imperialism, calls ‘a giant 
biopolitical machine for the production of subjectivity’ (478). This speculative 
imaginary is grounded in the reduction of human potential to biological 
programming, and the promise of a utopia of biological ‘goods’ – either based on 
an ‘originary’ ethnos (as in Iceland’s deCODE project and Nazi eugenics), or the 
cultivation of one (as in Soviet conditioning experiments and the interwar 
socialist British eugenicists). 
Framing the Canopus novels as an archive positions these narratives as 
cultural memory, which – it is implied – will be transmitted to subsequent 
generations. The first page of Shikasta describes the text as ‘a compilation of 
documents selected to offer a very general picture of Shikasta for the use of first-
year students of Canopean rule’ (S 12). In the logic of the Canopean universe, the 
novels are cultural artefacts produced for dissemination. Waste material of 
imperial history is incorporated into national narrative, compromised and 
partisan. Can the Canopean archive, comprised of the breakdowns, failures, 
anomalies and resistance to imperial rule, disrupt the constitution of empire 
enough to destabilise it entirely, to run it off the tracks? This is the question I 
consider throughout the thesis. 
 
 
Genetic Determinism vs. Evolutionary Plasticity in the 1970s 
 
The alternative forms of genetic and biological change depicted in the novels, 
countering the determinism and atomism of Anglo-American biology, register a 
debate of the 1970s. This debate can be broadly summarised as determinism vs. 
plasticity in the appearance of sociobiology and of evolutionary psychology and 
their detractors. The reduction of human behaviour to selective transmission of 
genetic traits through natural selection was popularised in E. O. Wilson’s 
Sociobiology (1975) and Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (1976), among others. 
Without ever giving a definition of what he means by ‘behaviour’, in 
Sociobiology, E. O. Wilson argues for the genetic predisposition of certain social 
actors to particular kinds of behaviour. Girls, for example, ‘are predisposed to be 
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more intimately sociable and less physically venturesome’, and anarchist 
theories of social organisation – he cites Mikhail Bakunin – would be ‘biologically 
impossible’ (133, 208).  
There was resistance to Wilson’s co-option of sociology and anthropology 
by a group of prominent Marxist biologists, led by Richard Lewontin and Stephen 
Jay Gould. Canopus in Argos’s critique of reductionism applied to governmental 
policy can be contextualised with reference to this debate, which played out 
publicly and prominently in the letters section of The New York Review of Books 
from 1975-78. The Marxist biologists argued that there was a lack of scientific 
justification for ‘the spurious promise of reducing such disparate fields as 
economics, government, and psychology to a biological science’ (Gould et al. 
‘The Politics of Sociobiology’). In ‘Against Sociobiology’, the group contest 
Wilson’s view of ‘behaviour and social structure as “organs” – extensions of the 
genes that exist because of their superior adaptive value.’ For Wilson, genes are 
located as the source of all aspects of existence, reflecting the broader genetic 
idealism that had taken hold of Western biology – and its translation into 
cultural production – since the publication of the double helix. The anti-
sociobiologists describe Wilson as one of ‘the long parade of biological 
determinists whose work has served to buttress the institutions by exonerating 
them from responsibility for social problems’ (Allen et al. ‘Against Sociobiology’). 
In an article on biological ‘spandrels’ published in 1979, Gould and 
Lewontin contest what they see as a Panglossian trend in US evolutionary 
biology, namely, the prevailing selectionist assumption that ‘everything is made 
for the best purpose’, with the example of architectural spandrels, ‘necessary by-
products of fan vaulting’ in cathedrals (581). They criticise what they describe as 
‘an adaptationist programme that has dominated evolutionary thought in 
England and the United States during the past forty years,’ which is based on the 
faith in ‘the power of natural selection as an optimizing agent’ (581). They argue 
instead that, 
 
Organisms must be analysed as integrated wholes, with baupläne so 
constrained by phyletic heritage, pathways of development, and 
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general architecture that the constraints themselves become more 
interesting and more important in delimiting pathways of change 
than the selective force that may mediate change when it occurs. 
(581) 
 
Their general argument is that, following Darwin, a pluralistic approach to 
identifying the agents of evolutionary change should be taken. For them, 
sociobiology confuses two modes of adaptation, defined as ‘the good fit of 
organisms to their environment’: cultural adaptation, where ‘heredity is imposed 
by learning’, and Darwinian adaptation based on genetic variation; there is a 
third form, which is where epigenetic adaptation can be located: phenotypic 
plasticity, which ‘permits organisms to “mould” their form to prevailing 
circumstances during ontogeny’ (592-3). By reducing all forms of adaptation to 
the natural selection of genetic factors – cultural, phenotypic and genetic – 
sociobiology produces ‘confused thinking’ (593). 
While Lewontin and Gould are not writing on epigenetics, nonetheless 
this broader view of evolutionary change paints a much more complex picture 
than genetic reductionism and natural selection. They urge caution with 
assuming links between cause and effect, pointing out that ‘the immediate utility 
of an organic structure often says nothing at all about the reason for its being’ 
(594). The Anglo-American approach of ‘atomising organisms into parts and 
trying to explain each as a direct adaptation’ – which in sociobiology is extended 
to categorised behavioural ‘traits’ and social phenomena – is contrasted in 
continental Europe with the vitalism or ‘mysticism’ of an unknown ‘internal’ 
mechanism of evolution, but also, more convincingly for Gould and Lewontin, 
with the argument that ‘the basic body plans of organisms are so integrated and 
so replete with constraints upon adaptation […] that conventional styles of 
selective arguments can explain little of interest about them’ (594). In this view, 
it is the constraints on evolution that are the most interesting part of evolution, 
rather than the changes wrought by natural selection. Particularly, 
developmental constraints, where the processes of organ system differentiation 
and their integration into a functioning body are ‘remarkably refractory to 
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evolutionary change’ (594). This indeed was the embryologist C. H. 
Waddington’s argument when he described an ‘epigenetic landscape’, where the 
embryo can ‘choose’ certain developmental pathways after the point of 
conception.  
Lessing’s representation of biological determinism in Canopus in Argos 
resonates with the criticisms of Gould and Lewontin, showing how she perceives 
the deployment of biological justifications for socio-political norms and goals as 
closing off the mystery of human and non-human existence, as well as 
naturalising unequal social structures. Her rewriting of genetics and evolution is 
grounded in the violence produced by such deployment, in the histories left out 
or eradicated by it, and the scale of physical destruction that the age of 
reductionism has wrought on the underclasses of the colonial core nations and 
the non-European peripheries and semi-peripheries. Lessing’s target is not just 
Anglo-American biology, but in a more general sense, the instrumentalisation of 
biological theory to undertake large-scale biopolitical control, and to amass 
resources of biopower. This age of complexity raises a set of semiotic questions 
about the nature of communication and expression in biological systems. How 
does this information move through a system? What are the processes that 
determine the expression of one cluster of genes over another? These are 
questions that have become prominent in post-genomic research, but which are 
also derived from a long debate in the biological sciences: whether or not the 
hereditary material passed on from generation to generation can be modified or 
influenced by environmental stimuli, either external to the gene or external to 
the body.  
 
 
Shock Responses: Epigenetics, Culture and Lessing’s SF 
 
Lessing never uses the word ‘epigenetics’ in her space fiction, but epigenetic 
versions of biological change emerge frequently. My claim that Lessing writes 
forms of epigenetic change as a counter to genetic determinism rests on the 
contextual debate outlined above, as well as the rise in prominence of epigenetic 
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theory during the 1970s and early 1980s. Since the 1990s, ‘epigenetics’ has referred 
to the study of heritable alterations to genetic expression that do not involve 
changes in the nucleotide (DNA) sequence. Classical genetics and molecular 
biology rely on an understanding of DNA as a coding blueprint for the organism, 
fixed from the point of conception, based on a one-way flow of information from 
DNA to RNA to protein; research in epigenetics, on the other hand, has shown 
that gene expression can be influenced well past the point of conception by 
environmental factors, leading to heritable changes in future generations.  
While epigenetic research has become increasingly prominent in Anglo-
American biology since the 1990s, theory now described as ‘epigenetic’ has 
developed alongside genetics as a counter explanation for inheritance for much 
of the twentieth century. Chromosomal rearrangements were first identified by 
geneticist H. J. Muller in the 1930s in his experiments on fruit flies in T. H. 
Morgan’s Drosophila laboratory, and labelled as ‘transposable elements’ by plant 
biologist Barbara McClintock from the 1940s. Transposable elements are 
sequences of DNA that move (or ‘jump’) from one genomic site to another, which 
McClintock suggested play a regulatory role in determining which genes are 
expressed, and when (Pray 32).  
In the late 1960s, Roy Britten and Eric Davidson suggested that 
transposable elements are not only important for gene expression, ‘but also in 
generating different cell types and different biological structures, based on where 
in the genome they insert themselves’ (Pray 32). This provides a very different 
picture of the genome than the one outlined by James Watson and Francis Crick. 
As Leslie Pray puts it, ‘If every single gene was expressed in every single one of 
your cells all the time, you would be one huge undifferentiated blob of matter!’ 
(32). Studying transposable elements, or ‘junk DNA’, reveals a large degree of 
contingency with regard to what genetic material is expressed, and what is not, 
and draws a picture of the genome as responsive and plastic. To use biologist 
Evelyn Fox Keller’s formulation, the study of junk DNA allows a move from 
discussion of ‘gene action’, to thinking of the genome as a ‘responsive organ’ 
perpetually involved in all manner of interactions in and outside the body (Fox 
Keller, ‘From Gene Action’). 
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 McClintock won the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine in 1983 for 
her work on transposable elements, giving the concept of the genome as 
responsive and plastic global recognition, and going some way to destabilising 
the reductionist dogma characterised by Anglo-American biology. In her Nobel 
acceptance speech, entitled ‘The Significance of Responses of the Genome to 
Challenges’, she describes ‘the unusual responses of a genome to challenges for 
which the genome is unprepared to meet in an orderly, programmed manner’ 
(180). In most instances, these responses to various kinds of shock ‘for which the 
genome is unprepared’ were unpredictable, in contrast to shocks that a genome 
faces repeatedly and for which it is prepared, such as ‘heat shock’ responses in 
eukaryotic (multi-celled) organisms. She explains,  
 
The responses of genomes to unanticipated challenges are not so 
precisely programmed. Nevertheless, they are sensed, and the 
genome responds in a discernable but initially unforeseen manner. 
[Some of these responses] lead to new and irreversible genetic 
modifications. These latter responses, now known to occur in many 
organisms, are significant for appreciating how a genome may 
reorganise itself when faced with a difficulty for which it is 
unprepared. (180) 
 
These observations are contributing to a ‘revolutionary period’ in genetic 
research, McClintock argues, which is ‘altering our concepts of the genome: 
their organisations, mobilities, and their modes of operation’ (181). It is no 
longer useful to think of the genome as separate from the somatic activities of 
the organism, or the environment outside it, but a part of an integrative system 
of activities and responses to unanticipated changes. The genome has the 
capacity – in the form of ‘junk’ DNA – for spontaneous responses, which can 
affect the inheritance of future generations. 
 The relevance of this claim for evolutionary theory is enormous, invoking 
both biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s theory that characteristics acquired 
during an organism’s lifetime might be inherited by future generations, and 
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Charles Darwin’s interest in chance as a driving force of evolutionary change. In 
the Euro-US,2 Lamarck’s theory had been effectively censored since the late 
nineteenth century after the German biologist August Weismann claimed that 
the material carried in germ cells was totally impervious to external influences, 
thereby ruling out the idea of environmental influence. While Lamarck’s theory 
was, problematically, based on the idea of the gradual perfectibility of species, 
his notion of environmental response as an evolutionary mechanism was also 
countenanced – albeit hesitantly – by Charles Darwin. In a description of 
evolutionary change in The Voyage of the Beagle (1839), Darwin notes the 
‘strictly subterranean habits of the tucutuco’, and discusses their relation to the 
‘gradually-acquired blindness of the Aspalax, a Gnawer living under ground, and 
of the Proteus, a reptile living in dark caverns filled with water’; in both animals 
‘the eye is in an almost rudimentary state, and is covered by a tendinous 
membrane and skin’ (66-7). No doubt, he conjectures half-seriously, ‘Lamarck 
would have said that the tucutuco is now passing into the state of the Aspalax 
and Proteus’ (67). While Lamarck’s theory posited a teleology, a gradual, pre-
destined progression of species from inferior to superior states of being, for 
Darwin, adaptation comes about through trial and error for the sake of survival, 
a process involving risk and loss. 
 The cultural relevance of epigenetics is part of the transition from an age 
of reductionism to an age of emergence, which could also be characterised as 
the shift from ‘origin’ to ‘interpretation’, a key theme throughout this thesis. If 
an atomistic approach seeks to break down matter to its smallest parts in order 
to find the origin of the universe, an emergent approach would focus instead on 
the activities and interactions of matter, and the ongoing process of 
interpretation that keeps matter moving. Echoing McClintock’s description of a 
revolutionary period in genetic research, Laughlin argues, 
 
What we are seeing is a transformation of worldview in which the 
objective of understanding nature by breaking it down into smaller 
                                                 
2 I use ‘Euro-US’ as shorthand for the post-war economic alliance between Western Europe 
(principally Britain, France and Germany) and the United States. 
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parts is supplanted by the objective of understanding how nature 
organises itself. (76) 
 
While a reductionist standpoint requires that ‘physical law is the motivating 
impulse of the universe’ as an ever-present force without origin or explanation, 
the ‘emergentist’ perspective understands physical law as ‘a rule of collective 
behaviour’ (Laughlin 80). For Wendy Wheeler, this shift ‘provides us a new way 
of thinking, not only about how complex systems work, but about how, in their 
biological manifestations and beyond, they are inter-related’ (27). While genetic 
determinism is part of an atomistic era of reductionism, epigenetics is part of a 
cultural paradigm shift in thinking about life, its organisation and its processes. 
 I argue that Lessing’s space fiction registers this shift as a political 
possibility as well as an ontological one, exploring the various ways in which 
scientific knowledge is deployed for the sake of governance, and how the 
instrumentalisation of life processes is resisted, on conscious and unconscious 
levels, and across the mind-body divide. Shadia Fahim observes,  ‘the theme of 
equilibrium is the major axis on which the whole series operates,’ and that the 
solution to the various crises represented in the novels ‘is the striving to regain 
equilibrium by descent into past history’ (139). Certainly, the theme of 
maintaining equilibrium is key to the Canopean and Sirian interests, but the 
novels gain their narrative momentum – and present their radical speculations 
– through repeated moments of disequilibrium, when systems are thrown into 
shock. In these moments, new responses are made possible. To develop Fahim’s 
argument about the role of history in the novels, and to connect this to the idea 
of ‘junk DNA’, the ‘waste’ material of pasts that have been left out or repressed 
is activated into the present, disrupting the linear course towards an imagined 
future. The word ‘archives’ in the title of the series mimics the utilisation of 
imperial documentation, and the way in which information that has been 
forgotten, has fallen into disuse, or become irrelevant – the junk of empire – 
might come back into circulation as a way of interrupting the present and 
resisting a projected future. 
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 Tom Sperlinger has observed this in an essay on interruptions that 
‘rupture the patterns of everyday life’ across Lessing’s fiction (140). He argues 
that these interruptions function to ‘insist on the repeated urgency of the 
present’, and that Lessing’s work is thus ‘peculiarly attentive to the way in which 
the present continually interrupts the process of entering what was assumed to 
be the future’  (140). They throw stable patterns into states of uncertainty, 
making them vulnerable to reconfiguration. To follow McClintock, they appear 
as unforeseen shocks to systems to which the novels’ characters are required to 
adapt: a ‘failure of the Lock’ between Canopus and Rohanda in Shikasta, the 
marriage between Al Ith and Ben Ata in The Marriages Between Zones Three, 
Four and Five, the Lombis’ displacement to a foreign planet in The Sirian 
Experiments for the sake of experimentation, the ice age in The Making of the 
Representative for Planet 8, and ‘the Rhetorical Disease’ in The Sentimental 
Agents of the Volyen Empire.  
 Sperlinger suggests that these interruptions provide a lesson: ‘how one 
might teach oneself (or a child) to be resilient in the face of cultural devastation’ 
(147). These repeated interruptions imagine strategies of resistance for the sake 
of survival. This survival is not restricted to competitive strategies. Rather, it is 
comparable to Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould’s theory of evolutionary 
change as ‘punctuated equilibrium’, which they published in 1972 (making it 
contemporaneous to Canopus in Argos). They suggest that ‘the history of 
evolution is not one of stately unfolding, but a story of homeostatic equilibria, 
disturbed only “rarely” (i.e. rather often in the fullness of time) by rapid and 
episodic events of speciation’ (84). The representations of systemic change in 
Lessing’s space fiction are constructed around such events, which lead to 
adaptations that are not reducible to the biopolitical ambitions of the series’ 
imperial rulers. Rather, change occurs by chance, at intervals, and as part of a 
complex web of activity. 
 The turn from determinism to emergence allows a renewed emphasis on 
studying the material basis for human sociality. Wheeler argues that it ‘allows us 
to see more clearly the relationship between individual, culture and society’ (13). 
This is not to reduce sociality to biological programming or evolution, as in 
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sociobiology or evolutionary psychology; rather, this turn towards complexity 
and emergence along the lines of a material basis for sociality prevents the 
reduction of heredity and evolution to genetics. Wheeler writes,  
 
Not only has the inheritance of acquired characteristics been shown 
to be possible, but also such epigenetic inheritance indicates our 
inseparable lived relation to our environment, including our 
cultural environment. And if what we feel and experience is both 
biologically and psychobiologically capable of heritability, this has 
very far-reaching social, ethical and political implications. (14) 
 
Rather than a bioregional perspective that would try to integrate different facets 
of an environment into a working whole, biosemiotics allows for loss and 
negotiation as unavoidable components of any evolutionary process. Wheeler 
argues that ‘it simply makes no experiential or biological sense to talk simply 
about “individuals”, but only about the environment-organism continuum’ (107). 
It is not that individuals are not ‘real’ and do not have ‘minds’, she argues, but 
rather than ‘these minds […] are more usefully understood in terms of semiotic 
processes which necessarily and logically include the environment in which an 
organism swims – its ‘world’ or Umwelt’ (107), taking the term, Umwelt, from 
Jakob von Uexküll. In Thomas A. Sebeok’s words, Umwelt refers to ‘the biological 
foundations that lie at the very epicentre of the study of both communication 
and signification in the human [and non-human] animal’ (Sebeok x). Dorion 
Sagan argues that Uexküll’s thought allows contemporary biologists to 
‘embrac[e] the reality of purpose and perception without jumping to creationist 
conclusions’ (4).  
 More specifically, the study of animals’ perceptual worlds and their 
influence on development and evolution renders governmental ambitions of 
programming individuals, either through genetic engineering or environmental 
conditioning, as only incomplete approximations of the complexity of what 
Wheeler calls ‘the environment-organism continuum’. As Wheeler writes,  
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[T]he world is not simply out there as ‘information’ to be processed 
by our senses (the representational view of mind); our 
human/nervous/endocrine/immune system (sensorium) actively 
contributes to the world it thus calls forth. The human inner world 
(Innenwelt) is constantly in dialogue (negative and positive feedback 
in the complex systems sense) with the human natural and social 
outer world (Umwelt). (108) 
 
Wheeler’s description could also describe various forms of adaptation that occur 
throughout Lessing’s space fiction. In these novels, evolution does not occur 
through environments (political, ecological) acting on organisms; rather, Lessing 
uses the speculative genre to depict this continuum, and the ongoing responses 
to chance events that repeatedly interrupt and re-route the functionality of 
sovereign teleology. 
 
 
Biopolitics and Race in the World-System 
 
One of the prevailing themes of Lessing’s space fiction is the body as political 
object. The age of complexity offers new ways for theorising ‘the body’ with 
regard to traversing the gap between objectification and subjectivity, and in 
Canopus in Argos, this possibility appears in what I read as speculations on 
decolonisation (notably, Southern Rhodesia’s transition to Zimbabwe occurs 
alongside Canopus in Argos’s publication). Many of the claims I make about 
Lessing’s writing of genetics in her space fiction are based on a materialist history 
of the political and economic instrumentalisation of life processes under 
imperialism that extends across categorical divisions of social and biological 
existence. While the bio-anthropological construction ‘race’ has not had 
currency in genetics since the 1960s, the contemporary world-system still 
requires racialising techniques to maintain governance over global resource 
extraction and wealth distribution. Up until the early twentieth century, this 
inequality has depended on a genealogy of ‘white’ property, whether economic 
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or genetic. Rather than isolate Nazi eugenics as a culmination or an end-point, 
Lessing’s space fiction reconstructs a social history of ‘whiteness’, staging the 
biological justification for the perpetual and unapologetic sacrifice of certain 
bodies in favour of others. It is this eugenic social order that sets the terms for 
the freedom of a liberal subject.  
Clare Hanson and Susan Watkins have noted Lessing’s apparent 
ambivalence in the representation of Canopean colonial protagonists, 
particularly Klorathy and Johor. While the Sirian Empire is unambiguously 
utilitarian in a negative key, they note the suspicious quality of Canopean 
‘benevolence’. Susan Watkins argues that ‘the need for the individual to exist in 
harmony with Canopean purpose does […] turn Canopus into a benevolent 
colonial dictatorship’ (86). Describing the ‘eugenic fantasy’ at the end of Lessing’s 
The Four Gated City, Hanson argues that the Canopus in Argos series continues 
this theme. Shikasta, she writes, is ‘rooted in the framework of the Modern 
Synthesis of evolution and genetics’ (86). Following Hanson, I read the Modern 
Synthesis as the theoretical framework through which Canopean biopolitical 
policy is constructed, and compare the Canopean agent Johor to one of its three 
inventors: Haldane. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Haldane, Ronald A. Fisher 
and Sewell Wright developed a new version of genetics which combined 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection with Gregor Mendel’s laws of heredity, to 
produce a qualitative theory accounting for small-scale, continuous variation: 
the Modern Synthesis. Crucially, the Modern Synthesis looked at variation at the 
level of population, rather than between individuals. For Darwinians, small-scale 
variation was the primary source of evolutionary change in populations. The new 
approach measured the intensity and incidents of natural selection in terms of 
evolutionary change in species, as well as the rate at which this change occurred. 
I place Watkins’ and Hanson’s readings together, arguing that Canopean 
biopolitical governance is grounded in the eugenic ambitions of socialist 
utopians, and a reductionist genetic epistemology where adaptation only occurs 
through mutation. 
Science historian Sujit Sivasundaram outlines three examples of synergy 
between race and empire that ‘suggest that the study of the human body was 
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vital to European expansion from the very start’: first, the ‘identification of racial 
and national types’ which provided a framework to uphold empire both ‘at home’ 
in Europe, and ‘abroad, amongst those who found themselves governing the 
colonies’ (115). Race functions as an apparatus of imperial governance alongside 
the invention of the nation-state as a differentiation of core and periphery 
territories under colonialism. Second, by offering the possible enabling of 
societal improvement and thereby justifying colonial rule by ‘supposedly 
superior’ colonial agents, ‘biology neutralised the question of whether empire 
was moral’ (115). How could it not be morally correct to habilitate colonised 
subjects into European living, with regard to reproductive choices and healthcare 
as much as religion and morality? Third, ‘empire provided the raw materials for 
science and helped to define the stereotypes’ (115). Bio-anthropological 
expeditions were sites of experimentation and resource extraction, as well as 
knowledge formation. ‘Raw materials’ in this history were constituted by 
scientific observations and accounts of colonised people, and became the 
biological matter for study: skeletons, organs, and reproductive bodies.  
 Sivasundaram’s overview of these three synergies between race and 
empire – race-nation typology, morality and materiality – provides a point of 
entrance in the representation of biological science in Lessing’s space fiction. By 
drawing in biological and genetic discourses into the narratives as tools of 
governmentality, Lessing reconstructs a capitalist (inter)world-system of 
combined and uneven development in her space fiction. In this universe, the 
Canopean Empire stands in for European colonialism, the Sirian Empire as the 
Soviet challenge, and Shammat as the externalised underbelly to capitalist 
modernity. In this system, biological life is purely instrumental for imperial 
acquisition; welfare programmes and humanitarian intervention are deployed as 
supplements to the annihilating sovereign power of the interplanetary 
administration, designed to protect investments or possible future sources of 
colonial biopower.  
The WReC Group repudiate ‘various recent attempts to pluralise the 
concept of modernity through the evocation of “alternative” modernities’, 
centring Harry Harootunian’s argument that capitalist modernity is 
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characterised by ‘the production of permanent unevenness, permanent 
imbalance between various sectors of the social formations, the process by which 
some areas must be sacrificed for the development of others’ (iv). The WReC 
group emphasise both the singularity and the global simultaneity of capitalist 
modernity, conceiving modernity as ‘the way in which capitalism is “lived”’, in 
‘systemic thinking in non-linear conjunctions’ (14-15). Rather than positing 
‘alternative modernities’ that develop differently and examining different points 
of origin for contemporary global configurations of knowledge and power, 
analysis can begin with the interpretative dynamics through which capitalist 
modernity is spread throughout the world. While the comparativist claim that 
‘different starting points of the transition to modernity lead to different 
outcomes’ is unquestionable (Gaonkar 1), I understand world-systems analysis as 
primarily an argument about interpretation, following the rhetoric of 
developmentalism in order to expose its speculative teleology as a myth that 
helps sustain underdevelopment.3   
This argument grounds my claim that Canopus in Argos is a speculative 
exploration of a competitive global eugenic order imposed through capitalist 
modernity, refracted in Soviet biology in Stalinist Russia under an opposing 
ideological regime, and represented in the competition between Canopus and 
Sirius in forced growth and accelerated evolution. This eugenic social order binds 
the project of human improvement to an economy of human value, and therefore 
– necessarily – of disposability. When, for example, sociologist Lisa Marie Cacho 
speaks of social death as the alternative to social value, she is referring to a system 
of investments in ‘whiteness’ as a human value, which exceeds the biological 
boundaries of genetic inheritance while still adhering to a mythological 
construction of the neutral subject as genetically ‘white’: ‘the institutionalisation 
of white privilege institutes “inalienable rights” as a property of whiteness and 
personhood’ (24). For Cacho, white privilege is not simply constituted by isolated 
                                                 
3 I use the following definition of developmentalism: ‘An economic policy concerned with 
improving the economy, and thus national autonomy, of an underdeveloped country by fostering 
the development of dynamic internal markets through such means as imposing high tariffs on 
imported goods.’ (OED) 
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acts of racism; if ‘human value is made intelligible through racialised, sexualised, 
spatialised, and state-sanctioned violence,’ then these calculations of social value 
make it ‘all but impossible for people assigned to certain status categories to 
represent themselves as moral and deserving’ (4). Social value is, then, 
profoundly eugenic, and this social determination of ‘good’ (eu-) ‘origins’ (-gene) 
is laced into reducing human existence to the biological.  
The narratives of the colonial agents in the novels – Johor, Klorathy and 
Ambien II – are characterised by a prevailing anxiety around imperial eugenics 
as a means of expansion and improvement. These investments in racial 
superiority prevent solidarity and the articulation of a common pluralism, not 
bound to the typological performance of ‘multiculturalism’ – which takes place 
in a key of national tolerance, rather than internationalism. As philosophers of 
race such as Cacho and Noel Ignatiev argue, ‘whiteness’ is not a static good 
reducible to genetics, but is a malleable signifier of biological superiority 
depending on the socio-political context. Materiality in the novels appears as the 
possibility of resistance. When imperial initiatives fail, it is not because there is 
a sustained ideological resistance from grass roots groups, but because colonised 
subjects recuperate extracted material, and through this recuperation, realise the 
possibility of their emancipation. 
 
 
 
 
Overview of Chapters 
 
In Chapter One, I relate the depiction of eugenic thinking in Memoirs of a 
Survivor (1974) and Shikasta (1979) to the history of the British Eugenics 
movement. In Memoirs, this comes through the depiction of post-colonial race 
relations in a disintegrating metropolitan core (which I read as a version of 
London in the mid-1970s), and in Shikasta, through the description of Canopean 
eugenic experiments on Rohanda/Shikasta on colonised populations. Reading 
Memoirs as a precursor to Canopus in Argos, I argue that the project of racial 
 19 
hierarchy – which manifests as the constitution of Emily as white, Anglican 
female leader and the consequent exclusion of the Irish-Polish Catholic June 
Ryan – gives way to one of liberal multiculturalism and ‘genetic usefulness’ in 
Shikasta. I relate this second project to a shift in Euro-US scientific racism from 
the mid-1950s onwards from describing ‘racial’ goods to ‘genetic’ goods, with the 
fundamental racialising logic left intact. The ideology of racial hierarchy is more 
covert, but there are various indications in the text that the Canopean 
determination of ‘genetic usefulness’ is based on a racialising logic, dependent 
either on miscegenation or endogamous reproductive orders. Ending with the 
trial of the white race, Shikasta lays out the biopolitical framework for the series’ 
depiction of imperial governance. 
In Chapter Two, I read The Sirian Experiments as a critique of Soviet 
biology, and, more broadly, as an exploration of competitive Big Science 
programmes between the US and the Soviet Union after World War II. The Sirian 
adaptability experiments on humans mimic Soviet biologist Trofim Lysenko’s 
agricultural experiments in which plants were environmentally conditioned to 
grow and flourish in particular climates. I introduce the principle critical vehicle 
of the thesis – what I call ‘epigenetic poeisis’ – as a literary term for the 
description of change extending across different levels of experience, as a result 
of chance events. I then explore the theme of biosocial4 ambivalence in the 
description of world cities in The Sirian Experiments, where the urban proletariat 
and subproletariat live in a present continuous state of responsivity to daily 
challenges and temporary negotiations; I argue that this condition, the effect of 
uneven social spheres, is a form of living by chance that is analogous (and even 
productive of) epigenetic poiesis, where bodies are required to constantly adapt 
to changed circumstances, and where living conditions might be passed on as 
heritable states of being.    
                                                 
4 I distinguish my use of biosocial and biosociality from biosocial theory (the study of 
psychological disorders as biologically-determined traits), extending Paul Rabinow’s concept of 
it as the formation of new identities from genetic or biological conditions, to social relations 
produced through the necessity to keep metabolic systems going.  
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In Chapter Three, I explore how epigenetic ideas about complexity and 
emergence are allied to queer modes of sociality, denaturalising 
heternormativity (and its attendant mythology of genetic inheritance as 
patriarchal genealogy) as the founding relationship of social life. The novels 
explore non-reproductive relationships and their effects on evolutionary change. 
Homosexuality is not constructed as a binary alternative to heterosexuality; 
rather, as I argue in my reading of Marriages, a queer sociality develops as a 
departure from what Michael Warner calls a ‘reprosexual’ social order. Writing 
on sf and queer theory, Wendy Pearson asks, ‘whether or not sf has traditionally 
been better at imagining machines and their conjunctions than it has been at 
imagining bodies and their possible relationships,’ or whether many sf stories in 
fact ‘take for granted the continued prevalence of heteronormative institutional 
practices – dating, marriage, the nuclear family and so on’ (150). One of my 
central claims is that Lessing represents the regulation of the body through 
biopolitical technological governance, while exploring ‘human sociality in all its 
complexity’ (Pearson 150) – including biological complexity – as always already 
resisting the capture of bodily processes by governing structures.  
Chapter Four continues the speculation on sites and modes of resistance 
to imperial scientific governance in the novels, this time at a collective level, with 
regard to the constitution of life itself as a soci0-political category. Reading The 
Making of the Representative for Planet 8 (1982), I argue that the Canopean 
invention of a race as a labour force and biological surplus by engineering and 
combining different genetic ‘stocks’, using a planet as a laboratory, can be read 
as an analogy for post-war neo-imperial governance of decolonised African 
nations through agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, and their temporary abandonment in the early 1970s, leading to 
what has been called the ‘African Tragedy’. A relation of transnational 
dependence between Europe, the US and former colonial territories could not 
withstand the Nixon Shock, and peripheral nations found their export goods 
decreasing dramatically in value, and themselves unable to participate in 
international trade. I read this economic crisis transformed into the 
unforeseeable shock of a sudden climate change – an ice age. In the novel, this 
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crisis presents an opportunity for biosocial adaptation away from imperial 
interests, a possibility that would not be afforded in the realist genre. By 
recuperating this (genetic) material at a time of meteorological crisis, the Planet 
8ers explore the possibility of their emancipation. I read this as Lessing’s 
intervention in the decolonial writing of the period that examines the magnitude 
of the task of mounting a sustained resistance to colonisation, in undoing the co-
option and extraction of colonised materiality, the invention of racialised 
populations, and the epistemological inheritance of imperial science.  
In Chapter Five, I read The Sentimental Agents of the Volyen Empire (1983) 
as a narrative of interruptions that lead to disequilibrium, following Sperlinger. 
Suspending the epigenetic argument, I focus on how Lessing’s use of form stages 
repeated scenes of disruption, destabilising the Canopean typological 
arrangement of life itself. Sentimental Agents develops a critique of 
multiculturalism, and suggests the political potential in contaminated and 
intoxicated states of being. As Elizabeth Maslen argues, the space fiction novels 
show the generational decline of Canopean sovereignty (56). In Canopus, she 
argues, ‘all powers are part of a dynamic process’ (56); Canopean sovereignty is 
not shown to be absolute and eternal, despite its colonial agents’ best intentions 
and imperial orders. While The Sirian Experiments shows the unravelling of 
Ambien II’s belief in Sirian ideology, Sentimental Agents (a speculative spy novel) 
depicts the interruption and undermining of Canopean ideology not through 
pitching an alternative ideology, but through the surfacing and transmission of 
a repressed memory of imperial violence. While the Canopean agent Klorathy 
seeks to arrest the spread of resistance, the series ends with his subordinate’s 
relapse into the ‘Rhetorical Disease’, questioning the role and history of 
Canopean imperialism. By ending the series in the present continuous, refusing 
an emancipatory resolution for the subjugate populations under Canopean rule, 
the novels emphasise that the work of decolonisation occurs at different entry-
points and in often incompatible time-frames, through long-term efforts and in 
taking chances when they arise.   
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Science and Social Change: Lessing’s SF Turn 
 
Lessing’s innovation in the Canopus novels is to deploy biological science to 
explore the construction, limits and peripheries of capitalist sociality, not to 
make predictions about the future of genetic engineering, transhumanism or 
even quantum physics, in the manner of Arthur C. Clarke or Isaac Asimov. David 
Waterman notes Lessing’s investigation of science ‘as used to support the war 
machine, justify colonial expansion and establish authority, all under the control 
of a special elite class of technocrats’ (cited in Watkins 89). Criticism on the 
novels acknowledges the innovative way in which Lessing redraws the limits of 
sociality and subjectivity outside the ‘natural order’ of capitalist modernity. Her 
space fiction retains a commitment to radical critique and social change, while 
registering a shift in how such change might come about. As Lorna M. Peterson 
notes, ‘her greatest fiction has always allowed for change, dramatic change, and 
certainly she has been undaunted by the necessity of changing her own opinions’ 
(155). An engagement with Marxist thought never departs the substance of her 
literary speculations, but Marxism increasingly functions as a political intertext, 
rather than an ideological alternative: Lessing does not pave the way to utopia, 
and manifestations of ideal socialist societies in the Canopus novels 
(Adalantaland, Lelanos, Zone Three) either meet rough ends, or fall into neo-
fascist endogamy through stasis and protectionist social organisation. By her 
own admission, sf offers her space to explore modes of being, perspectives of 
power and constructions of time, the body and materiality not available to her 
in realism.  
Offering ‘something in the way of clarification’ for her sf in the preface to 
The Sirian Experiments (after overwhelmingly negative reviews of the first two 
Canopus novels), Lessing makes it clear that her explorations in sf are both 
ontological and political, writing, ‘our current view of ourselves as a species is 
wrong […] We know very little about what is going on’ (SE 9). Her invented 
cosmology is a means of exploring ontological and socio-political alienation as a 
foundation for existence; the extraterrestrial locations and alien species suggest 
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the indeterminacy and unknowability of what we call ‘human’ existence, despite 
attempts to reduce life itself to an origin. 
On this note, Lessing’s space fiction appears after two decades of radical 
theoretical discussion around the body as political object under modernity, 
particularly in French theory. Some canonical texts relevant for the novels’ 
representations of gender, race, anti-colonial politics and sexuality would be R. 
D. Laing’s The Divided Self (1955), Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth 
(1961), Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology (1967), Hélène Cixous’s ‘The Laugh of 
the Medusa’ (1976), Foucault’s History of Sexuality, Vol. I (1976) and Society Must 
Be Defended (1978), and Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978). Jenny Diski gives a 
flavour of this context in her memoir of her time living with Lessing in the early 
1960s, where she remembers trying to keep up with the ‘table-talk’ of Lessing’s 
wide and varied social circle: 
 
Freud, Marx, Foucault, Canetti, Martin D’Arcy, Derrida, the anti-
psychiatrists, even the behaviourism of Desmond Morris and Konrad 
Lorenz were to different extents the background to the chat for some, 
while others, Doris among them, relied on a belief in their own grasp 
of the effects of heart and mind on individual or crowd behaviour. (22) 
 
While Lessing may, according to Diski, have relied on her own grasp of matters 
over that of others, her work from this time is nonetheless marked by radical 
conceptualisations of experience, governance, and power explored by her 
contemporaries. Specifically, her concerns around the human body as political 
object under modernity concern reproductive labour and its implications for 
sexuality, the racialised division of labour under neo-imperial industrial 
capitalism (which intersects both ‘race’ and ‘class’) and its implications for post-
colonial governmentality, and the creation of surplus value out of extractive 
technologies, including the biopower of colonised or subjugate populations. Her 
space fiction is produced alongside the development of critical and cultural 
theory as a radical and explicitly political field of study in Europe and the US, 
particularly after 1968, and bears this legacy in many of its thematic concerns. 
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Lessing’s turn from realism to sf does not announce itself with Memoirs 
of a Survivor (1974), but begins more surreptitiously, towards the end of the fifth 
novel of her Children of Violence series, The Four-Gated City (1965), through the 
novel’s explorations of both the social organisation of madness and the 
experience of shared psychosis. Like Memoirs, the novel’s speculative section is 
characterised not by a turn to extraterrestrial space, but to psychic space, leading 
to descriptions of a dystopian future. The narrative gradually shifts from centring 
Martha’s relationship with Mark Coldridge, ‘capitalist, member of an old upper-
class family, and an intellectual,’ to his wife, Lynda Coldridge, the madwoman in 
the basement, ‘nothing-but Cassandra,’ who sees things as they are, if through a 
glass, darkly (216, 236). It is Lynda with whom Martha is able to speak openly, 
while Dr Lamb, the rational psychiatrist, gives those with whom he comes into 
contact the ‘tremor’ of ‘the slave’s silent withdrawal behind defences’ (333). The 
honesty demanded in the psychiatrist’s consulting room is compared 
unfavourably with the openness made possible by Lynda and Martha’s shared 
experience of madness and breakdown; while there are many things that remain 
unsaid between Lynda and Martha, they are increasingly able to operate on the 
same horizon, and it is here that the possibility of change is registered.  
The depiction of this experience of madness echoes Laing’s speculation 
that ‘the cracked mind of the schizophrenic may let in light which does not enter 
the intact minds of many sane people whose minds are closed’ (27). Andy 
Hamilton argues that, similarly to Foucault, Laing understands psychotic 
delusion as ‘expressing a genuine, deviant vision; the deviant subject does not 
speak gibberish, but uses a linguistic code which non-deviants have not grasped, 
and has an alternative rationality’ (229). This is a theme returned to in Shikasta 
and Sentimental Agents, which I explore in Chapter Five alongside the anti-
psychiatry movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Diski relates that for Lessing and 
some of her social group in the early 1960s, 
 
[A]t that time, of all the ways of seeing in the world, understanding 
unconscious psychological motivation was everything, told you 
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everything, i.e. the truth, while surfaces, behaviour, the overt story 
were so much gaudy wrapping – false reasoning, self-deceit. (22) 
 
In Canopus, space travel functions as a metaphor both for journeys into ‘inner 
space’, as well as the freedom of movement afforded to colonial agents of the 
imperial core. Lessing’s turn to sf registers a shift from structural transformation 
in the public sphere to the internal change required to undo the epistemological 
violence of capitalist modernity. Marion Vlastos argues that Lessing’s writing up 
to and including the first four novels of the Children of Violence series is ‘marked 
with the stamp of historical determinism,’ populated by characters – Martha 
Quest included – committed to a certain kind of public political action for 
systemic change (245). Vlastos notes the resonance in Lessing’s earlier fiction of 
George Orwell’s position (outlined in his essay on Charles Dickens) that social 
transformation could come only from structural change, and that ‘the Marxist 
solution seemed the most basic approach to the problem of injustice’ (245). 
However, Vlastos also reads ‘a gradual movement away from Orwell’s position to 
a new kind of belief in the possibility of affecting the inner man’ in the trajectory 
of Lessing’s writing (245). Vlastos attributes Martha’s sense of ‘political 
hopelessness’ in The Four-Gated City to a loss of faith in public demonstrations 
of collective resistance: ‘Despite the new fashion of protest, the world of the 
sixties is even more fiercely and efficiently headed toward self-destruction than 
the more repressive earlier decade’ (248).  
This self-destruction derives in part from the seeming inevitability of 
fractures between various social movements of the period, and a need to 
recognise complicity in oppressive global regimes. There is a particular 
possibility afforded in sf that Lessing, the daughter of white settler parents in 
Southern Rhodesia, does not risk so easily in realism: the consideration of anti-
colonial politics from the perspective of black Africans. Anthony Chennells notes 
the ‘near-total silence’ of black Africans in Lessing’s writing, problematic for her 
credentials as a postcolonial writer (‘Postcolonialism’ 4). This is a subject 
position that earlier novels self-consciously fail to access, notably The Grass is 
Singing (1950), and indeed this failure is part of their narrative technique. As 
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Chennells notes, ‘The Grass is Singing was felt to be so objectionable by the 
settlers because, despite Moses’s silence, his actions show that he has written 
himself as the subject of an alternative discourse’ (‘Lessing’s Rhodesian Stories’ 
19). He notes that in most of her Rhodesian stories, ‘the dominant discourse 
within which the narrative appears to operate is that of a colonial bourgeoisie’ 
(‘Lessing’s Rhodesian Stories’ 31).  
I take Chennells’ description of Moses writing himself as ‘the subject of an 
alternative discourse’ as the starting point of my reading of Planet 8: the writing 
of an alternative discourse by colonised peoples. This is not to suggest an 
alternative modernity in terms of origin, but as an interpretation and resistance 
to a dominant narrative. By abstracting the mechanisms of imperialism into non-
realist settings, Lessing takes an opportunity to work through some of the 
problems encountered by African nationalist movements; namely, the repeated 
conflict between national liberation, the colonial inheritance of the new regimes 
(classifications of class, caste and gender), and the world-system of transnational 
finance capitalism that a new category of under-developed nations was obliged 
to enter, while always excluded from full participation. Read in this way, the first 
three novels build up to the narrative of collective self-determination in Planet 
8, and the fifth falls away to stage again the difficulty of breaking through 
imperial amnesia into sustained decolonisation movements.  
If, for Lessing, ‘the only hope for securing our future lies in the individual’s 
journey “back and in” to his self’ (Vlastos 257), then in Canopus, this ‘self’ is 
restricted neither to the individual nor to the mind, but is constructed beyond 
implicitly Cartesian parameters of ‘organism’ and ‘environment’. Noting the 
increasing interest in ‘biology as the “hard science” frontier of the future, Joan 
Slonczewski and Michael Levy argue that in contemporary sf, ‘the quest for outer 
space has given way to the quest for the genome’; the possibility of change in 
psychic ‘inner space’ is threatened by physiological ‘enemies within’ – ‘cancer, 
AIDS, and bio-weapons – as well as the accidental results of genetic engineering, 
and our own lifestyle destroying our biosphere’ (174). These new adversaries 
complicate an anthropocentric ethical framework based on self-other relations, 
urging instead an actor-network vision of actants constantly interrupting and 
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interrupted by each other at various sites of intersection. This field of conflict is 
not restricted to the enemy-friend distinction offered by Carl Schmitt in his 
concept of the political (26), but involves temporary alliances and chance 
responses at the level of molecular life.  
Preceded by Aldous Huxley and H. G. Wells, Lessing is a forerunner to the 
current fascination in and out of sf with speculative genomic futures, and with 
how post-genomic research is changing the epistemological constitution of the 
human subject. These speculative futures are as much the terrain of the 
biotechnology industry as they are subjects of fiction. Lessing’s connection with 
the British Eugenics movement through fellow sf-ist Naomi Mitchison, sister of 
Haldane, places her historically within a debate about the utopian possibilities 
for genetic engineering and scientific pessimism around it as yet another 
technology available for power abuses. Slonczewski and Levy identify five themes 
that consistently appear in the representation of biology in sf: intelligence and 
the brain, mutation and evolution, genetic engineering, sexuality and 
reproduction, and environment and the biosphere (175). To different degrees, 
Lessing engages with these themes in Canopus in Argos, intervening in the idea 
of ‘mutation [as] the ultimate mode of biological change’ (a theory of the Modern 
Synthesis) and portraying, instead, what I read as epigenetic change. Through 
this, she explores ‘the hope of a form of evolution that will leave behind what a 
future speaker [in Shikasta] sees as “always murdering and destroying”’ (Maslen 
46). This is an intervention in common sense understandings of life itself, 
unmooring evolutionary theory from its co-option by capitalist imperialism and 
suggesting alternative kinds of change. 
I analyse epigenetics in Lessing’s space fiction in two ways: first, as an 
epistemological alternative to genetic reductionism, and second, as an analogy 
for considering the roles of chance and creativity in life itself. There is currently 
little scholarship on epigenetics in literature, partly due to the fact that 
epigenetics has arrived only recently into popular media (although as I have 
argued, ideas associated with it have been around for a long time). As Claire 
Sprague argues, ‘the series as a whole does mark a radical and provocative 
departure from the simpler chronological novel of development with a single 
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protagonist familiar in the Martha Quest novels and in male-centred English 
examples’, and this innovation ‘loosen[s] the patterns of interrelationship in the 
novels as to have created something new’ (213). This idea of ‘loosening 
interrelationships’ (in order to speculate on alternative ones) is prominent in 
Hanson’s analysis of epigenetics, plasticity and identity in Jackie Kay’s Red Dust 
Road. Hanson’s approach shares a philosophical grounding with my arguments 
about Lessing’s space fiction, with regard to what she calls ‘the plasticity and 
mutability of being’ and ‘the inter-connectedness of biological systems and the 
complex interdependencies of organisms and environments’ (433). Crucially, 
Hanson connects this to a discussion about the complicity of genetic 
reductionism in the construction of ‘race’ as bio-cultural identity. It is my hope 
that this thesis will contribute both a theoretical and historically materialist 
account of biology in literature which, in the broadest sense, considers how 
scientific discourses of being shape experience (human and non-human), but 
also how the interdependency of organism and environment repeatedly 
interrupts supposedly stable systems, enabling the ongoing interpretation and 
adaptation of established conventions. 
As a final introductory remark, it is important to emphasise that what I 
identify as forms of epigenetic change in the novels are not presented uncritically 
as a quasi-socialist argument about complexity, opposed to quasi-capitalist 
reductionism. As I argue in my reading of forced conditioning in The Sirian 
Experiments, a biological theory of heritable environmental responses is also 
vulnerable to reductionism and political instrumentalism. Rather, epigenetic 
modes of change and adaptation emerge to interrupt the totalising regulation of 
life itself under the epistemological and material control systems of capitalist 
modernity. In the broadest figurative sense, I read this emergence as the waste 
materials of empire – fragments of a lost archive – disrupting the teleological 
drive of imperial sovereignty. Darko Suvin argues that the stretching and 
compression of temporality made possible in sf means that ‘[sf] can deal with the 
present and past as special cases of a possible historical sequence seen from an 
estranged point of view – since any empirical historical point or flow can be 
thought of as one realisation among practically innumerable possibilities’ (20). 
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In the context of Lessing’s space fiction, this is as much a material description as 
a metaphysical one: both as the ‘innumerable possibilities’ of the responsive 
genome, working back and forth across disused archives of junk DNA, and those 
of ‘cognitively plausible futures and their spatial equivalents’ (Suvin 20). 
1 
 
BRITISH EUGENICS, RACIAL HIERARCHY AND GENETIC 
USEFULNESS IN MEMOIRS OF A SURVIVOR AND SHIKASTA 
 
In this chapter, I read Memoirs of a Survivor (1974) and Shikasta (1979) in the 
context of the development of eugenicist thinking in Britain, first as a Victorian 
project constructing whiteness in opposition to the ‘non-whiteness’ of colonised 
and working class groups, with its attendant assumptions about a founding 
hierarchy of human ‘types’, and second, as a legacy of post-World War Two social 
policy, which continued a Eurocentric hierarchy of race in post-war international 
finance and production systems through the related vocabularies of liberal 
multiculturalism and developmentalism. Memoirs and Shikasta demonstrate a 
specifically British project of whiteness in the development of eugenic thought. 
In Memoirs, Lessing stages the reconstitution of whiteness in the imperial centre 
at a moment of socio-economic collapse, and in Shikasta, she puts whiteness on 
trial. Eugenic thinking emerges in the novels first, through the (re)constitution 
of whiteness at the top of a racial hierarchy in Memoirs of a Survivor, and second, 
as eugenic measures in Shikasta that echo the utopian socialist ambitions of 
interwar British eugenicists such as J. B. S. Haldane, Ronald Fisher and Julian 
Huxley. In the speculative mode, Lessing mingles different historical moments 
in order to create a general atmosphere of long-wave historical oppression, under 
the governing logic of ‘race’.  
As defined by Francis Galton, eugenics is grounded in racialising ideology, 
as ‘the study of the agencies under social control that may improve or impair the 
racial qualities of future generations either physically or mentally’ (‘Eugenics, its 
definition, scope and aims’ 43). ‘Race’ did not disappear from social organisation 
after World War II; what developed instead was an ethos of liberal 
multiculturalism in which cultures are differentiated through racial origin, 
mapped into a general typology of social groups. Reading Lessing’s literary 
treatment of ‘racial hierarchy’ and ‘genetic usefulness’ in her space fiction 
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alongside the historical development of British Eugenics, particularly the 
interwar eugenicists, her Canopean characters can be read as resurrections of 
utopian socialists such as Haldane and Julian Huxley. Huxley coined the word 
transhumanism in a lecture given in 1951, secularising the idea of spiritual 
transcendence, and describing it as ‘the idea of humanity attempting to 
overcome its limitations and to arrive at fuller fruition’ (‘Knowledge’ 139). In the 
speculative mode, the Canopus novels imagine the theoretical ambitions of these 
transhumanist thinkers around the perfectibility of humanity in practice. 
Lessing’s representations of imperial eugenics in Canopus undo the binary 
opposition of this debate to consider the broader implications of biology 
deployed as a disciplinary technique in an uneven world-system, already bound 
to the legislated ideal of a liberal subject, and therefore premised on the 
exclusion of others. 
The narratives stage alternative histories in which certain eugenic 
ambitions play out in practice, examining the possible scale of cost of such 
practices. Read alongside this history, the novels represent the context of race 
relations in the 1970s, both in the former imperial centre and in post-colonial 
and decolonising nation-states. These novels foreground the ongoing narratives 
of racialisation, eugenics and imperialism throughout the Canopus in Argos 
series, and introduce the deployment of genetics as a language of sovereign 
intervention. By arranging this history in speculative fiction, rather than in a 
realist mode (as in, for example, in The Good Terrorist (1985)), Lessing enters a 
longer tradition of scientific pessimism around eugenics in British sf, 
characterised not least by Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), countering 
some of the speculative claims of the interwar transhumanists about the 
possibilities for socio-genetic engineering afforded by eugenics.  
 
Eugenic Governmentality: Whiteness and Multiculturalism 
 
Throughout Canopus in Argos, eugenic initiatives appear as failing policies of the 
dominant imperial powers, Canopus and Sirius. These failures bring to crisis the 
reduction of life itself into a set of identifiable characteristics based on observable 
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criteria. In The Taming of Chance (1990), Ian Hacking describes this reduction in 
the context of the emergence of the statistical imagination during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries and the ‘counting’ of human behaviour: ‘Data about 
averages and dispersions engendered the idea of normal people, and led to new 
kinds of social engineering, new ways to modify undesirable classes’ (9-10). 
Biological and behavioural surveillance become the tools of a disciplinary 
society, to follow Michel Foucault. Moreover, the need for discipline creates 
these disciplinary boundaries between realms of experience. Certain phenomena 
are translated into discrete units of observed characteristics as the coordinates 
for social organisation, obscuring socio-political change not determined from the 
top down, and not accounting for biological events that appear as non-genetic 
inherited changes.  
There are two projects of whiteness in Memoirs and Shikasta: first, the 
project of racial hierarchy in the early phase of the British Eugenics movement, 
and multiculturalism as ‘genetic usefulness’ in the later phase. By negating the 
constituted political difference between them as a false opposition (the post-
Windrush institutional ‘forgetting’ of racial hierarchies in the name of 
meritocracy), the texts stage a critique of the general project to racialise life itself 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, allied to the categorisation of species 
in European biology from the sixteenth century. In Lessing’s novels, there is no 
culmination of violence in this project, but rather ongoing brutalisation, 
dehumanisation and extermination in support of maintaining a racial hierarchy. 
Historically, this project has determined decisions about the capacities and 
behaviours of differentiated living populations (human and non-human). It 
facilitates the co-option of genetics into eugenics in the late nineteenth century 
to mount a scientific justification for imperial subjugation of ‘non-whites’, in 
defence of racial hierarchy: certain genetic ‘types’ are considered to be fitter than 
others with regard to their hereditary germ-cell material (with regard to criteria 
of intelligence, physicality and so on), and certain populations are naturally 
predisposed to certain kinds of labour.  
I understand ‘whiteness’ not as a biological category, but as signifying a 
social position, following Noel Ignatiev’s definition:  
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Whiteness has nothing to do with culture and everything to do with 
social position. It is nothing but a reflection of privilege, and exists 
for no other reason than to defend it. Without the privileges attached 
to it, the white race would not exist, and the white skin would have 
no more social significance than big feet. (‘The Point of Whiteness’) 
 
For Ignatiev, whiteness refers to a set of conventions, rather than signifying 
something ‘natural’. This is similar to Paul Gilroy’s project ‘to introduce a more 
sophisticated theory of culture into the political analysis of “race” and racism in 
Britain by claiming the term back from ethnicity [as] a calculated challenge to 
the absolutist definitions of “race” and ethnicity’ (4). In order to understand 
racism, it is important – for both Gilroy and Ignatiev – to capture ‘race’ as a 
governing fiction, rather than any kind of essentialist cultural and/or biological 
truth. Gilroy argues that in the British context, racial borders and national 
frontiers are inextricable; British national history must be read alongside ‘the 
racist logic [that] has pinpointed obstacles to genuine belonging in the culture 
and identity of the alien interlopers’ (46).  
I read Memoirs and Shikasta as interventions in a conflict around race 
relations in Britain after post-war migration from former colonial territories, 
particularly India, African nations, the Caribbean, and the Republic of Ireland. 
While Memoirs demonstrates the challenge of escaping the social reproduction 
of whiteness, Shikasta explores the ideology of interwar utopian 
transhumanism, which implicitly adhered to a racialised economy of ‘good’ 
genes. In different ways, these novels reconstruct how whiteness functions in 
the broader field of biopolitical power wielded in the name of nation and 
empire. Through this, these novels challenge the typological construction of life 
itself into differentiated and unequal socio-political units through racialising 
practices. By confronting whiteness as a social position, rather than a narrow 
demarcation of ethnicity, Memoirs probes the discursive limits of a liberal 
subject legislated on the exclusion of others. The intersection of race and social 
organisation went through different phases in Britain during the nineteenth and 
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twentieth centuries, in synchrony with the requirements of labour for industrial 
production, resource extraction and exchange out of colonised territories, 
settler domestic policies of land demarcation and apartheid, and post-war 
migration to the imperial centre from former colonised territories, oscillating 
between a taxonomic grid of assigned places (racial hierarchy) to a more porous 
scale of economic position (multiculturalism). In both instances, ‘whiteness’ 
remains a stable category of sovereign power. 
The second project of whiteness redirects the focus from racial superiority 
to multiculturalism, which appears in Shikasta under the euphemism of ‘genetic 
usefulness’, while continuing to centre whiteness as the neutral, privileged 
category of existence. Both projects are a way of establishing a natural 
(biological) order out of social conventions. This culminates in a mock trial at 
the end of Shikasta in which these two projects take the position of defendant 
(racial hierarchy) and prosecutor (genetic usefulness). Memoirs and Shikasta do 
not present multiculturalism as a post-colonial remedy to imperial racism, but 
as a continuation of it.  
Multiculturalism depends on the transition of phenotypic racism to what 
Tariq Modood calls ‘cultural racism’: in Steve Garner’s words, the idea that 
‘people’s cultures are read as determining levels of civilisation, intelligence, and 
ways of doing things’ (Garner 447). Judith Butler argues, ‘Multiculturalism tends 
to presuppose already constituted communities [and] already established 
subjects’ (31-32). For Butler, multiculturalism depends upon discursively 
produced gaps between groups in order to come into existence. That is, the 
concept of multiculturalism itself depends upon a simultaneous articulation and 
division of cultures based on discursively produced signifiers of difference, such 
as race, class, gender and religion. This division of cultures is then mapped onto 
space through the notion of ‘community’. Critical for the argument in this 
chapter and throughout the thesis, which I also identify as a critique in Lessing’s 
space fiction through their representation of racialising techniques, is Butler’s 
following argument: 
 
[I]t remains clear that liberal norms presupposing an ontology of 
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discrete identity cannot yield the kinds of analytic vocabularies we 
need for thinking about global interdependency and the interlocking 
networks of power and position in contemporary life. (31) 
 
In comprehending the globalised logic of power networks grounding division of 
labour and distribution of resources, the typological system of classifying 
humans is not only reductive, but should also be understood as constitutive of 
this unevenness. Doreen Massey discusses the mapping of society onto space as 
a technique of Western imperial hegemony, arguing that it is a particular strategy 
of an imperial modernising project that categorised and segregated different 
groups in a project of ‘organising global space’ (64).  
Both Massey and Butler attribute this mapping of culture onto space, and 
the accompanying iteration that different cultures represent pre-constituted 
communities, to strategies of power relations in which capitalist imperialism 
asserted dominion by arranging the globe through a hierarchy of communities. 
This is what I read Lessing exploring throughout her space fiction. For Butler and 
Massey, as in Lessing’s space fiction, what is at stake is not ‘already constituted 
communities’, but rather ‘communities not quite recognised as such, subjects 
who are living, but not yet regarded as “lives”’ (32). This ongoing theme reaches 
its zenith in Planet 8, with the extinction of the genetically-engineered 
population on an outpost of Canopus. The point there is not just that they are 
not deemed important enough to Canopean interests to be saved by transport to 
another planet, but that their extinction is foreclosed by Canopus’s invention of 
them. Their ‘lives’ are not deemed ‘lives’ by Canopus.  
Multiculturalist discourse is a developed version of the eugenic 
management of space in a biopolitical regime. Foucault argues that the 
emergence of biopower in the nineteenth century, which he calls the power to 
‘make live and let die’ as opposed to the sovereign right to kill, ‘inscribes racism 
in the mechanisms of the state’ as ‘the basic mechanism of power’ (254). Racism, 
he argues, ‘is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that 
is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ 
(254). A hierarchy of races disrupts the ‘biological continuum of the human race’ 
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with ‘biological-type caesura[s] within a population that appears to be a 
biological domain’ (255). Foucault’s use of qualifiers here – ‘type’ and ‘appears to 
be’ – point to the construction of biological essentialisms around the notion of 
‘race’, while questioning their validity. Race caesura give governments ‘the power 
to treat that population as a mixture of races, or […] to treat the species, to 
subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races’ 
(255). Thus, racism ‘creates caesuras within the biological continuum addressed 
by biopower’, and racism is the ‘indispensible precondition that allows someone 
(else) to be killed’ (255). Multiculturalist discourse, based on racialising 
techniques, facilitates violence by displacing biological caesuras into cultural 
ones. It is not the feature of a progressive society, but holds within it this 
potential for exclusionary violence, constantly reiterating imperial typology.  
In this discourse, race continues to function as a medium – a semiotic 
configuration – that enables violent and oppressive relations; in Foucault’s 
words, by ‘appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one 
biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population, insofar 
as one is an element in a unitary living plurality’ (260). This third clause is key to 
his argument about racism in socialist analysis; the problem across both ‘left’ and 
‘right’ that allows racism to stand as the concept justifying the death-function is 
‘unit thinking’, the grounding of democratic political structures of one-man, one-
vote, and in the development of statistical imaginary as applied to ‘populations’ 
during the eighteenth century in Europe. Racism is not only a function of 
governance, but also becomes necessary in a ‘one-to-one’ encounter with an 
adversary carrying different cultural articulations into battle. It becomes the 
language of a binarised political field.  
Before the 1930s and the rise of Nazi eugenics, eugenic thinkers across the 
political spectrum adopted genetic epistemology as a vehicle for the project of 
full-scale social improvement from the turn of the twentieth century. Biologist 
Ernst Mayr argues, ‘When one reads the literature of the first decades of this 
century, one is amazed at the virtually universal popularity of eugenics. It was 
supported by writers from the far left, all across to those of the far right’ (83-4). 
Eugenics historian Mazumdar agrees, writing that in the early phase of genetic 
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research, ‘[A]lmost every geneticist in Britain, the United States and Germany 
who was interested in human studies at all was involved with the eugenics 
movement’ (58). When Foucault argues that socialist racism was ‘liquidated in 
Europe’ by the ‘domination of social democracy’ and its attendant reformism, as 
well as by the Dreyfus affair (Society 262-63), this does not apply to the British 
utopian socialists. If eugenics was born out of Victorian racism towards the 
colonies as a way of justifying killing a declared other in the name of whiteness 
(as ‘reason’, ‘civilization’, ‘society’), or stealing their bio-energy through slavery 
or exploitation, it bore this legacy across the political spectrum in the first four 
decades of the twentieth century. The ‘science’ of racism was incorporated into 
eugenic pedigree models alongside genetics, through physical anthropology and 
evolutionary theory from the late nineteenth century, as Nils Rolls-Hansen has 
argued (8). Eugenicists in Britain used their doctrine to claim differential 
birthrates and declining national intelligence, suggesting that eugenic measures 
be put in place to prevent national decline.  
Science historian Daniel Kevles explains the distinction between ‘positive’ 
and ‘negative’ eugenics: ‘positive’ eugenics, following Mayr, is the idea of 
‘increasing the frequency of desirable traits by encouraging reproduction by 
individuals with these traits’, and ‘negative’ eugenics would be ways to eradicate 
undesirable traits. Kevles also distinguishes, somewhat along this line of 
analysis, between ‘mainline’ and ‘reform’ eugenicists. According to mainline 
eugenicists, altering the environmental conditions for certain sections of the 
population – adequate housing, better education, free healthcare – would not 
save them from the defective material they carried in their germ cells. The 
reform eugenicists reconsidered the intersection between eugenic measures and 
‘soft’ environmental reform, suggesting a delay of the former until the latter had 
been properly implemented. However, Kevles’s distinction between ‘mainline’ 
and ‘reform’ eugenics is still situated in the widespread interest across the 
British Left and Right from the late 1800s to the mid 1930s in improving the 
general hygiene of a population along intersectional grounds of race and class. 
Philosopher of race Nathaniel Coleman frames the problem of commemorating 
the invention of eugenics in British history in the following way: 
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Eugenics is a two-edged sword: as much a concern of the pre-First 
World War British Fabian Left as of the pre-Second World War 
German Nazi Right, it intellectually underpinned policies not only of 
segregation, sterilisation and Shoah, but also of birth control, public 
hospitals and the welfare state. (‘Eugenics: The Academy’s 
Complicity’) 
 
The ambition of social improvement through biological intervention across both 
Left and Right, as exclusionary and meritocratic discourse, as well as 
multiculturalism, took whiteness as a social position as a governing narrative; 
race-blindness was grounded in meritocratic discourse about the best members 
of racialised groups rising to the surface. Its legacy is more than a historical 
moment in time, but underpins contemporary distribution of education, housing 
and healthcare, and, increasingly, private insurance. 
If the Galton phase of eugenics was based on what Foucault calls a 
disciplinary society which, in Gilles Deleuze’s words, ‘organises vast spaces of 
enclosure’ (3), the second phase anticipated what Deleuze calls a ‘control 
society’, following a generalised crisis of institutions, and characterised by 
endless and open modulation. British eugenics in the first phase is about 
enclosing the immutable germ material and protecting it through biopolitical 
institutions, implemented within the time frames of a closed system. Eugenics in 
the second phase anticipates the replacement of the individual with ‘masses, 
samples, data, markets, or “banks”’ (Deleuze 5). In this second phase, the socio-
scientific pursuit of either extracting or enhancing genetic predispositions takes 
‘unit thinking’ to the de-individuated level of gene clusters or traits, based on the 
scientific fallacy of constructing ‘genes’ coding for X or Y characteristic as both 
heritable and eradicable. The Galton phase of individualised racial hierarchy in 
a disciplinary society is replaced with the Haldane phase of genetic usefulness in 
a society of control. Reading Memoirs and Shikasta together, it is possible to map 
this onto the governmental logics they represent. While Kevles and Mazumdar 
read British eugenics as primarily a discourse around class, I read it more broadly 
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as articulating a concern about social position, out of which ‘the race question’ 
was formed. This question does not disappear in a control society, but rather is 
displaced onto a genetic imaginary that focalises these assumptions through data 
collection and policy practices. Multiculturalism in Shikasta relies on concepts 
and technologies of ‘genetic usefulness’ as a stand-in for former racial categories 
of imperial racism. 
Read together, Memoirs and Shikasta register the transition of eugenic 
thought from racial purity to genetic utility that took place in the British Eugenic 
movement, going from the racial hierarchy of Francis Galton (as Professor 
White) to the transhumanism of Haldane and Huxley (as Canopean agents Johor 
and Klorathy). This ideology appears as characters trying to control or regulate 
their environments, that is, at the level of content. It is the second legacy of 
transhumanism that is relevant for current debates around (and uses of) genetic 
engineering. In terms of the social history of genetics, ‘race’ does not disappear 
as a category of judgement, but is reformulated into the language of genetic 
goods. What is significant about Galton’s legacy for my readings of Memoirs and 
Shikasta is the ambition to deploy eugenic strategies (particularly selective 
breeding) as a governing technology along the lines of racial typology, an 
ambition that both novels rehearse.  
 
Whiteness in crisis in Memoirs 
 
Memoirs portrays the reconstitution of whiteness within a wider project of racial 
hierarchy at a point of national crisis in a city representative of a former imperial 
centre: unnamed, but recognisably London. This crisis is partly constituted by 
the long-term disintegration of the imperial topography of British nationhood – 
Britain and her imperial territories – from Indian independence, to the Suez 
Crisis, to decolonial movements in the African colonies. This was before the 
recentralisation of purchasing power to the United States and the deregulated 
finance capitalism of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in Anglo-
America, charting a point in time when a new world order becomes possible out 
of the temporary global alliances between the feminist, civil rights, disability, 
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anti-colonial and LGBT movements of the 1960s. Lessing stages the psycho-social 
establishment of neo-colonial white supremacy through the ruse of white female 
leadership, drawing out the chasm between a first-wave feminism allied to a 
eugenic utopian socialism, and the full implications of the anti-colonial agenda, 
which would be the abolition of whiteness as a position of privilege (rather than 
a cultural or racial marker). 
Memoirs asks what might happen when the historical basis for the 
privilege of whiteness is threatened by the emergence of post-colonial counter-
histories after the disintegration of empire, staging this question in a dystopian 
future. The dystopic space allows a speculation on the fragmentation of 
whiteness during a ‘real’ moment of social crisis, amidst anti-colonial struggle 
and independence movements in the colonies, the economic recession of 1973-
76 after the oil crisis and 400 per cent inflation in oil prices, the crisis of the post-
war finance institutions, and the three-day week imposed by Edward Heath’s 
government to conserve electricity due to strikes by coal miners. The three-day 
week forced a conflict between middle-class workers’ reliance on civic 
infrastructure to support a five-day working week and the working-class for fair 
pay; the suspension of state services closed off mobility. This conflict can be read 
into the prevailing sense of claustrophobia in Memoirs, with middle and working 
class workers forced to share limited resources, and the middle class confined to 
their residences rather than moving through the city for work.  
By constructing a dystopian crisis out of an unspecified disaster, the 
narrative centres the characters’ experience of it, rather than reconstructing a 
specific history. The dystopic space is a platform for the end of a historical era, 
as well as the possibility of something new being constructed out of a prevailing 
atmosphere of isolation and abandonment, where the state network has fallen 
into disuse, and where the fragments of imperial history assemble haphazardly 
and a-chronologically in the ruins of the present. Rather than a realist narrative 
that would confine interpretations to a specific history, the dystopia of Memoirs 
invites the reader to imagine the effects of the general crisis of late modernity, 
and to enter the long history of European imperial violence behind the walls of 
the narrator’s flat. The anonymity of the nameless city is woven with references 
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to social movements of the period: the civil rights movement in the US, 
decolonisation, and first-wave feminism, while the ‘Authority’ remains nameless 
and the city unknown. The narrator notes, ‘Attitudes towards Authority, towards 
Them and They, were increasingly contradictory, and we all believed that we 
were living in a peculiarly anarchistic community’ (MS 5). Various historical 
examples of violence and resistance are placed here synchronically, outside the 
linear temporality necessitated by realism.  
Lessing is also pushing at the seams of social organisation, exploring this 
period both through a general collapse and limited opportunity for 
reconstituting social norms. Missing this opportunity paved the way for the 
constitution of a new liberalism organised by the financial governance of the 
Euro-US in the late 1970s, leading to a society of control, rather than discipline, 
where the ‘[wo]man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network’ 
(Deleuze 6). At the end of the text, the walls dissolve and with them, the 
characters of a former disciplinary society. This marks a transition from 
leadership in a disciplinary society. If, in the disciplinary society, ‘any relation 
that is not supervised by authority or arranged according to hierarchy’ is 
terminated (Discipline and Punish 239), in a society of control  ‘what counts is 
not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position – licit or illicit 
– and effects a universal modulation’ (Deleuze 7).  
In this collapsed order, Memoirs shows two ways in which the inheritance 
of whiteness as social position is reconstituted: first, through the attempt to 
whitewash the memory of European imperial violence while the imperial centre 
falls apart, with the narrator applying white paint to the walls of the rooms 
behind the wall. There are various indications that it takes place in a version of 
London. As ‘London’ burns and groups migrate out of the city, the narrator finds 
another space in her flat, a kind of double world of disused rooms littered with 
broken or destroyed commodities of empire. The narrator describes the block of 
flats she lives in: not a council block with ‘lifts stained with urine and graffiti on 
the walls’, but a private development, once protected by a caretaker, ‘built by 
private money’ (MS 6), that at one time had stands of artificial flowers in the 
hallway. The crisis has meant that, 
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[B]y that time, with so many people gone from the city, the families 
who lived in these blocks were not all the class for whom the buildings 
had been put up. Just as, for years, all through the eroding streets of 
the poor, empty houses had been taken over by squatters settling in 
families or groups of families - that for a long time it had been 
impossible to say, ‘this is a working-class area, this is homogeneous’ – 
so, too, in these great buildings once tenanted only by the well-to-do, 
by the professional and business people, were now families or clans of 
poor people. (MS 6) 
 
The language the narrator uses should make us suspicious of how effective this 
supposed breaking down of class barriers at a time of crisis has been. While urban 
infrastructure has been made communal by the crisis, living space remains 
segregated. We should note the words ‘squatters’ and ‘clans’: ‘squatter’ holds the 
implication of homelessness and trespassing, and ‘clan’ implies a tribal identity, 
pre-urban: etymologically, from Old Irish ‘cland’ and Scottish Gaelic ‘clann’ 
(offspring, family), rather than Norman or Hanoverian. It also signifies a group 
identity, the migration of an entire genetic cluster, and again signals an invasion. 
Despite this initial description of crisis breaking down class barriers or at least 
making them - practically – obsolete, there is still a clearly racialised hierarchy. 
These words draw a racialised border between the narrator and the newcomers 
with regard to class and place of origin. She is the neutral not-clan, the not-
squatter, the permanent resident, the settled, singular. ‘They’ are the multiple, 
the pagan, the destitute, the migrants. Thus, while social organisation has 
changed as a result of this unknown crisis, the stratification of social hierarchy 
based on owning of private property remains. The names of the people living on 
the ground floor of the building along with the narrator are the Whites, the 
Smiths, the Jones, Miss Foster, Miss Baxter – Anglophone names. They are not 
multiples, but ‘self-contained units’, one or two people per flat, and the narrator 
barely sees or talks to anyone on her floor (MS 113).  
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Compare this to the Indian family from Kenya, the Mehtas, and the Irish-
Polish family, the Ryans, who live upstairs. These families are described in the 
language of sprawl, not in a proper place, always in motion. The Mehta children 
– appearing as a group, a multiple – are playing in the street, outside. To the 
narrator, they appear as a uniform group of ‘dark-skinned boys and girls, all 
dazzling white shirts, crisp pink and blue dresses, white teeth, gleaming hair’ 
(MS 15). She breaks them down into details that appear to her – implicitly setting 
up a contrast of their pale clothes and white teeth with the darkness of their skin, 
how they appear en masse to her. To her, they are a mass of contrasts of colour, 
simply appearing. She never speaks directly to them; their communication is 
restricted to a nod and smile. She accesses Mr Mehta’s informal economy 
upstairs, which she compares to a street market, ‘through an irregular gap in the 
wall’ (MS 116), hidden behind a heap of things. The Mehtas are narrated through 
an orientalised veil of excess and irregularity that exists simultaneously with the 
ordered white world below where the narrator has come from, supposedly part 
of this territory but split off from it.  
 If the Mehtas have carved out a space of informality to supplement their 
exclusion from state provision, then the Ryans are narrated through their 
exhaustion of welfare resources. Mr Ryan is a violent and alcoholic Irishman, Mrs 
Ryan a Polish refugee; both are Catholics. Catholicism here is implicitly placed 
in opposition to the Anglican whiteness of the narrator and Emily, and also 
serves as a signifier of uncontrolled reproduction and the profligacy of the poor, 
straining the resources of the state. The parents are usually drunk, the eleven 
children will not stay in school, and their fifteen-year-old daughter gets pregnant 
(MS 118-19). They do not hold the same social position of whiteness – coded 
Anglican British – as the residents of the ground floor, and it is always from this 
position that we see these characters. In her description of the Ryans, the 
narrator remarks, without intended irony: 
 
It often happens that a single case takes wing out of its anonymity 
and represents others; in our city alone there were thousands of 
“Ryans” of all kinds, colours, nations, unknown except to their 
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neighbours and to the authorities, and these people in due time 
found themselves in prison, Borstal, remand homes, and so on. (MS 
118) 
 
The Ryans are made to stand in for all types of non-white groups, representative 
of a mass of the unemployed, ‘unknown’, and perhaps dissolute, who cause social 
problems that neighbours and authorities have either to take on or solve. This 
mass is multicultural, made up of what Butler might call ‘already constituted 
communities, already established subjects’ (Butler 31). The narrator’s description 
has no insight or interest in the Ryans except as a social ill, a general degeneracy; 
they could be any number of non-white communities, described as ‘subjects who 
are living, but not yet regarded as “lives”’ (Butler 32). 
The narrator’s description of the Ryans articulates a classic neo-
Malthusian anxiety of the over-breeding of ‘the urban poor’, racialised as non-
white and classed as the proletariat or sub-proletariat. Thomas Malthus’s 
arguments in his Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) set the stage for 
Galton in terms of constructing poverty as a natural category of certain kinds of 
human, the poor characterised as ‘fecund beyond their limited resources and 
unconcerned at bringing weak or poor stock into the world’ (Levine 52). In the 
era constructed in Memoirs, the repeated construction of an ideal subject 
prevents reconfiguring the founding mythology of British nationalism based on 
whiteness, no matter how multicultural its population or progressive with regard 
to welfare policies the society is or has been. As I explore in the next section, 
Emily is constructed as white female leader, a subject position whose bonds she 
cannot stay within, and she is unable and unwilling to break from the implied 
obligation to reproduce whiteness.  
If ‘race’ is the conceptual field for the biologisation of human suffering, 
then class is a region within this field. Class position is racialised in so much as 
it constitutes a biological division in behaviour and capacity. Class division is a 
biological caesura, a fixed position carrying innate qualities. The racialisation of 
class is key to Ignatiev’s idea of the malleability of whiteness as a social position. 
Hence, the Catholic Irish in the nineteenth century ‘became white’ through 
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migration to and settlement in the United States, which led to their becoming 
‘part of an oppressing race in America’, and consequently, ‘the formation (or non-
formation) of an American working class’ (How the Irish Became White 1). While 
the first phase of the British Eugenics movement was characterised by the idea 
that immutable genetic stock resulted in natural social divisions, proponents of 
eugenics during the second phase considered social reform to be paramount in 
ensuring a level playing field of welfare – ‘evening out’ the environment – before 
any eugenic programme could be undertaken. Nonetheless, both projects were 
embedded in a class-race intersection of discrimination, and their end-goal, 
declared or not, was the protection and/or maintenance of whiteness as 
‘naturally’ superior.  
The rooms on the other side of the wall function as a historical imprint, 
and an explanation for these social divisions. There, Empire is materially 
reconstructed. The disused rooms contain the objects of disintegrating 
dominion. One room is described as an eighteenth century salon of the ‘French, 
Second Empire,’ a rich and formal room, scattered with old wood furniture 
upholstered in silk, commodities of Empire, laid to waste, in disorder, full of piles 
of rubbish. Another looks like the scene of a recent battle: 
 
The place looked as if savages had been in it; as if soldiers had 
bivouacked there. The chairs and sofas had been deliberately slashed 
and jabbed with bayonets or knives, stuffing was spewing out 
everywhere, brocade curtains had been ripped off the brass rods and 
left in heaps. The room might have been used as a butcher’s shop. (MS 
40) 
 
Savages and soldiers are the characters of a scene of colonial invasion. The semi-
colon between the two groups is important: it suggests a relation of equivalence 
between ‘savage’ and ‘soldier’, making it unclear which side committed violence.  
The scene describes a disembodied destructive force, an invisible tearing apart 
of an established order. There are two different historical moments suspended 
together here: the violence of the colonial invasion and the spoils of imperial 
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wealth. Confrontations between ‘savages’ and ‘soldiers’ happen at frontiers of 
invasion, and here the frontier is the salon brought into existence by a European 
project of wealth accumulation through territorial acquisition. The space behind 
the wall compresses these two moments, whereas in chronological time they are 
divided into discrete units of historical record (or left out entirely). Imperial 
trauma has become part of the cultural backdrop, along with the echoes of global 
freedom struggles of the twentieth century. There is the scene in the real world 
when a group of young people are leaving, and they sing ‘We shall not be moved’, 
a song of the civil rights movement, and ‘Down by the Riverside’, a Black 
spiritual. When the narrator is walking through the old hotel, she likens it to an 
African township outside a mine where the black workers live. This can be read 
as Rhodesia, urban ghettos where the miners lived, and strike after strike leading 
to the independence movement; the Rhodesian Bush War was ongoing at the 
time of Memoirs’ publication. 
The narrator tries to intervene in these memories and cover them over. 
Distressed by the chaos and disorder she finds again and again on the other side 
of the wall, she decides that she has to repaint the ‘forlorn and shabby walls’ of 
these rooms: 
 
I started on a room I knew well: it was the drawing-room that had 
brocade curtains and pink and green silks and old wood. I stacked 
what was usable in the middle of the room under dust-sheets. I 
scrubbed down the ceiling and walls with sugar-soap, with hot water, 
with detergents. Layer after layer of white paint went on, first dull 
and flat, then increasingly fine, until the last one covered everything 
with a clear softly shining enamel, white as new snow or fine china. 
It was like standing inside a cleaned-out eggshell; I felt that 
accretions of grime had been taken off which had been preventing a 
living thing from breathing. (MS 65) 
 
Immediately after this, she forgets the room, and she never sees it again. This is 
a scene of obliterating memory of the failure of Empire, painting over the 
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shabbiness of these old rooms. At the same time the material signs of colonialism 
are embedded in the process of cleaning the room. Silk, old wood, and sugar-
soap are commodities put into global circulation by capitalist imperialism. The 
cleaned-out eggshell connects whiteness and origin, as if she is responsible for 
restoring a ‘pure’ state. This purity can only be reached through synonyms – 
‘white as new snow’, ‘like standing inside a cleaned-out eggshell’ (italics added). 
In a sense, the inaccessibility of purity in reality articulates it as a speculative 
desire, and an unobtainable fantasy. Nonetheless, it is a fantasy that the narrator 
invests her efforts in upholding.  
These scenes represent a restricted historical moment where whiteness 
functions as double consciousness. The crisis shows up the fragility of this 
whiteness, making the narrator conscious of it, but in an alternative world. The 
act of cleaning, white-washing, of painting over gestures to what postcolonial 
theorist Anne McClintock has called ‘the hidden affinity between domesticity 
and empire’, in which ‘soap entered the realm of Victorian fetishism with 
spectacular effect.’ Soap symbolises rationality, cleanliness, and domesticity – 
both the repair of bodies to a pure, ‘new’ state of being, and a symbol of the 
capacity for reason. Soap is important here for two reasons: first, it takes off 
accumulated grime from the walls of the room, gesturing to a fear of 
contamination, and of obscuring whiteness. Second, the activity of washing and 
painting over figures for the doubled condition of colonialism: ‘whiteness’ as a 
social position must create its own origin by obscuring or eliminating what has 
come before. Sugar-soap as a substance for cleaning also refers to sugar 
plantations and the slave trade. The ‘old’ white world is remade by erasing or 
subjugating the ‘new’; they are mutually constitutive under the sign of imperial 
domination.  
 
 
Reconstituting Whiteness: Eugenic pairing in Memoirs  
 
The pairing of Emily and Gerald as the leaders of the post-crisis social order is 
implicitly eugenic. The narrative sets up pairs of pre- and post-crisis authority 
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figures: the narrator, confined to the walls of her apartment, and Emily, able to 
move between spheres but unable to escape her own socialisation; Professor 
White, the white patriarch ‘placed high in administrative circles’ (MS 56), who 
patrols the borders of his territory (the block of flats) like a sergeant, and Gerald, 
post-crisis white male vanguard who oversees a network of subordinates on the 
streets and in squats, upholding racial and sexual norms of imperialism for the 
sake of maintaining the network. The difference is that in this new order, it does 
not matter ‘who’ comes and goes, as long as whiteness retains its position. Emily 
is constructed as a white, female leader through the childhood scenes on the 
other side of the wall, and the ‘coming of age’ scenes in the ‘real’ world between 
(female) flat, (anarchic) street and (male) commune. The question here is not 
whether Emily is racialised into whiteness and gendered into a fertile, sexually 
active female, but how her inherited socialisation in the unconscious realm 
behind the wall prevents her from making a radical break with the past, despite 
points at which she seems to desire it (drawn out in the conclusion of her 
relationship with the Catholic Irish girl, June Ryan). Memoirs charts the difficulty 
of changing a society that has become defined by its invention and maintenance 
of a racial hierarchy of social positions, even at a moment of disaster where old 
rules seem to be suspended.  
This eugenic legacy goes back to Galton, whose ideas set up a framework 
for biologising race as a technology for improving the white race through 
selective breeding, rather than only as a justification of imperialism. Galton’s 
instrumentalisation of Charles Darwin’s arguments about inheritance in The 
Origin of Species (1859) in Hereditary Genius (1869) allowed him to posit 
biological heredity as the cause for innate inequalities between humans, and to 
imagine class as a sub-category of race. Galton argues that intellectual ability is 
inherited through parents, and that a ‘high reputation is a pretty accurate test 
of high ability’ (11). For him, hereditary superiority surfaces through social rank, 
and he speculates that ‘it would be quite practicable to produce a highly gifted 
race of men by judicious marriages during several consecutive generations’ (11). 
He ranks black Africans below white Europeans in terms of natural ability, and 
argues that the ablest race in history was the ancient Greeks: ‘[T]he average 
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intellectual standard of the negro race is some two grades below our own’ (307). 
Science historian Philippa Levine points out that Galton’s link between race and 
natural ability was ‘fostered in a climate suffused with notions of European 
imperial superiority, bolstered by a growingly confident scientific 
establishment’ (6). His invention of a science of ‘good (eu-) origins (-genes)’ to 
bolster his phylogenetic ranking of human capacity became, in the twentieth 
century, inextricably linked to genetic theory; a biological justification for social 
organisation which placed European man – whiteness – at the top of the tree.  
What is important about drawing Galton into a reading of Memoirs is his 
justification of eugenic partnerships on the basis of reproducing ‘good stock’. I 
read Emily as a characterisation of Galton’s continuing legacy, a vessel for British 
whiteness, and the narrator as its historian. Behind the wall, the narrator observes 
Emily being socialised into this position. Emily is first racialised as white, and 
then socialised into her desire to reproduce this whiteness with Gerald, 
competing with June for the position as Gerald’s primary partner. The notion of 
eugenic pairing to protect and ensure the inheritance of white morality comes 
through in the implicit coupling of Emily and Professor White, displaced onto 
her relationship with Gerald. Professor White’s professional title places him in 
the position of intellectual, granting him access to special bureaucratic privileges: 
food supplies and eventually an escape route for himself and his family out of the 
city. Given that there is no other professor in the text, the name ‘Professor White’ 
works as a tautology; in this text, to be a professor means also to be named as 
white. He functions within a sphere of dominance, regularity and order, where 
nothing is out of place:  
 
Professor White would come out of the lobby and down the steps and 
then stop, looking up and down the street, almost in a military way: 
Who goes there! Then, reassured, he stood for a moment: almost he 
could be imagined pulling on a pair of gloves, adjusting a hat. He was 
a slight man, young for a professor, still in his thirties; a precise, an 
ashy, man, with everything in his life in its proper place. (MS 28) 
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Professor White is the bastion of a certain kind of old order. Even as the White 
family are escaping, there is the appearance of regimentation and planning. The 
narrator notes, ‘The Whites, as if nothing had happened to our world, were off 
on a journey’ (MS 191). Gerald can be read as a post-crisis manifestation of 
Professor White, creating his own institution of discipline and development for 
the children of the street; in some ways, he is a post-Enlightenment 
manifestation of William Godwin, with ‘his need to protect the weak, his 
identification with them’ (MS 93), while also performing the role of the white 
patriarch required to mark his territory and sphere of influence.  
Gerald resurrects Professor White in a post-crisis society of control. His 
benevolent persona masks a civilising mission that, while reminiscent of empire, 
demonstrates his ability to incorporate others as subordinates into his network 
not through the use of military force, but through what Deleuze calls 
‘continuous forms of control [and] perpetual training’ (7). This comes out in his 
interactions with the Underground children, the anarchists of the text and the 
only group functioning with a radically novel communication system. Gerald’s 
response to their ‘savagery’ is to ‘separate them and put them into households 
in ones and twos’ (MS 181), to reduce their capacity for collective action by 
splitting up the group, and to domesticate them in households, socialising them 
into pre-crisis normative forms of communication and behaviour. Yet, while he 
attempts to re-establish heteronormative propriety and to reproduce the same 
social order, the disorder of these households and the haphazardness of their 
arbitrary construction, represent the deployment of a familial structure as such, 
rather than as a natural end. The power that Gerald exerts over the Underground 
children is not disciplinary in a punitive sense, but represents an ongoing form 
of socialisation without reference to an origin. It is the transformation of social 
order as a natural one, to a conventional one, which still maintains the reference 
(self-consciously abstract) to symbolic power. 
Gerald and Emily seek to improve society through their partnership, 
adopting a different set of governing techniques. In Gerald and Emily’s living 
space, there is ‘no furniture at all, but there were curtains, and shutters were 
scrubbed and whole, and mats and mattresses were rolled and stood along the 
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walls’; the communal rooms of middle-class domestic organisation are gone – 
dining room, sitting room (MS 128). There is only a ‘long room for eating, with 
trestles and benches, everything scrubbed bare’; apart from this, ‘each room was 
self-sufficient as a workroom or as a home’ (MS 128). The function of objects – 
mattress, table – are not fixed, but used according to need, and belongings are 
distributed among the community. This sparse space is stripped of the 
commodities laid to waste on the other side of the narrator’s wall, the rolled-up 
mattresses act as ramparts against the walls, where the past might lurk, and 
private ownership has been overturned in favour of communal property. Yet 
even here, Emily tells the narrator, ‘“It is impossible not to have a pecking order. 
No matter how you try not to”’, as the narrator watches the way the nameless 
children react when they see Emily: ‘This was how people respond to Authority’ 
(MS 129). Emily is the reluctant leader in this new society, run through controls 
which function ‘like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one 
moment to the other’, where the inhabitants are defined ‘dividuals […] in a 
continuous network’ (Deleuze 5-6). Emily’s complaint about a pecking order is 
not a Hobbesian observation about the necessity of government to suppress the 
natural human tendency to violence, but rather an acknowledgement that while 
she and Gerald have attempted to repress the memory of the old world, she has 
nonetheless risen to the top of the government, and not by accident. 
This control society is an extension of the disciplinary one, not a radical 
break with it, and follows the same protocols of racialisation and sexual 
socialisation. Emily is prepared to reproduce whiteness by choosing Gerald, the 
rational, enlightened benefactor, as a sexual partner. Instead of resisting the old 
world, Emily is also socialised into it; behind the wall, she becomes white. The 
scene of trying on the white dress shows her trying on various kinds of social 
possibilities for inhabiting the place of a white female leader; ‘most often’ the 
dress is a bride’s dress, connoting marriage; then a young girl’s dress for purity 
and innocence; then a transparent night-dress to signify a sexual availability and 
consequently fertility; then an evening dress to connote her mastery of polite 
society. There is no ‘real’ Emily to be seen here, either in the trying on or in the 
assumption of various positions; ‘she’ slips between roles, invisible to the 
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narrator, who has forgotten ‘the hidden person in the young creature […] the self 
which instructs, chooses experience – and protects’ (MS 57). The narrator’s 
‘forgetting’ is not a simple sign of senility or being elderly; rather, she is only able 
to conceive this ‘self’ in an abstract sense, as an ideal, while in the ‘real’ world of 
lived experience, ‘Emily’ moves between archetypes. This schizophrenic 
subjectivity facilitates the development of this new society of control. 
Behind the wall, the younger Emily overheats in a ‘hot white room, where 
the red flames pulsed out heat, filled the heavy white clothes on the bars with 
hot smells’ (MS 45); the room contains the atmosphere of an impending 
explosion, a fire at the centre of this whiteness; ‘hot white’ being a reversal of 
‘white hot’, a core instability that holds everything else together. There is the 
threat of sexual abuse from her father, and being ignored or told off by her 
mother: for both, she is the fetish-supplement to a marriage without sex, an 
object available either for the punishment or sexual enjoyment of her parents. 
She is obliged to escape from her own dirtiness, to negate it, to surround herself 
in white, to constrain herself within the social codes of her inheritance. These 
scenes are about the construction of female sexuality within this white heat, a 
visceral force that obliterates and destroys. ‘White’ as a descriptor is repeatedly 
applied to objects. Following Ignatiev, this should not be taken as a narrative 
attempt to work out what whiteness is or to interpret it. Rather, the constant 
repetition of this word draws attention to the narrator’s failure to comment on 
it. It is the elephant in the room in this control society that now calls itself 
‘multicultural’; whiteness is the singular, the fixed, the constant and the neutral, 
through which subjects are positioned, the medium through which all other data 
are tracked and measured. 
Emily’s role is to manage the domestic affairs of a patriarchal public 
sphere; that is, British, Anglican, and white. This is what she is being prepared 
for in the scenes behind the wall. These scenes produce the intersectional 
rupture between June and Emily that takes place across their respective 
racialised and classed difference, the constant in this situation being their shared 
socialisation as female. The alliance is challenged and eventually annihilated by 
the difference in value assigned to their bodies in this reconstituted economy of 
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whiteness. Irish-Polish Catholic June is described as smaller, younger, in awe of 
Emily, in love with Gerald. Emily adopts her like a child, looking after her like a 
benefactor, but refusing any kind of equal relationship. When Gerald has sex 
with June, Emily knows that this marks a break in her relationship with her; she 
seems frustrated by the protocols that demand this break, as if she is trying and 
failing to resist a script for feminine friendship fractured by uneven male sexual 
attention. She says to the narrator that she is upset because, ‘June was my friend 
and now she isn’t’ (MS 141). The narrator wonders why, because she knows Gerald 
will be on to the next girl soon enough. Emily also knows that he has to ‘make 
the rounds’ of female bodies within his network; she describes him as ‘like a cat 
marking his territory’ (142), tracking and incorporating, a constant modulation, 
the surveyor of the control society he and Emily have created. 
It does not occur to Emily to leave Gerald, but to blame June. The narrator 
wonders why does Emily not take the opportunity to begin her own group of 
outcasts, and supplies her own answer: Emily is in love. What is this love? It is 
the desire to belong but also to manage, to co-parent, to nurture. She cannot be 
a friend to June, because under the sign of heteronormative patriarchy, she needs 
Gerald as her primary source of protection. She wants Gerald to change, but she 
does not want to change her social position; on the other hand, she 
acknowledges that this position (of competition) is what separates her from June. 
The body socialised as female becomes a border crossing for marking imperial 
topography, with Emily as the core, and June a peripheral territory. This is all 
part of the longer game of making herself Gerald’s primary partner. June, on the 
other hand, comes back from her sexual experience with Gerald traumatised. The 
word ‘raped’ is not used, but June’s growth has stunted, falling apart after a 
premature sexual relationship. She echoes the younger Emily behind the wall: 
the proxy child, a sexual object for the father (Gerald), and a punishable body for 
the mother (Emily). The Irish famine of 1845-52 can be drawn in here: June’s 
sexual availability stands in for Irish resources seized by the British government, 
and her physical degeneration for the extermination of millions as a result. 
Yet June does escape this, perhaps echoing post-famine mass migration 
of the Irish to the US (again, the dystopian compression of historical time in the 
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novel permits this speculation). She leaves without any kind of conventional 
farewell, disappearing with ‘a band of women’, similar to the disappearance of 
the anarchist children (MS 160). To recall Butler, neither June nor these children 
can be properly regarded as lives in this world, where the supremacy of whiteness 
demands reproduction. June is both a tragedy and the survivor of the ‘real’ world. 
Her body is almost wrecked by a premature sexual experience that may or may 
not have been coerced, by the racialised inequalities that come with her social 
position, enabling her to be made object, a marker of Gerald’s political territory. 
When she returns to the narrator’s flat after her experience to be nursed by 
Emily, she is ‘listless’, suffering from an unnamed ‘malady’, drained (MS 158-59). 
The narrator does not want to protect her and June’s eventual departure is 
inconsequential; when hosting June, the narrator confesses to the reader, but not 
to Emily, ‘The truth was I would have liked her to leave’ (MS 161). Yet when Emily 
weeps after June’s departure, it is not just because she has lost a friend, but 
because she knows that the absence of a farewell demonstrates the rupture 
between them, drawn out through the violence inflicted on June’s body by the 
new order, dividuated, not an object for discipline, but part of a ‘universal 
modulation’ of Gerald’s network control (Deleuze 7). June’s departure brings into 
relief Emily’s own dividuated value in this system, as carrier of a pigment-
information, the bearer of a ‘code of “dividual” material to be controlled’ 
(Deleuze 7).  
Memoirs demonstrates the continued organisation of communities 
within racialised categories, while representing the maintenance of a racial 
hierarchy. Despite the post-war migration of former colonial subjects to the 
imperial centre, and despite the political desegregation of racialised groups in 
the name of multiculturalism, Emily’s movement throughout the novel, on both 
sides of the wall, shows her initiation into a specifically Anglican whiteness, and 
the violence inflicted on the other: Catholic, Irish-Polish June Ryan. As I have 
argued in relation to Butler and Massey, the discourse of multiculturalism in 
Memoirs and Shikasta is not constituted by the unproblematic co-habitation of 
different communities, but depends upon what Jan Pieterse might call ‘the 
fetishism of boundaries that has marked so much of history’ (221). Pieterse’s 
 55 
statement offers a two-fold critique of ‘failed multiculturalism’ discourses: 
firstly, we can understand the demarcation of ‘community’ as being intrinsic to 
a historical process of marking out space through perceived categories of 
identification. Boundaries mapped through culture are given a kind of essential 
reality.  
 
 
Genetic Usefulness: Eugenic Imperialism in Shikasta 
 
While Memoirs looks at the reconstitution of whiteness at a moment of socio-
economic collapse, in the context of a transition from a disciplinary to control 
society, Shikasta is more specifically a critique of the eugenic undertones of the 
post-colonial narrative of liberal multiculturalism in the former imperial centre; 
namely, ‘genetic usefulness’. Lessing pre-empts later texts on genetic selection as 
a new mode of eugenics. To develop Deleuze’s argument in the context of 
genetics, genetic usefulness depends on a data imaginary, rather than a statistical 
one. It disaggregates individuals into collections of genetic material, whose 
‘usefulness’ can be determined by the conventions of the society in question, and 
which facilitates fast-track eugenic intervention on the part of imperial rulers. 
Whereas Memoirs occurs on the edge of annihilation and from the perspective 
of imperial subjects, Shikasta is framed as a retrospective compilation of 
documents written by colonial agents on the subject of Canopean imperialism. 
Eugenic measures in Shikasta are not (solely) related to the promotion of a 
mythic racial purity – the reconstitution of whiteness – but rather to the idea of 
determining ‘genetic usefulness’ in peripheral territories in order to sustain and 
augment satellite proxy governments. This is comparable to strategies of post-
war global governance led by former imperial powers through international 
bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, 
which I explore in Chapter Four in my reading of The Making of the 
Representative for Planet 8 (1982). Rather than a national project in which the 
imperial centre must be governed by white bodies, Shikasta depicts the remote 
biopolitical governance of subject populations under the guise of genetic 
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usefulness, enhancing and promoting the ‘best’ genetic stock in a given locality. 
This frames the various kinds of eugenic plots throughout the series. Imperial 
eugenic intervention is a tool for ensuring the perpetuation of racial hierarchy at 
the imperial centre, by arranging and ensuring the reproduction of ‘good’ local 
stock in peripheral territories.  
In Shikasta, a macro-narrative composed of various accounts of colonial 
history, taking place in the time-scale of millennia and across an interplanetary 
imperial topography, Lessing stages a social history of eugenic imperialism 
through the Canopean colonial agent Johor’s civilising missions on 
Rohanda/Shikasta, a planet of great importance for Canopus. The Canopeans are 
described as golden-skinned, a race of superhumans with powers of immortality. 
Rohanda/Shikasta is a version of Earth, with places names such as ‘Britain’, 
‘China’, ‘India’ and ‘Zimbabwe’ used by the Rohandan/Shikastan inhabitants. 
Johor is responsible for forced breeding experiments and importing a false 
history into tribes, for the sake of cultivating them to Canopean criteria of 
progress. As George Sherban, he goes on missions to rescue ‘genetically useful’ 
people (S 357), and refuses to continue a relationship with an Indian activist, 
Sharma Patel, choosing the white Suzannah with whom to have children. As 
Hanson has pointed out, Johor’s defence of eugenic marriages in his letter telling 
Sharma he cannot be with her, despite his love for her, ‘is not just rhetoric’ (89), 
but an ideology embedded into his relations with others.  
As Hanson argues, Johor’s narrative ‘endorse[s] the philosophy of an empire 
grounded in eugenic ambitions’ (87). Indeed, ‘in Johor’s ideal scenario, 
individuals see themselves primarily as representatives of their race’ (Hanson 
88), conceived in terms of gene-clusters and restricted to reproducing in order 
to produce the best possible versions of each race according to the selection of 
useful genes in a given racialised population. Johor’s efforts are paradigmatic of 
imperial missions in colonised territories, where moral and biological values of 
the core are incubated among subject populations. His missions are comparable 
to anthropological ‘race studies’ in the colonies during the nineteenth century 
which became, in effect, a smokescreen for justifying the dominion of European 
governments. The sovereign power of Canopus over their populations is 
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reproduced by the typological structures they put in place to distinguish between 
different types of living beings, and, more fundamentally, the distinction 
between the ‘natural’ and ‘man-made’ worlds. The moment of crisis – ‘the Failure 
of the Lock’ – sees these distinctions overturned.  
British utopian socialist scientists, with whom Lessing had a connection 
through the Communist Party in the 1950s, may have provided a prototype for 
the contradictions of Johor’s benevolent colonialism. Hanson argues,  
 
Lessing’s move to space fiction is only intelligible if her space fiction 
is understood as part of a British tradition of scientifically informed, 
speculative fiction, which begins with H. G. Wells and goes on to 
include Haldane’s Daedalus (1924), Olaf Stapledon’s Last and First 
Men (1930), Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) and Naomi 
Mitchison’s Memoirs of a Spacewoman (1962). (Eugenics 83-4)  
 
Lessing takes up this tradition by restaging and problematising some of its key 
figures, particularly the transhumanist ambitions of the interwar utopian 
socialists – what Kevles calls the ‘reform’ eugenicists. In Shikasta, Canopean 
eugenics echo the interwar eugenicists’ transhumanist socialism: the idea of 
improving society for all, for the sake of eventually breeding in ‘good’ genetic 
stock and creating perfect specimens of the human, under the guise of utopian 
socialism. This would maintain racial categories but in a more complex account 
of genetic inheritance, where ‘mixing’ would be permitted, only so long as it did 
not threaten the ideal prototype of man (in Haldane’s view, himself). 
The ‘reformist’ eugenicists make their way into Lessing’s space fiction as 
Canopean agents, particularly Johor and Klorathy. Kevles dates the ‘reform’ 
period of eugenic thought to the interwar years (1919-38), and associates it with 
biologists such as Lancelot Hogben, Julian Huxley and Haldane. Mazumdar 
describes the interwar eugenicists as ‘Marxist scientists, […] left-wing, radical and 
sharply sensitised to the part played by class in the eugenist problematic’ (194). 
Haldane and Huxley visited the Soviet Union in the late 1920s, on separate trips, 
and both considered themselves socialists. Haldane later became a member of 
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the Communist Party. They considered the mainliners sellers of ‘false biology’, a 
stance which grew increasingly strident with news of Nazi uses of Mendelism to 
justify racist, ableist, and homophobic eugenic policy, and eventually, 
exterminations. For the mainliners, the new science of heredity gave ground for 
the biologisation of national poverty. According to this group, altering the 
environmental conditions for certain sections of the population – adequate 
housing, better education, free healthcare – would not save them from the 
defective material they carried in their germ cells. This group was committed to 
the idea of human improvement, but its proponents were also working alongside 
the introduction of national welfare programmes during World War I: pension 
schemes, public healthcare and education reform.  
Like the Canopean agents, the interwar eugenicists, inheritors of the Fabian 
legacy (Wells provided funding for Haldane’s reinstitution of the British 
Eugenics Society), were committed to social improvement through biological 
intervention, while not unanimous in their political reasons for criticising 
mainline eugenics. The reformists also continued to display explicitly eugenic 
aims to improve ‘racial qualities’ (biological traits), upholding a mythological 
whiteness as the basis for any programme of social improvement. Geneticist 
Ronald A. Fisher opposed the mainliners on the grounds of their explicit racism, 
rather than their class politics, but class-based determinations of genetic goods 
work to differentiate social groups through eugenic racialisation. Thus, Fisher’s 
anti-racism is less significant if we consider the way in which he subscribed to 
the biologisation of class. As Stephen Jay Gould observes, while Fisher’s The 
Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (1930) ‘has generally been acknowledged, 
and properly so, as the keystone of twentieth century evolutionary theory,’ few 
biologists attend to the final five chapters, ‘nearly 40 percent of the entire 
volume, [which] present a single coherent (if fatally flawed) argument in 
eugenics – a claim that modern industrial society (particularly the British 
version) has entered a phenomenally fatal decline as a result of “social promotion 
of the relatively infertile”’ (The Structure of Evolutionary Theory 512). Social 
mobility would promote social degeneration, and the ‘superior upper stratum 
will therefore be swamped by greater reproduction of less worthy social classes’ 
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(cited in Gould 512). Alongside Haldane and Sewell Wright, Fisher was one of the 
three biologists who devised the Modern Synthesis between Darwinism and 
Mendelism. Rather than upholding the ‘discreet silence’ around these chapters, 
Gould finds a ‘consonance of Fisher’s eugenical argument with his commitment 
to a general and statistical Darwinism’ (513). For Fisher, Gould writes, ‘Darwinian 
triumph must be measured as differential reproductive success, statistically 
defined in large populations’ (513).  
In Shikasta, it is genetic contamination rather than racialised 
protectionism that drives Canopean eugenics. For Johor, genetic contamination 
arising from unplanned reproduction is a sign of social degeneration. As the 
ecological crisis on Rohanda/Shikasta breaks up social organisation, the former 
sites of Shikasta’s great cities are claimed by ‘the waters from the melting ice’, 
becoming ‘green again, fertile’ (S 136-37). In this claim of the humanised world 
by natural forces kept at bay, Johor mourns the loss of careful breeding strategies: 
 
The children are heartbreaking now. In those times, the children of 
the Giants, the Natives’ children, were each one born after such 
deliberation, such thought, each one chosen and from parents 
known to be the best… each one with such a long life, time to grow, 
time to play, time to think, time to ripen their inner selves and grow 
fully of themselves. Now these delightful infants are born 
haphazardly of any mating, any parents, treated well or ill as chance 
dictates, dying as easily as they are born – and yet each child, every 
one, has all the potentiality, has it still, and completely, to leap from 
his low half-animal state to true humanity. (S 137) 
 
For Johor, the ecological crisis is bound up with the biological degeneration of 
humanity due to a lack of care taken around reproduction. Without such care, 
the inhabitants of Shikasta are half-animals whose development has been 
stunted or prevented by uninformed reproductive choices. For Johor, there is an 
ideal of ‘true humanity’ which might be realized through selective breeding and 
careful choices. He expresses distaste for reproduction through ‘chance’, and 
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disgust with the ‘low half-animal state’ of the children. This registers through 
physical repulsion: he does not want to ‘handle’ them out of distress for what he 
perceives as spoiled possibilities for evolutionary progress (S 137).  
Absent from Johor’s description of these new children, born through 
chance and more mortal (to him) than their carefully-bred predecessors, is any 
description of type. Transformation from a ‘low half-animal state’ to ‘true 
humanity’ marks the typologising of various degrees of ‘humanisation’. Without 
this transformation (or the iteration of it), progress cannot be marked. Rather, 
the anxiety around uncultivated, haphazard reproductive norms is tied to a 
general weakening of social ties between parents and children. Parents have no 
obligation to take responsibility for their offspring, who are ‘treated well or ill 
as chance dictates, dying as easily as they are born’ (S 137). New urban sites are 
‘an agglomeration […] without any skills or symmetry or mastery, or even an 
inkling of the knowledge of how such places are built’ (S 138). Informal urban 
development is paired with an economy based on unequal wealth distribution – 
‘There are the rich, but only a few’ – which leads to a fixation on appearance, 
women needing to be ‘slaves to their beauty’ in order to fulfil a social function, 
and children treated only as the possibility for advancing the ‘names [and] 
properties’ of their fathers (138). Post-crisis, according to Johor, chance and self-
interest have become the mechanisms of social organisation, rather than 
socially-determined (top-down) progress.  
Johor’s description ventriloquises the figure of a colonial emissary 
surveying a site of former rule. His observation of Shikasta’s degeneration 
extends from his sense of Canopus’s civilising accomplishments, and marks a 
necessary amnesia about the purpose and terms of these civilizing missions. 
Canopus’s activities on Rohanda/Shikasta have always been bound to 
maintaining and augmenting their own imperial power, necessitating violations 
of their principle rule: never make a slave or servant of another. In response to 
the crisis, Johor and fellow agent Jussel travel to herdsmen on the plains: 
 
We told them to maintain certain practices, which had to be done 
exactly, and changed as necessity required, keeping alive among 
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themselves, their tribe and their descendants the knowledge that 
these practices would be required by the Lords, the Gods, then they 
would be saved from the degeneration of the cities (which they abhor 
and fear) and their children would be strong and healthy, and not 
become thieves and liars and murderers. This strength, this sanity, a 
bond with the sources of the knowledge of the Gods, would be 
maintained in them as long as they were prepared to do our wishes. 
(S 139) 
 
In the interests of the people, who are assumed not to know any better or be 
capable of development on their own, Johor and Jussel promote their own 
despotism through a quasi-religious set of pre-determined codes, which will be 
passed through the gene lines of these endogamous communities as a way of 
preserving the Canopean doctrine. In these spaces, away from the degeneration 
of the cities, the teachings of Canopean imperialism can be propagated as the 
word of the deities; the only hope for ‘strength and sanity’ depends on the 
submission of these people to the wishes of their Gods. A ‘safe and wise 
existence’ on Shikasta involves, above all, ‘a quiet attention to what is most 
needed from them, obedience’ (S 139). Counter to the purported first law of 
Canopus, the herdsmen are to be kept in subservience to their imperial leaders 
by way of religious obeisance.  
Johor’s disgust for the degeneration of the cities and the unplanned 
reproductive practices on Shikasta is not based on a concern about welfare, but 
about hygiene. His inability to touch the children borne out of haphazard sexual 
congress appears as mysophobia, reflected in his dirge for the orderliness of 
urban planning. The invention of Canopus as ordering force against the chaos 
of their colonised populations is, to recall Anne McClintock’s argument in 
Imperial Leather (1995), part of ‘the inventedness of historical hierarchies’ (8). 
While preserving the epistemological distinction between order-
chaos/colonizer-colonised, an obsessive-compulsive neurosis emerges as 
symptom of the psychological imbalance of an imperial power that has long 
translated its pursuit of economic supremacy via the appropriation of territories 
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as a civilizing mission. Johor’s response to the dilution of Canopean influence is 
to stage its propagation in what Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Claude Lévi-Strauss 
might understand as a ‘pure’ or untouched site of tribal peasantry, enforcing the 
sedimentation of Canopean instruction in a kind of primitive wonderland. As 
Jacques Derrida points out in his reading of Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques 
(1955), the assumption of an original, pure site indicates a reverse 
ethnocentrism, which continues to centre European man as ‘true humanity’, 
with ‘non-European peoples […] studied as the index to a hidden good Nature’ 
(Of Grammatology 115).   
The typological project of selection and ordering generates an obsessive 
anxiety in its perpetrators that cannot be resolved. Instead, it is distributed to 
the Shikastans through the promise of improvement, and the threat of 
degeneration. In order to ensure that the tribe follow out their instructions, 
Johor and Jussel invent a lineage of deific inheritance to transmit to the ‘most 
respected of the tribe’: ‘We told the most respected of the tribe, a male already 
old […] that in his veins ran the ‘blood of the Gods’, and his progeny would 
always remain close to the Gods, if they kept up the right ways’ (S 140). In doing 
so, the Canopeans distribute the double anxiety of inheritance and obedience: 
in order to guarantee the safety of the tribe, this lineage must be protected and 
maintained, alongside the transmission of knowledge and practices bestowed 
by the ‘Gods’. Johor and Jussel control the tribe with a genealogical imperative 
in which the responsibility of biological inheritance and cultural transmission 
are carried by a central family line, inventing a historical hierarchy that can 
perpetuate the invention of Canopean civilisation. The fact that this is a self-
conscious invention which still follows specifically eugenic governing 
techniques marks a break from the Galton-esque anxiety around racial purity 
depicted in Memoirs: Johor and Jussel deploy the mythology of genealogy to 
ensure that they will be able to track and manage the tribe, and to ensure the 
continuous perpetuation of a Canopean code of living, ‘without limit’ (Deleuze 
6). The anxiety about whiteness has been superseded by an anxiety around 
genetic usefulness, and the supremacy of (Canopean) whiteness is now implicit, 
the grounding assumption of its agents, rather than an overt or explicit project. 
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Haldane, Huxley and Transhuman Supermen 
 
In this section, I outline a historical context for reading the Canopeans as utopian 
socialists, through the transhumanist ambitions of the interwar eugenicists – the 
group that Kevles calls ‘the reformists’, particularly Haldane and Julian Huxley. 
Marx and Engels describe a critical utopian socialism – characterised by Charles 
Fourier, Henri Saint-Simon, and Robert Owen – which does not recognise ‘any 
historical initiative or independent political movement’ of the proletariat; 
instead, the utopian socialists ‘wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and 
endeavour, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force 
of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel’ (498; italics mine). I 
connect this description to the interwar eugenicists, whose interest in (and, in 
Haldane’s case, political commitment to) Marxism was compromised by a vision 
of themselves as the prototype for a tranhumanist future (both biologically and 
intellectually, as I explore), and their belief in eugenics as a way of achieving this. 
The reformists believed in the possibility of humanity transcending current 
limitations, and were eager to create a race of ‘supermen’ defined on the basis of 
intellectual capacity. This context of utopian socialism is the basis of my reading 
of the Canopean interplanetary imperial vision throughout the Canopus series, 
drawing Marx and Engels’s suggestive postulation that utopian socialists, in the 
name of peaceful progress, carry out their vision through ‘small experiments […] 
doomed to failure’ into my reading of Canopean (and Sirian) eugenic practices. 
The idea of being able to identify and isolate genetic material that codes 
for particular traits – intelligence, fitness, and so on – underlines the biological 
assumptions of the interwar eugenicists. Haldane is explicit about his interest in 
breeding supermen, expressing the need in biology for ‘men with a knowledge 
not only of the biological sciences, but of mathematics, physics, chemistry and 
sociology,’ arguing that ‘without such supermen, biology will break up into a 
group of isolated sciences divorced from one another, and from human life’ 
(‘Possibilities of Evolution’ 85). Haldane is speaking here not only of education, 
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but also of augmenting innate intellectual capacity. Biology needs more men like 
him, and being ‘like’ Haldane equates to carrying an innate (genetic) intellectual 
capacity, just as he had inherited the intelligence of his father, the physiologist 
John Haldane. This inheritance enabled him, in turn, to carry on his father’s 
legacy in mathematics. Haldane concedes that while ‘many of the “unfit” are unfit 
for society as it is today’, it is ‘often society’s fault’, and that ‘the attempt to 
prevent them from breeding really involves the appalling assumption that society 
as at present constituted is perfect, that our only task is to fit man to it’ (88). He 
claims that this is the reason why ‘eugenicists are generally conservative in their 
political opinions’ (88). If the above comments seem to contradict his complaint 
about ‘stupider sections of society’ breeding faster than the more intelligent, this 
is only at first reading. The underlying categories or ‘types’ of human as ‘stupider’, 
‘unfit’, ‘intelligent’ and ‘supermen’ remain, despite his small concessions to the 
failures of social infrastructure. The so-called reformists were certainly more 
cautious than their mainliner antecedents in their vision for biological 
intervention in human evolution, but the ideology of racial improvement and the 
idea of slowly eliminating the genetic stock of the ‘unfit’ for the sake of social 
improvement were upheld.  
Haldane writes that the ‘demand for talent’ in interwar Britain – partly a 
crisis of millions of men dying during World War I – ‘will probably not be met 
[in the next generation], for at present the stupider sections of society are 
breeding faster than the more intelligent in most civilized countries’ 
(‘Possibilities of Evolution’ 85), reiterating neo-Malthusian concern for 
overbreeding of ‘stupider sections of society’, even while not explicitly 
identifying where these ‘stupider sections’ might be found. He makes clear his 
stance on the possibility for eugenics, calling it a ‘hopeful sign’ for this trend: 
‘[T]he eugenic movement […] leads intelligent and healthy adherents to produce 
large families’ (85-6). This is crucial to situating Haldane’s own class-race 
preferences: eugenicists were all white, and most of them from wealthy if not 
aristocratic families. Haldane was part of a long line of titled intellectuals and 
academics, and his biographer notes that it was his greatest wish to populate 
England with little Haldanes; to his grief, he was unable to have children. Like 
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Fisher, he was also keen on birth control as a way of preventing the reproductive 
spread of these ‘stupider sections of society’ (86), although for him stupidity was 
not necessarily causally related to class.   
Julian Huxley’s affiliation with the reformists shows how close the group 
were to Galton and Malthus, both in terms of scientific racism and with regard 
to the need for population control. Huxley believed that eugenics would prove 
that ‘“Negroes” were intellectually inferior [to white Europeans]’ (cited in deJong 
Lambert 16). In the second volume of his autobiography, Memories (1973), 
Huxley writes that he has reached to the same conclusions as Malthus on 
population growth, and he published several articles on the necessity of birth-
control measures on these grounds. In an astonishingly callous footnote on 
Indira and Sanjay Gandhi’s coerced sterilisation programme in India, he writes: 
‘I have just read that Indians who are vasectomised are given portable transistor 
radios, so that any decrease in Indian numbers will be accompanied by an 
increase in Indian noise’ (Memories 151). On the subject of eugenics, Julian was 
at odds with his brother Aldous about the utopian possibilities afforded by it. 
Brave New World (1932) is an early fictional polemic against eugenics, and, 
according to Haldane’s biographer Ronald Clark, was the subject of intense 
debate on skiing holidays in Switzerland (Clark 43). That the reformists debated 
eugenics primarily within a small, closed group of wealthy white British men, 
working in elite institutions of British higher education and holidaying in 
Switzerland is relevant to considering both the narrowness of this group’s 
perspective, and the privileged position they were to disseminate these ideas to 
a wide audience. 
Lessing’s second autobiography reveals her particular interest in Haldane 
as a compelling and deeply contradictory character in her social circle. In 
Walking in the Shade (1998), Lessing recalls reading Haldane’s articles on science 
in The Daily Worker: ‘I knew people who bought the paper for these articles and 
read not a word of the rest,’ she writes (104). In her preface to The Sirian 
Experiments, she cites a sentence from Haldane’s 1927 essay, ‘Possible Worlds’: 
‘Now, my suspicion is that the universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but 
queerer than we can suppose’ (SE 9). She writes that Haldane ‘thrilled us all’ with 
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this idea (Walking in the Shade 104). She takes Haldane’s speculation on the 
inconceivable queerness of the universe as an opportunity to ‘make things up,’ 
rather than to add to ‘a confusion of embattled certainties’ (SE 10). Haldane’s 
words appeal to her because they contest such certainties, giving space for 
writers to imagine how queer the universe might be, through fiction. His words 
create a space for a queered existence (not described as such) by distancing 
perception from knowledge and releasing the imagination into the unknowable 
vacuum of outer space, a theme that I explore in more detail in The Marriages 
Between Zones Three Four and Five. Lessing’s engagement with this is 
imaginative: she is ‘thrilled’ by the scope afforded to the imagination, and to 
fiction, by vast gaps in human knowledge, or even the impossibility of conceiving 
where such gaps might be.  
In my readings of Marriages and The Sentimental Agents of the Volyen Empire 
(Chapters Two and Five), I argue that the eugenic responsibilities of Al Ith, queen 
of Zone Three, and Klorathy, agent of Canopus, are suspended in favour of 
exploring what I call a queer sociality, defined in the broadest sense as 
interactions that are not somehow bound to the improvement, reproduction or 
maintenance of the status quo. Drawing this autobiographical text of Lessing on 
Haldane into my reading of her space fiction, this suspension of the eugenic 
imperative for the sake of the queer and speculative exploration is also critical to 
her perception of Haldane as a highly conflicted figure. For Lessing, Haldane’s 
compelling ruminations on the radical uncertainty of life itself were countered 
by ‘embattled certainties’ in his political life. She hints at his didactic tendencies 
during Communist Party meetings in the 1950s. Describing Haldane in the 
context of these meetings, she writes, 
 
People like these were originals and, like all their kind, shared the 
characteristic that when they talked about the Soviet Union, every 
word was rubbish […] No one could say that the guests were a boring 
lot, but I found the atmosphere oppressive. I hated the smugness 
that went with being in that position - we, the clever minority, 
supporting the defender of the world’s working class. (Walking in 
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the Shade 104)  
 
The breadth of vision and originality that Haldane invoked in his popular 
writing on science did not tally with his appearances as a public defender of the 
Soviet Union. Lessing’s description suggests her discomfort with taking such a 
position of authority, as part of a ‘clever minority.’ Her 1985 novel, The Good 
Terrorist, describes a similar combination of ‘smugness’ and oppression in a 
network of Marxist activist groups, which, while lofty in principles, rot from the 
inside with the imprisonment of ideas into ideology and dogma. In the 
quotation above, as well as in her later writing, Lessing shows little patience for 
uncritical defenders of the Soviet Union, and she left the Communist Party in 
1956 after the Soviet intervention in the Hungarian Revolution.  
Haldane’s vision was tied into particular networks of power, notably the 
British Communist Party and the Soviet Union.5 Rather than dismissing this side 
of Haldane, and her concern with the implication of sovereign violence, Lessing 
incorporates her impatience with his political didacticism and implicit, perhaps 
unrealized privilege into her depiction of her Canopean rulers, whose 
(described) brilliance is countered by their imperialist agenda. While Haldane’s 
science writing opens a space of speculation about possible futures, his political 
persona represented a mode of campaigning which would lead these futures 
into worlds of his own design. Haldane’s commitment to the possibility of 
perfection, and the necessary limitation of other biological possibilities, 
represents an aporia in any kind of large-scale social ‘improvement’: what is 
being left out or obliterated, while something is made better? Haldane’s eugenic 
vision of human perfectibility, Lessing’s fascination with his science and her 
discomfort with his politics stage a conflicted dialogue between policy and 
science, which I explore further in Chapter Two in a discussion of Soviet biology 
and The Sirian Experiments.  
                                                 
5 In his preface to Ronald Clark’s biography of Haldane, Peter Medawar writes, ‘People who are 
tired of reading how lofty thoughts can go with silly opinions, or of how a man may fight for 
freedom yet sometimes condone the work of its enemies, have a simple remedy: they need read 
no further. But they will miss a great deal if they don’t.’ in: Ronald Clark, J. B. S.: The Life and 
Work of J. B. S. Haldane (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969).  
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Haldane’s politics were grounded in his vision for the improvement of 
society. He believed that the Modern Synthesis could contribute to this vision, 
by supplying eugenics with the genetic knowledge to create biotechnologies. In 
1925, he delivered a talk called, ‘Daedalus, or, Science and the Future,’ in which 
he predicted the artificial production of human embryos, a process which he 
called ‘ectogenesis.’ In Haldane’s imagined future, ‘ectogenesis is now universal, 
and in this country less than 30 per cent of children are now born of woman’ 
(‘Daedalus’ 42). In this future world, the men and women selected as donors for 
the next generation are ‘undoubtedly superior to the average’; this proliferation 
of ‘superior’ stock has prevented the collapse of civilization, which would have 
been brought about by ‘the greater fertility of the less desirable members of the 
population in almost all countries’ (Haldane 45). Science historian Mark B. 
Adams argues that Haldane and his generation of scientists ‘had grown up with 
the triumphs and promise of a new ‘experimental’ biology predicated on 
manipulating organic nature to suit human ends’ (473). The manipulation of 
nature for human ends held, for Haldane, emancipatory potential for saving 
mankind from an otherwise inevitable decline.  
A notable rejoinder to Haldane’s notion of ‘ectogenesis’ is Brave New 
World, in which ectogenesis ensures total state control over the production of 
human life. As Phillip Ball notes, while Huxley’s novel was written at a time 
when ‘science and technology were widely seen as holding utopian promise’, 
‘Brave New World can be read as a turning of the tide in terms of perceptions of 
what science would bring: from optimism to foreboding’ (Ball 338-39). While 
Haldane’s predictions seemed fantastical in 1924 (and even in 1932), several 
critics have observed that many have since come into existence. Lessing takes 
up the younger Huxley’s foreboding, and Canopus can be read within this 
scientific pessimism – or at least deep skepticism about the assumption that 
producing ‘supermen’ will lead to utopias. 
Haldane develops his eugenic vision in another essay, ‘The Last Judgment’ 
(1927), which portrays the control of human evolution to create a race fit to 
inhabit another planet, after humans have achieved total control over genetic 
inheritance, far into the future. ‘The Last Judgment’ was a direct influence on 
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Olaf Stapledon’s novel Last and First Men (1930). Lessing, in turn, cites Last and 
First Men in her preface to Shikasta. Stapledon’s novel describes the gradual 
perfection of man to ideal forms, ‘new and glorious human species,’ the evolution 
of men to super-men, over thousands of years. Perhaps through Stapledon, 
parallels between ‘The Last Judgment,’ Shikasta and The Sirian Experiments are 
numerous. Haldane writes about the future mastery of the planet and its 
resources, the control of human evolution, the destruction of Earth, the 
subsequent migration to Venus, the engineering of humans to suit the conditions 
of Venus, the emergence of a collective mind, and ends with the pending 
colonization of Jupiter. As in his essays ‘Possible Worlds’ and ‘Daedalus,’ 
Haldane’s imaginative vision of the universe and the potential of human 
experience within it provided inspiration for Stapledon, Aldous Huxley and 
Lessing, whether their writing criticised (as in Brave New World) or developed it 
(as in Last and First Men).  
 Yet whereas Haldane and Stapledon wrote about the possibilities for 
controlling human biology, Lessing’s novels place the biological engineering of 
humans on the same platform as pedagogy, in a topological demonstration of 
colonial power. Her discomfort with Haldane’s didacticism should be borne in 
mind: it prevents the argument that pedagogy is the ‘good’ to the ‘bad’ of 
eugenics. Pedagogic and eugenic practices involve the notion of improvement, 
and beyond this, population control. Enfolded within them are conditions of 
social typology and hierarchical division, and the spectre of utilitarianism. 
Lessing’s version of transhumanism – as biotechnological interference in human 
life – is not presented as a ‘good’ for mankind. Lessing’s distrust for Haldane and 
the ‘clever minority’ helps us situate her imaginary rulers in a landscape of 
inevitable failure: the improvement of society is a lost cause if it is directed only 
towards the perpetuation of a certain ideal of existence, as espoused by the 
utopian socialists.  
 
 
Whiteness on Trial in Shikasta 
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The last section of Shikasta stages the supersession of an explicit project of racial 
hierarchy (as in Memoirs) with genetic usefulness (as in Shikasta) through a 
Mock Trial of the ‘White Races’ by the ‘Dark-skinned Races’, which takes place 
in a Greek amphitheatre (S 374). The location makes clear that it is not just post-
Renaissance imperial capitalism on trial, but the very foundations of Western 
civilisation that should be called to account for the violence of racial typology. 
The Trial is narrated by Chinese secret agents spying on Johor/George, depicted 
as the new global empire on Rohanda/Shikasta. Comrade Chen Liu sends 
intelligence reports to the central administration in Peking about ‘George 
Sherban’ (Johor), the structure of reporting mimicking Johor’s reports to 
Canopus. This comes after Rachel Sherban’s diary entries, written to and for 
herself, in italic typography, a micro-narrative embedded within the vast 
mechanisms of global and interglobal competition. In this trial, which the Chen 
Liu interprets as a sign of the West’s deterioration and diminishing power, ‘John 
Brent-Oxford’ – the Canopean agent Jussel in human form – will defend the 
White Races against the prosecution of the Dark-skinned Races, represented by 
‘George Sherban’, the Canopean agent Johor. The irony of describing this as a 
‘Mock Trial’ is drawn on several levels: first, the difficulty of prosecuting an 
imperial ideology sustaining biopolitical governance in both core and peripheral 
territories; and second, that the trial simply pits one era of Canopean policy 
against a new one. It is a trial of Canopean sovereignty, an autoimmune gesture 
of eradicating, cutting or editing a violent colonial inheritance of racial 
hierarchy for the sake of a new order that promotes ‘genetic usefulness’, 
undertaken by ‘George Sherban’. 
The trial is rigged, a performance for the sake of stating a break with the 
past, while not changing the underlying preconditions. John Brent-Oxford is 
described as ‘the white villain’, a member of ‘the old British left’, brought to trial 
‘to defend an impossible case’ (S 385). It is not, then, a history of Nazi eugenics 
that Lessing invokes as the greatest crime of modernity, but an imperialist 
system that enforces a global standard of racial purity, in which the Shoah takes 
its place among a multitude of crimes within an ideology of ‘white’ genetic 
superiority, and the reduction of difference to phenotypic and cultural markers. 
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 The wider narrative here is the inescapability of Canopean sovereignty, 
which reflects its own power and influence back and forth across both sides of 
the trial. In the context of the Canopean Empire, the trial does not represent a 
break or even reconciliation with past horrors, but merely the end of one stage 
of imperialism and its replacement with another: the replacement of ‘racial 
hierarchy’ with ‘genetic usefulness’, or what Deleuze understands as the 
transition from a disciplinary society to a control society; as I showed in my 
reading of Memoirs, this transition does not obliterate the past, but merely 
changes the technological character of sovereign power. John Brent-Oxford 
stands alone, representing ‘the old British left’, accounting for the crimes 
committed by core nations under the justification of racial hierarchy, while the 
hybrid leader of the prosecution, George Sherban (Johor) stands for a 
multicultural, post-colonial democratic order, surrounded by supporters. Chen 
Liu reports, 
 
He has the ivory skin of a certain type of racial cross, but he is black-
haired and black-eyed and could easily be an Indian or an Arab. But 
visually, white-skinned. With him, a changing group of every 
possible skin colour. (S 382) 
 
Important here is the fact that despite his apparent ‘mixedness’, George Sherban 
is still recognizably and familiarly ‘white-skinned’. The reference to ‘ivory’ has a 
doubled connotation – as white pigment, as valuable commodity, and the slave 
trade; when traders could not get real ivory, they took cargoes of ‘black ivory’, 
that is, of slaves. George’s ‘ivory skin’ then situates his body in a colonial history 
of commodity exchange and slavery. His black hair and black eyes represent the 
phenotypic mixedness produced through interracial relations – another violent 
history, while his skin sustains the continuation of whiteness as governing ideal. 
This description shows the peculiar malleability of whiteness as a signifier of 
privilege, the criteria of which depend on the interests of a given climate or 
context.  
In the transition from what can be read as a nation-bound regulatory 
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system to a globalism based on deregulated transnational finance capital in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s in the Reagan-Thatcher era, George’s genetic 
mixedness – comprised of the ‘best’ stock of a number of differentiated 
phenotypes – represents the porousness and fluidity of a new economic system. 
The ‘Mock Trial’ is not called such because the defence John Brent-Oxford has 
been set up to mount is an impossible one, but because it does not identify a 
criminal, rather a governing force that continues to perpetuate itself, albeit in a 
slightly different dynamic. It is a self-effacing manouvre, putting Canopus on 
trial with its own past, for the sake of transforming a previous world-system into 
a global liberal multiculturalism, in which the ‘best’ of each locality is selected 
for breeding. This constitutes the biopolitical imperative to produce a hybrid 
child in Marriages, which I explore in Chapter Three.   
 The case of Zimbabwe makes an appearance in the trial, although the 
post-colonial nation would not be formally established until two years after the 
publication of Shikasta. The conquest and colonization of Zimbabwe is used as 
an example of the way in which the whites ‘saw their rule as educational and 
benevolent’ (S 403), and enables the process of national forgetting during the 
Rhodesian Bush War that allowed Britain to escape taking any legal or moral 
responsibility for the situation. A young Zimbabwean solider explains that this 
was possible because ‘the British people and their government always had a 
blind spot for us, we blacks did not count’, remarking on the uneven accounting 
of deaths – the death of one white carrying a meaning that the deaths of fifty 
blacks did not: ‘we were always nonpeople to them’ (405). Drawing in fictional 
witnesses for Zimbabwe’s war of independence, Lessing sketches a racialised 
division of what, in Frames of War (2009), Judith Butler calls ‘grievable life’: the 
one white is mourned where the fifty blacks are not. This is not a simple case of 
individual empathy or lack of such, but a structural incapacity to recognize these 
lives as grievable.  
Butler argues that if ‘the “being” of life is itself constituted through 
selective means’ (in the case of Zimbabwe’s colonial history, ‘white’ is a 
placeholder for ‘life’, where black is not) then ‘we cannot refer to this “being” 
outside the operations of power’ (1). Thinking through ontology in this sense as 
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‘the “being” of the body [as] one that is always given over to others, to norms, to 
social and political organizations that have developed historically in order to 
maximize precariousness for some and minimize precariousness for others’, 
Butler outlines a ‘differential allocation of precarity’ that either makes possible 
or denies ‘the body’s persisting and flourishing’ (2-3). In the case of the black 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia, the lack of grief around their deaths signals a 
breakdown or failure in ‘the epistemological capacity to apprehend a life’ (Butler 
3). This is what Butler means by ‘frames’: ways of ‘differentiat[ing] the lives we 
can apprehend from those we cannot’ (3). Within a phylogenetic system of racial 
hierarchy centred on whiteness, the apprehension of grievable life derives its 
determinations from the pseudo realm of human classification.  
 While whiteness takes centre stage at the Trial, the organisation of the 
camp housing the delegates slowly begins to unravel. There is no end to the 
supply of witnesses against the white man, but the atmosphere surrounding the 
Trial exceeds its topic:  
 
The prevailing mood was one of restlessness, dissatisfaction, a 
continual movement around the camp, from tent to improvised 
shelter, to mess tents, where debates and ‘seminars’ seemed 
continuously in progress, and from the camp to the shores […] All 
this did not mean that the sessions were not fully attended. The 
amphitheatre was crammed, attentive, centred on the events in the 
arena, from four until eight, and from five until midnight. But now 
they were less silent, intervened often in the ‘indictments’, adding 
comments and facts and figures. There was total participation 
between the audience and – I was going to say – actors. (S 409) 
 
The activity of the camp is analogous to a media storm, the dissemination and 
circulation of speech and discussion made possible by the Trial. The 
‘restlessness’ and ‘continual movement’ of the camp suggests it as a space of 
negotiation and flux, enabling ‘total participation’; the energy derived from the 
symbolic trial of whiteness puts things in motion. Hence, the ‘mistake’ of calling 
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the defendants/prosecutors ‘actors’ is an intended one; the performance of the 
Trial makes possible a renegotiation of social conditions. John Brent-Oxford’s 
defense is largely irrelevant; his role is to perform whiteness, without speaking, 
and the act of listening. The perpetual movement marks an epistemological shift 
in the categories of grievable life, wherein whiteness comes to stand for 
territorial competition. Again, this is the modulation of the control society 
taking the place of discipline and order. This is comparable to the transition set 
up in Memoirs between Professor White’s undeclared custodianship of the block 
of flats, and Gerald (and Emily’s) new authority over the anarchic children in a 
space from which they have attempted to strip the memory of an imperial past.  
In Memoirs, the utopian socialist Gerald replaces the pre-crisis ‘Professor 
White’, while the underlying reproduction of white leadership remains in place. 
In Shikasta, the (Canopean) Brent-Oxford is replaced with the (Canopean) 
George Sherban. The purpose of the Trial is not to indict John Brent-Oxford, but 
to establish George as a new leader, and with him, a new social regime of control. 
Chen Liu reports, ‘The “Trial” succeeded in elevating him to a position of 
undisputed leader and spokesman, even though he spoke, during the “Trial” 
itself, perhaps not more than a score of sentences’ (418). George leaves the novel 
overseeing the construction of new cities, en route with a delegation to Europe, 
the former centre. This route traces a desire for the eternal return to an 
imaginary origin, despite the performance of putting this origin on trial. The 
opening of the world made possible by the Trial leads to large-scale urbanisation 
of formerly peripheral territories, a globalised control society functioning under 
the guise of an implicitly Euro-US liberal multiculturalism, an argument to 
which I return in my reading of The Sentimental Agents of the Volyen Empire.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have read Memoirs of a Survivor and Shikasta as narratives that 
present the problem of whiteness and its continual reconstitution. Through her 
depiction of imperial scientific typology, its constitution and reproduction at 
moments of crisis, Lessing traces a continuous line from Enlightenment 
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conceptions of man, public participation and property embedded within 
biological discourse. The repeated iteration of a liberal individualism premised 
on the freedom of whiteness, and the subjugation of its other, defines the 
national project of Britishness and grounds it in a mythology of imperial origin. 
Maintaining a distinction between ‘reform’ and ‘mainline’ eugenics is more 
accurately understood – in the context of these novels – as an exercise in trying 
to forget the deeply violent and elitist implications of the utopian socialists with 
regard to their decisions over what constitutes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ stock, despite 
their benevolent intentions. 
2 
 
OPTIMISING THE WORKFORCE: 
BIG SCIENCE AND SOVIET BIOLOGY IN  
THE SIRIAN EXPERIMENTS 
 
While Memoirs of a Survivor and Shikasta depict the deployment of science and 
scientific racism in British imperial governmental policy, I read The Sirian 
Experiments (1981) as a critique of Soviet biology, situating this history as part of 
the emergence of Big Science in industrialised nations after World War Two, and 
competitive national science projects between the US, Western Europe and the 
Soviet Union. It was not just space exploration and nuclear power that defined 
Cold War science competitions, but also biological research in human 
improvement. Like Brave New World and Last and First Men, Lessing’s narratives 
explore the endgame of biological engineering. Moreover, they show the history 
of the transnational commitment to research in improving the biological 
capacities of humans as a competitive undertaking, directed towards the 
breaching of frontiers for further expansion. Throughout Canopus in Argos, 
changing the biological constitution of subjugate populations in order to 
improve them is always for the purpose of strengthening imperial power and 
increasing interplanetary domination.  
The key vehicle of this critique is what I call ‘epigenetic poiesis’, a term I 
use for literary and/or cultural representations of biological change that exceed 
mechanistic accounts of material life, in a broader conception of experiential 
effects on development, and of life as semiosis (I develop epigenetic poiesis out 
of scholarship on biosemiotics, as I explain later). I use this term to describe an 
emergence out of the habitual and coded, while also destabilising ‘the biological’ 
as a purely material category of observable effects. I suggest using epigenetic 
poiesis as a description for Lessing’s mode of engagement as a designation of a 
particularly philosophical intervention in the debate around determinism as 
such. Determinism can be read across biology and philosophy as the assumption 
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that what comes before necessitates what comes after; in biology, this refers to 
the idea that development can be reduced to material attributes – in this case, 
genes – and that genes are the programme for life itself. Epigenetic thinking in 
the post-genomic era complicates this view, not just in the attention paid to 
environmental influences, but also in the processes that cause epigenetic 
changes. I derive an understanding of ‘poiesis’ as an emergence, a chance event, 
which – in Alexander Düttmann’s words, following Martin Heidegger – 
‘estrang[es] use from the usual and the habitual, [and] always displaces us to 
another place’ (223). Following Samuel Stolton, poiesis ‘does not “create” but it 
is the renewal and materialistic manifestation of a presencing’ (‘Poiesis and the 
Art of Creation’). It provides a philosophical frame for thinking about epigenetics 
as it appears in literary and cultural representations, as part of a strand of 
thought that emphasises the importance of contingency, spontaneity and 
chance.  
Heidegger understands poiesis as a bringing-forth or emergence. Murray 
Cox and Alice Theilgaard argue that for Heidegger, poiesis is a ‘threshold 
occasion, a moment of ecstasis when something moves away from its standing 
as one thing to become another’ (23). Adapting this idea of movement from one 
state to another (which I return to in my discussion of biosemiotics in Chapter 
Three), I suggest epigenetic poiesis as a literary device to describe emergent 
change registered across biological and cultural experience. Through her critique 
of various kinds of biological determinism throughout the Canopus series, 
Lessing arrives at a version of biological change as making or action extended 
across various aspects of experience. In The Sirian Experiments, this manifests in 
environmental or social conditioning as a tactic of (inter)global governance. The 
narrative of the Lombis is part of this critique. Displaced from their home planet 
to another planet colonised by the Sirian Empire, the Lombis are studied for the 
sake of an adaptability experiment. At first, they appear to be a peripheral 
interest to the Sirians and are ostensibly dismissed from the narrative in the first 
third of the novel. Yet their ‘failure’ to adapt eventually leads to the end of human 
experimentation in the Sirian Empire, the marginal slave-force that ruptures the 
centre.   
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This is a structural correlation, rather than an ontological one. By drawing 
this frame into her narratives through evolutionary and genetic theory, Lessing 
uses the metaphor of epigenesis to explore the element of chance and response 
in biological processes and what gets passed on. The plasticity of biological 
potential allows for space to consider the effects of accident and supposedly non-
functional relations not as anomalies or ‘junk’, but as potential events of 
transformation. Epigenetic poiesis makes it possible to discuss a theory of living 
laid out in literary and cultural texts that is not itself restricted to the spheres of 
the political, social, economic and biological, but in which all of these 
differentiated realms of experience can be seen as altering and affecting change 
and inheritance. 
Previous criticism on The Sirian Experiments has interpreted Ambien II’s 
narrative arc as a development in her understanding and appreciation of 
Canopean influence as, in Ruth Whittaker’s words, ‘something that will enable 
her to fulfil her own potential’ (110). I focus here on analogous intersections 
between Sirian and Soviet policies, particularly with regard to the speculative 
claims about the possibilities for engineering human life. Lorna M. Peterson 
notes the dramatic change in Lessing’s attitude to the Soviet Union, from her 
optimism during the 1940s, to her trip with Naomi Mitchison in the early 1950s, 
to leaving the Communist Party in 1957, and her memoir on her trips to 
Afghanistan during the 1980s: 
 
No other nation, with the exception of those countries in which she 
has lived – Persia, Southern Rhodesia, England – has been as 
prominent in the writings of Doris Lessing as has the Soviet Union. 
The first home of communism, the leader of the socialist world, the 
invader of Afghanistan, these are some of the roles the USSR has 
played in Lessing’s life and work. (142) 
 
This change is marked by her gradual pessimism towards the Soviet project. I 
suggest that it appears in Canopus in Argos through her portrayal of the Sirian 
Empire. Sirian is a competing world-system to Canopus, rather than an inferior 
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one (as Ambien II’s transformation would have us believe). In the period of her 
space fiction, Lessing’s pessimism can be read into some of the abuses that she 
writes the Sirians inflicting on subjugate populations. By following The Sirian 
Experiments with The Making of the Representative for Planet 8, Lessing closes 
the ideological distance between Canopus and Sirius, representing instead 
different manifestations of eugenic violence.  
With regard to the science competition going on between Sirius and 
Canopus in the novel, The Sirian Experiments is also a speculative interpretation 
of Big Science in the Soviet Union after World War II, the turn to governmental 
investments in large-scale scientific research. The methodologies and projected 
outcomes of these experiments and studies were tied to the respective 
ideological projects of the Soviet Union and the Euro-US, and here I focus on the 
biological engineering of populations. Told from the perspective of an agent of a 
fictionalised version of the Soviet Union, the text stages the Soviet belief in 
environmental conditioning brought to crisis, mingling agricultural experiments 
of the 1930s with population studies of the 1970s, framing them within a wider 
project of Soviet development and expansion, as well as crisis management 
resulting from bad governmental policies. The agricultural crisis of the late 1920s 
and the early 1930s – the grain crisis leading to the effective starvation of millions 
in rural parts of the USSR – and the labour crisis of the 1970s, were two moments 
when the Soviet government needed to come up with ways of cultivating more 
resources; in the first example, food, and in the second, labour-power. To do this, 
Soviet scientists were enlisted to come up with effective solutions, and both 
moments saw the theory of accelerated adaptation as policy recommendation. 
The idea was that evolution of certain groups (of plant, of human) might 
accelerate in extreme climate conditions. The Sirian Experiments writes 
epigenetic poiesis as accelerated transformation not directed towards political 
ends, but for the sake of collective survival not embedded within governmental 
restriction or instrumentalisation of populations for governmental gain. 
A realist intertext here is Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago 
(1973), with the Lombis’ displacement from their home to an isolated planet 
comparable to the displacement of millions within the vast forced labour camp 
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system functioning like a chain of islands in the Soviet Union under Stalin. The 
Sirian Experiments imagines these camps through the sf trope of medical 
experiments, similarly to H. G. Wells’s The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896), where 
the eponymous scientist conducts brutal grafting experiments to create human-
animal hybrids. Like Doctor Moreau, The Sirian Experiments depicts the 
zoological boundaries of ‘human’ and ‘animal’ as arbitrary categorisations, which 
serve the purpose of dehumanising possible test subjects, drawing distinctions 
between imperial and subjugate populations. Ambien II repeatedly refers to the 
Lombis and other test groups as ‘animals’, despite their recognisably human 
features, and the purpose of this becomes clear, both to her and to the reader, 
through the course of the novel: to alleviate responsibility for atrocities carried 
out in the name of progress and development. 
Yet the example of the Lombis stages a resistance to this oppression not 
available within Solzhenitsyn’s realist text. This can be read as extending the 
conditions of the Beast Folk rebellion in Doctor Moreau, who stop following 
orders, with the Lombis’ biological adaptation also stating a form of refusal. 
Whereas Wells’s Beast-Folk carry out an active revolt against their master, 
culminating in the deaths of their oppressors, the resistance of the Lombis does 
not take the form of violence, but of epigenetic adaptations that make them 
useless for workforce optimisation and expansion under Sirian governance. 
Demonstrating a collective response to their changed environment across lines 
of ‘social’ and ‘biological’ experiment, they become ‘inutile’ for the Sirian grand 
plan, defunct and irrelevant. Importantly, this change happens through the 
emergence of a non-coded biological inscription which becomes part of what 
Lessing calls their ‘gene memory’. Like the Beast-Folk, the Lombis are eventually 
left to languish, no longer the subjects of Sirian interests. The violence of their 
displacement is not undone or reversed; there is no homecoming for them, but 
their adaptation enables them to subvert any further co-option into Sirian 
development programmes. This is survival, not progress. They are living a life 
‘decoupled from the ideological demands’ of Sirian expansion, to follow Dale 
Beran (‘4Chan’). This decoupling does not arise from a collective decision, but 
emerges out of chance. The Lombis’ accelerated adaptation to their changed 
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environment represents an ecstatic moment, a crossing over from one kind of 
being to another, frustrating, interrupting and destabilising the determinations 
of their imperial masters.  
 This version of epigenetic thinking as governmental policy allows a degree 
of scepticism about considering epigenetic research as a preferred alternative to 
genetic determinism in public health. While epigenetic adaptation emerges as 
an alternative, it is not as one empire in opposition to another, but rather as 
adaptation from below, in response to necessity. Lessing does not present 
epigenetics as an alternative form of developmental science in the name of 
governance – in this case, Soviet biology as a counter to Nazi eugenics or 
scientific utopian socialism in Britain. She uses this form of adaptation to place 
focus on the governing conditions which produce this extreme biological 
response. The Sirian desire for accelerated evolution through environmental 
conditioning for the purpose of optimizing their workforce and expanding their 
sphere of influence is frustrated; nonetheless, their experiments produce a 
response in their test subjects, which effectively cuts off the possibility of their 
being used for Sirian ends.  
 
 
Big Science and the USSR: Context and History 
 
In this section, I lay out a historical context for my reading of The Sirian 
Experiments as a narrative of Soviet biology, which puts in contrast research on 
and policies of epigenetic conditioning with manifestations of epigenetic poiesis. 
On his deathbed in 1964, J. B. S. Haldane spoke with praise for Trofim Lysenko, 
the Soviet biologist who, under Stalin, oversaw the banning of genetics as a 
‘bourgeois science’ and the imprisonment and execution of many Soviet 
geneticists. Haldane called Lysenko ‘a very fine biologist’ and said that ‘some of 
his ideas are right’ (in Paul, ‘Haldane and Lysenkoism’ 23). The praise is 
significant for two reasons: first, because it underlines the cross-pollination of 
scientific epistemology between the Soviet Union and Anglo-US, and second, 
because it highlights the troubled legacy of ‘Lysenkoism’ in post-Stalinist 
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biology. Lysenko was anti-Mendelian and a proponent of the theory of the 
inheritance of acquired characters in his agricultural experiments. At stake was 
also the legacy of Darwin: in Anglo-America, Darwin was allied to Mendel and 
mathematics (through T. H. Morgan in the US, and Haldane, Fisher and Sewell 
Wright in the UK); in the Soviet Union, Lysenko wanted to foreground the 
Russian biologist Ivan Vladimirovich Michurin’s ‘Creative Darwinism’.  
In his 1948 Lenin Academy speech (in which he banned genetics), Lysenko 
dismissed what he saw as Darwin’s errors – the Malthusian influence, the 
struggle of the species and its contribution to natural selection and evolution – 
and placed ‘environment’ as ‘the sole force that drives organic change and 
evolution’ (Schneider 147). Through Michurin, Lysenko also resurrected a form 
of Lamarckism in Russian biology, although he denied this was the case; he 
believed that organisms evolved through the inheritance of acquired characters 
in response to environmental stimuli. Lysenko’s ideas were compelling for 
socialist utopians who believed – like Haldane and Stapledon – that an ideal Man 
might be created out of environmental conditioning. While Lysenko’s 
agricultural experiments were failures, his political popularity in Stalin’s 
government during 1940s and 1950s reflected Stalin’s broader ideological interest 
in engineering an ideal Soviet man.  
The other history of Soviet medical biology invoked in The Sirian 
Experiments could be the Human Adaptability studies carried out during the 
1970s, which were part of the International Biological Program (IBP) initiated by 
C. H. Waddington, which was implemented between 1964 and 1974.  Added to 
this, the text’s focus on architecture, territory and population calls up the 
production of what Susanne Bauer describes as ‘genogenetic’ maps by Soviet 
scientists during the 1970s, through which scientists projected ‘genetic data onto 
geographical space’ using population studies and experiments carried out in 
places like the Pamir Mountains, the Caucasus and other ‘hard to reach’ rural 
communities under Soviet dominion (Bauer, ‘Population Genetics’ 146). The 
purpose of the IBP was to investigate ‘the biological basis of productivity and 
human welfare’, based on the ‘development and application of ecological 
principles’ (Smith 5). The IBP was an attempt to attract governmental funding 
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for ecosystem ecology, making large-scale ecological research into a government 
priority. Big Science also meant national competition: it came out of the 
Manhattan Project and the national space programme. However, the 
International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 provided a chance for ecologists to 
reroute the focus on technological development and instead to develop ‘a 
synoptic collection of observational data on a global scale’; the International 
Biological Program was to be a ‘model for the natural sciences to achieve the 
stature and reach of the experimental physical sciences’ (Aranova, Baker and 
Oreskes 183-4). The failure of the IBP to achieve this goal is not the focus here; 
rather, of interest in this chapter’s reading of The Sirian Experiments is the 
competitive nationalism between the Soviet Union and the United States, 
already playing out in the space race, through measuring human adaptability, for 
what it demonstrates about a transnational, in this case highly politicised 
development of epigenetic thought.  
The involvement of C. H. Waddington in the IBP is important to note, 
given his work on epigenetic inheritance; the notion of making research on 
environment-organism interaction a transnational priority reflects the cultural 
significance of epigenetic thinking, not as a peripheral interest, but as central to 
the history of Big Science as a programme of global science. Its failure to reach 
comparable prominence in the US is also significant, when considering the 
political and ideological priorities of the Soviet Union in contrast to those of the 
US, and how these played out in Big Science. Elena Aranova, Karen Baker and 
Naomi Oreskes attribute this to a conflict of methodologies and epistemic 
assumptions between the Big Science mode of research and those of many 
ecologists. In the Soviet Union, however, it was a different story. It is also 
important to note that while C. H. Waddington was a British biologist, his ideas 
were in competition with the Central Dogma of genetic flow published by Francis 
Crick in 1958, which reduced the passage of genetic information to a one-way 
movement from DNA to RNA to protein, modelling DNA as an immutable 
blueprint for the organism to express. Waddington’s model of an epigenetic 
landscape suggests instead that there are various ‘developmental pathways’ open 
to an embryo during foetal development, and proposed ‘genetic assimilation’ as 
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an evolutionary process through which acquired characteristics would become 
heritable. Erik L. Peterson argues that Waddington’s work did not have as large 
an impact in Anglo-American science as it might have done for three reasons: his 
support for process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, a lack of institutional 
support, and his marginalisation by the American neo-Darwinians (Peterson 
301). The Soviet investment in the ‘Human Adaptability’ area of the IBP – as 
opposed to the ‘Conservation of Terrestrial Communities’ take up by the United 
States – shows how developmental biology was already a Soviet concern.  
Eugenics in the Soviet Union was officially anti-racist, partly because the 
official stance was that under primitive communism, there were no human races, 
and that ‘race’ developed as the result of socio-economic conditions.6 The Soviet 
man would be a racial hybrid. However, Soviet nationalist policies during the 
1920s also reveal ‘Soviet anthropologists’ concepts of race and nationality’, which 
themselves ‘reflected attitudes prevalent in the European and North American 
discourse at a time before eugenics turned into a politically divisive issue’ during 
and following World War Two (Rudling 45). Soviet biologists Iurii 
Aleksandrovich Filipchenko, Nikolai Vavilov, and Nikolai Kol’tsov, among 
others, located ‘race’ in the blood ‘as a means of determining national or ethnic 
characteristics’ (Rudling 48). Racial anthropology remained a legitimate subject 
of study for Soviet biologists. Well into the 1970s, ‘Soviet racial anthropologists 
continued to chart the “racial characteristics” of various peoples in the Soviet 
Union, operating within increasingly dated paradigm of pigmentation, shape of 
eyelids, noses and lip thickness to racially classify human populations’ (Rudling). 
Eugenics in the Soviet Union did not involve the atrocities of Germany or the US 
along the lines of race. Pers Anders Rudling argues that Soviet eugenicists ‘aimed 
at establishing a Marxist, Soviet eugenics movement as part of a vision for a 
scientific organisation of society’ (46). It was not a question of exclusion, but of 
studying racial differences for the sake of eventual incorporation into the 
                                                 
6 US biologist Leslie Clarence Dunn visited the Soviet Union in 1927, and his textbook (co-written 
with Edmund Sinnott), Principles of Genetics (1925) was popular among Soviet geneticists. 
However, the chapter advocating eugenic policies was removed in the Russian version, because 
– according to the translator’s preface – its ‘outmoded bourgeois capitalist ideas […] have no 
relevance for our body of citizens’ (deJong Lambert 19). 
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Communist project, getting closer to the Socialist man, along the lines of 
progress and productivity. 
The influence of Lysenko on research in genetics was not total; genetic 
thought was not eradicated, and when it reappeared as a legitimate field of 
research, it remained allied to the ideological and political interests of Soviet 
industrial development. Susanne Bauer writes, ‘Despite Lysenko’s influence on 
the Soviet life sciences, the terms genetics and cytogenetics began to reappear in 
medical research during the 1950s, yet they remained an “underground science”’, 
moving to radiation biology and mutations research (‘Mutations’ 164). By the 
mid-1960s, Lysenko was declared a fraud and was condemned by Soviet 
geneticists for ‘causing great damage to Soviet agriculture’ (Graham 1). Despite 
Lysenko’s fall from grace, his influence over Soviet biology – namely, his 
fundamentalist environmentalist stance – meant that genetics in Russia from the 
late 1960s bore this inheritance. An epistemological fertilisation of Mendelian 
genetic calculability and Lamarckian plasticity occurred. This meant that it was 
the Soviet Union, and not the West, who led the way in the 1970s ‘adaptability’ 
experiments of the IBP.  
The genogeographic maps produced in the late-Soviet period were one of 
a number of public health policies in the Soviet Union during the 1970s geared 
towards the ‘optimisation of the workforce’. Bauer notes that while Western 
approaches tended to try to ‘preserve the alleged backwardness of the 
populations they termed “unique”,’ that ‘Soviet science policy was to overcome 
the isolation of these communities’ and draw them into the labour force of the 
Soviet Union (‘Mutations’ 168). This difference in approach can be elicited in The 
Sirian Experiments’ account of difference between Sirian and Canopean methods 
and aims of and for biopolitical governance of outlying populations. The 
ideological ambitions of Euro-US geneticists were more transparently directed 
to eugenic utopias; the Soviet interest in environmental conditioning continued 
throughout its history. While the early Soviet commitment to ecological research 
and environmental conservation was overtaken by fast-track industrialisation 
under Stalin, as Kunal Chattopadhyay argues, the difference between Soviet and 
Western studies on the subject of human adaptability shows that in the former, 
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what are now regarded as epigenetic ideas were central to Soviet Big Science 
(‘Rise and Fall’). Despite the attack on Soviet ecology by I. I. Prezent and Lysenko 
on the grounds of productivity, and the suggestion that scientific theory should 
be used to ‘enhance economic competitiveness with the West or [to] 
ideologically justify’ Stalinism (Chattopadhyay, ‘Rise and Fall’), Lysenko’s 
agricultural biology merged productivism with an ideological commitment to 
environmental influences.   
 
 
Lysenko, Vernalisation and the Lombi Experiment 
 
I read The Sirian Experiments as a critique of Soviet biological research under 
Stalinist and post-Stalinist productivism, rooted in the idea of enhancing the 
relation between human and the environment for the sake of industrialisation 
and workforce optimisation. The Sirian Experiments can be read through this 
history as mingling two moments of Soviet science policy and imagining the 
implications of their fusion, a project implicit in Soviet ideology but never fully 
realised: the cultivation of Soviet man through environmental conditioning. 
Imagining the implications of the fusion of Soviet biology and ideology into a 
speculative future makes sense of Lessing’s deployment of future fiction to 
explore these ideas. This emerges most notably in the Lombi experiment, which 
involves the displacement of 30,000 ‘underdeveloped’ people to a remote and 
challenging climate, and monitoring their adaptation and progress (or, in this 
case, their lack of it, according to Sirian criteria). The Lombi experiment mingles 
two centrally planned economic programmes undertaken for the sake of national 
development under the sign of collective organisation: Lysenkoism during the 
1940s and the genographical studies of the 1970s. 
In 1948, at the peak of his powers and influence in the Party, Lysenko was 
responsible for banning genetics altogether as a ‘bourgeois science’; this was 
partly a reaction against Nazi abuses of Mendelism, but also because genetics 
itself is allied to a notion of property passed on through a genealogy, a profoundly 
anti-Communist idea. Soviet science research under Stalin was undertaken in 
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alignment with Soviet political ideology. The context of Stalin’s purges and an 
atmosphere of paranoia meant that Russian scientists went to efforts to justify 
their research along the lines of Marxist-Leninist ideals. DeJong Lambert writes 
that during this period, ‘Scientists no longer criticized one another, they 
“unmasked” and “exposed” dangerous ideas’ (24). During this time, Lysenko 
oversaw the expulsion of many Soviet geneticists to gulags or – in the case of 
geneticists Theodosius Dobzhansky and Hermann Muller – propelled them to 
seek exile in the United States.  
Lysenko applied the idea of environmental conditioning to agriculture 
during the grain crisis of 1927-29. He was part of the turn to utilitarianism in the 
Soviet Union at the end of the 1920s, ‘growth-oriented and rather statist, […] not 
interested in maintaining the integrity of ecological systems [but] willing to trim 
ecological issues to fit them into political and economic goals created without 
ecological consideration’ (Chattopadhyay, ‘Rise and Fall’). The intersection of 
politics and biological science in the Lysenko affair, prompting H. G. Wells, 
George Bernard Shaw and J. B. S. Haldane to weigh in, was a transnational 
controversy, challenging the idealistic perspective of Soviet science among 
British socialists. The ‘sordid affair’ prompted Foucault to write Madness and 
Civilisation ‘within the horizon of […] questions’ of ‘power and knowledge’; he 
argues that ‘science’ and ‘ideology’ can be understood as interwoven into power 
and knowledge, that science is already embedded into the ‘relations with the 
political and economic structures of society’ (‘Truth and Power’ 109). Foucault’s 
choice of Lysenko as an explanation for his thinking around power and 
knowledge – rather than the more obvious example of Nazi eugenics – is 
significant because of an argument he wants to make specifically about ‘post-
Stalinist Stalinism’, which ‘exclud[ed] from Marxist discourse everything that 
wasn’t a frightened repetition of the already said’ (110); he writes, ‘the price 
Marxists paid for their fidelity to the old positivism was a radical deafness to a 
whole series of questions posed by science’ (110). Loren Graham notes that 
‘“Lysenkoism” became a synonym for pseudoscience in Russia and indeed around 
the world’ (Ch. 1). 
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The Lombi experiment evokes Lysenko’s technique of ‘vernalisation’: the 
accelerated development of wheat plants for the sake of adapting seeds to sprout 
in colder temperatures, alongside the ‘adaptability’ studies on Soviet citizens 
carried out by state-funded medical biologists in rural areas of the USSR during 
the 1970s. Both these examples uphold an ideological narrative of cultivation and 
expansion. The Sirian Experiments can be read alongside the application of 
Lysenkoist experimentation in the context of adaptability experiments, taking 
the idea of environmental conditioning into the realm of human 
experimentation. Read this way, Lessing’s novel brings into relief the long-term 
influence of Stalinist policy on habits of post-Stalinist Soviet governmental 
practices, characterised by the mapping and exploitation of territory and 
population by central administration for the sake of expansion, the suppression 
or annihilation of defectors or those considered ‘inutile’, and emphasis placed on 
collective productivity rather than collective living. While productivity requires 
the objectification of the body for the purposes of extracting bio-energy, 
collective living is based on the agency of subjects over the use of their own 
biological resources. There is a marked despondency in The Sirian Experiments 
about the direction of the Sirian project, and its massive human cost. Lessing 
intermingles images of plantation, ghetto and gulag throughout the novels to 
underline a world-historical continuum of disciplinary subjugation in which the 
USSR played its part.  
The Sirian Empire succeeds a feudalist regime of serfs and aristocrats, a 
recognisable representation of Tsarist Russia. Ambien II’s description of Alikon, 
the society preceding Sirius, resembles Soviet historiography on Imperial Russia. 
Alikon is, according to Ambien II, ‘a rigid and militaristic society, based on 
limited natural resources, whose ruling caste maintained power by use of a 
repressive religion, keeping nine-tenths of the population as labourers, slaves, 
and servants’ (SE 80); there is no account of the takeover of power which led to 
the development of the Sirian empire, but this former society bears strong 
resemblance to the former Russian Empire (1721-1917). The ‘ruling caste’ of 
Imperial Russia was an absolute monarchy through which power was transferred 
by genealogy through the divine right of kings, and the ‘repressive religion’ can 
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stand here for the Russian Orthodox Church. Social positions were divided into 
nobility, clergy, merchants, Cossacks and peasants; the latter made up 80 per 
cent of the population in 1913. Closing the distance between Alikon and Sirius 
would also mean eradicating the differences in social organisation, and also 
between Canopus and Sirius. Ambien II’s rhetorical disavowal of certain features 
of the previous system charts a series of differences between Sirius and Alikon: 
90 per cent of the population in Alikon are ‘labourers, slaves and servants’ rather 
than, as in Sirius, bureaucrats and educated people in urban areas, and groups 
waiting for ‘civilisation’ in the rural areas, with limited resource extraction. 
Alikon is defined through limits and restrictions of resource distribution, 
territory and governmental genealogy; Sirius by expansion and development of 
a utilitarian kind. This is in opposition to the geographical restrictions and 
‘natural order’ of the previous regime.  
 Lysenko’s name first appeared in the Soviet press in 1927, as the grain 
crisis was taking hold. In the early 1930s, famine in the Ukraine was leading to 
people dropping dead in the streets. The first five-year plan for a new programme 
of mass industrialisation followed: collectivisation through the mass conversion 
of 25 million private farms to collective farms, involving the deaths of 
approximately three million kulaks (land-owning peasants). Lysenko had a key 
role in determining the biological justifications underpinning collective farming. 
During the grain crisis, Soviet scientists were asked to consider ways of 
innovating agricultural productivity, and Lysenko, the son of a kulak, was 
stationed at a research station in the Caucasus to find crops suitable for freezing 
conditions (deJong Lambert 22). Lysenko invented a method called 
‘vernalisation’: ‘the transformation of winter-habited plants into spring habit’ 
(deJong Lambert 22). Literally, ‘making spring-like’. It was an idea he had taken 
from his farmer father, Denis, who had sown winter wheat in the spring after 
keeping seeds in a sack under snow (he had been hiding them from grain 
collectors during the grain crisis). Upon planting, he saw that these seeds 
produced exceptionally high yields. Lysenko promoted vernalisation and its 
miraculous results, and it was imported as an official agricultural policy.  
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 The Sirian Experiments depicts three kinds of biological experiment that 
can be read through Lysenko’s experiments on plants. Lessing translates these 
into experiments on humans, not just plants. The populations that undergo 
experimentation are colonised groups relegated to sub-Sirian (sub-human) 
categories. For Lysenko, plants go through what he calls ‘phasic development’, 
determined by environmental conditions such as sunlight, temperature, 
humidity, chemical elements in the soil and gases in the atmosphere. Graham 
notes that Lysenko chose to ignore genetic theory when it came to determining 
biological development: ‘He believed that the whole cell, not some constituents 
in it – was the carrier of heredity’, an approach that reflected his commitment to 
analysing the interaction between organisms and their environments (Ch. 6). 
There was nothing new in this line of thought, which had been developed by 
cytologists in France, Germany and Belgium. Lysenko believed in the inheritance 
of acquired characteristics – which he called the ‘internalisation of 
environmental conditions’ (Graham Ch. 2) – and saw this ‘materialistic theory’ 
of environment-organism relations as essential to understanding biological 
development. For Lysenko, breaking the hereditary stability of an organism 
could happen in three different ways: first, placing the organism in different 
environmental conditions; second, grafting a variety of plant onto another; third, 
crossing forms differing markedly in habitat and origin. 
 Similarly, the experiments depicted in The Sirian Experiments on human 
subjects are conducted through regulating or recreating changes in atmospheric 
climates, and measuring the subjects’ response to them. This involves displacing 
these subjects into radically different environments. Vernalisation involved 
interrupting the growth period of winter wheat by sowing it in a very cool 
temperature for around two months, using snow. This was supposed to hasten 
the plants’ flowering by exposing them to low temperatures. After this 
vernalisation treatment, the temperature of the environment was raised. In the 
Kooperatorka experiment, the surviving plant flowered in September rather than 
spring (when it normally matured) which to Lysenko proved the efficacy of the 
experiment. Lysenko went further: on the premise that the grain from the 
accelerated-maturity plant would have inherited this acquired characteristic of 
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early maturation, he took grain from this plant, sowed it in a greenhouse, and 
this flowered at the end of January. After three generations, he announced that 
the ‘“habit” [of the grain] had been converted’ (Graham, Ch. 6). He argued that 
there was no separation between phenotype and genotype, and defined heredity 
as, in his words, ‘the property of a living body to require definite conditions for 
its life, its development, and to react definitively to various conditions’ (‘Heredity 
and Its Variability’ 55). The Sirians’ experiments are based on a set of 
assumptions about different ways of enforcing accelerated evolution among the 
subjects of their experiments, for the sake of progress and development. Early in 
The Sirian Experiments, Ambien II describes this as the ‘duty of more evolved 
planets to guide and control’ the development of others’ (41). The test subjects 
are disposable experimental material, the ‘broken eggs’ necessary for the 
omelette of Sirian development (245). 
 
 
Genography and Crisis Management  
 
The Lombi experiment is undertaken as a response to a crisis of Sirian expansion; 
similarly, Lysenko’s plant experiments demonstrate the uses of science to resolve 
problems created by bad governmental policy. Lysenko’s biology emerged as a 
solution to an agricultural crisis, involving the compulsory expansion of a rural 
state labour force to supplement the urban workforce; the Lombi experiment is 
undertaken because the Sirian Empire requires ordinary labour power. It is an 
attempt at crisis management, the Sirians’ response to a lack of manual labourers 
in the Sirian Empire and their consequent desire to expand into new territories 
for the Sirian intellectual class to inhabit. There is an indirect correlation at this 
point in the narrative to a second moment of Soviet biology: the production of 
genographic maps as part of Soviet public health policies in the 1970s, and the 
expansion of Soviet labour. Ambien II’s descriptions of the Lombis are 
reminiscent of nineteenth century anthropological descriptions of indigenous 
peoples in Africa and South America by European colonial agents, who – in social 
anthropologist Alan Barnard’s words – ‘invented the hunting-and-gathering 
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“Bushman”’ as ‘specimens of a race very different from and quite inferior to the 
European’ (23; 20). Employing the typological rhetoric of race and behaviour 
enables the desubjectification necessary for the utilitarian project. Lessing 
gathers together imperial anthropology and Soviet population studies in order 
to connect the exclusionary violence of their practices. While race studies in the 
Euro-US tend to be focused on maintaining a narrative of white supremacy, in 
the Soviet Union, race figures differently. For Bauer, the genographic maps evoke 
race as one of a number of ‘absent presences’, including ‘heredity, eugenics, 
national, [and] colonialism’, and a holism that ‘may generate again classificatory 
violence and impose new taxonomies and exclusions’ (‘Population Genetics’ 163).  
 At the beginning of The Sirian Experiments, Ambien II explains that the 
Sirian Empire needs to expand its labour force because the home population has 
‘evolved beyond certain levels’ and that this ‘made it impossible for them to do 
certain kinds of work’ (SE 31). Despite efforts in population reduction, the Sirians 
find themselves with ‘hundreds of millions of “surplus” people’ without ‘enough 
ordinary labourers’ to carry out ‘different classes of unpleasant and degrading 
work’ (SE 31-32). To deal with this labour crisis, the Sirians decide to make use of 
colonized populations in order to expand Sirius proper into peripheral Sirian 
territories. The Lombi Experiment is initiated because Sirius wants to make one 
of their colonised planets – Colonised Planet 23, ‘a barren planet, waterless, all 
rock and sand and extinct volcanoes’ – ready for the ‘Thinkers’, those evolved 
beyond the capacity for ‘ordinary’ labour (SE 33). The Sirians need labourers to 
clear the ground and to build structures in which the Sirian Thinkers can live. 
These structures have to be ‘self-contained, with their own climates and 
atmospheres’, ‘domes of a controlled environment’ (SE 33-34).  
 They find this labour in an as-yet uncolonised planet, Planet 24, a Sirian 
‘discovery’ which they have recently ‘found and explored’ (SE 35). There they 
‘find’ a group that they name ‘the Lombis’, which Ambien II describes as a 
population of ‘animals […] of simian type, using four legs or two according to 
need,’ using language akin to a colonial anthropologist documenting the colonial 
‘discovery’ of a new species (SE 35). The Lombis are social, living in families, 
tribes and smaller groups, with a knowledge of fire and hunting and ‘at the very 
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beginnings of an agriculture’ (SE 36). Ambien II’s final comment places these 
observations in a utilitarian key; she notes that ‘their main characteristic was 
adaptability’ (SE 36). Identifying their capacity for adaptability as their ‘main’ 
feature tells us more about Sirian plans for their use. To follow Barnard, Ambien 
II ‘invents’ the Lombis through an already-established set of bio-anthropological 
criteria in order to claim them as Sirian property. Conceptually, this invention 
depends on the mapping of genetics to physical territory. In order to register as 
biologically displaced, the Lombis have to come from an original site. This 
displacement, as social narrative, becomes important for both the failure of the 
Sirian experiment, and the adaptation that the Lombis actually undergo.  
 The Sirians attempt to accelerate evolutionary change in the Lombis to 
cultivate a population in accordance with Sirian ideals of civilisation, placing 
proto-epigenetic theory into policy and practice. USSR population studies in 
remote areas were ‘conceived as a means to modernise, providing a scientifically-
grounded public health system and making these communities part of Soviet 
socialist modernity’ they were also ‘more directly related to a mode of human 
adaptation, if not enhancement, that was part of the Soviet project’ (‘Mutations’ 
167-8). There are repeated examples of these kinds of experiments being 
conducted throughout The Sirian Experiments, with both Canopus and Sirius 
targeting ‘hard to reach’ populations and carrying out different kinds of research 
and experiments on or with them. While the Canopean agent Klorathy is usually 
found in some kind of didactic relationship with the groups under his 
surveillance, Ambien II details many Sirian experiments involving high altitude 
studies. She describes an experiment involving space-lifting 30,000 ‘species 
members’ to ‘a plateau hallway up a mountain range that had sparse but 
adequate food, and a wet changeable climate’, and leaving them there ‘to adapt’ 
(SE 187). These experiments demonstrate a conceptual link between people and 
territory in a way that pushes an epigenetic instrumentalism into government 
public health.  
 I suggest that the depiction of Sirian experimentation in Lessing’s novel 
can also be read alongside Soviet biomedical studies in the Soviet Union into 
scientific practices for optimising the workforce. Studies in the 1970s targeted 
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different professional groups for the sake of increasing their productivity; most 
notably, factory workers, railway line workers and construction workers.7 Bauer 
notes that many Soviet population geneticists also focused on ‘communities 
living in extreme conditions, including either industrial exposure or extreme 
climates’ (‘Mutations’ 167). In 1977, there was a study carried out on the ‘adaptive 
physiology’ of high altitude populations, measuring the capacity to work, 
physical performance and ‘adaptive capacity’ of local communities, and even 
whether these high altitude conditions could be used for therapeutic purposes 
(‘Mutations’ 168). In terms of genetic and evolutionary theory, the scientific 
presuppositions of these experiments, while ‘situated in a genetic paradigm, […] 
were also compatible with some of Lysenko’s postulates’ about short-term 
evolutionary change, or the idea that populations could adapt over the course of 
a generation to extreme environmental changes (‘Mutations’ 168). The 
experiments allied genetics to the ideological predominance of ‘nurture over 
nature’ in Soviet life sciences during the 1930s and 40s.  
 The combination of biomedical surveillance with expansion and 
settlement projects of the 1970s echoes Ambien II’s descriptions of Sirius’s 
development initiatives and adaptability studies. The Soviet studies were geared 
towards optimizing the working conditions and the workforce itself; more 
broadly, they were about ‘humankind’s capacities to response to changing 
environments and aimed to find physiological principles on adaptation to new 
conditions, which included contemporary and future workplaces and, possibly, 
outerspace’ (Bauer, ‘Mutations’ 168). These studies were undertaken for the 
purpose of Soviet development, concerned with how to achieve the highest levels 
of productivity out of citizen-workers. This purpose evokes the teleology 
(‘agapasticism’, or evolutionary perfectibility) of Lamarck: the idea that evolution 
moves towards the progression and amelioration of species. It also suggests that 
this forward movement can be seized and conditioned by governmental 
                                                 
7 One study followed the workers who moved with the construction of the Baikal-Amur 
Magistrale, a railway line going across Russia, from Tayshet to Bratsk. Construction of the BAM 
line began in the 1930s, with the Tayshet to Bratsk section of it being built by inmates of the 
Bamlag gulag. Construction of the railway in the 1970s opened up the BAM service area to 
thousands of young people, with new settlements and bridges built. 
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intervention, a situation registered in the novel. In keeping with the Sirian desire 
for improvement, Ambien II says that the Sirian technicians watch the Lombis 
‘closely, constantly, for signs of the familiar demand for more, for higher, for 
better’ (SE 41); that is, for the innate capacity for ‘more’ to exhibit itself in the 
Lombis.  
 Ambien II describes the Sirian experiments in a racialised anthropological 
register, and the Lombi experiment is specifically grounded in the creation of a 
racialised sub-species of human. Ambien II writes, ‘[T]his whole experiment was 
based on an attempt to keep, just for once, a race on a subservient level’ (SE 47). 
The aside, ‘just for once,’ a break in speech to parenthesise the experiment as an 
anomaly, also functions to justify it. ‘Just for once’ articulates a biological caesura, 
the explicatory parenthesis correlated to the caesura in the biological continuum 
created by the Sirians’ invention of the Lombis as a separate race, a textual 
caesura standing in for a division in power. It represents the biological caesura 
that the Sirians place between themselves and the Lombis. In their treatment of 
the Lombis, exemplified here and throughout, the Sirians fulfill Foucault’s three 
criteria of biopolitical control in Society Must Be Defended: first, through 
relations between man and the environment; second, charting and mapping 
experiential phenomena (natality and mortality rates) through observation in 
order to distinguish and describe constants and anomalies; third, to collect these 
observations into population data, and to make predictions or estimations based 
on statistical ‘facts’, biopolitical governance working always towards ‘the level of 
generality’ (245-46). Governance of the Lombis is reduced to the merely 
(ostensibly) biological, and merges their life processes into a technological 
ordering of life itself for the sake of Sirian development.  
 
The Lombis and Transgenerational Epigenetic Immunity 
 
I have so far explored the historical analogy of Soviet biology in The Sirian 
Experiments. I now explore the theoretical implications of what I identify as 
epigenetic change in the text, which I call ‘epigenetic poiesis’. Epigenetic change 
emerges in the Lombi population, but as a form of resistance to further capture; 
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in this sense, the ‘epigenetic’ experiment works, but not for Sirian gain, but as a 
socially-coded and biologically cultivated protection of the group against their 
enslavers. The Lombis exhibit what I identify as transgenerational epigenetic 
change in response to the threat of recapture and a repeated displacement, a 
physical adaptation to an extreme climatic change, which emerges as their flight 
response (restlessness, fitfulness) as an inherited protection against a historical 
attack. This can be allied to Darwin’s thesis in The Origin of Species about species 
survival, which he linked not to strength as an individual trait, but to adaptability 
as a general capacity, a feature that would ensure species could become ‘better 
designed for an immediate, local environment’, the emphasis being on 
‘immediate, local’ rather than towards a loftier, a-temporal goal of biological 
perfection. While the Sirians associate adaptability with getting stronger, the 
Lombis’ seeming incapacity for (Sirian norms of) development enables them to 
survive. One of the challenges that epigenetics poses to Herbert Spencer’s 
doctrine of ‘survival of the fittest’ – ‘the preservation of favoured races in the 
struggle for life’ (Principles of Biology 444) – is the idea that changes can occur 
that do not fit criteria for ‘good’ or ‘progressive’ adaptation. Holding these ideas 
in mind, I suggest that the Lombi experiment brings forth a form of survival that 
allows the Lombis to develop outside the determinations of Sirian conditioning.  
 There are contemporary descriptions of epigenetic processes of change 
and inheritance, appearing forty years after the publication of the Canopus in 
Argos novels, which nonetheless resemble the kind of change described by 
Lessing’s protagonists. Molecular biologists Oliver J. Rando and Kevin J. 
Verstrepen describe epigenetic inheritance in terms of ‘rapid phenotype 
switching’ (660). Epigenetic changes can account for what look like accelerated 
evolutionary change across generations, and take a number of forms. In the case 
of the Lombis, the inheritance of DNA methylation patterns and RNA molecules 
are particularly relevant. DNA methylation occurs in cells and controls gene 
expression, silencing or activating the expression of genetic material; progeny 
might inherit the state of a gene as it has been silenced or activated in its 
ancestors; this means that genetic material long silenced can be expressed, and 
that this new activated state can be inherited by future offspring. RNA – 
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ribonucleic acid – is the transcription or copy of a strand of DNA (as micro RNA) 
that is then translated into a protein.  
 Moreover, these changes can travel between different ‘surfaces’ of the 
body, challenging August Weismann’s thesis that germ cell material cannot be 
changed. Biologist Oded Rechavi argues that small RNAs have the ‘potential to 
serve as transgenerational carriers of somatically-acquired traits’ in the 
movement of regulatory RNA molecules between cells and tissues (213). This 
means that silencing can travel between different somatic surfaces, including the 
germ line. As Rechavi points out, this thesis challenges the so-called ‘Weismann 
barrier’, which argues that the material in the germ line is impermeable and 
immune to external influences. Rechavi argues that the biological purpose of the 
transmission and inheritance of small RNA could be to ‘establish the foundation 
for transgenerational genome immunity’, against viruses already experienced by 
previous generations and to defend against transposons (215).8  
 However, Rechavi also notes that it is important to acknowledge that 
some epigenetic effects ‘favour’ invading viruses and ‘establish an inherited 
susceptibility’ (218). Crucially, epigenetic effects are not always tied to the 
Darwinian principles of survival or selection, but can limit survival potential in 
subsequent generations. This caution is intriguing, as it shows how radical the 
epigenetic proposition is: Darwin’s positioning of selection as the central driving 
force of evolutionary change, and its accompanying assumption that adaptation 
works along the general lines of survival and improvement, is undermined by the 
idea that an organism’s ‘negative’ response to the environment can be 
transmitted and maintained in its progeny. Rather than evolution working at the 
level of a discrete individual in a top-down instruction system, this presents a 
more horizontal image of adaptation, where different processes going on within 
and outside ‘the individual’ can affect and alter the constitution of future 
offspring. Epigenetic events propose an assemblage understanding of organisms 
as part of open systems, made vulnerable and always host to various kinds of 
molecular dialogue. The roles of different kinds of RNA in epigenetic inheritance, 
                                                 
8 Transposons, or ‘jumping genes’, are DNA sequences that can change position within genome, 
sometimes leading to or reversing mutations. 
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as well as the inheritance of genes in states of activation or silence, complicate 
questions of genetic engineering – which will become important in the following 
chapter – as well as the general story of evolution as a more or less progressive 
narrative, and the idea of genetic determination at the point of fertilization.  
 These descriptions of epigenetic processes challenge epistemological 
orthodoxies around genetic inheritance. Given the possibility afforded in 
speculative fiction to imagine alternative modes of transformation, I identify the 
changes undergone by the Lombis as ‘epigenetic’ for two reasons: first, because 
they undergo accelerated change that cannot be accounted for in a version of 
evolution in the Modern Synthesis, by which adaptation takes place slowly and 
change occurs incrementally, but which occurs through what Rando and 
Verstrepen call ‘complex switching mechanisms to reach the seemingly simple 
goal of turning genes on and off’ (660). The adaptation of the Lombis in response 
to a sudden climatic change takes place ‘outside’ the genome in psychological 
and physiological responses translated into a set of physical reflexes. They exhibit 
a heritable defence reflex that does not change their fundamental phenotypic 
constitution, but constitutes a change in the way they move and use their bodies, 
as I explore below. This can be identified as ‘stochastic switching’, which, 
according to biologists Murat Acar, Jerome T. Mettetal and Alexander van 
Oudenaarden, occurs when ‘cells in the wild have to face and surmount the 
challenges raised by random fluctuations in extracellular conditions’; these 
might include changes in temperature, pH, and concentrations of nutrients and 
toxins (Acar, Mettetal and Oudenaarden 471). They argue that this is not simply 
a question of gene-environment interaction. More radically, these changes can 
be induced due to the ‘phenotypic heterogeneity in genetically identical cells’ 
(471). That is, cells which may be genetically identical, containing the same 
genetic information, may be different with regard to phenotypic diversity. In 
response to stressful external conditions, a cell might ‘“blindly” anticipate and 
survive environmental changes by randomly switching among multiple 
phenotypes, each fit to a particular environment’ (471). This is a ‘strategy’, in 
Acar, Mettetal and Oudenaarden’s words, for ensuring that at any given time, ‘an 
optimal fraction of the population is prepared for an unforeseen environmental 
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fluctuation’, allowing the population ‘to act at a faster timescale’ in response to 
sudden environmental change (474).  
 I read the Lombis’ adaptation as speculative, not empirical, restricted to 
the possibilities of sf rather than a realist depiction (or prediction) of biological 
adaptation. Rather, the narrative takes up the concept of epigenesis and writes it 
as a form of resistance, and as resistance. When Ambien II goes to report on the 
Lombis for the first time after their forced displacement to Planet 25, the Lombis 
have developed a new characteristic: ‘restlessness and fitful energy’, which 
Ambien II describes as a ‘physical change’ (SE 45). Is this change purely physical? 
Seeing Sirian technicians approaching them, the Lombis ‘ran to find cover and 
disappeared’, meaning that ‘it took days for the first encounter’ (SE 44). 
Moreover, while ‘none of [the Lombis] remembered, as individuals, their capture 
from their home planet and subsequent events,’ they ‘remembered as a race: this 
was the most important change: their speech had evolved’ (SE 44; italics mine). 
This is an epigenetic moment; the memory of capture and forced labour has been 
transmitted at a collective level, and is correlated with their development of 
speech. The collective memory requires the development of speech as inscription 
as creating place to hold it, and has become a shared-out experience, not 
restricted to one or two people per generation but through the whole group. This 
implies that the Lombis’ capacity for speech has happened not because of their 
innate predisposition towards ‘adaptability’, but because the task of 
remembering their traumatic history makes it necessary to develop speech in 
which to place it, ‘not over the business of day-to-day maintenance of life, but in 
this one direction: they had songs, and tales, that instructed them in all their 
history’ (SE 44). The necessity of historical instruction over daily communication 
has inscribed a kind of ‘gene memory’ of oppression out of which their capacity 
for speech has developed. The Lombis’ fear of the Sirian visitors, their evasiveness 
and hiding away, their furtive and suspicious interactions; their commemoration 
of their traumatic history also recognises that their initial displacement can be 
repeated for the benefit of outside interests. By hiding away and by developing 
the physical capacity for spontaneous flight, they (attempt to) protect 
themselves from re-capture. They reconstitute the social bonds of their ancestors 
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through this mingling of fear and suspicion, but also their shared efforts to 
ensure that such an event will not be repeated.  
 The Lombis are in some sense successful. If their survival depends on 
avoiding re-capture by hostile powers, then this is what they achieve. The Lombis 
are left on Planet 25, diagnosed as incapable of development by Ambien II. When 
she re-visits them for a third time, she finds that they have not ‘advanced’ beyond 
the family or tribe as social unit which ‘seemed to be retarding them’; they live 
in shelters as ‘crude’ as before, they continue to hunt and to use fire, but they 
have not ‘progressed’ in their development (SE 119). She wonders if this signifies 
their innate inferiority, understanding their failure to develop according to Sirian 
aspirations as a fundamental biological weakness: ‘The point was that the Lombis 
had no capacity for development, or seemed not to have,’ she concludes (SE 119). 
The narrative game played here between the assumed distance between Ambien 
II’s description and the Lombis’ activities as they appear to a reader is that the 
Lombis have adapted, but this adaptation has converted ‘dread’ of re-capture into 
social and physical habits: 
 
In the daytime the Lombis ran about, and attended to their 
sustenance, but at night they gathered with the first sign of the sun’s 
going into their groups and pressed together around their little fires, 
cowering and waiting for that moment when a rock, or leaf, would 
emerge greyly from the thick black and tell them that they had once 
again survived the extinction of the light. (SE 120-21) 
 
Ambien II describes this scene with a tone of pathos; for her, the Lombis have 
created monsters of their own imagination, without knowing their intended 
purpose in the grand Sirian narrative of progress and development. For her, their 
invention of gods and monsters as a means of protecting themselves against 
further capture is a symptom of their stunted development. The Lombis have 
been conditioned by the Sirian experiment, but not in the way that the Sirians 
hoped: not towards Sirian benefit, but in the direction of self-protection against 
known invasions. The Lombis' narrative shows on one hand the Sirian failure of 
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forcing accelerated development, but also can be likened (although not reduced 
to) an anti-colonial strategy of identifying the needs of the master, refusing to 
fulfil them, and thus avoiding further exploitation. The Lombis are left to 
languish by the Sirians on Planet 25, no longer required.  
 The failure of the Lombi experiment is a disappointment to the Sirians. 
This failure is displaced into a grander mistake, not an error of process but a 
fundamental epistemological flaw in Sirian governance. Ambien II’s description 
of Lombis’ suffering is a turning point in the narrative, precipitating her 
realization of the violent after-effects of the Sirian experiments. She observes, 
 
The planet was a dark one, by nature and position. The Lombis must 
have had it in their gene memory the knowledge that nights could be 
lit with infinite variation from a star hanging so close it seemed like 
a creature, a living being – and changing from a full and bright disc 
to the tiniest of yellow cracks one had to peer towards and watch 
for… and then up flash the stars, giving light when a moon is 
temporarily absent. (SE 120) 
 
The reference here to daybreak stands as an intertextual reference to anti-
colonial, pan-African poetics in the 1960s and 70s: specifically, Aimé Césaire’s 
repeated phrase in Notebook of a Return to a Native Land (1939), ‘au bout du petit 
matin’ - at the end of daybreak, and Frantz Fanon’s invocation of Keïta Fodéba 
in the chapter on national culture in The Wretched of the Earth (1961): ‘Dawn 
was breaking – dawn, the fight between night and day. But night was exhausted 
and could fight no more, and slowly died’ (183). Contrary to her previous 
observation that the Lombis have no capacity for development, Ambien II 
recognises a different form of writing: the inscription of cultural memory on 
genetic memory, activated in response to the pure terror of their daily existence. 
To follow Heidegger, they ‘dwell poetically’ (212), the everydayness of an 
inauthentic Being-in-the-world which, as Alexander Di Pippo has argued, 
became Heidegger’s conception of poiesis, rather than positing it as an original 
site of truth (14). The Lombis have written the constitution of the stars as they 
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appear to them, a cosmology that collapses space-time into a present 
continuous, reading celestial bodies as fellow creatures and the objects of their 
environment – rocks and plants – as night watchmen; they have fashioned an 
ecology of oppression, in-so-doing decapitating the imagined power of the 
sovereign; the colonial agent is no more fearsome than the total darkness.  
In Ambien II’s description there is the recording of what Fanon describes 
as ‘a body of efforts by which a people has created itself and keeps itself in 
existence’ (188), a quasi-national culture formed not by the construction of a 
pre-imperial folklore long since forgotten, but out of struggle, and not for the 
purpose of expansion, but survival. The Lombis’ survival is a feeble chorus in a 
silent bush, an effort of existence, not available for capture by governmental 
transhumanism. Ambien II’s recording of it translates this effort as critique, as 
political activity, disrupting Sirius’s claim to world-building power.  
 
 
 
 
Evolution by Chance: The Lombis and Epigenetic Poiesis 
 
The Lombis are the first example in The Sirian Experiments of a process that I 
describe as epigenetic poiesis. I have chosen to use this term because it conveys 
the speculative element of their transformation as a creative endeavour subject 
to chance, while also linking it conceptually to the field of biosemiotics. 
Biosemiotics looks at forms of living adaptation occurring through the 
communication and interpretation of signs, while also destabilising 
epistemological categorisations of experience (atmospheric, biological, verbal, 
emotional). The idea of evolution by chance was foundational to Darwin’s theory 
of evolution, distinguishing his from the teleological theory of Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck. Charles Sanders Peirce, whose triadic semiotic theory is foundational 
to biosemiotics, uses this idea in his semiotic account of evolution. For Peirce, 
tychism (evolution by chance) in Darwin is ‘the support of a vital freedom which 
is the breadth of the spirit of love’; through this, he argues, ‘we may be able to 
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produce that genuine agapasticism [evolution by creativity, as in Lamarck] at 
which Hegel was aiming’ (CP 6, 293-5). This interest in chance and creativity as 
the ‘support of a vital freedom’ is intrinsic to Peirce’s semiotic, and also to 
biosemiotics. Distancing his own inquiry from Hegel’s faith in a ‘method of 
inclinations’, Peirce develops a notion of semiotic movement (adaptation) from 
experience, with the constraint of fallibility (error, risk, loss) drawn into his 
deductive method.  
 I derive the concept of epigenetic poiesis from the Peircean concept of 
evolution by chance as a semiotic process (an ongoing process of interpretation). 
Epigenetics allows biosemiotic thinkers such as Eve Jablonsky and Marion Lamb 
to suggest modes of biological inheritance that occur alongside genetic 
inheritance. The Lombi experiment throws up something unexpected, departing 
from Sirian teleology, and disrupting the fundamental structure of Sirian 
governance. This disruption eventually leads Ambien II to criticise Sirius and 
‘contaminate’ her fellow rulers with dissent, and the breakdown of Sirian 
sovereignty. The Lombis adapt to the new environments they are placed in, but 
this adaptation cannot be used in any productive sense by the Sirian developers. 
They have an epigenetic response to their new environment, expressing the ‘gene 
memory’ of their traumatic past. While the Lombis become adapted to their 
environment through Sirian intervention, their kidnapping and relocation 
produces a kind of genealogical trauma, preventing them from being of further 
use to the Sirians. This results in the experiment being considered ‘inutile’ by the 
Sirians, and the Lombis diagnosed as being incapable of development (SE 117).  
 The question of whether trauma can be inherited is a prominent debate 
in current writing on epigenetics, given the uncritical attachment of cause and 
effect in popular understandings of genetics. Biologist Rachel Yehuda’s paper, 
‘Holocaust Exposure Induced Intergenerational Effects on FKBP5 Methylation’ 
(2015), generated much publicity. However, objections were raised to the idea of 
heritable trauma by, among others, Ewan Birney, who questioned the small 
sample size (32) and the basis of the study in blood (‘Why I’m Sceptical’). 
Significant here about the idea of heritable trauma is not its scientific plausibility, 
but the imaginative challenge to narratives of progress and strategies of 
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resistance based around a coherent ‘I’: that is, the thinking being as a discrete 
body in a series of calculable interactions with its environment, reducible within 
a typological, statistical framework of life itself. Rupturing the coherence of ‘I’ 
also means, to an extent, destabilising the integrity of governing structures based 
on the calculation of citizenship via one-person counting as a vote. The idea of 
inherited trauma functioning at a collective level, which disallows individual 
development in the name of group survival, destabilises the functional integrity 
of ‘I’ – as identifiable civic actor – in the public sphere. In Rogues, Jacques Derrida 
states this formulation through the challenge posed to the base unit of 
calculation in democratic governance – one person = one vote – and asks,  
 
What is to be done with what is called the unconscious, and thus 
with the spaced divisibility, the hierarchized multiplicity, and the 
conflict of forces it imposes on sovereign identity? How many voices, 
how many votes, for an unconscious? (54)  
 
While this question about the political implications of psychoanalytic 
formulations of ‘the self’ for democratic calculation seems removed from the 
biological, the possibility of inheriting states of minds through a biological 
genealogy complicates the idea of political action restricted to a common 
identity that excludes others. To take a stand for or against something is to 
construct the self (again, individual or representative of a collective) into a 
coherent place of origin, to articulate a goal or a set of demands.  
 In the case of the Lombis, this place of origin is an absence, a void, and it 
is on this basis that they organise their sociality, and this which is transmitted to 
future generations: a ‘gene memory’ of absence. Ambien II’s observation that 
they remain confined to tribal and family groups, and by implication that they 
have not developed into individual units that will make up a civic commons, is 
also an observation about a lack of political consciousness. Yet the Lombis have 
made this lack into the basis for their mode of living; it informs their culture and 
forms their motor memory into an inherited flight response.  
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 The Lombis remake their relation with the world in response to what, for 
them, are chance events. They respond collectively, rather than as individuals. 
They are described as being ‘constantly on the move, changing their residences, 
their plant-gathering places, their watering places’ (SE 45), to prevent the 
repetition of their capture. Their restlessness and fitfulness represents a physical 
adaptation to a psychical conditioning, part of their socialization as animals by 
the Sirians, with few resources for self-protection and survival. Their restlessness 
reflects, rather than contradicts, their ‘fearful and secretive’ states of being; their 
monthly rituals commemorate their ancestral abduction. Ambien II describes 
them as developing into ‘a race of strong, indeed violent, contradictions’, intent 
on hiding from ‘strangers from the skies’ (Sirian technicians) arriving in a similar 
manner to those who took them away from their homeland; at the same time, 
the Lombis wait for rescue from these strangers, to be returned to what they call 
their ‘real home in the skies’ (SE 45). This is recognizably a retelling of the 
transatlantic slave trade and plantation trauma, which Lessing mingles with a 
Soviet history of adaptability experiments. Trauma motivates the interpretation 
of their surroundings, leaving a mark that is expressed across generations 
through shared memory.  
 The Lombi narrative is not a Hegelian narrative of master-slave, wherein 
the Lombis develop self-recognition in relation to their masters. The Lombis 
disappear from the text as a failed experiment. Yet they also deposit a memory 
in Ambien II that ends up unravelling her position as colonial administrator, 
making it impossible for her to continue her work as Sirian bureaucrat. They 
leave the memory of an adaptation without an identifiable purpose for Sirian 
interests, at once caused by Sirian biopolitics and also emerging to frustrate 
Sirian purpose. The Lombis’ adaptation has no use but for their own survival. 
This is not a willed resistance, but a survival response, not the intention to 
dismantle or to resist their slavery and abandonment, but the emergence of a 
gene memory that carries the trauma of their past. 
 The Lombi experiment is a narrative of epigenetic poiesis, a remaking 
through response to chance events, and the shared experience of displacement 
and suffering. This shared experience inscribes an epigenetic mark in the Lombis’ 
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gene memory, passed down from generation to generation, a change that does 
not leave a trace in their DNA and cannot be captured by Sirian technicians, but 
which works for their own benefit, rather than that of their Sirian captors. It is a 
manifestation of freedom, in the sense that it expresses the decision of the 
Lombis to live, to carry on living, and to manage the threat of their future 
annihilation. The Lombis create their world as a vehicle for their own survival, 
in dialogue with the environment which produces their response to it. This 
response is not a calculable transmission and translation of information across 
borders of organism and environment, but constitutes their world. Following 
Peirce, the Lombis’ evolution arises out of chance responses necessitated by the 
requirement to interpret their place within this new environment, not directed 
towards a particular end, but a creative, emergent and ongoing process.  
 Jesper Hoffmeyer calls this ‘semiotic freedom’, which Wendy Wheeler 
describes as a kind of flourishing, the ‘the richness of our semiosis; our contacts, 
our ability to be heard and responded to, our sense of being supported and 
effective in a rich number of ways’ (109). While this might appear as a fantastical 
or imprecise way of understanding living, as well as a highly idealized reading of 
the Lombis, who after all do not seem (to Ambien II) to be flourishing, Wheeler 
means something different to Ambien II’s use of ‘development’. The Lombis do 
not develop according to Sirian needs, but they flourish according to what they 
determine as their own. Their stress and fear are mediated by their responses; 
this is not an ideal way of living in the sense of Canopean harmony or Sirian 
utility, but nonetheless it is a kind of politics. This politics is not dependent on 
the calculation of a voting body, but on the commemoration of an absent centre, 
the knowledge of a lack; it is not apophatic in the sense of describing their gods 
in the negative, but in acknowledging the absence of their own knowledge about 
their origin. This ambivalence, a psychic state of epigenetic poiesis, is closer to 
an apophatic humanism – a knowledge of themselves as ‘not’ being where they 
should, living in the hope that they might one day be returned to a place they do 
not remember. Their existence is not centred on accepting or welcoming, but on 
escaping and returning. Their future is directed towards filling this lack.  
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Multicultural Inequality and Biosocial Ambivalence in Koshi 
 
Developing the idea of ambivalence as a psychic state of epigenetic poiesis, I turn 
in this section to Ambien II’s description of the city of Koshi later in the novel. 
Koshi resembles a contemporary world city under rapid and uneven 
development. Here I draw the ambivalence of the Lombis out of the analogy of 
the Soviet era and resistance to workforce optimisation, to a discussion of 
migrant working classes in contemporary world cities, which do not function 
evenly with regard to governance, but which house contradictory and conflicting 
political organisation. The Lombis’ ambivalence in the face of the Sirians’ 
attempted instrumentalisation of them introduces a way of thinking through 
anti-coloniality as an ongoing and often ambiguous or even undetectable project 
of the present moment, when viewed from a top-down perspective. (This 
discussion foregrounds my reading of Planet 8 as a text of anti-colonial resistance 
in Chapter Four.) While the Lombis represent the invention of a rural periphery 
by an imperial centre, The Sirian Experiments also explores experimentation 
in urban design and construction by neo-imperial centres. This necessitates 
the displacement of workers from around the various territories to urban centres 
in order to carry it out, resulting in the ‘mixture’ of different ‘types’ in informal 
and unregulated spaces (from the perspective of the typologising governing eye). 
This goes beyond the example of Soviet biology, foregrounding a contemporary 
moment of urban living: the era of the ‘multicultural’ megacity, and various sites 
of biosocial resistance.  
I use the term ‘biosocial’ to refer to the sociality of metabolic systems, in 
terms of the relations produced through ensuring the continuation of metabolic 
function (more simply, survival), between humans and non-humans, inanimate 
and animate matter, and how biosociality designates living spaces. This extends 
Paul Rabinow’s concept of biosociality as the social relations and identities 
formed through knowledge of genetic or biological conditions, when new 
genomic technologies of diagnosis and intervention create new possibilities for 
(or restrictions to) life for medical subjects, changing social and ethical practices 
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(Rabinow 183). I extend Rabinow’s concept first, to include non-human subjects, 
and second, to pivot his focus from biosociality constructed through knowledge 
and diagnosis, to biosociality arising through metabolic dynamics. Rabinow’s 
suggestion of new biosocial identities takes for granted that subjects have access 
to information about their genetic or biological conditions, and is therefore 
restricted to a rarified context of individualised and pre-emptive healthcare. My 
use of biosociality – social relations that arise through the necessity to keep 
metabolic dynamics going – allows a discussion of peripheral subjects engaging 
in ongoing negotiations with their environment for the sake of survival, often 
past the point of hope.  
After her trip to see the Lombis, Ambien II visits Koshi, a sprawling urban 
centre in what appears as an African plain. She narrates an aerial view of Koshi, 
hovering over it in her spacecraft:  
 
The first thing to be seen here was that it had experienced recent 
growth, that it bulged and spread out to the west in large suburbs of 
shining white villas and gardens. These covered more ground than 
the old city, which was earth coloured, and composed of densely 
crammed buildings from which rose tall cone-shaped towers. In 
other words, there was a disparity between the rich and the poor – a 
punishable disparity, to my mind. Gardens of an ornamental kind 
spread around the western suburbs. Market gardens lay to the south. 
To the east, the poor mud-coloured dwellings ending in the shabby-
looking semidesert. The great city on its eminence in the plain had 
lost its vegetation almost entirely. (SE 132) 
 
Ambien II’s noting of architectural colour is implicitly racialised, colours 
corresponding to a class divide: the ‘shining white’ of new developments split 
from the ‘earth’ and ‘mud’ of slums. The new city is a brightness of clearly-drawn 
lines between organic growth and concrete growth, manicured ‘gardens’ for the 
purpose of decoration instead of ‘vegetation’, or any complex ecosystem weaving 
– beyond human intervention – life as biomass. The old city sucks in life, rising 
 109 
upwards in vertical slums, incorporating detritus as population density, an 
urbanisation of the word ‘earth’ that forces it out of any kind of naturalist 
idealism, into the exclusionary mechanism of the ‘disparity between rich and 
poor’ (SE 133). While the white developments ‘bulge’, the earth-coloured ‘old city’ 
is crammed, jammed, out of space. The architectural incongruity designates an 
incongruity between the inhabitants dwelling in the two sections of the city; it 
brings a class difference into the infrastructure of the polis.  
However, this articulation is only perceptible from the air; on the ground, 
foliage is made to function as a ‘natural’ barrier between the two. Landing in the 
old city, Ambien II notes, ‘all I could see of the rich suburbs were a mass of trees 
in which I knew the houses were disposed’ (SE 133). In the air, the boundary 
between ‘new’ and ‘old’, the disparity between rich and poor, is visible as a feature 
of urban planning; on the street, the ‘new’ becomes something hidden from view, 
behind a ‘natural’ boundary, impermeable to the residents of the ‘old’. In the old 
city, surveillance is simple, and for this reason, development in the old city is 
restricted. The governability of the old city is built into the limits of city 
development. The tall cone buildings in the old city are not tall for want of space 
– ‘there was all the space that any system of governance could possibly need’, 
outwards into the plain – but because ‘tall tightly populated buildings are easily 
policed and supervised’ (133). They seem to Ambien II ‘rather like certain ant 
heaps’ (133); the reference to scale signals the reduction of humans to insects or 
small creatures made possible by this urban design. 
In this densely-packed space, Ambien II perceives the ease with which 
organic matter mixes, noting the ‘very varied genetic mix’ of a group of men, 
‘probably traders’:  
 
I fancied I was able to see in them the high moulded cheekbones and 
wide-set eyes of the old giants, as well as the sturdy set of the natives, 
but this group of twenty or so were quite extraordinarily mixed, of 
several skin tones, and with grey and green eyes as well as the more 
familiar brown. (SE 133-4) 
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Ambien II’s perception of ‘mixed’ genetic origins is in line with her typological 
perception of living beings. An efficient colonial administrator, populations can 
be reduced to types on a phylogenetic tree of increasing complexity through her 
diagnostic gaze. Her perception of the genetic mixing based on their phenotypes 
signals her own biopolitical surveillance; like a good anthropologist, her gaze 
connects the (as-yet-unconfirmed) social position of the men as ‘traders’, and 
the exogamous reproduction enabled by a system of global capital. Genetic 
material is disembodied, fixed not to people but to territory: the native land has 
been mixed with a foreign soil. Her description reduces the inhabitants to 
geographically-determined gene clusters, where particular genes ‘code for’ 
certain facial traits (nose, cheekbones, eyes).  
Yet as she explores further, her attempts to typologise the residents of 
this part of the city falter. While Ambien II fixes her diagnosis of the traders as 
‘mixed’, this is an effort to typologise a situation that she finds overwhelming 
and chaotic, to assert a degree of control, if only by exercising a mental habit 
that has been such an important feature of Sirian governance. She is following 
procedure, activated by uncertainty into the ethnographic mode. The cramming 
of Koshi’s old city’s ‘crooked streets and lanes’ is not just the habitation of 
physical space by people, but what urban geographer AbdouMaliq Simone, 
writing on Jakarta, calls the ‘interweaving of temporal rhythms’ in ‘a built 
environment littered with projects of all kinds, full of consolidations, fragments, 
remnants and repetitions’ (‘What You See’ 229). Similarly, Ambien II observes 
the material traces that put the city into motion. These rhythms are not just 
social, but also biological – they are the metabolic rhythms of various strategies 
of survival going on in proximity to one another. The traders that Ambien II 
encounters are, for her, composed of the temporal rhythms of different genetic 
expressions – their appearance of ‘mixing’ articulates a history of global 
movement and commerce. Her observations as she wanders through Koshi’s old 
city fix a Malthusian gaze onto the interactions of its inhabitants: 
 
This was a sad and to-be-pitied people, I could see, even more now 
the night had come, and they were taking their ease. They were 
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drunken, often fighting, tense with deprivation, and the degraded 
females dominated everything, openly selling themselves, and 
retiring with their customers no further than into a doorway, or 
under a table. (SE 136)  
 
Ambien II places reproduction at the centre of this nightly performance of 
degeneration: it is the sex workers who ‘dominated everything’, reproducing the 
chaos of the section of the city with unplanned and unregulated assignations. 
Meaning is not fixed; sex here is not for the sake of marking and maintaining a 
genetic inheritance; these areas will be repopulated by the illegitimate products 
of paid sexual exchanges, the results of public sex between strangers.  
In contrast, Simone finds a space that continually escapes the 
ethnographer’s gaze, who must instead try to enter these rhythms of experiment 
and manoeuvre, in the uncertain hope of sensing a transformation or two. 
Where Ambien II sees ‘shacks and hovels [and] swarms of people’ in Koshi (SE 
134), Simone reads ‘collaboration and reciprocity […] each street and lane 
characterised by a hotch-potch of the old and the new’ (230) in Jakarta. For 
Ambien II the old city is motivated by fear of local officials and harsh 
punishments – ‘I knew that the inhabitants of the city were afraid’ – assuming 
that their experience is organised around the threat of governmental 
recrimination; for Simone, ‘collaboration and reciprocity’ are ‘experimental 
devices whose aim is not usually to cohere to an emergent social body or 
concretize a collective-to-come’, practices that ‘do not produce a zero-sum 
game of clearly identifiable winners or losers’, nor necessarily ‘work towards 
enhanced levels of solidarity aimed at securing clear political objectives’ (229); 
these practices do not try to guarantee representation, because such 
representation would mean exposing and fixing practices into responsibility and 
contribution, no longer the realm of the immediate and local, but subject to the 
governing mechanisms of sovereign power. 
Simone reads Jakarka’s ‘majority world’ – which I read alongside Koshi’s 
old city, separated from the luminescent hidden world of prosperity by a border 
of trees – as perpetually at strike, a present continuous striking, seeking 
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temporary entry to the ‘right procedures’ only for the sake of setting particular 
processes into motion, borrowing resources, commodities absorbed into a flow 
of conditional exchanges. In Simone’s view of the city, the uneven combination 
of single and multi-storey, the density of bodies, the ‘mixtures of residences’ 
embed residents ‘in a built environment that facilitates or constrains particular 
comings and goings, visibilities and vantage points, soundscapes, inputs and 
evacuations of raw materials and waste, along with public exposure and private 
containment’ (229-30). This is not a valorisation of ‘making do’; Simone observes 
that this heterogeneity is also tied to the necessity of governance, however 
unevenly and informally legislative rule plays out in practice. The ‘new’ city, 
converted from ‘multiple registers of use and ownership into the exclusive 
prerogatives of private property’, is somehow outside this governability, not ‘a 
simple assignation of specific rights’ but a ‘modality of clarity that need not 
engage in the messiness of negotiations and transaction costs’ (230). ‘Clarity’ here 
can be read as corresponding to the ‘shining white’ villas of Koshi’s new divisions, 
the precision of the gardened borders that ‘obviate the need for regulation of 
externalities.’ This minority, core world of private property development – which 
‘bulge[s] and spread[s]’ to the west of Koshi – squeezes the margins for 
acceptable behaviour and daily life in the urban periphery. The world of infinite 
resources constrains the world where resources are in short supply. 
The jamming and cramming of Koshi’s periphery makes the concept of 
‘property’ ambivalent, and this extends to biological property. It is not the old 
city, but the white shining world that is not subject to regulation, hidden behind 
a ‘natural’ boundary, a space of economic exclusion and genetic purity, 
untouched by the bodily exchanges of chance interactions between 
differentiated types. When Ambien II notes mixed genetic origins in the old city, 
attaching the feeling of fear and threat to this diagnosis, she implicitly articulates 
an anxiety around mixed-race reproduction happening by chance, while also 
assigning these ‘variations’ to the socio-economic status of ‘traders’. It is one 
thing to breed new hybrid forms, to extract with intention the most desirable 
aspects of one race and combine them with the most desirable aspects of 
another, but the unplanned and unchecked mixing she observes in Koshi’s old 
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city has nothing to do with imperial ends. If anything, the mix of giant with 
native dilutes the ‘good’ stock of the giants with the ‘degenerative’ stock of the 
natives: a waste of good genes. Trading, too, is a profession associated with 
mixing. The mixed-race people can be incorporated in the imperial classification 
system, but only as those engaging in ‘mixed’ pursuits, and the movement of 
goods through the globe. The ‘trader’ is, then, a racialised, ‘biological’ category 
of work, in the sense that the movements of global trade articulate the mythology 
of ‘mixed-race’. 
Ambien II describes what can be described as an ambivalent biosociality 
in her description of Koshi: social relations are not fixed or bound to a higher 
authority, but are centred on the ongoing activity of social and biological 
survival. Residents work to ensure that their metabolic function does not cease 
operating. For this, flexibility in response is crucial; what works one day may not 
the next. The idea of ‘good’ stock that will prevail and guarantee survival does 
not fit here. Following Simone, survival in Koshi’s jammed periphery is 
characterised by negotiations and compromises, not by the eugenic preservation 
of genetic heritage.  
In her role as colonial administrator, Ambien II expects to feel familiar 
wherever she is, but in Koshi’s old city, she reports: ‘I did not feel familiar. There 
was a sharp tang of difference, of the alien, that was affecting me sharply’ (SE 
134). This alienation can be described as the difference between biosociality and 
biopolitics: the first is based on social relations whose power dynamics are in 
motion, subject to fluctuations of a global economy, and the second on top-down 
power relation between a ruling body (government, corporation) and its 
subjects, in which sociobiological traits are programmed from the top down, 
creating socio-economic environments that place certain constraints on life and 
reduce the possibility of chance variations. In the latter, ‘bio’ equates, in practice, 
to biological or genetic essentialism; in the former, ‘bio’ refers to biological 
processes within and between actors (human and non-human) that inform and 
influence social interactions, subject to change and modification. 
The ambivalent biosociality of the traders in Koshi is a reminder of the 
biopolitical control of Sirius, and the Sirians’ failures in sociobiological 
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engineering. Unlike the engineered workforce on Planet 8, which I discuss in 
Chapter Four, bred to specification for a particular environment and a singular 
purpose, the residents of Koshi’s periphery can inhabit and exhibit different 
possibilities, depending on the requirements of the immediate context. As a 
colonial administrator, a bureaucrat whose job is to report back on issues and 
situations relating to Sirian interests, Ambien II’s discomfort in Koshi’s old city, 
where there are ‘no gardens’ – no (apparent) planning – but a ‘low huddling of 
buildings, crowds of poorly-dressed people, children who I could see were ill-
nourished, and an assortment of canines’ (SE 134), is not only a discomfort with 
degeneration or poverty, but with a series of activities over which she has little 
control, concerning ‘the alien, the not-understood’ (SE 135). The nationalistic 
bureaucrat interested in progress displays a kind of naïve ignorance about the 
biological cost of imperial expansion. Far from the traders she encounters being 
the anomalous hybrids of transient activities, they make this world work through 
‘a process of experimentation [rather than] following the right procedures’ 
(Simone 229). Like the Lombis, the residents of Koshi undo, by chance, the 
planning and regulation of life itself, capturing the processes of experimentation 
to which they are usually subject and remaking them for their own survival, 
ambivalent and insecure as such survival is. This example stands as a figurative 
description of epigenetic poiesis, in distinction to genetic engineering. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have read The Sirian Experiments as an allegory for the development of Big 
Science in the Soviet Union, specifically in the realm of Human Adaptability 
projects in the 1970s. This is connected to a history of thought in Communist 
Russia based on the notion of environmental conditioning of Soviet political 
subjects and the optimisation of the workforce; I argued that this can be read 
into the history of Lysenko’s agricultural experiments, his popularity under 
Stalin, and also in post-Lysenko medical genetics in the Soviet Union. While the 
Soviet Union was officially anti-racist, I have argued that Lessing draws out the 
 115 
racialised basis of population studies in ‘remote’ areas of the USSR in her 
depiction of the Sirians’ experiments on test subjects; the suggestion here is that 
economic and public health policies based on principles of utility and 
productivism are still implemented along racialised lines; while there is no 
‘negative’ eugenics in the sense of breeding ‘bad’ stock out of the population, the 
Sirians engage in environmental conditioning for breeding an engineered 
workforce as a ‘sub-race’. 
 The Lombi experiment is a failed attempt at eugenic cultivation. However, 
while the Sirians fail to adapt the Lombis to their requirements, the Lombis 
nonetheless undergo a form of epigenetic change that prevents their re-capture 
by Sirian agents, and cancels the possibility of their being put to further use. I 
introduced the concept of epigenetic poiesis, which I elaborate further in the 
next chapter. I have also extended this analysis to consider the depiction of 
biosocial ambivalence in emerging world cities among the groups that construct 
the city and keep its circulation of goods and labour in motion. This ambivalence 
creates sites of potential change, and foregrounds my argument in Chapter Four 
about a vital politics as a strategy of resistance, as well as the discussion of 
intoxication and contamination in Chapter Five as interruptions to biopolitical 
governance. In the following chapter, I develop the idea of epigenetic poiesis in 
a reading of The Marriages Between Zones Three, Four and Five (1980), connecting 
the theme of ambivalence as a psychic state of epigenetic poiesis to a discussion 
of queer biosociality as a form of resistance to what Michael Warner calls a 
‘reprosexual’ ideology in Western modernity. 
3 
 
EPIGENETIC POIESIS AND QUEER BIOSOCIALITY IN  
THE MARRIAGES BETWEEN ZONES THREE, FOUR AND FIVE 
 
In this chapter, I read The Marriages Between Zones Three, Four and Five (1980) 
as a narrative of queer biosociality that subverts what Michael Warner calls 
‘reprosexuality’: ‘the notion that our lives are somehow made more meaningful 
by being embedded in a narrative of generational succession’ (7). I develop the 
idea of epigenetic poiesis as a description of literary reconfigurations of social 
norms and changes in inheritance in response to chance events. In this, it is not 
only non-human ecology that represents ‘the environment’; rather, ‘the 
environment’ extends to social conditions for living, both internal and external 
to individuals. The construction of ‘nature’ as a category in opposition to social 
life is suspended. Writing across these differentiated forms of experience, 
Marriages does not reduce social habit to biological predisposition in the vein of 
sociobiology or evolutionary psychology, nor is semiosis depicted ‘more or less 
entirely in terms of articulate language alone, and talking about the materiality 
of this language as constructing reality’, in Wendy Wheeler’s words (17). Rather, 
Marriages speculates on a queer possibility for biosemiotic processes of 
adaptation not reducible to genetic inheritance, making space for a much wider 
remit of understanding how influence is transmitted, what constitutes it, and 
how non-genetic influences can be inherited in biological processes. This 
speculation occurs at an imaginative level, in which object relations between 
human, nature and survival are reconfigured, and an empirical level, in physical 
adaptation.  
I make this argument about the reconfiguration of inheritance across 
‘social’ and ‘biological’ categories of experience through biosemiotic theory, 
which provides a conceptual framework for developing an account of epigenetic 
poiesis in literary theory. Thomas A. Sebeok argues that life is semiosis, an 
ongoing process of signification, based on signs and codes (Sebeok, ‘Foreword’ 1; 
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Barbieri 29). In this vision, boundaries between ‘social’ and ‘biological’ 
transformation become less distinguishable when considered under the general 
category of adaptation: in biology, this refers to the process of change through 
which an organism becomes better suited to its environment. Biosemiotics 
theorist Jesper Hoffmeyer writes, ‘Seen from the biology of biosemiotics, a 
human life does not necessarily start at conception’ (155); rather, the family – 
with all its cultural and genetic inscriptions, and extended across generational 
and geographic variation – is biosemiotics’ evolutionary individual. The memory 
of genetic activation or silencing, or changes in chromatin position that occur 
during an organism’s lifetime can be passed on through genetic inheritance. 
Hoffmeyer writes, ‘[E]xperiences appear to us as analogue codings of meaningful 
parts of our surroundings’ (180). Biosemiotics extracts evolution from the 
epistemological hold of the Modern Synthesis, in which ‘organisms begin to be 
treated as black boxes, operated upon by the external forces of mutation and 
environmental selection’ (Hoffmeyer 174). In place of this, Hoffmeyer suggests 
‘an evolutionary history of experiential existence’ derived from studying 
‘complex adaptive systems that form dynamic wholes that are not just 
‘epiphenomena’, but are capable of exerting causal power over their own 
components and of exhibiting both formal and final causality’ (174-6).  
 Previous readings of Marriages describe it as a feminist text in the 
tradition of a power struggle between male and female. In these readings, Al Ith 
educates Ben Ata about gender equality, and what is at stake is restoring 
equilibrium across the combined ecosystem of the Zones. Ursula Le Guin 
describes Marriages as ‘a dialectic of marriage’ whose process is ‘Hegelian, 
struggle and resolution, without the option of a maintained balance’. For Le 
Guin, this represents ‘so purely European an explanation of human destiny that 
anyone slightly familiar with other religious or philosophical systems must find 
it inadequate, if not presumptuous’ (‘Doris Lessing’s Parochial Science Fiction’). 
Elaine Hoffman Baruch and Marsha Rowe read Al Ith’s world as a feminist utopia, 
and Elizabeth Maslen reads Marriages as a ‘fable developed through the ironies 
of mutual misunderstanding on all levels into a celebration of emotion and 
passion and, through these, into a celebration of the need for light and dark, 
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“daylight selves” and the energy of our “shadow side”, if genuine evolution and 
growth are to be achieved’ (35). Jayne Glover argues that Al Ith’s ‘understanding 
of the importance of the relationship between human and animal within an 
entire ecosystem is [bound to] the lessons she must teach Ben Ata in order to 
restore balance between Zone Four, as well as the balance between Zone Four 
and Zone Three’ (126).  
These readings restrict the implications of the interaction between Ben 
Ata and Al Ith to a political logic of top-down influence over social organisation, 
which suggests that change occurs only by leading through example; in this case, 
through the experiences of the two archetypal leaders. This logic does not 
account for the text’s depiction of the biopolitical management of reproduction, 
genetic inheritance and evolution by ‘the Providers’ (either Canopus or Sirius), 
nor the queer possibility of Al Ith’s narrative arc. The readings are striking in 
their commitment to the role of feminist thought as a teaching strategy – 
enlightened, Wollstonecraft-like women instructing rough beast-men – and 
thereby valorising and idealising Al Ith as feminist saviour. This diminishes the 
nuances of her characterisation, and dismisses the ambivalent narrative 
resolution the text affords her. Reading Al Ith’s influence on Ben Ata as an 
Oedipal correction of Zone Four through the introduction of paternal 
responsibility over human and nonhuman subjects, and the tutoring away from 
non-consensual sexual violence as the primary form of sovereign reproduction, 
implicitly centres male psychological transformation as the primary narrative of 
the text. These readings focus on the reformation of Zone Four in response to a 
fertility crisis, rather than questioning the basis of what Warner calls the ‘repro 
ideology’ of Western modernity through which self-other relations are modelled.  
Warner highlights ‘the way in which modernity models self-other 
relations, or the way modernity’s consciousness of time is deeply intricated with 
a reproductive growth economy and its oedipal household’ (Warner 7). It is 
possible to read Le Guin’s identification of an implicit Hegelian logic of the 
arranged marriage between Ben Ata and Al Ith as embedding the narrative in a 
Eurocentric account of historical progress, and the extension of this model to the 
management of domestic spaces. However, this should be read in the context of 
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what Warner calls ‘the globalization of a new and exacting sexual order’, a 
‘regime of sexuality that first transformed Europe’ that ‘has now been registered 
not only in the New World but in all the reaches of modern colonialism’ (Warner 
7). Interpreting the marriage as a eugenic imperative, administered within a 
biopolitical framework of imperial governance, I read Marriages as a critique of 
the imposition of European ideals of living on the rest of the world through neo-
imperial capitalism. Clare Hanson’s identification of profoundly eugenic 
overtones throughout the novels takes the reading in this direction. Accounting 
for the depiction of the eugenic management of social relations through 
capitalist reproduction means also paying attention to Al Ith’s deviation from the 
role of mother, matriarch and wife, into an undetermined sphere of indirect 
influence.  
Through her movement back and forth between Zones Three and Four, 
the complexity and difficulty of this pregnancy compared to previous ones, and 
her eventual exile to the borders of Zone Three, Al Ith experiences repeated 
moments of cognitive estrangement, which I argue leads to the emergence of a 
queer biosociality. Al Ith’s queering incorporates the losses she undergoes 
throughout the course of the narrative, and the possibilities opened to her as she 
departs it. Al Ith’s queer arc destabilises the biopolitical logic of a 
heteronormative economy, in which the repressions of heteronormativity are 
themselves estranged (although not abolished). Glover reads Marriages as an 
ecofeminist text in which Lessing ‘seems to propose that there is an intricate web 
of interrelationships between the earthly or natural, the animal, the human, and 
ultimately the spiritual’ (122). She argues that this ecofeminist perspective ‘finds 
expression […] most often through the juxtaposing of various dualities – 
male/female or human/animal […] that are overturned in the course of the 
narrative’ (122). Following Glover, I also argue that Marriages offers a conception 
of experience across differentiated spheres of activity, problematising the role of 
the female body as the principle vessel for survival. Rethinking sexuality, and 
through this, gender relations, also means rethinking what counts as (or is 
narrated as) ‘survival’. 
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 I address the novel’s implicit critique of remote biopolitical governance, 
which takes the form of eugenic instruction similar to the directives issued by 
Johor in Shikasta, and read Marriages as a narrative of queering, exploring more 
fully the refusal of a sustained equilibrium of the kind that Le Guin identifies. 
The marriage leads to a ‘social death’ for Al Ith: the cost of species survival in this 
bioeconomy is post-natal female subjectivity. However, it also – by chance 
(important for my discussion of epigenetic poiesis) – creates space for the 
emergence of a queered subjectivity out of these reconstituted social norms. If, 
according to Warner, ‘a nonrepressive gender order can only come about 
through a radical change in sexuality’ (4), then the maintenance of an 
equilibrium based on reforming or tutoring adolescent masculinity would not be 
enough to abolish this. Al Ith’s ambivalent ending decentres the Oedipal 
narrative as the primary social relationship of heteronormativity, decentring this 
and considering it as one particular cultural inheritance within a field of 
continuous meaning-making, comprised of multiple interactions not restricted 
to human/non-human or human/nature dualisms.  
Situating Marriages in a wider context of sf and queer theory, Wendy 
Pearson’s observation of the ‘coincidence between the history of sf and the 
history of modern sexuality’ is useful (159). She argues that ‘sf can hardly escape 
the influence of a culture in which epistemologies of sexuality have become so 
naturalised as to be invisible,’ and that ‘sf’s task, often, is to make visible to us 
the unthinking assumptions that limit human potentiality’ (159). By ‘imagining 
bodies and their possible relationships’, sf and queer theory share a common 
perspective: namely, ‘a dystopian view of the present and a utopian hope for the 
future, a hope that it will be, at the very least, a place where we do not 
automatically kill what is different’ (159). Al Ith’s transformation through the 
novel is from the paradigm of Zone Three to a discarded, value-less remnant of 
former dominion, replaced in every feminine role by other women, in exile. A 
wasted body in the realm of biopolitical utility, Al Ith takes on a different role, 
not recognised as such by either realm: that of queer vanguard, at the margins of 
empire. By closing the novel with Al Ith’s solitary transformation, and her 
eventual departure, Lessing speculates on a possible future for queering survival, 
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no longer dependent on biological imperatives, but incorporating non-
reproductive forms of biosociality as part of a narrative trajectory leading to 
adaptation and social change. 
 
 
The Bioeconomy of ‘Repro Ideology’ 
 
Marriages structures its speculative critique of heteronormative social relations 
through archetypes of character and place. The fictional realms of Zones Three 
and Four make up an imaginary world divided into types of social organisation: 
the feminist utopia (Zone Three), the military dictatorship (Zone Four) and the 
female-led anarchic ‘barbarism’ of Zone Five. The borders between the realms 
might be argued to mark historical borders of civilisation (with Zone Three 
hundreds of years in Zone Four’s future, and so on), but they also reiterate the 
prevailing theme of uneven development in the series. The narrative begins with 
the unseen Providers’ directive of an arranged marriage between Al Ith and Ben 
Ata: ‘Al Ith was ordered to travel to the territory of Ben Ata, so that the wedding 
could be accomplished in his land’ (M 12), and this can be interpreted as both 
the attachment of one time-zone to another, as well as an attempt to improve 
both societies through mutual cooperation (in the guise of forced breeding). The 
Providers’ invisible control resembles Michel Foucault’s analogy of power as 
‘panopticism’ in Discipline and Punish (1975), ‘a system of permanent 
registration’, in which ‘power is exercised without division, according to a 
continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located, 
examined and distributed among the living beings, the sick and the dead’ (196-
97). While the border between Zones Three and Four have to this point been 
closed, the zones are all governed by this invisible power.  
On hearing the Order, Al Ith ‘believed it to be a joke,’ laughing about it 
with her sister, Murti, before a message arrives ‘that could only be regarded as a 
rebuke’ (M 12). Ben Ata, too, does not desire any kind of partnership with Al Ith 
and Zone Three. He is suspicious of Al Ith and remarks to her that it is said in 
Zone Four that, ‘You are all witches in your country’ (M 44), conjuring Al Ith and 
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Zone Three as superhuman entities, not of the same biological order as Zone 
Four. Neither desires this marriage, but have no choice but to carry through the 
orders of the Providers. Meeting for the first time, they share a feeling of 
complicity in their unwillingness to participate in this arrangement: ‘They looked 
at each other with a frank exchange of complicity: two prisoners who had 
nothing in common but their incarceration’ (M 42). They are trapped together 
in the Pavilion, a structure ‘built to specification’ on the orders of the Providers, 
where they are expected to carry out the task of cross-regional breeding and 
cross-pollination of influences and resources. 
The border is closed for reasons of ideological discord. Zone Three values 
its post-industrial socialist feminist democracy over and above the militaristic 
despotism of Zone Four, and its inhabitants do not want to risk cross-
contamination. The Zones are described by the Zone Three archivists as ‘inimical 
by nature’ (M 12), ‘nature’ understood not as an arbitrary difference, but an 
essential one. The imperative of the Providers exposes these differences between 
kingdoms as arbitrary – and thus vulnerable to change – rather than natural, 
overriding their respective insistence on the biologised incongruity of the Zones 
(neither Al Ith nor Ben Ata trust that they can breathe properly in the other’s 
land, and believe they will be poisoned by the air).  
Al Ith quickly works out the reason for their marriage: low birth rates 
across both zones and among different species, an extended failure of biological 
reproduction that they are tasked with correcting. The horses ‘have lost the will 
to mate’ in Zone Three, Al Ith informs Ben Ata, continuing, ‘It is all the animals. 
All. And the birds. And as we know, that means the plant kingdom, too, or if not 
now, soon’ (M 56). This is not a crisis of fertility but of reproductive drive: the 
horses ‘have lost the will’; this is the opposite of the so-called species survival 
instinct, negating the neo-Darwinian idea that the driving force of evolution is 
the will to reproduce and for species survival. This lack of will to reproduce has 
also affected the human populations – ‘there has been a long, steady decrease’ in 
the amount of children being born across the zones, to the extent that for both 
Al Ith and Ben Ata, ‘outlying parts of our Zone are lying derelict’ (M 56). This 
crisis is centred on a general loss of will to sustain the ecosystem.  
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The crisis makes perceptible complicity between the two zones that 
passes through the closed political borders, disrupting the biopolitical division 
of territory. The cross-regional nature of the crisis outlines what Jesper 
Hoffmeyer calls an ‘ecosemiotic interaction structure’, which he describes as ‘the 
whole system of semiotic relations that the species finds itself a part of’, ‘the 
integrative level between the species and the ecosystem’ (196). It is this 
integrative level that has fallen into decline, with a socially-coded loss of will, 
rather than a biological incapacity; this biosociality is not restricted to human 
relations, but encompasses the complexity of ongoing ecological processes 
occurring between the zones. It is only by perceiving the land this way – as an 
ecosystem rather than two segregated sovereign territories – that the crisis, in 
turn, becomes fully perceptible.  
Yet Al Ith and Ben Ata’s perception of shared complicity in this 
reproductive crisis initially only serves the Providers. The marriage is the 
imperial response to this crisis, which from the perspective of Canopus 
represents a crisis of labour power. For the purposes of this discussion, and 
following my reading of Johor in Shikasta, I read the instruction of the Providers 
as analogous to the encouragement of reproductive labour in order to ensure the 
smooth functioning of capitalist imperialism. If, as Silvia Federici has argued, 
‘Capitalism must control the work of reproduction, as it is a central aspect of the 
process of accumulation,’ and thus that ‘reproductive work functions as the 
reproduction of labour power, i.e. our capacity to work’ (‘Feminism and Social 
Reproduction’), then the imperative to reproduce in order to reverse the falling 
birth rates is an explicitly biopolitical manoeuvre that imprisons Al Ith and Ben 
into a heteronormative exchange in order to ensure the continued production of 
biopower and, beyond this, Canopean dominion. In History of Sexuality, Vol. I, 
Foucault describes the ‘Victorian regime’ which continues to dominate 
modernity, in which ‘nothing that was not ordered in terms of generation or 
transfigured by it could expect sanction or protection’ (3-4). In this regime, 
 
The legitimate and procreative couple laid down the law. The couple 
imposed itself as model, enforced the norm, safeguarded the truth, 
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and reserved the right to speak while retaining the principle of 
secrecy. (3) 
 
This is the governing fiction to which Al Ith and Ben Ata are bound, sexuality 
confined to the domestic sphere, ‘absorbed […] into the serious function of 
reproduction’ (Foucault 3). Federici’s rejoinder to Foucault is that this logic is 
bound up with capitalist accumulation: ‘The promotion of life-forces turns out 
to be nothing more than the result of a new concern with the accumulation and 
reproduction of labour-power’ (Caliban 16). The reproductive imperative of the 
Providers enforces the rhythm of capitalist accumulation of biopower across 
both Zones, undoing the illusion of progress in a society governed by women. It 
represents what Federici calls ‘a global expansion of the labour-market [that] is 
attempting to set back the clock with respect to the anti-colonial struggle, and 
the struggles of other rebel subjects’ (Caliban 17). Lessing makes this 
subordination of colonised subjects to colonial time literal: Al Ith and Ben Ata’s 
relationship is punctuated by the drumbeats of the Providers, which determine 
their movement and activities. In a very literal sense, the drum, audible 
throughout, determines the rhythm of the fulfilment of heteronormativity, heard 
until the point that Al Ith returns to Zone Three for the final time. 
Federici argues that despite the successes of first- and second-wave 
feminism, ‘The conquest of the female body is still a precondition for the 
accumulation of new reproductive technologies that, more than ever, reduce 
women to wombs’ (Caliban 17). This resonates with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s 
assertion that gendering on the basis of reproductive ability constitutes a 
primary violence that grounds heteronormative social organisation: ‘the female 
body is seen as permeable [in] perhaps the most basic gesture of violence’ (26). 
Accordingly, despite Zone Three’s robust programmes of gender equality in 
terms of labour division and social relations, their (apparent) feminist utopia is 
still governed by the biopolitical commands of the Providers, a foil for satellite 
management. Echoing Memoirs, Marriages anticipates that something more 
than white female leadership is required to undo the Canopean world-system of 
capitalist patriarchy characterised by Johor, in which women’s bodies are simply 
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tools at the service of the biological reproduction of labour power. The 
reproductive imperative of the Providers enforces the rhythm of capitalist 
accumulation across both Zones, undoing the illusion of progress in the feminist 
utopia of Zone Three. It represents what Federici calls ‘a global expansion of the 
labour-market [that] is attempting to set back the clock with respect to the anti-
colonial struggle, and the struggles of other rebel subjects’ (Caliban 17).  
Al Ith’s movement between Zones Three and Four produces a cognitive 
estrangement from this system, revealing it as a set of protocols, rather than a 
natural duty. Her movement intercepts the apparent inescapability of this logic, 
making it ‘strange’ within the text, as she moves towards a different mode of 
sociality. At the point of the narrative where the relation between Ben Ata and 
Al Ith seems to have led to a kind of mutual fulfillment, after Arusi’s birth, the 
drums interrupt to tell Al Ith that she must leave, and that she is no longer 
required. It is not that this interruption of capitalist labour-time destroys the 
possibility of ‘real’ domestic harmony, as Marx argues in Capital, Vol I. Rather, it 
lays bare the false premise and promise of an individualised social sphere as 
‘leisure time’: domestic harmony is portrayed as a mythology deployed to ensure 
species survival at the level of political economy. While Ben Ata and Al Ith wait 
for the drum to beat after her departure from Zone Four, ‘the drum was silent. 
No messages came from anywhere’, because ‘the child, who was after all the heir 
to two realms, was flourishing in this common household’ (M 285). Instead, 
‘when the drum did beat, it was for Vahshi’ (M 285), the female leader of Zone 
Five, who must now also enter an arranged marriage with Ben Ata. The 
implementation of these reproductive orders through the drum signals a 
centralisation and expansion of imperial influence across the zones. The 
characters forced to be part of this effort are useful only so long as they are 
capable of reproducing biopower. Al Ith is subalternised through her post-
reproductive exile (she loses her social function), going from a position of power 
and influence to one of stigmatization and exclusion, concomitant with ‘the 
colonial devaluation of female power’ (Caliban 237) as a change-maker rather 
than facilitator of an established system upheld by cultural heritage. It is a social 
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death, through which the Zone Three people cancel out her immediate influence, 
and her social meaning becomes fixed in archive.  
Al Ith can be read through Federici’s vision of a revalorisation of the body 
in feminist thought, a post-essentialist turn to materiality and subjectivity, 
necessary ‘to counter the negativity attached to the identification of femininity 
with corporeality, and to create a more holistic vision of what it means to be a 
human being’ (Caliban 15). While this is not a biological claim, Federici’s 
argument is nonetheless in a relationship with biological thought, moving away 
from the abstraction of life itself into the realm of pure discourse (this is also 
Eugene Thacker’s critique of post-structuralist accounts of life itself). As 
Federici notes, had Foucault studied the witch-hunt instead of the pastoral 
confession in History of Sexuality, he would have learned that ‘such history 
cannot be written from the viewpoint of a universal, abstract, a-sexual subject’; 
instead, ‘he would have recognized that torture and death can be placed at the 
service of “life” or, better, at the service of the production of labour-power, since 
the goal of capitalist society is to transform life into the capacity to work and 
“dead labour”’ (Caliban 16; italics mine). What is important here is not Foucault’s 
failure to situate his theory of biopower in the context of capitalist development, 
in which – Federici writes – ‘the promotion of life-forces turns out to be nothing 
more than the result of a new concern with the accumulation and reproduction 
of labour-power’ (16), but Foucault’s neglect to account for the cost of this with 
regard to women. Without this, the specific repressive violence against bodies 
socialised as female is obscured. 
 
 
 
 
Bioeconomy in Zones Three and Four: Inheritance and Environment 
 
Zone Three and Zone Four represent archetypal paradigms for either side of the 
‘nature/nurture’ debate – genetic reductionism and cultural environmentalism 
respectively. As I have argued in Chapters One and Two, the historical relevance 
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of this debate takes on political significance in Cold War science debates 
between the Soviet Union and the Euro-US. Zone Four operates as an archetype 
of a patriarchal order that reduces ‘influence’ to a purely genetic paradigm. In 
Zone Four, the only relation that biological male parents bear towards their 
children is one of genetic goods and – if the child is male – as the child’s future 
military commander. Ben Ata notes this while surveying his armies, picking out 
sons he may or may not have fathered in a row of soldiers: 
 
He had been quite proud of the Children’s Army, in which his own 
offspring had been placed together with those of his officers. He 
would often, on parades, or on similar occasions, allow his eye to 
sweep over those young faces, and try to pick out some that 
resembled him. He expected these boys – some of them young men 
now and in every way fulfilling expectations – to become ornaments 
to his armies. (M 203)  
 
In this military fratriarchy, children are objects for circulation, either for the 
reproduction of military power, or for the labour of reproducing these objects 
of labour power. This is an inheritance of paternal disinterest which, until Al 
Ith’s arrival in Zone Four, he has had no reason to question: ‘He had done and 
behaved as he had always done, and as his father had, and his father’ (204). 
Passed down with the biological inheritance is a social genealogy in which 
biological fathers are not expected to take care of their children and, more 
broadly, where authority and governance equates only to the assembling and 
dispatching of militia to protect or expand the borders of the realm. 
Having little or no contact with the children born out of his rapes of women 
across Zone Four, Ben Ata reduces paternal responsibility to biological idea of 
‘fathering’ or ‘siring’. This comes out in his first conversation with Al Ith, when 
she explains that ‘adoption’ is not a word in Zone Three, and that while she has 
given birth to five children, she is ‘the mother of many. More than fifty’ (M 45). 
In response to this, Ben Ata says, ‘I suppose you feel about them exactly as you 
do about your own’ (M 45), and while the question appears rhetorical – ‘this was 
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mimicry’ (M 45) – this can be read as an attempt by Ben Ata to understand this 
new idea of parenting and nurture. That ‘adoption’ is not a word used by Al Ith 
reconfigures the idea of children as property of their biological antecedents. He 
talks about both children and mothers in possessive terms: ‘It’s not my idea of a 
mother for my children’ (M 46). The repetition of ‘my’ here places Ben Ata’s 
agency and decision-making at the centre of the conversation, and relegates the 
other nouns – ‘mother’ and ‘children’ to a subordinate position. Moreover, he has 
had no cause to question this social organisation, because he has inherited this 
disinterest. In Zone Four, lineage descends, confined to genetic material and 
restricted to the territorial limits of the kingdom. There is a valence here in which 
ideology is extended across social and biological organisation, tied together 
through the social arrangement of biological property, and the absence of 
paternal influence after conception.  
To return to the biosemiotic framework outlined previously, Hoffmeyer 
would contest Ben Ata’s reduction of paternal influence to genetic contribution; 
that is, as a purely material transmission. Hoffmeyer argues that ‘virtuality’ 
should be understood as something ‘real’ in the world, ‘built into life from the 
beginning, and overcoming the idea that a life is fundamentally non-living’ (176). 
This would negate the idea of biological programming as the core determination 
of living, and the suggestion that life forms are only passive, pre-programmed 
representations of immutable substance of inheritance: what has been 
understood up until recently as the ‘code of life’ passed on through DNA 
replication. ‘Living’ here would mean active, in flux, with agency and 
determining power, not with regard to technological intervention, but in terms 
of responsivity and adaptation across different levels of experience.  
In their thesis of four evolutionary dimensions, Jablonka and Lamb describe 
this heritable responsivity as a different kind of inheritance system involved in 
evolution. They argue, ‘Not everything inherited is genetic’: rather, behavioural, 
epigenetic and symbolic can have both ‘direct and indirect influences on 
evolutionary change’ (107). This line of thinking would take post-Synthesis 
evolutionary theory away from a ‘gene-centred approach, because it is no longer 
necessary to attribute the adaptive evolution of every biological structure and 
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activity, including human behaviour, to the selection of chance genetic 
variations that are blind to function’ (2), as in Richard Dawkins’s The Blind 
Watchmaker (1986). Inheritance would not be constituted by the passive 
transmission of what Dawkins, in The Selfish Gene (1976), calls cultural ‘memes’, 
units of information in the brain that take the physical form of neural circuits, 
which are passed on through a competitive system of exchange, where memes 
fight each other for dominance in the collective psyche, a model of symbolic 
transmission which looks suspiciously like advertising in a system of 
technologised mass reproduction. In accord with Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic 
theory of semiosis in which any event of signification involves a triadic relation 
between sign and object in which the sign is mediated by an ‘interpretant’ (also 
a sign), Jablonka and Lamb argue that signs ‘become symbols by virtue of being 
a part of a system in which their meaning is dependent both on the relations they 
have to the way objects and actions in the world are experienced by humans, and 
the relations they have to other signs in the cultural system’ (200). This 
understanding works across to epigenetic events during development, which 
occur through interactions between the genome and its surrounding 
environments. Epigenetics would re-cast the genome from master programmer, 
to what Evelyn Fox Keller calls a ‘responsive organ’ (‘From Gene Action’).  
The issue of adoption introduces another dimension into the semiotic 
operation of reproduction in Zones Three and Four: the question of biological 
and environmental influences over development. For Ben Ata, the line between 
the two is clear, the former suggesting paternal possession and maternal care, 
the latter secondary or even unimportant. Social structures for child welfare that 
extend beyond the nuclear family have little relevance in Zone Four.  By contrast, 
in Zone Three there is understanding of epigenetic influences on embryonic and 
post-natal development. Encountering Yori, a Zone Three agriculturalist, Al Ith 
considers the possibility that she may already be pregnant after Ben Ata’s two 
rapes, and how different her pregnancy would be in Zone Three: 
 
When she had been pregnant – and after what care, and thought, 
and long careful choices – in the past, she had, as soon as she had 
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been sure, chosen as beneficial influences for the child, several men 
who, knowing why they were chosen, and for what purpose, co-
operated with her in this act of blessing and gracing the foetus […] 
They were the Fathers of the children just as much as the Gene-
Fathers were. These men formed a group who, with the Gene-
Mother, and the women who cared for the child, considered 
themselves joint-parents, forever available to her, or him, any time 
they were needed, collectively and individually (M 72). 
 
The ritual of choosing ‘beneficial influences’ for the developing foetus appears 
as a folkloric understanding of pregnancy. Yet the idea of different kinds of 
parents having a direct influence on foetal development resonates with the 
theory of embryonic development in epigenetics. The embryologist C. H. 
Waddington’s case study for his ‘epigenetic landscape’ model (1957) looked at 
the different developmental pathways open to a cell during embryonic 
development, in an attempt to synthesize genetics, embryology and evolution. 
Concerned with developmental mediation in the conversion of genotype into 
phenotype, Waddington was interested in a process-based approach to biology, 
taking events, rather than objects, as his primary point of departure. 
Waddington’s method assumes developmental interactions between gene and 
environment (a distinction he found suspicious), and the influence of these 
interactions on development. While Al Ith does not use this language, her 
description of embryonic and foetal development in Zone Three – the idea that 
the child in her womb might be ‘fed by [Yori’s] essences,’ ‘hear his words and be 
nourished’ (M 72) – implies that this process is in flux, open to external stimuli, 
and that events outside uterus might affect the growing child.  
 This understanding of a child’s development is coded between Al Ith and 
Ben Ata into a conversation about male and female gender roles. Al Ith explains 
that while women rule Zone Three, men bake, and farm, and herd, and grow, 
and trade and mine and smelt and everything there is to do with the different 
ways of feeding children, mentally and emotionally, and the keeping of archives 
and maintaining Memory and making songs and tales’; Ben Ata replies, ‘All that 
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is women’s work’ (M 125). Ben Ata’s understanding that cultural memory and 
development are the task of women, given that his is a society in which the most 
socially-valued tasks are distributed among men, carries the assumption that this 
work is secondary to the inheritance passed on via male insemination; the 
archive on which he places most value is his own genetic inheritance, with 
endless military campaigns for securing borders a way of ensuring its continued 
influence. This plays out in his jealousy of Kunzor, Al Ith’s Zone Three ‘husband’, 
whom he assumes – ‘defensively’ – to be ‘a finer fellow than me in every way 
possible’ (M 126). Ben Ata here is thinking about (genetic) influence as a 
competition, the battle to win the struggle of natural selection of his own gene 
products against those of other males. His understanding of reproduction is tied 
to his military pursuits: reproduction is a battle between men for the right to 
inseminate the female body.  
This socially-constituted refusal of paternal post-natal influence is 
depicted as having – for Al Ith – negative implications in terms of the child’s 
development, as Al Ith attempts to explain to Ben Ata after their child, Arusi, is 
born. She tells Ben Ata, ‘with us […] the child’s fathers are present to greet the 
child. To…. To feed him…’ (M 208). Yet Ben Ata cannot get past the phrase 
‘child’s fathers’, because of the genetic paradigm of parenthood in Zone Four. Al 
Ith is not talking about feeding in terms of milk or food – ‘not with milk’, but 
with ‘other foods’ (M 209). She tells Ben Ata to hold Arusi, to ‘think of him’ and 
to ‘make him know you are there, with him’ (M 210). This non-verbal 
communication between parent and child constitutes a form of nourishment, 
for both Al Ith and the child – she is ‘restored, because at last Arusi was being 
nourished by his father’ (M 210). Moreover, in her Zone, this nourishment would 
not just be from Ben Ata, but from a number of different influences.  
This scene of feeding between Al Ith, Ben Ata and Arusi can be read in 
this way. It is not that Ben Ata does not understand the value of emotional care; 
rather, in Zone Four, this care is assigned to women. Maternal love-as-labour is 
assumed by the menfolk, rather than shared. In Zone Four, children are the 
possessions of their parents. Returning to his ostensibly rhetorical question to 
Al Ith – ‘I suppose you feel about [your adopted children] exactly as you do about 
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your own’ (M 46) – this signals both the possession of children on the basis of 
biological inheritance, as well as the gendered division of emotional labour. 
Thus, despite the implication of mockery, Ben Ata’s question is not rhetorical, 
given that he has no experience with his own children, whose number and 
existence he only assumes. He expects mothers to have strong ties to their 
children, but does not know if he should expect the same from Al Ith.  
The importance of this nourishment supports what Wheeler describes as 
‘a good materialist argument about the nature of human sociality’, which takes 
into account ‘the fundamentally social nature of human existence’; she argues 
that ‘our fundamental sociality […] is lived in our inner, as well as outer, world; 
and it is emotional as well as physical; and all this – our essential social being – 
is written on our bodies in terms of flourishing or (its opposite) illness’ (Wheeler 
12). Al Ith understands that there is a fluidity of signification between her and 
her child, both physical and emotional. Despite the social pressure placed on 
her to nurture Arusi physically, she knows that certain psychological barriers 
would prevent her from giving him the kind of care he needs. Waiting, ‘rocked 
by all kinds of emotions’, for Ben Ata to come to see the child, she is urged by 
Dabeeb ‘to put the child to her breast, poor lamb’; Al Ith refuses, because ‘to 
feed the baby now would be to feed it annoyance and need’ (M 201). This is an 
important confrontation between two forms of maternal care. Dabeeb’s instinct 
is that Al Ith should put the physical needs of her child above her own distress, 
thus sublimating herself and taking the position of sole caregiver. Al Ith’s refusal 
to do this is a political decision – refusing the ethic of care to be placed primarily 
and irredeemably on the birth-giving body, and refusing to be seen as merely a 
‘channel or a vessel’ for Ben Ata’s son (M 193).  
This refusal is based on the material reality of Al Ith transmitting her 
emotional state to her baby through the act of feeding, signalling her 
understanding of the porous boundary between emotional and physical states 
of being. Dabeeb makes a classic mind-body distinction in urging Al Ith to feed 
Arusi, in which two needs co-exist but are not in accord: Al Ith is upset and 
needs Ben Ata to come home, and Arusi needs feeding. Al Ith sees these two 
needs in a valence; her need of Ben Ata and the attending feelings of deprivation 
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and loss will be fed into her child. The pain she feels at this moment, she knows, 
will ‘poison the baby, who was not only deprived of the food of his father’s 
presence, but would be additionally ill-influenced by herself’ (206). The political 
refusal to put the needs of her child above her own pain is then premised on the 
idea that to do this would only continue the damage and pain of the present 
moment. Thus, the nourishment that she would pass to Arusi at this moment is 
not a purely material inheritance, but constitutes – following Wheeler – the 
material effect of this non-verbal interaction. Dabeeb’s construction of the 
relation between Al Ith and Arusi being one of total giving and total receipt from 
one generation to another is displaced; rather than two individuals co-existing 
with different needs, Al Ith’s refusal articulates an environmental relation 
between these two needs, and the dialogue between the human inner world – 
Innenwelt – and the human natural and social outer world – Umwelt.9  She is 
paying attention to what Wheeler calls ‘the triggers and perturbations between 
complex coupled systems’ (Wheeler 108), rather than assuming a direct 
transmission of information between parent and child. This does not negate 
parental responsibility, but opens it up to a system of influences and obligations. 
The pain that Al Ith would transmit to Arusi would be the genealogical 
inheritance of a patriarchal social sphere in which emotional labour of care 
forms female subjectivity. This means resisting the genealogical genetic 
paradigm that determines paternal relations in Zone Four. 
 
 
Semiotic Adaptation and Reproduction 
 
Al Ith’s adjustment to what I identify as a queer biosociality is made possible 
through the reconfiguration of sign relations across both zones that goes on 
from the moment Al Ith meets representatives from Zone Four. The negotiation 
between Al Ith and Ben Ata throughout the narrative is centred on signs and 
                                                 
9 A ‘world’, or what Jacob von Uexkull calls an Umwelt: in Thomas A. Sebeok’s words, ‘the 
biological foundations that lie at the very epicentre of the study of 
both communication and signification in the human [and non-human] animal’ (Sebeok x).  
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signification; as such, I read it as a narrative of semiotic adaptation, staging the 
adaptation of common sense understandings of various signifiers. Al Ith and Ben 
Ata begin the novel as archetypal representatives for their respective zones. In 
a Peircean sense, they are ‘icons’, and their semiotic economies function 
iconographically – that is, the relationship between sign and object is assumed 
to a ‘natural’ representation based on resemblance or signified truth. Ben Ata 
knows what he means when he says, ‘woman’, and Al Ith knows what she means 
by ‘love’. In Zone Four, a horse is a mode of transport; in Zone Three, a 
companion. In Zone Four, sex is for male pleasure and female fertilisation, and 
rape is a necessary task for maintaining fratriarchal governance; in Zone Three, 
reproductive labour is distributed between groups of men and women, not only 
a task for the female body, but shared out in an understanding of embryonic 
development that extends the male role well past the point of conception. The 
novel puts the symbol (here, sign) of reproduction to work across these semiotic 
economies, drawing into this movement questions of gender and 
heteronormativity at a social level, and genetic and developmental influences at 
a biological one; ‘learning’ extends beyond subjectivity into multi-regional 
interpretation, which – in Jesper Hoffmeyer’s words – ‘leads to a change in the 
disposition of the organism for a different behaviour’ (459). Through the 
marriage of Ben Ata and Al Ith, distinct symbolic constructions of reproduction 
in individual zones conflict as the protagonists negotiate the process, from 
heteronormative intercourse, to foetal development, to birth, to child-care. This 
negotiation does not imply a transformational movement, but an adaptive one; 
some ‘things’ are lost in the process of trial and error in adaptation.  
Al Ith and Ben Ata’s communication frequently results in moments of 
‘runaway’ or ‘disequilibrium’, which leads to the alteration of certain grounding 
assumptions about sociality. Semiotic adaptation involves the production and 
interpretation of signs at crossing-points of differentiated semiotic economies 
(discrete systems of managed sign relations). These crossing-points are marked 
by events of signification that produce moments of what psychoanalyst Gregory 
Bateson calls ‘runaway’ in his theory of schizophrenia (316), and what 
philosopher-chemist Isabelle Stengers, in a discussion of entropy, calls ‘far-
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from-equilibrium’ (244). In this adaptive operation, some ‘thing’ – not unit or 
calculable component – tends to escape, given that this operation necessitates 
conflict. Furthermore, the change induced is not necessarily quantitative, and 
economies run the risk of falling back into their former states. Bateson argues 
that adaptation is not an efficient economy, but involves trial and error, and 
‘error is always biologically and/or psychically expensive’ (274). In his theory of 
schizophrenia, ‘runaway’ may be induced when the interaction of two codes 
come into conflict, analogic and digital, throwing a subject out of equilibrium. 
Bateson describes this as ‘a patient’s failure to recognize the metaphoric nature 
of his fantasies,’ when what is usually a triadic constellation of messages (for 
example, ‘as if’ as an interpretive phrase) is understood to be direct and ‘natural,’ 
and ‘the metaphor of the fantasy is narrated and acted upon in a way which 
would be appropriate if the fantasy were a message of the more direct kind’ 
(190). That is, when metaphor is received empirically. This moment can result 
in destruction, but it can result in a reconfiguration of the system. This arrives 
at stochism, rather than determinism, as a mode of adaptation: stochastic 
change that occurs at the borders of different regions.  
The examples that constitute Bateson’s theory of schizophrenia are 
genetic mutation, learning, and change in family organization; important here 
is the idea of change occurring at epistemological boundary points, the 
confrontation of (bio)semiotic economies. This idea of change ruptures the 
supposition of the internal cohesion or sovereignty of these economies, and the 
‘self-identity’ of their signification. In a discussion of entropy, Stengers 
understands far-from-equilibrium as a moment of radical possibility, in which 
‘the very identity of the system can be transformed’ (244), producing a ‘new 
configuration of requirements and obligations’ that make up a system’s ‘self-
organization’ (245). In semiotic terms, this transformation necessitates some 
unforeseeable loss of meaning, as regional significance falls into disuse. These 
two moments, as the interplay of dyadic and triadic semiotic constellations 
risking loss, mark a site of adaptation. 
Al Ith’s explanations of Zone Three habits in Zone Four are not a 
continuation of Zone Three governance, but emerge as a reflex. She is 
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establishing norms of living in a different context, forcing a confrontation 
between two forms of social organisation that necessarily leads to negotiations 
on both sides. Many of Ben Ata and Al Ith’s interactions come under the category 
of what Thomas Szasz calls ‘protolanguage’, and Stephen Shapiro and Philip 
Barnard call ‘semi-peripheral speech’. These forms of speech take place because 
the symbolic realm of communication is no longer open to them as it is to other 
inhabitants of their respective realms. For Szasz, protolanguage comes before 
metalanguage – or ‘signs referring to signs’ – a juncture of semiotic configuration 
that ‘communicates outside of, or in retreat from, symbolic language’ (Shapiro 
and Barnard 106). Szasz argues that protolanguage often appears in the realm of 
psychoanalysis as a communication of ‘problems in living’, and ‘functions 
similarly to the mode of communication or expression involved in self-cutting’; 
self-cutting is a two-fold means of communication in which the subject begins 
to question their status as living being (the pain of the cut communicating 
existence to the subject), and which allows the cause of trauma to be displaced 
and communicated outwards (Shapiro and Barnard 107). For Szasz, pragmatic 
speech is ‘language used to establish interpersonal relations, without reference 
to a statement’s verifiability’ (Shapiro and Barnard 108). It is language used to 
establish (although not maintain) social relations.  
For Shapiro and Barnard, ‘a protolanguage approach looks for the ways in 
which the ritual makes new kinds of social relations possible’ (112). I want to 
look at this idea with regard to the ritual of rape in Zone Four as the primary 
mode of sexual reproduction. The biopolitical instructions of the Providers 
administer no accompanying guidelines for sexual conduct in this partnership, 
forcing a negotiation between Al Ith and Ben Ata on the form and possibilities 
of sexual intercourse. The first conversation between the two rulers is on the 
subject of child-raising and sex, and concludes with Ben Ata raping her. This 
moment marks a moment of runaway, of disequilibrium, and the establishment 
of a different kind of social relationship for both characters. For Ben Ata, the 
rape itself does not constitute a break with protocol (according to the rules of 
Zone Four, it is a commonplace task for men). Rather, it is Al Ith’s assertion, 
‘There is more to mating than children,’ which introduces a novel notion – and 
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thus an epistemological rupture – in Zone Four, and a struggle within Ben Ata 
(M 46). Ben Ata’s sexual experience has up to this point been limited to wartime 
rapes, in which ‘those who wept or who struggled in a way he recognized he did 
enjoy, and began to tame slowly’ (M 45). Male-female sexual communication, 
for Ben Ata, is limited to reading the different degrees of the struggles and 
weeping of women. In response to Al Ith, he ‘groaned out loud and struck his 
fists hard on the floor beside him’ (M 46). Al Ith’s further suggestion that sex is 
a ‘skill’ in her Zone marks a tipping point. The rape is a retroactive ‘task’ for Ben 
Ata, implied to function as such by ritualized conduct: ‘He put his hand over her 
mouth in the approved way’ (M 47), a censorship of female sexual license in 
response to its verbal articulation. While this moment marks a rupture, neither 
Al Ith nor Ben Ata have yet broken character; both are behaving according to 
their respective regional rules and roles. 
Yet, this scene also marks a change in Ben Ata immediately following the 
rape: ‘[A]lready embarrassed, [he] showed his feeling that all was not right by a 
gesture of concern most unusual in him: he twitched her dress down again and 
removed his hand from her mouth quite gently’ (M 47). Al Ith’s gaze is described 
as ‘quite blank’. Focalising the narrative through Ben Ata’s gaze, the reader is 
shown how he perceives her, transforming this moment from one of following 
protocol to one of observation. His ‘embarrassment’ marks a moment of 
translation, and his loss of composure signifies a break from the status quo. Her 
expression, converted into an empty space, signifying his active negation of her 
assertion, his attempt to instruct her that there is no more to mating than 
children, and that ‘she’ – the fertile female body permeable for male penetration 
and insemination – functions as an open blank for Zone Four’s male task of 
female censorship and the female task of reproductive labour. Ben Ata’s gesture 
of concern and Al Ith’s blank gaze signal a moment of runaway, directed toward 
trauma or grief, the first rupture to their respective symbolic orders. In Szasz’s 
terms, this is a form of protolanguage that establishes a different social relation.  
If Ben Ata’s second rape is read as a repetition, then the runaway moment 
of the first rape has had no effect on the significance Ben Ata attaches to the 
female body. Yet, after he rapes Al Ith a second time, his embarrassment is 
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replaced by shame and grief, marking the difficulty of his learning from Al Ith, 
and, simultaneously, the gradual loss of his previous symbolic configuration of 
sexual activity:  
 
Her ways seemed too difficult for him, or at least unfamiliar, or out 
of his reach just then. And his were striking him as crude … he could 
only complete the entry and the possession by taking a furtive 
glance at the bruise he had inflicted, and this itself now shamed him 
so that as he spurted he groaned and then lay still. He was filled, 
amazingly, with grief. (M 62) 
 
This act is not a simple repetition of the first; its significance has altered. Ben Ata 
now sees that Al Ith’s eyes are not only ‘open’ but also ‘desolate’, an observation 
that had not occurred to him during the struggles and weeping of the women he 
has previously raped; he understood those previous struggles only as sexually 
provocative and therefore as invitations for him to ‘tame’ them. The point of 
orgasm in this second scene of rape – a ‘spurt’ that carries with it the possibility 
of insemination – carries with it ‘shame’ and ‘grief’. Significantly, this shame is 
produced by the fact of finding the bruise he has inflicted sexually arousing. The 
bruise on Al Ith’s face reflects male domination over the female body, while 
marking Ben Ata’s orgasm with shame and grief; ‘he’ is split into a general social 
economy of male violence directed against unconsenting female bodies, and ‘Ben 
Ata’ in a particular encounter with ‘Al Ith’. 
 Something has changed between these two scenes of rape, which, while 
materially identical, carry different significance. Between these two scenes, Al 
Ith’s blue dress functions as an interpreting sign, negotiating Ben Ata’s 
encounters of ‘Al Ith’ as character whom he has a duty to host as fellow sovereign, 
and a universal female body that he is used to dominating and subjugating. At 
first, he is offended by her choice of dress, finding it un-arousing; female dress 
in Zone Four is for the purpose of facilitating male sexual excitement, the 
obligatory costume for a blank body that either struggles, weeps, or bears 
children. Ben Ata’s “gesture of concern” is transmitted through negotiating this 
 139 
symbol of female permeability: he twitches down Al Ith’s blue dress, covering her 
back up, an acknowledgement that the dress might function not only as a tool of 
male arousal, but also of female protection. If lifting up the dress is only a 
confirmation or completion of its signifying function, Ben Ata’s gesture of 
twitching it back down extends and reconfigures its purpose.  
 The dress appears again when Al Ith makes an assertion about the ‘general 
damp’ of Zone Four’s climate: 
 
‘Oh, come now, it isn’t as bad as that,’ he said. ‘You’ll see, 
when the sun is up, and things have dried off. We have some very 
pleasant days down here, you know.’ 
‘I hope so! Feel my dress, Ben Ata!’ 
But this invitation put them back again. It was certainly not 
coquetry, and to be invited to feel her dress for any other reason 
affronted him. He took a fold of the dark blue stuff between thumb 
and finger, and pronounced it damp. (M 57) 
 
Ben Ata is right to assume that Al Ith’s request is not a sexual invitation, but it is 
a sexual instruction. If female dress signs for male arousal in Zone Four, where 
female body and dress are interchangeable, both objects for male pleasure, then 
Al Ith is drawing attention to the possibility of female arousal. The ‘general damp’ 
of Zone Four and the ‘damp’ of Al Ith’s dress are drawn together, and the labial 
anatomy is mapped onto the ‘fold’ of the dress. Ben Ata’s touch both mimics and 
moves the autoerotic touch of the first rape scene (where he ‘fingered himself to 
see if he was up to it’ (M 47)) to responding positively to her request that he 
touch ‘her’. The drawing together of two sites of dampness might also sign for an 
already-present female sexuality in Zone Four. Drawn into a relation with the 
“general damp” of Zone Four, the dress functions as an instruction to Ben Ata 
about immanent possibilities of female sexual arousal in Zone Four. It is, 
however, a purely physiological instruction about sexual potential; the invitation 
from Al Ith is yet to arrive. Indeed, the women of Zone Four use coquetry as an 
informal barter system extended beyond institutionalized prostitution; in the 
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secret song festival, fearful of censorship, the women – wives – sing, ‘I’ll make 
him hunger, / And languish and anger, // And give me his pay, / A corporal’s pay’ 
(132-33).  
 Al Ith’s instruction of Ben Ata is not just a correction of Oedipus, but a 
tutoring away from unconsensual sexual violence as the primary reproductive 
performance of Zone Four. The Oedipus correction would limit the adaptation 
at work in Zone Four to the transition from fratriarchy to patriarchy, or son to 
father. There is more at stake – namely, the figure of wife, mother and sister: the 
vessels of reproduction and the primary labourers of child-care.  
 
Zone Three as Spencerian Utopia 
 
The speculative genre is deployed on one level to present a kind of time-travel 
between societies at different stages of development, but, more importantly for 
reading the novel as a queer text, is also used to stage moments of estrangement 
as Al Ith travels back and forth between the regions. From Al Ith and Ben Ata’s 
perspective, Al Ith’s tutoring of Ben Ata signals a hierarchical tree of civilised 
behaviour between Zones Three and Four. However, from a narrative point of 
view, and attending to Al Ith’s various moments of crisis and eventual exile, Al 
Ith’s narrative is not restricted to a utopian socialist telos of female 
emancipation. The narrative moves from focusing on Ben Ata’s change in 
perspective concerning women to exploring the possibilities rendered through 
Al Ith’s discovery – not wholly welcomed by her – of the spontaneous and 
complex verbal ‘poison’ within her, and what to her seems like excessive 
neediness and dependence that some of her encounters with Ben Ata draw out 
in her. It is not that Zone Three has reached a perfect state of social relations, 
but rather that it has settled into stasis of repeated cultural inheritance. Indeed, 
by creating Zone Three as the realisation of a 1960s and 70s Euro-US ideal of 
female leadership and equal gender relations, Lessing questions whether this in 
itself would be enough to keep society going, and whether the cost of protecting 
this equality would risk a society running into stasis, as Zone Three does.  
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Glover and Maslen read Al Ith as the harbinger of knowledge of 
ecological awareness, but these interpretations circumvent the narrative’s more 
critical exploration of Zone Three. Settling on this narrative would leave the 
relation between Zone Three and Zone Four in a civilized-barbarian paradigm 
(indeed, Al Ith uses the word ‘barbaric’ to describe Ben Ata and the men of Zone 
Four a number of times), with Al Ith cast as a Zone Three missionary sent to 
reform a barbarian region. However, with regard to its critique of imperialism, 
this is not a settler narrative, but a biopolitical one. The arranged marriage is a 
different cultural figure to the civilizing mission, based on the idea in 
evolutionary theory of fitness derived from exogamous relations. Through it, the 
Providers are ensuring the continued production of genetically useful colonized 
subjects, just as Johor/George undertakes missions on Shikasta to find 
genetically useful peoples to crossbreed. 
Rather than reading Zone Three as a feminist utopia to which Zone Four 
must aspire, Zone Three can be read instead as a Spencerian utopia that follows 
Herbert Spencer’s principle that social progress could be equated with biological 
evolution, and that both are teleological. Al Ith’s task in Zone Four can be read 
as neo-colonial, in that it is for the purpose of encouraging the exchange of 
resources across developed countries. Her descriptions of Zone Four bear a 
strong resemblance to First World intervention in Third World nations. Al Ith 
notices the destitution of Zone Four repeatedly: she thinks of it as a ‘graceless 
and impoverished land’ (190), and sees that ‘everywhere had the same stamp of 
on the edge of poverty (189). The society of Zone Three operates through a fixed 
cultural inheritance through which a certain moral standard of collective living 
is upheld, echoing Spencer’s notion that there is an innate morality that might 
be worked towards through progressive adaptation; in J. D. Y. Peel’s words, this 
is ‘evolution in a popular, teleological form’ (in Spencer xxi). Peel writes that 
Spencer ‘naturalise[s]’ society and suggests that it is governed by principles of 
growth, valid independently of the wills of men, which should never, and 
ultimately can never, be disrupted by interventionary actions’ (cited in Spencer 
xxv). If Spencer is writing in the context of an industrialised free market, Zone 
Three can be read as representing this developmental, anti-statist theory of 
 142 
evolutionary change in a post-industrial age, a society living off accumulated 
wealth, having returned to an agrarian economy.  
Al Ith’s entrance into Zone Four makes her realise for the first time the 
constituted bonds which govern Zone Three’s social relations, and transforms 
these bonds from ‘natural’ ones to conventional ones. For the first time, she is 
required to articulate protocols of care that in Zone Three are taken simply as 
truth. Moreover, her awareness of the effects of emotional as well as physical 
nourishment on Arusi is still based on a model of inheritance as more or less 
linear and chronological. This does not undo the assumed responsibility of elder 
generations to preserve and pass on established protocols to the younger ones. 
While Al Ith’s refusal to feed her child the ‘poison’ of her inner pain resists Zone 
Four’s model of mothers as primary care-givers by acknowledging a broader 
ecology of care, she retains the supremacy of parent-child influence, resisting 
instead – and throughout the novel – the idea of her own adaptation. While she 
resists the unchecked or careless transmission from mother to son, as well as 
the positioning of mother as the primary caregiver, the end-goal of her 
interactions with Arusi is still the transmission of an established cultural 
inheritance. It is this that she has to articulate. 
Placing Zone Three in a hierarchical relation to Zone Four, Rowe 
describes Al Ith’s Zone as ‘a feminised world, one in which women are 
independent and men do women’s work’ (cited in Taylor 155). But, as she is 
quick to imply, a reading of Marriages as a feminist instruction manual on 
correcting male psychoses would disappoint; Rowe finds the narrative focus on 
female dress and heteronormative sexual relations not sufficiently politically 
feminist. Rowe argues that Zone Three is a utopia in the vein of William Morris 
in News From Nowhere (1890), ‘a steady expression of the longing for a society 
of equality of conditions’ (Rowe 158). Rowe reads Marriages as a fable of 
transformation – the gradual progress across the Zones to the kind of society 
described by Morris.  
Rowe’s reading aligns with what Joseph Fracchia and Richard Lewontin 
call ‘transformational theories of cultural evolution,’ which reduce cultural and 
historical change to the mechanism of evolution derived from the Modern 
 143 
Synthesis (66). As a historical paradigm, the ‘transformational’ theory reads as 
a justification for colonialism, in which ‘more advanced cultures will spread and 
replace the less advanced when they come into contact’ (66). The biological 
paradigm is devolved from this historical model: in transformational theories, 
evolution is theorized as a directional and calculable ‘unfolding process [in 
which] the possibility of each successive transformation is dependent on the 
completion of a previous step of transformation to provide the initial state for 
the next change’ (61-2). If Al Ith represents a member of a more civilised society 
based on ‘advanced’ sexual and parental relations, then the story of Al Ith and 
Ben Ata is a simple teleological narrative of social transformation, where Zone 
Four becomes more like Zone Three, and Zone Three can now set its sights on 
becoming more like Zone Two. Rowe’s reading is then, a teleological 
interpretation of the text, which would bracket Al Ith’s change and eventual 
exile as the loss incurred through the effort involved in social transformation. 
This reading does not allow for the radically different kinds of 
experience-systems in Zones Two, Three and Four, which have specific kinds of 
sociality that – when read in an anti-hierarchical relation to each other – exhibit 
different kinds of attributes and energies for change, as well as its opposite. 
Rather than reading Zone Three feminist utopia, I read Zone Three as instead a 
utopia aligned with Herbert Spencer’s vision of – in J. D. Y. Peel’s words – 
‘human history as one long process of man’s “adaptation” to the prerequisites of 
a perfect social life, when all men could be free because all would be altruistic’ 
(Spencer xx). This reading allows us to be more attentive to the difficulty within 
Zone Three of breaking from its established norms of behaviour and speech. Nor 
is this ‘mystical marriage’ between Al Ith and Ben Ata ‘an allegory of Being’, a 
‘fusion of opposites further[ing] the emotional and psychic growth of 
consciousness in both personal and social contexts’, an ‘esoteric ascent toward 
wisdom’ through competing and contradictory forces, as Roberta Rubenstein 
has argued (61).  
The governance of Zone Three is led by an understanding of phenotypic 
plasticity and epigenetic forms of adaptation, but this has resulted in a static 
and stagnant social sphere of environmental conditioning, in which cultural 
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memory is rigidly maintained, and there is no spontaneity or possibility of 
radical change. While Al Ith transmits epigenetic knowledge to Ben Ata, there 
has been no need in her zone to make these arguments before, or to have to 
intervene directly in decisions about the possible absence of influences during 
its development: ‘Her children, in the past – those she had borne personally – 
were viewed more as a summing up or a confluence of influences and heritage’ 
(M 192). These influences are fixed and stable, passed on through environmental 
conditioning via ‘methods of artificial selection and psycho-physical training’ 
(M 192).  
The narrator – a Zone Three archivist and one of Al Ith’s ‘mind fathers’ – 
admits this conditioning has resulted in a ‘general malaise, or stagnation, in 
Zone Three (but such a word was hard to use in our beautiful land,’ and ‘our 
songs, our stories, had not changed for a very long time’ (M 175). The Zone Three 
festivals are ‘very beautiful’, with a ‘rich rolling plumpness about them’, 
‘reassuring’, but there ‘was no sting or surprise there. No moments of shock. 
They did not stimulate’ (M 175). Without interruption, the system of symbolic, 
genetic, behavioural and epigenetic inheritance has run into a ‘positive feedback 
loop’, where the repetition of the same message has led the stability of this 
system into disequilibrium. The low birth rates of Zone Three – a result of 
endogamous reproduction among isolated populations – are symptoms of this 
disequilibrium. Zone Three’s environmental determinism has led the system 
into ‘far-from-equilibrium’, and a need for adaptation and variation to alter the 
fixed and stable influences and heritage.  
Zone Three’s xenophobia and resistance to change becomes clear when 
Dabeeb – now permitted freedom of movement by her husband – leads a 
diplomatic mission to Zone Three to find Al Ith with a group of women from 
Zone Four. The archivist reports: ‘Everything about them was condemned, and 
this reflected badly on Al Ith’ (M 282). Al Ith is alienated by her former people, 
and undergoes exile as a form of punishment. Her sister Murti attempts to 
quarantine Al Ith’s changed significance, now that Al Ith is no longer ‘our Al Ith,’ 
in Murti’s words (294). She wants to prevent Al Ith from ‘creating disorder,’ a 
phrase that Murti cannot articulate in a conversation with Ben Ata; he must 
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supply it for her (M 292). Zone Four has within it the knowledge or cultural 
memory of disorder, whereas Zone Three does not have the resources to cope 
with any kind of imbalance. Murti, observing Al Ith’s ‘runaway’ from a position 
of assumed semiotic stability, does not yet have the words to describe the 
changes already at work in Zone Three, not least in the flexibility between 
borders. 
In Al Ith’s absence and under the reign of Murti, Zone Three has brought 
the fascistic undercurrent of its doctrine of social perfectibility to the centre stage 
of its governance. Murti has no interest in incorporating Al Ith’s changed state 
into the governing protocols of Zone Three, and instead banishes her to the far 
reaches of the Zone, for the sake of maintaining regional equilibrium. A younger 
sibling, in accordance with the lineage model of genealogical governance, has 
simply replaced Al Ith’s previous function. Her exile represents the exclusionary 
violence necessary for upholding this tightly ordered regime. In Zone Four, 
Dabeeb thinks that Al Ith is ‘being punished’ (M 284) for her relationship with 
Ben Ata, but this is not the case; rather, according to the protocols of Zone Three, 
Al Ith has no longer any use-value. She is no longer part of the bioeconomy of the 
Zone: 
 
She was not going to be accepted back into her old self, or into her 
land. She was separated from everything she saw. The joyous oneness 
with soil, and tree and air, the being part of her people so that she 
knew instantly all there was to know about them, since she was them, 
as well as being herself, had drained away. (M 232) 
 
‘Contaminated’ (for Murti) by Zone Four through her biological ingestion and 
incubation of its socio-genetic materials, Al Ith no longer has a purpose in Zone 
Three, other than as a icon of a transformative moment, now part of the region’s 
archive. If the primary social function in Zone Three is the passing down of a 
fixed cultural memory, then Al Ith is no longer able to do so. Now that she has 
been influenced by Zone Four, she has crossed the boundary between 
(re)productive capacity and social death.  
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Al Ith as Queer Vanguard 
 
Previous criticism of Marriages is relatively silent regarding the final part of the 
text, which sees Al Ith’s return to Zone Three and her rapid exile to the fringes 
of the region, given that it does not offer a satisfying politically feminist 
resolution. Al Ith does not head off to start her own society (although she has the 
opportunity to), but eventually drifts into Zone Two, while Ben Ata’s new 
marriage with Vahshi is used to demonstrate his changed relations with women. 
Politically speaking – in terms of gender equality – the significance of Al Ith’s 
exile is minor, given that both Zones remain attached to the reproductive 
imperative as the primary motivation for social change; the fundamental 
possibility for a queer subjectivity not tied to this imperative does not make its 
way into the core code of either realm. Nonetheless, Al Ith’s exile allows her to 
take on the role of a queer vanguard, a symbol for the revolutionary possibility 
of an order no longer bound to this reproductive logic, existing on the margins.   
Al Ith is exiled because the change she presents to Murti threatens the 
previously unchallenged, nationalistic narrative of Zone Three as – in Murti’s 
words – ‘untroubled’, a society in which ‘things were as they ought to be’ (M 294). 
When Murti describes Zone Three in this way to Al Ith, Al Ith points out, ‘Things 
were very bad before I was sent down to Ben Ata. We were sorrowful and 
despondent and ailing’, contrasting this to the state of Zone Three after her 
marriage to Ben Ata, which is not ‘falling birth rates and animals who will not 
mate’, but ‘the opposite’ (M 294). Al Ith’s failure to convince her sister Murti that 
the marriage has turned around the falling birth rates and reversed the general 
degeneration of both zones is indicative that there is another change at work, 
outside the imperative of the Providers. This change can be understood as Al 
Ith’s queering. Her stigmatization in both Zones allows her, in Warner’s words, 
‘to challenge the common understanding of what gender difference means, or 
what the state is for, or what “health” entails, or what would define fairness, or 
what a good relation to the planet’s environment would be’ (6). Warner’s broad 
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definition emphasises queerness as a possibility to change the constitution of 
social codes with regard to the relation between an individual and their 
environment. In the final section of the text, Al Ith no longer bears the same 
responsibility towards socialised femininity as she did before and during her 
marriage: she has been replaced as female leader by Murti, as wife by Vahshi, and 
as mother to Arusi by Dabeeb. Seeing that her links with ‘her’ children are now 
broken in Zone Three, Al Ith wonders ‘what those links and bonds could ever 
have meant, if now someone else could stand where she had, and she was not 
missed at all’ (M 234). In her own diagnosis, she does ‘not belong anywhere’ (M 
235). There is no longer a place for her in any familiar site. For her former people, 
she is ‘somewhere over there’ (M 275), an unspecified location, unnamable, as if 
her departure from the governing centre is not only practical one, but 
metaphysical.   
In this section of the text, Al Ith begins to function, practically, in different 
parts, no longer adhering to the difference between the metaphorical and 
empirical worlds. The narrator writes,  
 
She does not turn her back on her realm. She does not repudiate it. 
Easier, more dramatic, if she did. But it is as if she is already living, 
at least with part of herself, somewhere else. (M 277) 
 
Rather than a repudiation of or clean break from Zone Three, Al Ith at this point 
in the text is described as part of a different set of relations, taking in influences 
from distant locations through both memory and direct experience. When 
Dabeeb – visiting Al Ith in exile – sings the song from Zone Five, Al Ith is 
fascinated by it, ‘leaning forward, hands gripped together in front of her’, ‘all 
flushed and red and wild, a worn thin woman who seemed as if she was being 
burnt through and through by invisible flames’ (M 279). As Dabeeb notes, this 
new Al Ith is far removed from the matriarchal figure in blue that arrived in 
Zone Four to carry out her duty.  
Towards the end of the narrative, Al Ith becomes the witch-like figure 
that Ben Ata mistook her for at the beginning, inasmuch as such she represents 
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the disruption of established social relations and holds a power not wielded by 
local crown or imperial drum. Federici describes this figure as, ‘the embodiment 
of a world of female subjects that capitalism had to destroy: the heretic, the 
healer, the disobedient wife, the woman who dared to live alone, the obeha 
woman who poisoned the master’s food and inspired the slaves to revolt’ 
(Caliban 11). On the peripheries of this post-industrial region, where social life 
has been managed into a strict equilibrium of what should be preserved and 
what should be annihilated, and where the national benefits of female 
governance are outweighed by endogamous fascism and an unsustainable 
closed system, and, most importantly, where the female body is still subject to 
the obligation of reproductive labour, Al Ith represents a disorderly force. It is 
significant that she moves to this pre-industrial space of pasture and animal care 
on the margins, the imaginative realm assigned to this figure.  
 As I have argued, despite Zone Three’s illusion of autonomy and feminine 
utopia, it is still compelled to act in accordance with the orders of the Providers. 
Zone Three remains the peripheral interest of another centre, which functions 
explicitly through a colonial capitalist logic of territorial acquisition, the 
amassing of biopower, and the extraction of resources. Federici argues that by 
looking at capitalism from the viewpoint of women as primary bearers of the 
responsibility of species continuation, ‘Marx could never have presumed that 
capitalism paves the way to human liberation [because] even when men 
achieved a certain degree of formal freedom, women were always treated as 
socially inferior beings and were exploited in ways similar to slavery’ (13). No 
matter what advances have been made with regard to gender equality in this 
Zone, Al Ith is still compelled by the Providers to facilitate the improvement of 
birth rates across the Zone, and to dedicate her sexual choices and bodily labour 
to this effort. No matter what changes occur as a result of this marriage and the 
social interaction of Zones Three and Four via Al Ith and Ben Ata, respectively, 
the Canopean colonial masters still enforce the reproductive imperative on the 
female body, in this case, Al Ith. To return to the anti-Spencerian argument: 
when viewed from the perspective of the obligations placed on the female body 
and the resulting alienation of non-conforming females – exemplified in Al Ith’s 
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banishment – Zone Three does not represent a more advanced civilization than 
Zone Four, but a different stage of capitalist accumulation. Thus, when Rowe 
argues that Zone Three is not sufficiently politically feminist, I would go further: 
Zone Three is not ‘feminist’ in any true sense, because it is still bound to the 
reproductive imperative demanded by its imperial rulers.  
Al Ith’s presence in Zone Four changes the epistemological construction 
of previously fixed signs, revealing a conventional rather than natural relation 
between sign and signified. This change in understanding of the possibilities for 
meaning-making allows a space for her to explore a novel experience of 
subjectivity – that of a queered subject, and to become a vanguard for the 
revolutionary potential of this experience at the borders of Zone Three. While 
her replacement by Murti, Dabeeb and Vahshi signifies a loss of function, it also 
opens up a different possibility for existence to Al Ith at the peripheries of her 
former realm. Unwittingly and without a particular goal in mind save living, Al 
Ith takes the position of vanguard working at the edges of Zone Three, no longer 
the facilitator of old customs, but instead indirectly challenging the constitution 
of a social sphere that has grown stale. Lessing’s idea of the vanguard is explicitly 
based on this idea; in a non-fiction essay on social change, she writes that the 
foremost task of the vanguard is to ‘prevent a society from going sleepy and 
uncritical,’ rather than to promote the replacement of one dogma with another 
(Prisons 85).  
This is the work that Al Ith carries out in this final section of the text. She 
becomes a farm labourer, working with the beasts of villagers that give her food 
and shelter for her work, ‘caring for [the animals], feeding them, exercising them 
along the lanes and the fields’ (M 245). While this place is bucolic and mediaeval, 
the scene of a return to a pre-industrial world where a system of barter and 
agrarian sustainability is still in place, the pastoral idyll is illusory; it provides a 
backdrop for Al Ith’s changed state, but it is not a resting place. When Murti’s 
guards remove Al Ith still further to a shed with a small cow, the place of exile 
becomes a peripheral site of resistance to the regional centre. Zone Three 
inhabitants also ostracized come to find her, ‘similar to Al Ith’ and feeling ‘a pull 
towards her’, settling in the farms and villages of the northwestern parts of the 
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Zone, because they ‘suffe[r] from an inability to live in Zone Three as if it was, or 
could be, enough for them’ (M 296-97). On the peripheries, Al Ith becomes a 
symbol for Zone Three dissidents looking for a way out, the vanguard that stands 
in for disruption, rather than any alternative ideology. Here, she can receive the 
influences of other Zones in a way that Murti, the governor of the realm, cannot.  
 The work that Al Ith carries out in Zone Four does not force the Zone Four 
inhabitants to adopt the ways of Zone Three. The need for Al Ith to articulate 
certain protocols of Zone Three around sexuality and childbirth in the 
environment of Zone Four, translating the digital code of instruction into the 
analogue code of social context, causes repeated moments of ‘runaway’ for both 
her and for the Zone Four inhabitants. One of the results of Al Ith’s passage to 
Zone Four is the general realisation that the zones share this ecosystem, and that 
what goes on in one Zone has an effect in the other, despite closed borders and 
aggressive frontiers. They realize their bioregionality, not as a utopia but as a 
system of stochastic change. Later in the text, the narrator notes, 
 
This story of Al Ith has taught us that what goes on in one Zone 
affects the others, even when we believe we are hostile, or forget 
everything that goes on outside our own borders. We share and 
exchange even our times of sluggishness, insularity, self-applause. 
When those women strove and struggled to lift their poor heads so 
they could see our mountains towering over them it was as if they 
were secretly pouring energy and effort into springs that fed us all. 
(M 176-77) 
 
This vision of ecological contamination across zones does not denote Zone 
Three as superior and Zone Four as inferior. The energy derived from the 
striving and struggles of the Zone Four women is its own kind of nourishment, 
not the ‘poison’ Al Ith considers their unhappiness to be, which carries over to 
Zone Three and energises its inhabitants. Rather than inspiring the pursuit of 
perfectibility, the effect of Al Ith and Ben Ata’s marriage seems instead to draw 
attention to the ebb and flow, warp and woof that necessarily becomes the 
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measure of activity in a broad and open system of living exchanges. Al Ith has 
been converted into a ‘story’, an example, of these exchanges; that the supposed 
dysfunction of ‘sluggishness, insularity, self-applause’ does not signal the end or 
impossibility of sharing and exchange, but rather that these tendencies also 
produce biosociality, despite the efforts of the Providers to cancel them out or 
reverse them. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that Marriages can be read through epigenetic ideas about the 
complexity of interactions in a given ecosystem as a form of stochastic change, 
rupturing biopolitical borders of gender, territory and sexuality, and that this 
leads to the possibility for a queer biosociality in which social relations are not 
centred on reproductive capacity. The change Al Ith undergoes, which is brought 
about by repeated moments of disequilibrium and involves the experience of 
protolanguage as a means of changing social relations, take her from a 
biopolitical object to a queer subject. In the following chapter, I explore the 
imaginary of evolutionary complexity and epigenetic change in The Making of 
the Representative of Planet 8. Whereas Marriages focuses on reconfiguring 
subjectivity at an individual level, Making can be read instead through histories 
of anti-colonial struggle and pan-African poetics during the 1960s and 1970s and 
what John Berger calls ‘peasant survival’. Marriages and Making are somewhat 
paired because they are the only two novels in the series told from the 
perspective of colonised subjects (although Al Ith and Ben Ata are proxy leaders, 
whereas the Planet 8ers are subalterns), and both depict different modes of 
resistance from colonised subject to imperial power. Making is also a rejoinder 
to the Lombi narrative in The Sirian Experiments, attaching a first-person 
narrative to the voice of the dispossessed. While the ethical problem of The Sirian 
Experiments centres on Ambien II’s defection from Sirius and the resulting chaos 
this brings, the fourth novel is a narrative of subaltern change – the ‘making’ of 
a representative who will be able to tell the tale.  
4 
 
PEASANT SURVIVAL:  
THE AFRICAN TRAGEDY AND VITAL POLITICS IN  
THE MAKING OF THE REPRESENTATIVE FOR PLANET 8 
 
In this chapter, I read The Making of the Representative for Planet 8 as a fable of 
peasant survival, placing contemporary scholarship on vital politics alongside a 
reading of the ‘African Tragedy’ during the early to mid-1970s, after the 
abandonment of development initiatives in peripheral economies after the Nixon 
Shock and recession in the Euro-US. John Berger argues that ‘peasant life is a life 
committed completely to survival’, a characteristic ‘fully shared by peasants 
everywhere’, no matter the master or type of social organisation (feudal or 
capitalist) (187). Berger defines the peasantry not as non-urbanised groups not 
yet brought into civilisation, but as a necessary invention of capitalism for the 
sake of its own perpetuation, a group constituted historically through uneven 
development. While it is possible to understand the peasantry as antithetical to 
capitalism’s destruction of feudalism – those left behind by capitalist 
development, a remainder – I follow Berger in understanding the peasantry as 
‘integrated into the historical economic-cultural system’ because it ‘produced the 
necessary surplus’, rather than being left outside it (188). This is an example of a 
combined form of development in which the peasantry – a rural subproleteriat 
producing surplus material for capitalist accumulation – exist alongside 
supermodern structures, and indeed whose conditions of existence are made 
necessary by these structures. As I explore in my reading of Planet 8, it is in the 
interests of imperial capitalism to keep this class always outside the privileges of 
the core, while simultaneously within its regulatory mechanisms and extractive 
efforts. 
Tying together the notion of economic and biological surplus under 
Canopus’s imperial biopolitical regime, Planet 8 describes this uneven and 
combined incorporation as not only socio-historical, but also biological: the 
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peasantry of Planet 8 are brought into material existence through Canopean 
engineering. Planet 8 follows the extinction of the Planet 8ers, a race genetically 
engineered by Canopus, after an unknown crisis affects planets and populations 
under the dominion of Canopus, which manifests as a sudden, extreme climate 
change – an ice age. This race, which I call throughout this chapter the ‘Planet 
8ers’, in the absence of any other given denomination (presumably deliberate), 
are some of the peasantry of the Canopean Empire, brought into existence 
primarily for the creation of surplus labour power and as physical storage for 
genetic ‘goods’.  The crisis marked by the ice age can be described in the broadest 
sense as ecological; the text sets up categorisations of geological, biological and 
cultural under the question of what constitutes survival, and what constitutes 
‘life itself’. Key to this is the figure of the wall, which the Planet 8ers construct on 
guidance from Canopus, which is supposed to mark a distinction between 
cultivated and natural worlds. The failure of the wall to protect them against the 
ice signifies the limits of Canopean power.  
Developing the notion of peripheral realism suggested by the WReC 
group, as literature which ‘bear[s] testimony […] to the “shock of the new”, the 
massive rupture effected at the levels of space-time continuum, lifeworld, 
experience and human sensorium by capitalist modernisation’ (50), I suggest 
Planet 8 as a narrative of peripheral speculation. It not only registers this ‘shock’, 
but also develops a speculative resistance to it. As the Planet 8ers realise the fact 
of their impending extinction, they begin to push against their understanding of 
themselves as reducible to carefully-assembled clusters of DNA material. They 
begin to consider what Eugene Thacker calls ‘extrinsic life’: ‘life that is 
perpetually going outside itself, or peripheral life’ (‘Biophilosophy’ 134). If their 
engineering is for the purpose of creating a surplus-value of genetic material, to 
be used at a future date, the Planet 8ers’ resistance to this requires not just 
ideological contest, but reconfiguring Canopus’s reduction of their existence as 
a Canopean resource. Using Berger’s formulation that ‘the metaphysic of capital’ 
is not based on past achievement, but refers only ‘to a future expectation’, the 
Planet 8ers’ loss of relevance for Canopus is also a moment of opportunity. In 
this sense, I read Planet 8 as extending the theme of irrelevance as resistance 
 154 
introduced in the Lombi experiment in The Sirian Experiments (1981). In Planet 
8, the perspective is repositioned from coloniser to colonised, depicting the work 
of decolonisation as both epistemological and structural.  
Can the formerly colonised territory ever be fully decolonised, and is 
decolonisation only effected through a change in political representation? In a 
discussion of post-colonial Johannesburg, the WReC group ask if the city can 
ever be ‘liberated from the divisions of labour and living that its constructed 
material form, its design and layout, its roads and communications networks, 
continue to encode and institutionalise’ (146)? What is to be done with the 
inheritance of an implicit instruction, continually activated by the functioning 
of everyday life? In Planet 8, this question is extended to the question of 
biologically programming. The novel develops a theme that recurs in all the 
novels – what Nikolas Rose calls ‘a new “vital” politics’, the ‘object, target and 
state’ of which are ‘human life itself’ (‘The Politics of Life Itself’ 1) – tying this to 
a speculation on emancipatory politics that push against this paradigm. Rose 
argues that while vital politics of the first half of the twentieth century were 
characterised by ‘a particular understanding of the inheritance of a biological 
constitution and the consequences of differential reproduction of different 
subpopulations,’ this changes in late twentieth and twenty-first centuries to 
become ‘concerned with our growing capacities to control, manage, engineer, 
reshape, and modulate the very vital capacities of human beings as living 
creatures. It is, I suggest, a politics of “life itself”’ (Politics 3). Planet 8 can be read 
through this transition – broadly speaking, from governmental focus on 
inheritance and reproduction to that of control, management and modulation.  
Rose follows Deleuze’s formulation of a control society here, which I 
outlined in Chapter One: while a disciplinary society seeks to enclose, the control 
society requires no gates, but ‘effects a universal modulation’ by tracking ‘each 
person’s position’ (7). Similarly to Memoirs, the crisis in Planet 8 is also a moment 
of possibility for social reorganisation, and resisting new technologies enabling 
this ongoing seizing of life itself. Rather than representing this possibility at a 
structural or subjective level, as Memoirs does, Planet 8 takes as its subject the 
politics of life itself. Undoing the epistemological and psychological inheritance 
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of imperial subjugation is developed through a repositioning of ‘human agents’ 
in a sphere of living actants. This leads to what Thacker might call a ‘molecular-
wide’ perspective which acknowledges ‘the ineffability and irreducibility of life’s 
description’ (‘Biophilosophy’ 142), taking this as an opportunity not to abdicate 
responsibility, but to cultivate a new kind of ethical relation between 
differentiated spheres of ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ activity. In this crisis, 
Canopean knowledge formation about the relation between humans and the 
environment, and their efforts to produce and capture human life as biopolitical 
surplus, are subverted. This subversion is temporary, but, I argue, mark Lessing’s 
speculative and literary contribution to the global debate around African anti-
colonial resistance contemporary to the novels. 
By focalising the narrative through the Planet 8ers and their perspective 
on Canopus, a peripheral workforce observing their rulers, the novel stages a 
critique of neo-imperial governance through voices of an invented 
subproletariat. The Planet 8ers function as what Berger calls ‘an economy within 
an economy,’ whose primary characteristic is survival. The peasant must ‘survive 
the primary handicap of having a “surplus” taken from him’, ‘all the hazards of 
agriculture – bad seasons, storms, droughts, floods, pests, accidents, 
impoverished soil, animal and plant diseases, crop failures’, and ‘with the 
minimum of protection, he had to survive social, political and natural 
catastrophes – wars, brigands, fire, pillaging, and so on’ (189). The environmental 
insulation afforded to the capitalist or feudal lord is not given to the peasant 
class, which must adapt to rapid and unforeseen shifts in their circumstances by 
forging temporary alliances and cultivating informal negotiations to supplement 
the failure of care and the extraction of labour. In this sense, the peasantry are 
positioned at the forefront of evolutionary change.  
 Shadia Fahim reads Planet 8 through Sufi transcendentalism, arguing that 
it depicts ‘the reconciliation between the individual and the collective 
consciousness […] which signifies the fulfilment of descent and the first step 
towards ascent’ (152). She argues that throughout the Canopus novels (and also 
Memoirs), a strategy to ‘transcend [a] limited perspective’ is repeatedly invoked. 
Sufism allows an interesting entry point into the discussion of perspective and 
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self-understanding in this chapter; however, this suggests a much more directed, 
self-aware and self-willed mode of change than I read in the text. Given that the 
Planet 8ers are in the first instance responding to a crisis, I find more 
interpretative flexibility in the argument that the Planet 8ers’ transformation is 
tied to recognising, then negating, then modifying their genetic engineering. My 
claim here is that the transformation undergone by the Planet 8ers – albeit 
temporary, given the ‘return’ to Canopean care at the end of the text – is to 
disconnect themselves from the determinations of their inheritance and to 
explore a mode of living as molecular life. In Planet 8, a posthumanist vision of 
‘life itself’ appears as a strategy of decentring and undoing the long-term violence 
of the transhumanist project, through the invoked history of anti-colonial 
struggle.  
Angela Hague argues that ‘forced evolution’ is ‘actually Lessing’s 
depiction of a world in which intuitive consciousness emerges as a political 
stance that relinquishes power and control in favour of a symbiotic, 
collaborative relationship among diverse peoples and cultures’ (298). I read this 
as a description of a capitalist world-system, not a relinquishment of power and 
control but rather power and control premised on vast economic unevenness 
sustained through forced symbiosis between core and peripheral territories. The 
WReC group describes such a system as ‘characterised by vertical and horizontal 
integration, connection and interconnection, structurality and organisation, 
internal differentiation, a hierarchy of constitutive elements governed by 
specific “logics” of determination and relationality’ (8). Diversity of culture and 
of people can be understood here as economic as much as biological. Through 
‘forced evolution’, Canopus manages the domestic concerns of its peoples, in 
terms of labour, biopower and culture. The novel’s critique of Canopus through 
the narrative construction of a world-system based on the extraction of a surplus 
(energy, resources, genomes) that the Planet 8ers are programmed to 
experience as ‘natural’. What Hague reads as a ‘symbiotic, collaborative 
relationship among diverse peoples and cultures’ with regard to Canopean 
ordering of the system, I read as a relation of biopolitical management, in which 
populations are created and controlled by Canopus for imperialist expansion.  
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A materialist interpretation of Planet 8 allows a thorough exploration of 
the novel’s representation of genetic epistemology, and keeps the repeated 
blurring of boundaries between human/non-human, animate/inanimate at the 
centre of the analysis. Spiritual transcendence does not equate to political 
emancipation, and is bound to implications of infinite temporality; a vital 
politics, on the other hand, still restricted by the contradictions and challenges 
of living between past and present, is a way of exploring different modes of living 
which are in themselves historical. I read Planet 8 along the ethical contours of 
the following claim made by Donna Haraway about ‘transspecies love’: 
 
Human beings’ learning to share other animals’ pain nonmimetically 
is […] an ethical obligation, a practical problem, and an ontological 
opening. Sharing pain promises disclosure, promises becoming. (84) 
 
The significance of the wall’s inefficacy as a barrier between ‘human’ and ‘nature’ 
is at the centre of the narrative’s ethical considerations. The Planet 8ers do not 
so much become different beings, as they perceive their existence beyond the 
biopolitical determinations of Canopus, as part of a perpetual ‘becoming’; 
furthermore, this changed perception comes about through relations of care. As 
Hanson argues, Planet 8 ‘calls into question our assumptions about the 
relationship between humans and all other now or once living species’ (‘A 
Catastrophic Universe’ 165). The conflict between transhumanist and 
posthumanist implications that Hanson reads can be interpreted historically as 
the difference between the superman projected through the transhumanist 
ideals of the interwar eugenicists, and a mode of living that would take into 
account the suppleness, flexibility and fragility of animate and inanimate 
relations. Planet 8 depicts these interactions taking place in what Jane Bennett 
might describe as an assemblage of human and nonhuman actants (following 
Deleuze and Guattari), in a ‘distributive and composite’ understanding of the 
‘nature of agency’, not confined to the human (Bennett 446). 
I draw Rose’s argument about vital politics into a historical reading of 
Planet 8 as an analogy for the African Tragedy of the 1970s, the effect of a global 
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economic shock on sub-Saharan Africa, in which the development initiatives of 
the 1950s and 60s by international funding agencies – the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), among others – came to a halt as the effects 
of the Nixon Shock swept the globe. The shock revealed much about the state of 
global governance and the post-colonial ‘North’/‘South’ division of former 
colonial centres and colonized peripheries and semi-peripheries, not least in the 
devastation it caused for emerging post-colonial markets. Using a metaphor 
highly appropriate for my reading of Planet 8, Giovanni Arrighi describes the 
effect of the recentralisation of US purchasing power as a way of dealing with the 
Nixon shock as the ‘cold winds of competition blowing’ over the world-system 
(334). In Planet 8, I read this shock as analogised through the ice age on Planet 
8, a peripheral planet under Canopean dominion, resulting in the extinction of 
its populations. By drawing the extinction as not only economic loss but loss of 
life, Planet 8 incorporates the undocumented life-cost of an unspecified 
transglobal crisis into the Canopean archive. 
In the ‘Afterword’ for Planet 8, Lessing explains her motivation for 
rendering this change across different levels of experience, and different forms 
of life:  
 
It seems to me that we do not know nearly enough about ourselves; 
that we do not often enough wonder if our lives, or some events and 
times in our lives, may not be analogues or metaphors or echoes of 
evolvements and happenings going on in other people? – or animals? 
– even forests or oceans or rocks? – in this world of ours or, even, in 
worlds or dimensions elsewhere. (190) 
 
This perspective, in theoretical terms, resonates with multispecies ethnography, 
which S. Eben Kirksey and Stefan Helmreich described as the study of ‘the host 
of organisms whose lives and deaths are linked to human social worlds’ (545), 
and a conceptual bridge between anthropocentric ethnography and the 
dissolution of species borders into extrinsic life. In political terms, this would 
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also rupture any kind of typological hierarchy of being fostered through the 
language of scientific racism.  
Ventriloquising the rhetoric of developmentalism in terms of Canopus’s 
relation to the population of Planet 8, Lessing’s novel moves out of this 
confinement of human interests to what Eduardo Kohn describes as ‘an 
anthropology of life that is not just confined to the human but is concerned with 
the effects of our entanglements with other kinds of living selves’ (cited in 
Kirksey and Helmreich 545). Planet 8 stages the reconfiguration of boundaries 
between life forms differentiated by imperial typology and the bordering of a 
‘human’ world from ‘nonhuman’ actants and inanimate elements. Following 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s notion of ‘becomings’, this introduces 
different possibilities for ‘new kinds of relations emerging from nonhierarchical 
alliances, symbiotic attachments, and the mingling of creative agents’ (241-42). 
In Deleuze and Guattari-inflected essay on cross-species transmission of 
influenza through what she calls ‘multispecies clouds’, Celia Lowe finds value in 
the idea of viral becomings, because it centres a radical uncertainty and makes 
the recognition of molecular agents necessary for understanding all of the 
transformations and encounters created by this transmission: ‘Rather than 
existing in well-bounded populations, these biotic entities organise into clusters 
of genomes with unstable group boundaries’, making necessary words such as 
‘mutant swarms’ or ‘clouds’ in order to describe the nature of their existence 
(625-26). This ‘transforms types into events, objects into actions’ (Kirksey and 
Heimreich 546). In this transformation, other modes of survival are thrown into 
relief, unmoored from the neo-Darwinian focus on species survival and into an 
extended ontology of ‘life itself’. Their extinction is reconfigured under the sign 
of ‘life itself’, away from the anthropological or zoological differentiation and 
categorisation of life forms into species, towards conceiving molecular life.  
 This is comparable to epigenetic theory, understanding epigenetics as 
holding the potential for an anti-reductionist framework allowing the 
consideration of adaptation as a series of flexible and ongoing processes, rather 
than a trait-oriented theory that stresses the relative fitness of particular species 
to adapt to their environment and to compete with fellow actors in determining 
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evolutionary change. It opens up the scope of evolutionary activity by painting 
a more complex vision of the organism as a set of co-existing and often 
contradictory processes through which equilibrium is managed. The 
epistemological reconfiguration of ‘types into events’ and ‘objects into actions’ 
echoes a radical shift in epigenetic thinking for theorising the complexity of 
adaptation and evolutionary change, outside a gene-centric model of 
inheritance and mutation. This has implications for the political sphere, not in 
the sense that organisms can will their own change – as some popular accounts 
of epigenetics claim – but rather implies the contingency and unpredictability 
of life when analysed as a process of molecular interactions between various 
differentiated spheres of activity. 
Planet 8 engages with the debate over environmental influence on gene 
expression in Euro-US genetics parallel to the publication of the Canopus series, 
made prominent by the work of epigeneticist Barbara McClintock and her 1983 
Nobel Prize win for her work on ‘jumping genes’, which I explore later in this 
chapter. The determinations of the colonial rulers on the Planet 8ers as 
individual units designed and produced specifically for future Canopean use, 
and their organisation of ‘nature’ against ‘human’ with regard to global 
organisation, are subverted on one hand by a form of adaptation that takes place 
at levels of epistemology and learning towards what Thacker calls a ‘molecular-
wide perspective’ (‘Biophilosophy’ 142); on the other, by the rupture of 
individual or species death as a category of experience and its supplementation 
with new kinds of relations between different agents. There is an epigenetic 
textuality at work in the descriptions of the Planet 8ers’ adaptation to their 
changed ecology, and their recognition of themselves as being part of this 
ecology – both influencing and influenced by it – and in the narrative’s breaking 
down of anthropocentric boundaries of experience (the wall and the snow being 
a grounding topological binary that is gradually undone as the narrative 
progresses). 
 Through the Planet 8ers’ perspective, the novel introduces the question 
of self-determination into the more general Canopus in Argos narrative of 
(inter)globalised inequality and exploitation. It can be read alongside Eve 
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Jablonka and Marion Lamb’s claim, outlined in Chapter Two, that ‘not everything 
inherited is genetic’, and that behavioural, epigenetic and symbolic systems can 
have both ‘direct and indirect influences on evolutionary change’ (107). Reading 
Planet 8 as a rejoinder to the Lombi experiment – this time told from the point 
of view of the slave workforce/test group – the more striking change is not their 
biological adaptation, but the epistemological reconfiguration of ‘themselves’ 
outside a colonial logic. Berger argues that the peasant ‘does not conceive of what 
was taken from him as a surplus’, but instead ‘might think of his imposed 
obligations as a natural duty, or some inevitable injustice’ (188-89; italics mine). 
The emancipatory potential of the narrative derives in part from the Planet 8ers 
no longer taking their subjugation and exploitation for granted. With regard to 
their self-understanding, the Planet 8ers go from being extensions of Canopus 
(who abandon them) to being part of a ceaseless sphere of activity (where they 
can move between differentiations). Their survival narrative is characterised by 
recognising the possibility of self-determination in a molecular-wide ecological 
realm, a possibility which the Lombi experiment, given its narration by Ambien 
II, does not allow. The Planet 8ers reconceive their existence under Canopean 
dictates from a natural duty to an artificial one, and their perception of the 
conditions of ‘life itself’. 
 
 
 
 
Constructing a Workforce: Canopus’s Genetic Creations 
The subjects of Planet 8 are genetic creations of Canopus, the product of 
stock from four species, defined by Canopus before the crisis in purely 
biological terms. The crisis prompts an epistemic shock – an unexpected shift 
in knowledge – for both Canopus and for the Planet 8 population. The 
implications of this shock affect the biopolitical management of the Planet 
8ers by Canopus, the shock produced by the experience of ecological crisis 
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precipitates a change in the social relations among the Planet 8ers, as well as 
their relationship to their colonial masters, the Canopeans. The Planet 8ers 
have been transported to the planet by Canopus under the broad project of 
Forced Evolution that the Canopeans undertake among most of their subject 
populations. Planet 8 is taken over by Canopus as a colonial outpost on which 
they deposit a genetically-engineered workforce:  
 
Everything on Planet 8 that had been planned, built, made – 
everything that was not natural – was according to their 
specifications. The presence of our kind on the planet was because 
of them: because of Canopus. They had brought us here, a species 
created by them from stock originating on several planets. (P8 11) 
 
The Planet 8ers are objects in a Canopean system, created and governed for the 
purpose of a future symbiosis with Rohanda. They have no say over their own 
development; everything is determined for them by Canopus, who are bringing 
up another race ‘to a high level of evolution’ for the sake of cross-breeding with 
the Planet 8ers (P8 45). After the ecological shock hits Planet 8, the Canopean 
agent Johor, from Shikasta, tells them they will be taken to Rohanda once they 
have completed ‘raising a certain species there to a level where, when your kind 
[the Planet 8ers] are brought in, you will make a harmonious whole’ (28), but not 
before this has happened. The Canopean economy is ‘a very finely tuned one’, 
Johor tells Doeg; ‘our growth, our existence, what we are is a unit, a unity, a whole 
– in a way that, as far as we know, does not exist anywhere else in our galaxy’ 
(57). This unity would be reflected in the synthesis of the Rohandan and Planet 
8 populations, which together would ‘become something quite extraordinary’ 
(P8 80), and is embedded in a transhumanist vision of human futures: to create 
a Canopean utopia on Rohanda from the genetic material of various engineered 
or edited human populations.  
This is a eugenic vision of an (inter)world-system determined by Canopus, 
a unity based on a shared economic consciousness. Hague reads this ambition to 
 163 
create a ‘harmonious whole’ as an abdication of power, a carefully planned 
structure that ‘avoids the ravages of power and technology’; realizing one’s own 
part in this unity, ‘Necessity’, ‘allows one to function consciously and effectively 
as part of it’, and it is Canopus’s ultimate goal to ‘acquaint each individual with 
this knowledge’ (300). Hague’s reading brushes over the highly utilitarian 
language of this ambition, and seems to justify a kind of brainwashing into 
Canopean purpose. Here, Gore Vidal’s observation in his review of Shikasta is 
relevant, when he describes Canopus/Sirius/Shammat as ‘good and bad 
extraterrestrial forces who take some obscene pleasure in manipulating a passive 
ant-like race’ (203). It would be a case of taking this observation further into the 
different mechanisms of manipulation in the novels, rather than taking 
exception to the idea that the Canopeans are manipulative power-seekers. These 
criticisms of Canopus in Argos novels miss Lessing’s critique of imperial 
manipulation in the name of general good, rather than depicting these different 
empires as being a battle between benevolent intervention and utilitarian rule.  
The forced evolution of populations under Canopean dominion is 
achieved in part through ‘the Lock’, ‘a network of near-physical emanations that 
links Rohanda to the Canopean Empire and supplies it with a steady, nurturing 
stream of SOWF’, the ‘substance-of-we’ feeling. The Lock maintained between 
Canopus and its governed populations is analogous to this structure of 
dependency, management and – in practical terms – the continued direction of 
resources towards the Euro-US. As I show below, this ‘substance-of-we’ feeling – 
ephemeral, invisible, a general atmosphere of connection and influence – is 
comparable to the disembodied force of post-war global finance, the system of 
finance capital set up through the Bretton Woods institutions to ensure 
economic security for Western allies (US, Canada, Western Europe, Australia 
and Japan), with the US positioned as the central power of finance (rather than 
the UK). The two institutions set up through the system - the IMF and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – employed the 
mechanisms of transnational finance capital to centralise global development 
and, to an extent, global governance. One of the two branches of the World Bank 
that focus on international development, the IBRD is based on human 
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development, agriculture, environmental protection, infrastructure and 
construction projects; they also fund governance programmes on legal 
institutions and anti-corruption. These institutions determine both what needs 
to be done and how to do it, and manage the receipt and use of funds with which 
to carry out ‘development’, according to centrally-determined criteria. When 
Fahim points out the general theme in Canopus in Argos of the Canopeans 
‘striving to regain equilibrium’ (139), I would suggest that such equilibrium is 
economic, based on regaining control over the mechanisms of its sovereign 
power. SOWF is analogous to finance capital without a country. 
On one hand, the ‘substance’ of these funding bodies - the basis of the 
connection from benefactor to recipient, creating a global ‘unity’ - is a satellite 
governmental relation based on the transmission of finance, maintaining a core-
periphery dynamic between countries during the post-war period by 
constructing a mythology of ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds, or North/South. However, 
they also ensure the management and control of these peripheral economies, 
both domestically and internationally, through a relation of borrowing and 
therefore obligation to uphold certain international standards. These 
institutions re-constituted the Core-Periphery topography of the capitalist 
world-system; while the US was repositioned as the central national power in the 
Bretton Woods system – thus marking a change in power in nation-state terms 
– in an ideological and bureaucratic sense this was simply the shift of British 
imperialism westwards, a regional change rather than a systemic one. The IMF 
and the World Bank effectively created a stranglehold by which to grant or 
disable certain peripheral economies’ participation in global finance and 
exchange. 
Planet 8 immediately establishes a power dynamic between Canopus and 
the Planet 8ers analogous to that of North/South, ‘First’/‘Third’, rooting this in a 
biological analogy with regard to the genetic invention of the Planet 8ers by 
Canopus, a population that has been created to sustain inequality. As I will argue 
later, this is the imaginative realm within which the management strategies of 
the IMF and the World Bank are administered: they continue to operate within 
colonial constructions of other worlds, where the word ‘developing’ replaces 
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‘civilising’, maintaining a ‘Lock’ between core and peripheral economies to 
ensure the continuation of colonial power structures.  
The text begins with the premise that the Planet 8ers will give an account 
of ‘how the Canopean Agents seemed to us in the time of The Ice’ (P8 11), told 
from the perspective of Doeg, the Planet 8 storyteller. By arranging the narrative 
in this way – as a response to a request for an account of Canopean 
administration from a group made extinct by them – the text offers a truth 
contract not present in the first, third and fifth novels. If Johor, Ambien II and 
Klorathy’s accounts in Shikasta, The Sirian Experiments and The Sentimental 
Agents of the Volyen Empire are organised to deliver a story about colonial power 
by mimicking and parodying the anthropological violence of the European 
empires and Soviet Union along the lines of progress, then the account from the 
perspective of a colonized subject makes visible the effects of this governance 
across mind and body; for the Planet 8ers, this dynamic is their origin, their claim 
to life itself. Colonialism brings into being peoples by naming them, displacing 
them, recording them, studying them, and managing every aspect of their 
existence in relation to that which they are not.  
This comes out in Doeg’s statement on the Planet 8er’s ‘obedience’ to 
Canopus: ‘Does one talk of obeying when it is a question of one’s origin, and 
existence?’ (P8 11) Doeg’s name is interesting to consider, suggestive of a relation 
of domesticated non-human (a dog) to a master. The dynamic of dependency 
sustained by a disembodied, ethereal ‘substance-of-we’ feeling is not an 
abdication of power, as Hague suggests, but is the strict enforcement of absolute 
control over life in every aspect. This is why, when the crisis comes, it is not just 
a question of economic failure; this crisis affects every aspect of life for the Planet 
8ers. What is simply economic profit/loss for Canopus (in a general sense, as 
opposed to Johor’s individual guilt) is translated into biological loss for the Planet 
8ers; their extinction as a result of the ‘Failure of the Lock’, suffering the effects 
of The Ice, is a kind of literal analogy for the uneven effects of economic on 
peripheral economies.  
In Planet 8, economic crisis is imagined through its effect on a peripheral 
planet, while in The Sirian Experiments, we see this disparity in the urban 
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planning of individual cities. The structure can be scaled up from city district, to 
peripheral nation, to peripheral planet; from a structural perspective, the scale is 
incidental. In this sense, the same structure of domestication and annihilation 
occurs in both plantation and colony. Yet by setting up the account of the Planet 
8ers on a planet on which they are governed by Canopus, Lessing imagines the 
experience of economic crisis for a peripheral economy as an existential threat, 
conveying the scale of devastation and the way in which the failure of a ghostly 
capitalism annihilates biological life.  
What seems to the Canopeans not much more than a sad, small loss, for 
the Planet 8ers is total. Planet 8 is a peripheral interest of the Canopeans. The 
demise of the Planet 8ers is mentioned in The Sirian Experiments during an inter-
imperial conference between Sirius and Canopus on the general crisis following 
Failure of the Lock. Ambien II reports that the atmosphere of the conference is 
‘low and dispirited’: ‘Canopus had been shaken by the Rohanda failure, and was 
made miserable, as they freely confessed, because of the fate of the unfortunate 
Planet 8, which they now could not save and which, even as the conference took 
place, was being abandoned, with loss of life and potentiality’ (SE 77). Planet 8’s 
parenthetical appearance in The Sirian Experiments – referred to only to explain 
the low atmosphere of the Sirius-Canopus conference – is a demonstration of the 
disparity in action. The loss for Canopus is a potential, a possibility for future 
use; their sadness does not mean that they are prepared to concede anything 
with regard to their general organisation or centralised decisions about who lives 
and who dies. As the Planet 8ers are in the process of dying out, the Canopeans 
are already mourning them as a failed experiment. 
Staging this peripheral disintegration on a planetary scale invokes what 
Sylvia Wynter calls the biocentrism that grounds the sovereignty of capitalist 
imperialism: the description of human life in meta-Darwinian terms (McKittrick 
14). This description becomes most visible when the system falls into crisis, as it 
shows up the terms in which life itself is measured. By holding natural selection 
as a core evolutionary mechanism – that is, by reducing biology to an economic 
system of exchange – life can be calculated, given value, and also can and will be 
biologically annihilated by being unable to participate in the economic system. 
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By setting up a relation of dependence, the Canopeans effectively create a 
situation in which biological life is conditioned by economic inclusion. The 
destruction is organised to be a remote experience for the centre, and a direct 
one for the periphery.   
 The relation of dependency between Canopus and Planet 8 is set up 
immediately. Before the crisis, the Canopeans – usually Johor – come without 
warning, sporadically; they ‘gave us advice, showed us how we could more 
effectively use the resources of our planet, suggested devices, methods, 
techniques,’ before leaving ‘without saying when we might expect to see Canopus 
again’ (P8 11). The intermittent and unpredictable rhythm of the Canopean 
agents’ visits reflects a unequal relation, in which Canopus may come and go, 
while the Planet 8ers are required to carry out whatever instructions are 
bestowed to them by Canopus. It is also an effective strategy of surveillance, as 
the Planet 8ers never know when the Canopeans will arrive to check that they 
are upholding Canopean specifications. This governance extends across all 
realms of existence – cultural, biological and infrastructural. Just as the biological 
inheritance of the Planet 8ers is determined by genetic engineering, Canopeans 
also ‘give’ the Planet 8ers legends to repeat to their offspring ‘to prepare the 
minds of our people for understanding our role as a planet among planets’ (P8 
50). Like Lelanos and Adalantaland in The Sirian Experiments, the social 
structure is upheld by the rote learning of origin stories to transmit to future 
generations, that will one day form the cultural mythology for Canopus’s planned 
utopia. This is long-term genetic engineering, colonisation across all levels of 
lived experience.  
 Planet 8 is rich in resources, and the Canopeans make sure that the 
infrastructure for mining iron is put in place. The ‘best road on the planet’ is 
constructed in order to transport ‘heavy loads or ore’ from the mines; Nonni 
relates,  
 
Before our town was built and we began mining, there was no centre 
for making iron, though it was made in a small way everywhere. It was 
Canopus who told us to look for iron here, and what to look for, and 
 168 
then how to work it and mix it with other metals. It was clear to us 
that these metals we were making would change the way we all lived. 
(P8 41) 
 
If this is a development project for the sake of the progress of the Planet 8ers, 
then it bears close resemblance to colonial resource extraction – Rhodes’s gold 
mines in southern Africa. Planet 8 resembles a colonial outpost under the 
governance of the imperial centre and a decolonized nation dictated by 
development projects – skills training, the installation of infrastructure for 
extractive processes – of the World Bank. In terms of the effect of Canopus on 
the Planet 8ers’ practical existence, these histories exist on a continuum. 
Whether colonized or supervised, the Planet 8ers develop according to a 
programme not determined by them. 
The debilitating impact of IMF and World Bank policies on Africa has 
been much discussed; in a paper on this topic, Christina Kingston, Jackson 
Irikana and Kato Kingston support the view that ‘Africa’s underdevelopment has 
largely resulted from the ways in which African states have been created and 
political authority shaped through interactions with developed countries in the 
context of global economic and political systems,’ and that ‘the economic woes 
of Africa are due to the vagaries of the external environment which is controlled 
by the industrialized countries’ (111). Africa, argue P. Thandika Mkandawire and 
Charles C. Soludo, ‘has turned into a pawn in the chessboard of experimentation 
for all manner of ill-digested development theories and pet hypotheses’ (2). 
Similarly, Kingston, Irikana and Kingston argue that ‘development and 
underdevelopment in society are two sides of the same coin’ (111); it is not that 
African countries have been slow or unable to take up the initiatives and training 
offered by the World Bank and other international funding agencies, but rather 
that this funding is premised on the condition that decolonial nations continue 
to be profitable for neo-colonial powers. Thus, this power dynamic nurtures 
sustainable underdevelopment: the systematic denial of equitable standards 
from ‘First’ to ‘Third’ worlds as the very basis on which the world-system is 
founded. The term ‘sustainable underdevelopment’ was first used in a UN press 
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release from 1997 titled ‘Sustainable Development Commission Hears Calls For 
Reversing Trend Towards “Sustainable Underdevelopment”’; representatives 
from Second or Third World economies (Cuba, Brazil, Algeria, Indonesia) argue 
that economic liberalisation is contributing to poverty, environmental issues, 
and marginalization. Ricardo Sanchez-Sosa, then the Cuban Vice-Minister for 
Science, Technology and Environment, is quoted as saying that ‘the process of 
globalization and the new trends towards liberalization has led to poverty and 
hunger’ (‘Sustainable Development Commission’). As a laboratory for 
development experiments, ‘Africa’ is constituted as a speculative realm, a site of 
potentiality and possibility, not for ‘Africa itself’, but for the sake of trying out 
markets, methods and products that can be brought into the domestic markets 
of the world powers.  
In Planet 8, this laboratory is not only socio-economic, but also biological. 
Canopus’s sorrow at the loss of Planet 8 described in The Sirian Experiments can 
be read through this lens, as a loss inscribed in speculation, the loss of a possible 
future and source of labour power, rather than a shared grief for an annihilated 
present. Just as the world-system can absorb failed experiments in Africa, so too 
can Canopus absorb the loss of Planet 8. Seen from the perspective of the 
chessboard – to use Mkandawire and Soludo’s analogy – these losses are 
existential, rather than calculable. This difference traces the fault-line between 
abstract loss and actual; or, between different constitutions of ‘life itself’, the 
reduction of the biological to the economic, or – following Haraway – the 
opening up of life to the promise of becoming.  
 
 
Core Quake, Peripheral Tremors: The Nixon Shock 
 
The end of Canopean development initiatives on Planet 8 echoes the 
interruption of development projects during the 1950s and 60s in decolonial 
nations by the monetary crisis of the 1970s, beginning with the Nixon Shock of 
1970, involving the overvaluation of the dollar. What is called the ‘Nixon Shock’ 
stands in for the accumulation of several failures in US governance: the failure of 
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the Vietnam War and the massive incursion of debt and loss of confidence in the 
US globally; debt incurred through Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society 
programmes between 1964 and 1965 which attempted to address domestic 
inequalities of education, healthcare, urban infrastructure and income, focused 
on the elimination of poverty and economic racial segregation; the collapse of 
the London Gold Pool and the subsequent drain on US gold reserves in 1968; and 
a negative balance of payments. Giovanni Arrighi argues that the crisis was 
signalled in ‘three distinct and closely related spheres’, military, financial and 
ideological: 
 
Militarily, the US army got into even more serious troubles in 
Vietnam; financially, the US Federal Reserve found it difficult and 
then impossible to preserve the mode of production and regulation 
of world money established at Bretton Woods; and ideologically, 
the US government’s anti-communist crusade began losing 
legitimacy both at home and abroad. (Long Twentieth Century 309) 
 
Arrighi’s analysis is useful in drawing a multifaceted picture of the crisis: first, 
as a crisis of legitimating foreign intervention and the international 
condemnation of the loss of life incurred by the war, both Vietnamese and 
American, made possible in part by the global media transmission of US military 
failure and attempted genocide in Vietnam; second, as the inability of the US to 
retain their hold over financial power made possible by Bretton Woods, and, by 
extension, the (temporary) failure to maintain a relation of developmentalism 
to peripheral economies; and third, a loss of faith in anti-Soviet Cold War 
propaganda. In short, it was a crisis of confidence in US neo-imperialism, both 
domestically and internationally, threatening its post-war position as supreme 
world power and as core market for globalised capital and exchange, to which 
all other markets are directed. 
I read a correlation between the historical retreat of the US from the 
centre stage of global governance during the time-period of the novels, and the 
fictitious failure of the Lock that causes Canopus to withdraw temporarily from 
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their usual intervention on peripheral planets. Arrighi argues that Vietnam 
caused a crisis of credibility for the US; he writes that the war demonstrated that 
‘the most expensive, technologically advanced, and destructive military 
apparatus the world had ever seen was quite powerless in curbing the will of one 
of the poorest people on earth’, undermining the US government’s claim to be 
‘policemen of the free world’, and contributing to the power vacuum then 
exploited by the USSR and its allies (Long Twentieth Century 332). Notably, this 
included ‘complet[ing] the process of national liberation from the last residues 
of European colonialism’, and Arrighi uses the example of Zimbabwe. 
Articulated resistance to Canopus appears early in the narrative. While 
Doeg describes Canopus as the ‘origin’ of the Planet 8ers’ existence, he follows 
this by admitting that ‘there was once a near rebellion’, after the Planet 8ers try 
to argue against Johor’s instruction to build a ‘tall thick wall’ around their globe, 
on the grounds that ‘to make this wall would take all of our strength, all our 
effort, and all our resources for a long time’ (P8 12). The resistance is met with 
‘Johor’s smiling silence’ (P8 12), and the wall is built, but the rebellion erodes the 
vision of unquestioned obedience that Doeg claims defines the relation between 
the Planet 8ers and Canopus. It is an attempted moment of collective self-
determination, in which the Planet 8ers attempt to assert their right to their 
own resources and labour-power.  
While the crisis ostensibly has nothing to do with the attempted 
rebellion of the Planet 8ers, the moments merge in a general devolution of 
Canopean hegemony. Pulling in the historical crisis out of which the text 
emerged, we can also read the order to build the wall alongside the competition 
among First World countries for Third World supplies of labour and energy, 
resulting in hyperinflation and, consequently, a loss of purchasing power for the 
US. Similarly, the wall is a speculative construction project, creating a need for 
the Planet 8ers to invest strength and resources in a Canopean venture, without 
much possibility of a pay-off. It depletes their resources, meaning that they 
cannot build new dwelling places when the Ice arrives, because ‘we did not have 
the materials’ (60). The resistance to the wall’s construction can be read as 
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analogous to a Third World bargaining position while the First World struggles 
to maintain dominion.  
 
 
Core Retreat, Peripheral Extinction: US Recentralisation and the African 
Crisis 
 
The extinction of the Planet 8ers occurs because Canopus refuses to bail them 
out, which equates to refusing to transport them to a safe planet to save them 
from the ice. Similarly, the US was able to restore its economic dominion towards 
the end of the 1970s by ‘tightening [its] monetary policies’ and recentralizing 
purchasing power to the US, using private high finance to ‘regai[n] the upper 
hand in the global power struggle’ (Arrighi, Long Twentieth century 334, 333). 
This ‘curtailed the demand for Third World supplies’, leading to increased 
competition between these nations to supply to the US, and contributing 
significantly to the African Crisis of the late 1970s (Arrighi, Long Twentieth 
century 334). While the excess liquidity of the early 1970s had resulted in the 
improvement of bargaining positions in Third World regions, the welfare of 
populations had not improved at a similar rate. The reversal in US fiscal policy – 
the redirection of capital flows to the US – ‘reflated both effective demand and 
investment in North America, while deflating it in the rest of the world’ (Arrighi, 
‘The African Crisis’ 22). This forking of destiny constituted a split between 
markets able to compete in supplying the North American demand for cheap 
industrial products, and those who could not; East Asian and, to a lesser extent, 
South Asian nations were in the first bracket, and African countries in the second 
(Arrighi, ‘The African Crisis’ 22). The reordering of capital flows saw Third World 
states requesting First World governments provide the credit needed for them 
to stay afloat, and the US in a particular position to be able to allow certain 
nations to – effectively – die out in economic terms.  The US was able to restore 
their dominion post-crisis, but only through ‘a basic neglect of world 
governmental functions’ and the recentralisation of purchasing power (Arrighi, 
Long Twentieth century 309).  
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There is a comparable logic at work in Planet 8. At first, Johor claims that 
the plan is still to transport the Planet 8ers to Rohanda, and that they will be 
sheltered from the worst of the Ice until then (P8 27). Explaining the crisis as a 
change of ‘Alignments’, he tells Doeg that Canopus has had to give up its hopes 
for the ‘stability and slow growth’ of Planet 8 (P8 28), resonant of the rhetoric of 
developmentalism, the emphasis being on bringing Planet 8 to a particular 
economic standard before they can be fully of use for Canopean purposes. By the 
time he returns to Planet 8, Johor tells them that they will not be saved. He comes 
alone, as a representative for Canopus at the deathbed of a dying colony: ‘I shall 
be with you for – quite a little time’ (P8 70), not to save, but in a performance of 
benevolent colonial guilt. Doeg realises this, and his voice becomes ‘wild and 
angry’ when speaking to Johor, resistance replacing his former stance of 
deference towards the Canopean Agents. Whereas at the beginning of the text, 
Doeg describes the Canopeans through the lens of ‘an authority they all had’, ‘an 
expression of inner qualities’ rather than ‘a position in a hierarchy’ (P8 11), now 
he challenges Johor on the intrinsic inequality of Canopean relations with Planet 
8, letting his voice ‘ring out in the cold silence’ while shaming Johor’s admission 
that they will not be saved, and interrogating Canopean biopolitical control: 
‘Have you planned that another species, another of your genetic creations is to 
enjoy Rohanda?’ (P8 70) Doeg’s reference to ‘genetic creations’ shows his 
awareness of the Planet 8ers position with regard to Canopus, not simply as 
progeny or wards, but as synthetic products put into existence for the sake of 
Canopean interests: the meaning of obedience to an origin is constituted 
differently. Rather than standing as the reason for obedience or duty, the 
oppressiveness of the debt of origin is realised. 
It is also at this time that the Planet 8ers begin to realise the inefficacy of 
Canopean teachings and skills training, how these initiatives are not taking hold 
in the way they have done in the past, after their abandonment in this time of 
great need: ‘[W]e were not saved, not being rescued, and everywhere our people 
degenerated and became thieves and sometimes murderers and there seemed no 
end to it all’ (P8 63). While Doeg condemns these violent deeds, they can also be 
read as part of a militant resistance to the regulations of life under Canopean 
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determinations, guerrilla warfare for the sake of establishing a new political 
regime. This is comparable to the tactics of resistance fighters in Zimbabwe’s 
Bush War, whose broader context represents the continued fall in the fortunes 
of European colonialism and the possibility for alternative models of governance 
in sub-Saharan Africa.  
No longer of use to Canopus, and no longer in the relation of teacher-
pupil, the Planet 8ers begin to teach themselves about their relation to this 
changed environment. They make a journey around the planet, without Johor, 
‘feeling a need to press on from place to place, as if elsewhere we could come on 
something that might aid us’ (P8 64).  It prompts the Planet 8ers to imagine a 
different kind of origin story – and beyond this, a different account of life itself – 
by bringing into relief the fragility of their connection to Canopus, their 
supposed source of life. The Planet 8ers begin to understand that their bodies 
and minds have been conditioned to function as machines for the sake of 
Canopean power, and that their sense of themselves is limited to Canopean 
determinations of use-value. During a public meeting of Planet 8ers in a town 
square to plead with Johor to save them, Doeg observes, 
 
[E]veryone around me seemed to be an automaton[.] [W]as it 
possible that was how we all looked and sounded to Canopus: 
automata, bringing out these words or those, prompted by shallow 
and surface parts of ourselves – for it was clear to me, as I stood there, 
that these demands and pleas were quite automatic, made by 
sleepwalkers. (P8 107) 
 
Defined by Canopus, the Planet 8ers function as machines, existing in the 
‘shallow and surface parts of ourselves’, restricted to pure mechanism with the 
life-force sucked out of them. This can be read as an intertextual reference to 
Marx’s description of capital in Capital Vol. I as ‘dead labour which, vampire-like, 
lives only by sucking living labour’ (342). In this system, the lives of workers are 
defined only in terms of labour power, extracted by capitalism in an endless 
cycle, people reduced to utility. From a Canopean perspective, their surplus-
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value had been the genetic material they will one day contribute to the hybrid 
species the Canopeans are planning to breed. Doeg’s realisation that this is how 
the Planet 8ers seem to Canopus helps to break the psychological hold that the 
Canopean Agents have over the population, for whom the Planet 8ers are simply 
machines that have fallen into disrepair. As his fellow Planet 8ers plead with the 
benevolent master, Doeg realises that they are now irrelevant to Canopus, having 
no more meaning than spare parts no longer needed.  
 
 
Peripheral Speculations: From Dead Labour to Vital Politics 
 
At this point, the narrative departs from what I read as a critique of First World 
abandonment of Third World beneficiaries, to consider the metaphysical 
experience of living outside the governing logic of this world-system, and the 
radical epistemic break with an inheritance of a biopolitical, anthropocentric 
economy that such a moment might produce for a peripheral nation. Doeg’s 
anger at Johor passes. This is not because the text is dismissing the efficacy of 
anti-colonial resistance, but rather suggesting that systemic change will arrive 
only by a radical adaptation of inherited epistemic formations. In Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy (1985), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argue that social 
struggles run into difficulty when directed against ‘simple empirical referents’; 
they use the examples of ‘men’ when deployed as biological referents in feminist 
struggle (132). Choosing a referent against which to set the struggle – in Planet 8, 
Johor as Canopean agent – prevents the development of antagonisms such as ‘the 
struggle for freedom of expression or the struggle against the monopolisation of 
economic power’, which affects both men and women (132-3). Laclau and Mouffe 
argue that this is a common feature of anti-colonial struggle, given that, ‘in the 
Third World, imperialist exploitation and the predominance of brutal and 
centralised forms of domination tend from the beginning to endow the popular 
struggle with a centre, with a single and clearly defined enemy’ (pg no). If 
Canopus – and Johor – are identified as the ‘clearly defined enemy’ in this 
analogy, for Laclau and Mouffe this would obscure the fact that the very 
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constitution of the Planet 8ers against this enemy is itself a fiction, a ‘floating 
signifier’, ‘like any other social identity’ (141). 
While the Planet 8ers realisation of Canopean violence could have led to 
an anti-colonial movement along the lines of a kind of nationalism, empowering 
a collective identity pitched against the colonial one, Planet 8 circumvents the 
discourse of nationalist politics by shifting the narrative focus away from Johor 
as an object to mobilise against. In doing so, the text both recalls and departs 
from what Frantz Fanon identified as a stumbling block to national liberation in 
The Wretched of the Earth (1961): calling upon an indigenous heritage to demand 
recognition as national bodies. Fanon observes the tendency of ‘cultured 
individuals of the colonized race’ to support the claim to national liberation by 
reviving or referring to a pre-colonial native history; this is usually unsuccessful 
as a counter to the colonial claim of barbarism (the absence of historical record), 
partly because ‘the ideas expressed by the young colonized intelligentsia are 
widely professed by specialists in the mother country’ (Fanon 168). Claiming a 
native history in order to counter the charge of barbarism is simply replacing one 
form of destruction with another, given that imperial anthropologists have 
already invented this native history, and that further recourse to it would simply 
add to further co-option.  
Restoring a lost origin – ‘discovering beyond the misery of today, beyond 
self-contempt, resignation and abjuration, some very beautiful and splendid era 
whose existence rehabilitates us both in regard to ourselves and in regard to 
others’ (Fanon 169) – cannot be done within the constraints of nationalism, or by 
inventing a pre-colonial ‘African’ culture to address the need ‘to exist side by side 
with the European Cultural Society’ (173). For Fanon, the effort of decolonisation 
would have to encompass the Black world as a whole, on the basis of regional 
difference rather than homogenised custom, ‘to use the past with the intention 
of opening up the future, as an invitation to action and a basis for hope’ (187). 
The stakes are this: that ‘the contention by colonialism that the darkest night of 
humanity lay over pre-colonial history concerns the whole of the African 
continent’ (170). What Fanon understands by ‘culture’ is not marked off with 
‘fences and signposts’, reduced to custom, ritual, and ‘mummified fragments’, 
 177 
but rather the ‘hidden life, teeming and perpetually in motion’ (190, 180). 
Systemic change would involve breaking the episteme of custom as fixed 
inheritance to culture as (something like) motility. It would require, following 
Laclau and Mouffe, recognising the metonymy of the social (that it is constituted 
by signs standing in for ‘truth’ – ‘nation’, ‘people’ and so on), in order to undo the 
regulation and ordering of colonised space into articulated units of labour power, 
resources and territory.  
Lessing uses the metaphor of biological creation in order to show the 
impossibility of return to a pre-colonial context, and the necessity of re-
imagining the epistemological inheritance of colonial world-building. By 
depicting the Planet 8ers as creations of Canopus, without origin, the task of 
demonstrating a ‘Planet 8’ culture (the task of making a representative for Planet 
8) is given to the present, to what exists. This is why the problem of resisting 
against an origin is articulated in the first pages of the text; Lessing is showing 
the difficulty of subverting ‘existence’ away from ‘origin’. Fanon’s vision of a 
‘black world’ can be read figuratively into Planet 8 as a means of transforming 
the social organisation imposed by Canopean imperialism. This would do away 
with regionalism based on North/South, First and Third Worlds, and the 
economic inequities manifesting from dividing the globe into spheres of 
development. It would undo a political economy of resource distribution based 
on the calculations of world powers. The Planet 8ers begin to use their resources 
to reconstitute their relation with and to the world around them, rather than 
waiting on the margins of empire for a utopia that will never arrive. 
 
 
Junk DNA and Jumping Genes: Epigenetic Responses to Climate Change 
 
In Planet 8, the metaphor of biological creation is extended into the epistemic 
reformulation of empirical objects, semiotic reconfiguration in a Peircean sense, 
in which adaptation (epigenetic poiesis) involves the translation and 
interpretation of semiotic relations at the level of ecology or biome. Considered 
this way, different criteria for ‘survival’ emerge, beyond the neo-Darwinian 
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(profoundly economic) ideal of reproductive success restricted to individuals 
passing on an inheritance. Instead, we could take as a starting point the stable 
metabolism of a given system, not restricted to categorising individual organisms 
as the prime subjects. This allows a suspension of empirical referents such as 
‘body’, ‘cell’, ‘molecule’ and ‘ice’, and thus a much broader vision of semiotic 
interactions in a given ecology. Firstly, the aim of the Planet 8ers is not to 
reproduce; this desire leaves them fairly early on. Rather, their aim is to recover 
equilibrium in a rapidly changing environment. This concurs with Fahim’s 
argument that ‘striving to regain equilibrium’ is fundamental to the narratives, 
but departs from her claim that it is the ‘solution’ to the problems raised. Rather, 
through this striving, the possibility of adaptation emerges, by chance. In a 
discussion of entropy, philosopher-chemist Isabelle Stengers calls this ‘far-from-
equilibrium’ (244), which she understands as a moment of radical possibility, in 
which ‘the very identity of the system can be transformed’, producing a ‘new 
configuration of requirements and obligations’ that make up a system’s ‘self-
organisation’ (244, 245). In semiotic terms, this transformation necessitates some 
unforeseeable loss of meaning, as regional significance falls into disuse. These 
two moments, as the interplay of dyadic and triadic semiotic constellations 
risking loss, mark a site of adaptation. 
Through the crisis affecting Planet 8, referents that articulate Canopean 
epistemological categorisations – ‘human’, ‘animal’, ‘individual’, ‘population’ – 
are reconfigured into what Thacker might call a ‘molecular-wide’ perspective. 
This is not just an intellectual process for the Planet 8ers, but a means of survival, 
brought out by necessity through their experience of the crisis. The terrain that 
opens to the Planet 8ers can be read as a landscape of junk DNA – noncoding 
genomic material that affects genetic expression. These silences refer to that 
which has not been programmed by Canopus, what their genetic programming 
does not prepare them for, their gaps in self-understanding, and the vast spaces 
between what is expressed and what is not. They are the silences of unexpressed 
possibilities. Having left their bodies behind, the Planet 8ers are able to 
‘comprehend’, for the first time, the possibilities of their existence: 
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When we looked back to that huddle of bodies under their piles of 
dirty skins, to see how far we had travelled from that mountain peak, 
we saw them as webs and veils of light, saw the frail lattice of the 
atomic structure, saw the vast space that had been what in fact we 
mostly were – though we had not had eyes to comprehend that, even 
if our minds knew the truth. (P8 157) 
 
This is a strikingly epigenetic description of biological matter: the ‘vast space’ 
resembles post-genomic descriptions of non-coding or junk DNA. This vast 
space is not registered as abyssal or as infinite, but as mobile. Rather than being 
determined by the genes they have been programmed to express by Canopus, 
the Planet 8ers are now able to perceive many alternative modes of living. 
How might this idea of unexpressed junk have come into Lessing’s writing 
of alternative ways of understanding bodily experience? As I discussed in the 
Introduction, the 1970s were important years for epigenetics, specifically for 
research on non-coding material in the genome, unsettling the orthodoxy of 
Francis Crick’s Central Dogma (1958). What I read as epigenetic textuality in 
Planet 8 can be read as part of the growing attention to epigenetics in this period 
in and outside the life sciences, in which research on the mechanisms of 
adaptability and the mystery of genetic ‘decisions’ and environmental 
interactions were not only being debated, but also recognised by global 
institutions. In the late 1970s, Richard Roberts and Phillip Sharp discovered split 
genes, introducing the conundrum of junk DNA and its possible functions. This, 
Evelyn Fox Keller argues, threw a ‘monkey wrench’ into the concept of the gene 
as a discrete unit (59). Split genes, or ‘interrupted genes’, are spliced into coding 
and noncoding segments of mRNA (messenger RNA)10, called, respectively, 
‘exons’ and ‘introns’; or, in Jablonka and Lamb’s words, ‘the DNA sequence 
coding for a polypeptide is often a mosaic of translated [exonic] and 
nontranslated [intronic] regions’ (66). Exons are expressed as proteins, and 
introns are not – they are removed prior to the translation of RNA to protein by 
                                                 
10 Messenger RNA are RNA molecules that transport genetic information from DNA to the 
ribosome, giving the amino acid sequence for the protein products of gene expression.   
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the ‘spliceosome’ process. While introns were presumed not have a function, 
they explain in part why a relatively small number of genes can code for an 
enormous diversity of proteins in animals. They are ‘epigenetic’ in the sense that 
they are not coded but are involved in gene expression regulatory functions, such 
as exporting mRNA from the nucleus to the cytoplasm (mRNA export), and in 
forming a surveillance pathway that reduces errors in gene expression by 
eliminating mRNA transcripts that contain ‘nonsense codons’ (nonsense-
mediated mRNA decay).  
Introns are one example of what Barbara McClintock calls mobile genetic 
elements: genetic material that moves within the genome. Different parts of RNA 
transcripts can be spliced together at different intervals, meaning that ‘one DNA 
sequence can give rise to many mRNAs and protein products’ (Jablonka and 
Lamb 66), crucially, ‘deciding’ which polypeptide will be formed depends on 
developmental and environmental conditions, and the other genes in the 
genome. Introns represent the vast amount of possible responses to a given 
environment contained within the genome; they in part account for the 
molecular diversity of a relatively small number of genes. McClintock’s notion of 
transposition – transposons, or jumping genes – challenged Francis Crick’s 
suggestion of a unidirectional flow of information in the Central Dogma. Rather 
than the linear model – DNA transcription leading to RNA translation to protein 
– McClintock’s research motivated the following speculation: ‘If parts of the DNA 
might rearrange themselves in response to signals from other parts of the DNA, 
[…] and if these signals might themselves be subject to influence by the external 
environment of the cell,’ this would mean that information would ‘have to flow 
backward from protein to DNA’ in order for the sequence of genes to ‘depend on 
factors beyond the genome’ (Fox Keller 9).  
Planet 8 transmits these innovations in genetics into speculative fiction, 
with regard to environmentally-induced gene expression undermining the 
deterministic model of life put forth by the Central Dogma, and rupturing the 
idea of a one-way flow of information from nucleus (core) to cytoplasm 
(periphery), figured through the Canopean genetic engineering. The Planet 8ers 
go from being imperial objects for future resource extraction to molecular 
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subjects, blurring the divide between ‘molecular’ and ‘human’ life, presenting a 
complex picture of response and adaptation. This happens through two 
conceptual tropes of epigenetic research: first, the silences of unexpressed 
possibilities; and second, the movement of the Planet 8ers through physical 
space and metaphysical thought. As they move through their changed 
environment, their epistemological understanding of ‘nature’ is altered, with 
regard to how they are constituted by and constitute the world around them, not 
in negation of their Canopean inheritance, but not restricted by this 
programming.  
The Planet 8ers rearrange their perception of their surroundings, 
responding to the climate change in a valence of biological and epistemological, 
or biosemiotic, adaptation. Looking out over the lake around which they have 
been accustomed to gather, now frozen, Doeg relates, ‘we could see, far over the 
mountains on the other side of the water, a light greyish blue sky that seemed 
still to smile’ (P8 48). This anthropomorphic vision of the atmosphere, creating 
the sky as a person or a spirit, is not an image bestowed by Canopus, who has 
taught them by this point to fear the elements and protect themselves against 
external threats (most aptly shown by the order to build a wall). This is also not 
the ‘smiling silence’ of Johor in response to their attempted rebellion. Their 
perception of the smiling sky reflects a choice to perceive the world differently. 
Doeg then notes, ‘Populations under threat know silences that they understand 
nothing of in lighthearted times’ (P8 48). For them, the silence before the crisis 
was Johor’s silence in response to their rebellion. It was the silence of sovereign 
power and the impossibility of overcoming it, the noise of peripheral Planet 8 
formulating a set of demands, in contrast with the silence of the colonial agent 
in a position to say nothing and to grant no favours. Post-crisis, the perception 
of new silences reposition the Planet 8ers as central to their own narrative, not 
in relation to the silences of their creators, but in the midst of an abyssal terrain. 
These ‘silences’ that they now are aware of can be read alongside genomic 
‘silence’ as the introns that stand for evolutionary flexibility, and the genes that 
have been silenced by the engineering of Canopus. Doeg articulates a growing 
collective awareness of what is not expressed, what is silent and silenced; while 
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Johor might want to save them, the careful programming of Canopean interests 
means that he cannot, recognising all the while that they have not been 
programmed to survive this sudden atmosphere change, that there are silenced 
parts of the Planet 8ers for which Canopus is responsible.   
The Planet 8ers’ perception of life itself begins to change, along with their 
understanding of what ‘survival’ might constitute. In a scene that mirrors Johor’s 
inability to save the Planet 8ers, the Planet 8er Alsi sits with the Planet 8ers 
domesticated animals, mourning their gradual extinction. She tells Johor, ‘there 
are no young things left on our planet’, and that despite her efforts, she ‘cannot 
make them breed’ or ‘change what they are feeling – or what they know’ (P8 116). 
Through the analogy of domesticated animals, Alsi articulates Johor’s dilemma: 
by breeding a population for specific purposes in particular genetic combinations 
in order to prop up an economy centred around sustaining human life over and 
above all other kinds of life, and by transporting this population to another 
ecosystem, Canopus has dramatically reduced the chances of this population 
being able to survive a massive climate change. Just as the little animals that Alsi 
cradles ‘could not endure their lives’ and would die soon (P8 116), so the Planet 
8ers cannot survive the cold. Yet this reading of extinction works only if life itself 
is reduced to individual utility and reproductive success, the same criteria that 
Canopus uses to make their determinations. 
 As Berger argues in his essay on peasant survival, the peasant community 
of Planet 8, determined under the Canopean system of biopolitical labour 
extraction, see their lives as ‘an interlude’. This understanding of life is bound to 
what Berger calls a ‘cyclic view of time’ composed of birth, life and death, in 
which the peasant must only ‘hand on the means of survival […] to his children’, 
while ‘his ideals are located in the past’ and ‘his obligations are to the future, 
which he himself will not live to see’ (Berger 189). This is a radically different 
understanding of time than that in which the Canopean agents function, which 
is more or less unilinear and chronological, characterising a ‘morality based on 
cause and effect’ (Berger 189). Cyclic time, on the other hand, is ‘simply the trace 
of the turning wheel’ (Berger 189), and the peasantry lives in a dual movement 
between certainties of past and future: that there is something to pass on, and 
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that it will be passed on. This, argues Berger, is the temporal logic of the peasant’s 
survival.  
 As the Ice falls on Planet 8, the conception of inheritance, expression and 
living transforms among the planet’s human inhabitants. They begin to move 
away from understanding their lives as interludes in a cycle of birth, life and 
death, and to understand that the surplus extracted by their rulers might be 
redirected for passing something different or even transformational to their 
children. Doeg relates,  
 
 We were learning, we old ones, that in times when a species, a race, 
is under threat, drives and necessities built into the very substance 
of our flesh speak out in ways that we need never had known about 
if extremities had not come to squeeze the truths out of us. An older, 
a passing, generation needs to hand on goodness, something fine and 
high – even if it is only potential – to their children. (P8 38) 
 
This description can be related to epigenetic activation at a time of extreme 
climate change, and also the recognition of potential to survive that they did not 
previously recognise. More than this, this might be transmitted to their offspring 
through gene memory – not through mutations, but through the genetic 
memory of biological effects marked onto the material through the silencing or, 
in this case, the activation, of particular parts of the genome. These activations 
are bound up with the social requirement to adapt and survive. These new 
expressions trace the repositioning of boundaries between the Planet 8ers and 
their environment, who recognise for the first time both the vulnerability of their 
situation and the previously silent possibilities within them for survival.  
The reconfiguration of epistemological boundaries between organism and 
environment takes place in a register of restlessness, through the journey a group 
of Planet 8ers make around ‘our planet’, during which the bond of possession 
between human and environment is unravelled into a diverse economy of 
molecular life. Their movement, therefore, makes possible a change in their 
relation to the environment.  Exhausted, they nonetheless make the journey, as 
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if it will save them from their impending extinction, because ‘we felt some kind 
of restlessness […] a need to press on from place to place, as if elsewhere we could 
come on something that might aid us’ (P8 64); they are ‘keeping, and in a 
conscious effort, our knowledge of our own possibilities, our potential for the 
future’ (P8 63). The words ‘possibilities’ and ‘potential’ are being used in an 
analogous way to the way that Canopus describes them, but with a crucial 
difference: they are moving in order to realise this potential; their restlessness is 
a possible means of expressing it. Whereas for Canopus the population of Planet 
8 is a vast, static reserve of genetic programming guaranteed for their exclusive 
use that might help them achieve a pre-determined potential at a later date, the 
Planet 8ers are using potential in a mobile and contingent sense, making the 
journey without any guarantee that the silences of their programming will be 
activated. By undertaking this journey with this potential in mind, in view of 
rediscovering it or activating it, the Planet 8ers depart from their construction as 
Canopean genetic ‘goods’, in view of the possibility that they might activate a 
previously-silenced possibility.  
This is where I read the historical analogy of the African Crisis during the 
1970s being incorporated into a biosocial speculation on the possibility of 
systemic change in post-colonial territories, and what this change might entail. 
The form of the novel – one long narrative chain – captures the ongoing sense of 
this change, tracing the movement as a continuous one; it is a question of 
considering a direction to go in, a choice. The movement of the Planet 8ers, 
holding the knowledge of their potential, enables them to remake a world 
previously determined by their colonial rulers. Their journey around the planet 
following the crisis is the second such journey; the first took place with Johor 
leading them. Now they go alone, and it is difficult: ‘The journey took us twice 
as long as when we had travelled with Canopus, and we were cold and torpid, 
and felt the need to sleep’ (P8 64). Without Canopean guidance, their sense of 
the world changes, and surviving becomes more challenging.  
However, the narrative stages the question of whether it is Canopus’s 
abandonment that is the problem, or the fact that they have engineered a 
population completely reliant on them for survival. If it were a case of the first, 
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then the solution would be for Canopus to save them, and their failure to do so 
would be the narrative focus of the text; indeed, the Planet 8ers ask Johor again 
and again to do so. Yet by not making this the focus, the broader, structural crime 
emerges: that Canopus has constructed itself as the centre and determined the 
value of life – preservation and abandonment – on the basis of its imperial 
topography. The Planet 8ers are being abandoned because in the Canopean 
(inter)world system, there is nowhere for them to go. The possibility of the 
utopia they planned to cultivate on Rohanda has been destroyed by the crisis. To 
do anything else but abandon these populations and wait to build up the centre 
once more would be to give up Canopean centrality. The text shifts the focus 
away from Canopus and through this, states the problem – the necessary 
endgame – of colonialism: that in order for the core to be sustained, the 
peripheries might have to become extinct – both economically and biologically. 
Lessing renders the figurative cost of this kind of power in a literal mode; she 
looks at the human cost. 
Yet the text departs from the fatalism of extinction by shifting gear into a 
narrative speculation on molecular life, and the potential use of scientific 
knowledge for subaltern emancipation. The Planet 8ers go on their second 
journey when their energy is at its lowest, when all around them other Planet 
8ers are sinking into the snow and giving up, languishing in the cold and the ice, 
or killing each other in the cities. What do they envision they will find in the 
snow to aid them? The help they seek is the cultivation of different relations to 
the planet, rather than relying on Canopean knowledge, detaching themselves 
from Canopean dependence. Doeg narrates, ‘we dozed there as if we were one 
organism, not many – as if our separate individualities had become another 
burden to be shed, like unnecessary movement’ (P8 64), articulating a relation 
of sharing between the Planet 8ers. Whereas Johor’s interactions with the Planet 
8ers have been up to this point based on the premise that each Planet 8er has a 
function and role – Doeg the storyteller, Marl the breeder and so on – the journey 
allows them to suspend these demarcations of individual existence for the first 
time, defined not through Canopean-influenced denominations of individual 
labour but as a collective. Correlating individuality and ‘unnecessary movement’ 
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as burdens that need to be shed refers to living under the strain of colonial 
determinations of their existence, and – importantly – realizing it as such. 
‘Unnecessary movement’ is the unnecessary waste of labour-power and resources 
that Johor demanded when telling them to construct the wall. Their movement 
around the planet, however, is a decision made at the point at which they know 
they are alone. For them, there is no longer any centre but that of their own 
creation. 
 
 
 
Transcending the Centre: Two Journeys in Peripheral Extremity 
There are two intertexts running through Planet 8. The first is named by Lessing 
in her ‘Afterword’ to the text: the accounts of Robert Falcon Scott’s two 
expeditions in the Antarctic, the first from 1901 to 1904, and the second from 1910 
to 1913, from Scott’s diary and the memoir of his fellow explorer, Aspley Cherry-
Gerrard, The Worst Journey in the World (1922). It is not the snow and ice that so 
much interests her, she writes, ‘but rather some social processes of that time and 
of this, so strongly illuminated in the expeditions’ (P8 162). The point, she 
explains, was not to write a novel about these expeditions in any literal 
(historical) sense, but to draw an equation between polar exploration and ‘any 
extreme of climate or geography or behaviour’ (P8 162). The idea is, then, 
responding to extremity, negotiating one of the most hostile environments on 
Earth, but also imperial nationalism. She writes that she first heard about Scott’s 
expedition ‘in the middle of Africa, in the old Southern Rhodesia, now 
Zimbabwe, on my father’s farm’ (P8 164), situating her receipt of the story in a 
paradigmatic location of colonial territorial acquisition. ‘The middle of Africa’ 
means, in this context, an outpost of empire, so the heat of the Bush and the cold 
of the Antarctic are not in opposition here; Lessing is drawing an equation 
between two sites of exploration, and two sites created through the colonial 
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accounts of them, with no other history save that determined by the imperial 
centre. 
 The second intertext is not named, but nonetheless emerges through the 
prose repeatedly: T. S. Eliot’s poem, ‘Journey of the Magi’ (1927). Speaking about 
the coming of the ice that will ‘pres[s] down in great sheets and will rise against 
the wall,’ Johor tells the Planet 8ers, ‘You may have a hard time of it, surviving’ 
(29), echoing Eliot’s first two lines, ‘A cold coming we had it, / Just the worst time 
of the year / For a journey’ (1-2). The Planet 8ers know that they have entered the 
time of a ‘new dispensation’, a phrase that is used twice; Eliot’s Magi feel ‘no 
longer at ease here, in the old dispensation, / With an alien people clutching 
their gods’ (39-40). The intertext conjures a realm falling away, a civilisation 
dying out, old rituals becoming irrelevant. Something has arrived; for the Magi, 
it is their own death, and the question at the heart of the poem is, ‘were we led 
all the way for / Birth or Death?’ (33-4) Something has been born, but for them 
it signals their own death, a ‘Hard and bitter agony for us, like Death, our death’ 
(37). Read alongside Planet 8, the implicit violence of Eliot’s poem comes into 
relief: that in order for a new dispensation to take its place, the old must give 
way, must accept its own extinction. The Magi bearing gifts have been led to their 
own death, for the sake of a birth that renders all the certainties of their existence 
irrelevant.  
This dying is not just a physical matter, but also a matter of influence; it 
is the death of a system, and a reconfiguration of planetary relations under the 
sign of certain death. By suspending the image of hearing the story in Africa, and 
Scott’s expedition in the Antarctic, Lessing also maps two sites of imperial 
abandonment: the abandonment of Rhodesia by the British government in the 
1960s, and subsequently the abandonment of Zimbabwe and other sub-Saharan 
African countries by international funding bodies during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Scott’s team was ‘shamefully neglected’ by the British government, in Lessing’s 
words, which for her symbolises a ‘niggardly short-sightedness [that] seems for 
some reason a perennial characteristic of the British government’ (P8 172). This 
left Scott with ‘an inadequate and dangerous ship’, and a team that was ill-
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prepared, without extensive experience with snow and ice and dog handling (P8 
176, 172). Lessing notes that while the Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen’s 
book ‘describes in a sensible non-boastful way a sensible and efficient 
expedition’, and is ‘quiet in tone, and practical’, the records of the Scott 
expedition put the reader ‘at once […] in a different world’ (P8 172).  
Lessing finds in the accounts of Scott’s expedition, despite the inadequacy 
of funding and preparation, a motivation that went beyond ‘duty to England, 
God, science and their best selves’; rather, to Lessing, the first driving force of 
the expedition was that ‘they were engaged […] in an attempt to transcend 
themselves’ (176). This motivation is an analogy for something else, or a 
metaphor or echo of ‘evolvements and happenings going on in other people […] 
or animals […] even forests or oceans or rocks […] in this world of ours or, even, 
in worlds or dimensions elsewhere’ (190). The transcendence of the British 
explorers comes not through the journey itself – otherwise why give more 
emphasis to Scott’s than to Amundsen’s, but in the way in which their narratives 
of struggle open into a metaphorical dimension of experience, in which the 
stability of human mastery over the planet is undermined – and that this is a 
deliberate strategy for transcendence. Abandoned, the British team were 
prepared to die, and in so doing, get beyond the mythology of mere nationalism 
– ‘these Kingdoms’ of Eliot’s Magi – to another kind of ecological existence: ‘I 
should be glad of another death’ (‘Journey’ 41). This transcendence would not be 
a spiritual one, however, but the overcoming of a certain restricted ethical 
possibility for life itself into what Haraway calls ‘transspecies love’.  
 
Microscopes, Molecules and Peripheral Life 
I have argued that the adaptation at work in Planet 8 involves the extension of 
categories of life itself, and that the Planet 8ers exist as both human subjects and 
molecular conglomerations. This is a way of drawing together post-colonial 
struggle, anti-nationalism and a new political realm for ‘life itself’ in terms of 
molecular existence. Yet this last construction has difficult ethical implications: 
can there be an ethics of molecular life? The answer given by Eugene Thacker is 
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yes, but that this would involve a reconceptualisation of what constitutes ‘life 
itself’, and rearrangement of the social. In ‘Biophilosophy for the Twenty-First 
Century’, Thacker names three philosophical paradigms for life itself, in roughly 
chronological order: soul (Aristotle), meat (Descartes) and pattern 
(postmodernism), which together ‘form a trinity’ that is also a triptych, with soul 
in the centre, meat on the right, and pattern on the left; this is ‘an image of 
thought that continuously switches, swaps, displaces, and replaces the 
placeholder that defines life: from psyche to mechanism and animal electricity, 
to the “gemmules” and “pangens”, to DNA and the “code of life”’ (‘Biophilosophy’ 
123). Getting away from this construction/reduction of life would mean departing 
from, on one hand, the division, ordering and interrelating of species and types 
(the ‘inward-turning aspect’ of this thinking), and on the other, detaching from 
the ‘immunologic’ of border control and boundary management, which marks 
out an individual through the self-nonself distinction (‘Biophilosophy’ 124).  
The categorisation of living forms into species and types is only 
sustainable when the self-nonself distinction can be upheld. As soon as it begins 
to unravel, so do the divisions of biological existence into genera, species and so 
on. Thacker uses the example of an epidemic which ‘cannot be limited to an 
individual organism, for its very nature is to pass between organisms, and 
increasingly, to pass across species borders (and national borders)’ (124). 
Considering the effect of transmission and movement of biological life that is not 
reducible to the description of organism, such as microbes, epidemics, swarms, 
packs, flocks, biopathways, parasitism, and so on, rather than centring life within 
discrete units of existence, the distinctions that uphold the division between 
social organization and ecological organization are compromised. Rather than 
thinking life as an essence or an organizing principle, Thacker writes, ‘what about 
considering life at the peripheries? Extrinsic life, a life always going outside itself, 
peripheral life’ (‘Biophilosophy’ 125).  
For Thacker, the affective-phenomenological, the biopolitical and the 
politico-theological conceptions of life allow only what he calls ‘an ambivalent 
conjunction of biology and politics,’ which has been extended ‘across broad 
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swathes of social, economic and cultural existence’ (‘After Life’ 32). His aim is not 
to devise a new ontology of life, but to change the framework of life itself, re-
routing it away from that of Aristotle in De anima, which he describes as a ‘two-
fold framework of a principle of life (psukhē) and the bifurcation between Life 
and the living’ (‘After Life’ 34). This account of life is an inheritance borne 
through Western philosophy, ‘highly stratified, the view down from on top of a 
pyramid of increasing complexity’ (‘After Life’ 40), the concept that the Planet 
8ers inherit from Canopus in their treatment of fellow living beings and the 
planet around them. While this has been challenged to a certain extent by 
‘vitalist contradictions’ – he cites Henri Bergson’s synthesis of mechanism and 
vitalism in Creative Evolution (1907) and, after him, Gilles Deleuze and ‘a concept 
of life that is defined by immanently dynamic, self-organizing and germinal 
qualities’ (‘After Life’ 32) – nonetheless ‘we remain under the spell of [Aristotle’s] 
framework whenever the question of “life” is raised’ (‘After Life’ 39).  
Thacker finds a political challenge to De anima in the weird fiction of H. 
P. Lovecraft, where the idea of life in outer space (‘an absolute exteriority’) causes 
‘the notion of life to fall apart’ (‘After Life’ 40), I would suggest that Lessing’s 
vision in Planet 8 is comparably destabilising. Lessing’s absolute exteriority is 
based on life not lived, what is not-life, made perceptible in the dimension of the 
living; in Thacker’s words, a ‘world “without us”, the life sans soi’ (‘After Life’ 40). 
This is the vision of life that the Planet 8ers reach towards the end of their 
account. It comes about through using the resources dispatched by Canopus – 
the microscopes – through which they see that they are part of a molecular world, 
and that their image of themselves as finite beings with beginnings and ends is 
‘an illusion’. This changed perception does not alter their diminished desire to 
reproduce, but it does change the significance – the meaning – of their 
extinction. That is, it shifts the focus of existence from species survival to a re-
configuring of decay and death.  
Alsi tells Johor that she remembers the moment when a certain kind of 
‘naturalness and pleasantness ended’ in her childhood, and that ‘it was when you, 
Canopus, brought the instrument that made small things visible’ (123); that is, 
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when Canopus delivered microscopes to the Planet 8ers. Looking into the 
microscopes, Alsi relates, 
 
[W]e saw the substance of our bodies, and found that it vanished as 
we looked, and knew that we were a dance and a dazzle and a 
continual vibrating movement, a flowing. Knew that we were mostly 
space, and that when we touched our hands to our faces and felt flesh 
there, it was an illusion, and that while our hands felt a warm solidity, 
in reality an illusion was touching another illusion. (P8 124)  
 
The basis of their social organisation is rearranged by the arrival of the 
microscopes. By making the existence of smaller elements visible, the 
microscopes open other worlds beyond their inhabitation of a planet of which 
everything they know and with which every relation has been determined by 
Canopus. They step out of their genealogical ‘circle of their parents and friendly 
adults’ to gather together, finding that ‘our selves, that the ways we experienced 
ourselves, were all illusion’ (P8 125). The repetition of ‘our selves’ and ‘ourselves’ 
is important, as they constitute two kinds of self: the first is the sense of a self 
that is distinct and individual to itself, and the second denotes the questioning 
of species-life, the foundations of what the Planet 8ers understand about their 
own existence. Both are challenged by the arrival of the microscopes. 
 The microscopes make the silences of the Planet 8ers’ genomes ‘speak’. 
They introduce what Thacker calls a ‘molecular-wide’ perspective to the Planet 
8ers presence to ‘themselves’ and on the planet, allowing them to escape 
themselves as colonised automata, reduced to number and function. Dying, they 
lose their ‘old shapes’, ‘what we had been’, but still ‘mov[e] on together’ as, 
 
patterns of matter, matter of a kind, since everything is – webs of 
matter or substance or something tangible, through sliding and 
intermingling and always becoming smaller and smaller – matter, a 
substance, for we were recognizing ourselves as existent; we were 
feelings, and thought, and will. (P8 158)  
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The Planet 8ers turn the meaning of ‘matter’ and materiality into something 
different, not the physical forms that they have now left behind, but another kind 
of matter that moves among other substances. Their existence is not confined to 
meat, soul or pattern, nor some synthesis of the three; their existence escapes 
into non-life, into what is not liveable in any humanistic sense of existence. This 
experience is not ‘lived’ in any strict sense of a conscious or identifiable 
individual or body. In the final pages, the eponymous Representative is not Doeg 
or Alsi, but is named as ‘a conglomerate of individuals’ that ‘swept on and up, 
like a shoal of fishes or a flock of birds’; they no longer see ‘wastes of snow and 
ice, no, but a perpetual shifting and changing’; they see the planet ‘in a myriad 
guises, or possibilities’ (P8 159-60). This vision cannot be named as simply 
ecological or planetary, but reformulates the idea of individual death. 
This molecular-wide perspective challenges ‘biological-biomedical’ 
definitions of life (Thacker, ‘Biophilosophy’ 133), and has implications for a 
renewed ethical relation with nonhuman and inanimate subjects. This 
perspective enables the Planet 8ers to consider their potential not in terms of 
mechanism or function, but in terms of ‘myriads’ of ‘unachieved possibilities’ of 
worlds, ‘each real and functioning of its own level […] – each world every bit as 
valid and valuable as what we had known as real’ (P8 160). These are not parallel 
worlds in the sense of alternative dimensions, but worlds not lived. To return to 
the figure of intronic life, the dormancy of unexpressed genetic material is 
replaced by conceiving the silence differently, hearing potential as an always-
already, rather than an end-goal. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
If, as I have argued, Planet 8 is a survival narrative of a peasant population 
brought into existence through neo-imperial capital, it is also about the 
adaptation of this population at a point of ecological crisis out of what Berger 
calls ‘the cyclic time’ of birth, life and death, and towards a conception of 
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molecular life and its attendant temporal dimensions. The ethical implications 
of this would be to surround the concept of ‘life itself’ with a kind of delay, a 
pause, to interrupt its ongoing instrumentalisation by an expanding and 
annihilating world-system. The story of the Planet 8ers does not follow the 
model of anti-colonial resistance by which the new nation inherits the structural 
deficiencies and dependency of its colonial past, but rather seeks new forms of 
living through re-conceptualizing the criteria for ‘life itself’. This is not to say that 
Lessing is promoting a kind of collective suicide or is giving up on the possibility 
of human-centred political action; rather, this vision would enable a different 
foundation for existence to emerge outside the core-periphery economic 
topography laid out by racial capitalism. It is an imaginary possible in speculative 
fiction, offering a way of conceiving of ‘something like an unhuman politics’ 
(Thacker ‘After Life’ 40). In the last chapter, I return to the question of 
democratic participation in a reading of The Sentimental Agents of the Volyen 
Empire, developing the idea of peripheral speculation in terms of psychological 
disorder, and the gradual rupturing of imperial typology enacted by biosocial 
relations of intoxication and contamination.  
 
5 
 
INTERRUPTING AGENTS: 
CONTAMINATION AND INTOXICATION IN 
THE SENTIMENTAL AGENTS IN THE VOLYEN EMPIRE 
 
Up to this point, my discussion has focused on the theory and effect of epigenetic 
processes and what Donna Haraway calls ‘the promise of becoming’ (84). In this 
chapter, I take as my starting point moments of being affected, exploring the way 
in which intoxication and contamination interrupt imperial diagnostic 
intervention in The Sentimental Agents of the Volyen Empire (1983). I explore how 
the final novel in the series manoeuvres between humanitarian intervention and 
chance interruptions, staging a critique of neo-imperial humanitarian 
intervention on one hand, and exploring the repeated frustration of Canopean 
aims by intoxicated or contaminated subjects on the other. The dementia caused 
by forgotten histories spreads to subvert the Canopean project. The 
contamination of modernity interrupts Canopus’s sovereign imperative to forget 
violent and destructive parts of its historical creation and to streamline the 
course of its influence into chronological inevitability. In biological terms, this 
influence figures as an innate and immutable essence transmitted through time. 
These disruptive moments arrive before system change, producing the 
disequilibrium that I have discussed in previous chapters. The figure of the virus 
motivates a vital politics, figuring as a trope of resistance to imperial 
governmentality. I return to my claim that Lessing’s space fiction opens an early 
critique of liberal multiculturalism as symptomatic of a control society in which 
subjects are tracked and monitored according to racial typology, opposing this 
with the political potential of an always-already contaminated subject, not 
reducible to racial type. I read the text as a consideration of democratic 
participation in satellite or peripheral states under neo-imperialism, and the way 
that psychological disruption can work to break this governance.   
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The trope of getting intoxicated, being affected, of ‘being carried away’, to 
use Andrew Benjamin’s phrase in his discussion of Walter Benjamin’s notion of 
intoxication (6), comes out through Sentimental Agents’ narrative of a loyal 
subject at risk of corruption by external influences. The intoxicated subject may 
seem to recuperate back to the status quo or point of equilibrium, but the 
disturbance created by intoxication unsettles the criteria of this equilibrium, and 
– in the case of Canopean agent Incent – forces him to recall forgotten colonial 
histories of violence and to question and eventually abdicate Canopean 
sovereignty. Rather than forgetting bearing ‘a joyous side,’ as David Punter, 
echoing Nietzsche, argues in his discussion of time travel in Lessing’s fiction 
(130), a certain kind of pleasurable melancholy makes possible a confrontation 
with the proximity of the past, and functions as an effect of adaptation. The 
narrative constructs the long history of Canopean Empire as an absence, 
continually interrupting regional ‘progress’ in the Volyen Empire; as Punter 
argues (following Freud), Lessing’s criss-crossing of timescales, made possible by 
the speculative vehicle of time-travel, ‘reveals that the past is not, after all, 
absent; that it is there ready to spring out unbidden and thwart the apparent 
logicalities of the chain of discourse’ (130). 
Mel Chen has theorised toxicity as a figure for a materialist queer politics, 
and I explore Chen’s ideas alongside the idea of the virus as a possible movement 
that mobilises chance, and the possibility of epigenetic poiesis. In Sentimental 
Agents, the trope of intoxication disrupts two strategies of imperial governance 
when negotiating the possible infiltration of a peripheral resource (in this case, 
the invasion of a planet and its inhabitants), in economic and healthcare policies: 
first, protectionism and psychological rehabilitation, and second, immunity 
through contamination. The first involves diagnostic intervention in order to 
protect imperial influence from contamination, and the second promotes what 
Dean Spade and Craig Willse call a ‘multicultural imperialism’ in order to prevent 
the loss of biopower through violent retaliation to invasion, and to maintain 
sovereign dominion over identified (socio-political) ‘differences’ by reducing 
these differences to biological goods. These two ways of negotiating invasion are 
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undercut by a resistance to imperial power which appears as intoxication or 
contamination, a susceptibility to external influences.  
Elizabeth Maslen argues that the novels of the series ‘show a decline in 
[Canopean] powers through succeeding generations: Klorathy, the pupil of 
Johor, is more vulnerable than his master, while Incent, Klorathy’s pupil, is more 
vulnerable still, indeed comically so’ (56). This decline can be traced through the 
constant interruptions to Canopean interests, which I explored up to this point 
through failed eugenic experiments – as in Shikasta, or by unforeseeable climate 
change – as in The Making of the Representative for Planet 8. She also notes that 
‘timing is a keyword in Sentimental Agents’ (45). Tom Sperlinger has observed 
the frequent appearance of narrative interruptions in Lessing’s fiction, which, he 
writes, work as ‘a disruption to an existing continuity, such as linear time’ (140): 
One function of the interruptions in Lessing’s work is to insist on the 
repeated urgency of the present. […] Lessing often writes about 
everyday events that rupture the patterns of everyday life. Such 
events happen on various scales in her fiction, including the arrival 
of a person (in Memoirs of a Survivor), an arranged marriage 
(Marriages), a nuclear war (The Four-Gated City), an ice age (Mara 
and Dann), or a change in the balance of power on a galactic level 
(Shikasta). Lessing’s work is thus peculiarly attentive to the way in 
which the present continually interrupts the process of entering 
what was assumed to be the future. (140) 
I explore this claim in Sentimental Agents, linking it to the implications it holds 
for the kind of interruptions that might produce epigenetic change. I focus less 
on epigenetic effects than these moments of interruption. Useful here are 
Benjamin’s notion of intoxication in his description of the flâneur and his notion 
of Jetztzeit – ‘time filled by the presence of the now’ (Illuminations 252) – to frame 
the argument that Lessing’s narratives produce an active resistance to Benjamin’s 
description of progress as, first, ‘the progress of mankind itself’, and second, as 
‘something boundless, in keeping with the infinite perfectibility of mankind’ and 
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as ‘something that automatically pursued a straight or spiral course’ 
(Illuminations 252).  
In ‘The Flâneur’, Benjamin arrives at intoxication through a discussion of 
the nineteenth century fascination with physiology (studies of the mechanisms 
by which systems operate), describing it as a ‘petty-bourgeois genre’ which 
extends out of biology into urban studies to typologise (and thus familiarise) 
urban experience: Paris la nuit, Paris à table, Paris dans l’eau, and so on, and is 
‘extended even to nations’ (35-36). Benjamin understands the interest in 
physiologies as part of the ordering of everyday life, citing Eduard Fuchs, on the 
‘colossal parade of bourgeois life’ in which ‘everything passed in review’ (36), 
helping to ‘give people a friendly picture of one another’ and to help ‘fashion the 
phantasmagoria of Parisian life’ (38-9). Alongside the development of this culture 
of increasing visibility, made possible by technologies of tracking (photography), 
sites of indirect resistance emerge. For Benjamin, ‘the crowd’, ‘the newest asylum 
for outlaws’ is ‘also the latest narcotic for those abandoned’; the flâneur is 
‘someone abandoned in the crowd’ (55). The crowd is a space of intoxication, ‘the 
intoxication of the commodity around which surges the stream of consumers’ 
(55). The nature of this intoxication is ‘empathy’, a total giving up oneself to ‘the 
buyer in whose hand and house it wants to nestle’, and following Marx, ‘like a 
roving soul in search of a body’ (55). Completely embedded in maintaining the 
circulation of commodities that characterises bourgeois life, the 
commodity/flâneur – abandoned in the crowd – is uniquely positioned to escape 
and resist the tracking and ordering of physiological practices, and to become 
consumed by context. 
In contrast to the crowd, the diagnostic gaze of humanitarian intervention 
– which decides what the disorder is, how it functions and how to proceed – is a 
way of maintaining the linear time of ‘progress’ on ‘a straight or spiral course’, to 
follow Benjamin. It maintains the sovereign power of the intervening nation, and 
supplements their disproportionate influence over the world-system. Breaking 
this would also mean breaking into this linearity, pushing against the 
irrevocability of a diagnosis that withdraws agency from the diagnosed subject. 
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Contamination and intoxication are suspended states, where medical knowledge 
is not yet deployed. In Sentimental Agents, they function to open the ostensible 
absolutism of Canopean intervention to chance interruptions. As Benjamin 
introduces a nineteenth century fascination with physiology to reach a discussion 
of cerebral intoxication interrupting ‘the colossal parade of bourgeois life’, 
Lessing plays with boundaries of physiological and psychological typologies of 
disease and disorder in her construction of symptoms that resist diagnosis, 
contaminate the diagnostician, and disrupt imperial surveillance.  
Making this argument involves a slight pivot in my theoretical focus, 
wherein epigenetic poiesis can be understood as a biological analogy for the 
disruptive force of silenced or repressed memory. Despite Klorathy’s repeated 
attempts to dismiss counter-histories of imperial violence as historical anomaly, 
they continue to be expressed – whether directly or in the various moments of 
breakdown. The threat or manifestation of intoxicated subjectivity interrupts the 
colonial agent Klorathy’s first-person narration. While I have focused up to this 
point on how the novels resist the reduction of the architecture of the human 
subject to the expressed parts of the genome, here I explore how moments that 
precede epigenetic poiesis can be figuratively likened to the intoxicated empathy 
of the flâneur, with regard to his vulnerability and openness to chance, context 
and change. I argue here that this openness leads the Canopeans into breakdown, 
making them unable to adhere to the constituted protocols of the present. 
While Klorathy focuses either on rehabilitating individuals or on 
preserving what he sees as the genetic diversity of the planet’s population, his 
efforts are continually disrupted by an unpredictable, invisible force, transmitted 
between subjects and emerging at points in the narrative where his reports break 
off. Given that this text follows The Making of the Representative for Planet 8, the 
choice to narrate it almost exclusively through the perspective of a colonial agent 
– rather than an inhabitant of the planet – can be read as a way of making 
palpable the silences of the text as well as the weaknesses in colonial agency, the 
lack of accounting from members of the peripheral planet, the fragmentation 
and frustration of Klorathy’s humanitarian efforts, and his inability to locate the 
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origin of continual disruption. After the testimony of the Planet 8ers, the 
narrative silence of the Volyens – their omission from the first-person narration 
– stands out.  
Planet Volyen is of peripheral interest to the Canopean Empire until it is 
under threat of invasion from the Sirian Empire. Klorathy has been sent to check 
up on Incent, the Canopean agent stationed on this planet, the colonial diplomat 
stationed in a peripheral nation who finds themselves at the centre of a storm of 
competing imperial interests. The text is constructed through a series of field 
reports and historical entries written by Klorathy, the first to Johor, and the 
second for Canopean history. This topographical direction of information is 
significant, as it immediately situates Klorathy’s mission within the broader 
interests of Canopean imperialism, both in terms of immediate control and the 
framing of another planet’s history through Canopean focalisation; that is, every 
piece of information is considered by Klorathy to be either of immediate political 
interest or long-term historical interest to Canopus. Also significant is Klorathy’s 
reappearance: the last time the reader encounters him is as Ambien II’s mentor 
in The Sirian Experiments. Sentimental Agents revisits Klorathy’s role as 
mentor/therapist, but while in The Sirian Experiments, Ambien II’s narration 
focuses almost obsessively on Klorathy as an example of Canopean benevolence, 
here a less sympathetic version of Klorathy emerges.  
On one hand, Klorathy’s treatment of Incent represents a fascistic, 
sociobiological protectionism at work in Canopean domestic policy. Finding 
Incent more sympathetic to the influence of an agent from the rival 
contaminating imperial force, Shammat, Klorathy ‘treats’ him (medically and 
socially) as if he is on the cusp of defection. According to Klorathy, Shammat’s 
influence may make Volyen more susceptible to invasion by the Sirian Empire, 
now in its final throes and expanding without caution or care. In The Sirian 
Experiments, Shammat is described as the cause of social degeneration, carrier 
of disorder, whose influence on a society will lead to chaos and devastation. 
Arriving on Volyendesta, Klorathy observes Incent’s symptoms, reaches a 
diagnosis of ‘Rhetorical Disease,’ and sends Incent to the Hospital for Rhetorical 
Diseases as a proposed cure; following this, he continues his observation of 
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Incent through post-treatment check-ups. Through this treatment, Klorathy is 
attempting to restore an essence of Canopus in Incent, and to erase any other 
influences. The first paragraph of the first report ends with Klorathy’s frustration 
at the ‘self-destructive dementia’ that ‘permanently afflict[s]’ the populations of 
the planets to which he is sent (SA 11). This sets the tone for the rest of the text, 
as at no point does Klorathy as character question his own role as observer, the 
history of imperial subjugation and/or surveillance and its psychological effects 
on those it subjugates. Klorathy travels the galaxy, above all, with a sense of 
Canopean supremacy. The interruptions of the narrative stage this history where 
Klorathy does not. 
This ongoing reiteration of Canopean supremacy works in tandem with 
another mechanism of sovereign power: historical amnesia, another kind of 
dementia, or what philosopher Rebecca Comay has called ‘legally mandated 
forgetfulness’, by which a state ensures social stability through ‘enforced 
amnesia’, thereby breaking ‘the traumatic hold of the past’ and suspending ‘the 
deadlock of inter- and transgenerational violence’ (240). This amnesia is 
signalled by Klorathy’s rapturous praise of Volyendesta’s multiculturalism later 
in the text, and his happy observation that there is ‘no general sort or type’, but 
rather that the planet’s assorted history of invasion, settling and protection has 
resulted in a public sphere formed by ‘every conceivable mix’ of various genetic 
characteristics (SA 209). This praise forgets the historical life-cost of this mixing, 
while simultaneously employing hybridity as a conceptual weapon against 
further losses; the traumatic past resurfaces, but as Klorathy’s wish that violent 
domestic uprising against the oncoming invasion not destroy this multicultural 
collectivity.  
Multiculturalist discourse reappears as a tactic of imperial surveillance 
and ordering, rounding off its introduction in Memoirs of a Survivor and Shikasta 
as a paradigm of governmentality for a post-colonial control society. Klorathy 
defines difference as genetic/phenotypical diversity; through this concept of 
difference, he continues the legacy of imperial anthropology, as ‘genetic’ 
multiculturalism only makes sense under the sign of taxonomic classifications of 
social life into different types of humans, continuing the legacy of imperial 
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racism and racialisation. There may not be one general type on Volyendesta, but 
Klorathy’s gaze is embedded in the division of human life into arbitrary 
categories of observable characteristics. Klorathy’s combined strategy of 
protectionist rehabilitation and multicultural imperialism along the uneven lines 
of core (Canopean) and peripheral (Volyen) borders is repeatedly interrupted by 
a force of intoxication. Each time Klorathy’s reports end in some articulation of 
his failure to cure, or some anxiety about his own susceptibility to external 
influences, or the denial of an ending to Incent’s narrative, the work of this force 
emerges, invisibly, undoing Klorathy’s efforts without any political presence.  
Contamination appears to Klorathy as a site of disembodied resistance, a 
force that pushes his efforts into failure; I read this final text, then, as a coda to 
the more directly political narrative of Planet 8. If Planet 8 stages the emergence 
of political consciousness among oppressed subjects of imperial domination, 
then Sentimental Agents threads this consciousness as a kind of translucent 
spectre which pulls the imperial project away from completion or satisfaction. 
The series does not end on a liberatory note in any final or concrete sense, but in 
dissonance, and implied decay of the principal sovereign power. 
 
 
Spies and Proxy Wars 
 
Sentimental Agents emerges in a context of the mass production and 
consumption of spy novels in the Cold War period in Anglo-America, notable 
examples being Ian Fleming’s Bond series (1953-1966) and John le Carré’s George 
Smiley series (1960-77). Sentimental Agents deploys a familiar narrative of the 
home agent on a mission to recuperate a defecting spy, who finds himself 
similarly contaminated after spending time on the planet. Unlike le Carré and 
Smiley, Lessing uses space fiction to probe the biomedical and psychiatric 
engineering of feelings of loyalty, complicity and affection to the home planet. 
On Volyendesta, ‘spies are the subject of every other article, broadcast, 
broadsheet, popular song’ (SA 167): the risk of the spy, and the threat of unseen 
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or unperceived external forces rupturing the integrity of social constitution, is a 
constant anxiety.  
While The Sirian Experiments depicts a series of Socratic encounters 
between Ambien II and Klorathy as pupil and master, Sentimental Agents takes 
this power dynamic into the realm of mind-altering therapies in psychiatric 
treatments during the 1950s and 1960s, attaching these to the governmental 
interest in keeping spies psychologically loyal to their respective national 
interests: sovereign mind control. These therapies were based on a notion of the 
patient as first, disordered or unbalanced measured against normative social 
function, and second, as curable. In other words, the contamination of mental 
illness might be cured at the level of the individual. Compounding this are the 
implications of Incent’s name, which is both a verb: to provide someone or some 
group with an incentive, as well as a truncated spelling of ‘innocent’, with the 
verbal form of negation, ‘no’, taken out. Read in this way, Incent is an agent 
whose power of negation has been removed, suggesting a lack, an inability to 
give a negative response. Klorathy wants to ‘cure’ Incent of a certain 
psychological imbalance, the Rhetorical Disease that Incent has ‘caught’ from 
Krolgul, treat him out of it with various forms of therapy (immersion, dialogue), 
and to restore him to an appreciation of Canopean supremacy. 
 In modern medical terminology, a disease means dysfunction, a set of 
observable symptoms that may or may not be treatable; its older use, from Old 
French desaise (des- -aise), means ‘lack of ease’ or ‘inconvenience’. Klorathy uses 
the term in the former sense. In his account, Incent has been contaminated by 
‘the stimulus of words’ on Volyen, a planet which ‘seethes with emotions of all 
kinds’ (SA 13). The symptoms of this disease are Incent’s vulnerability to 
Shammatian influence. For Canopus, Shammat represents the threat of 
Canopean ideals being contaminated, and the corruption and corrosion of their 
benevolent governing interventions. Catching the Rhetorical Disease therefore 
equates to being contaminated by Shammatian influence. In a report to Klorathy, 
Incent describes being struck by the Shammatian Krolgul’s ‘compassion’, 
‘warmth of heart’, ‘sensitivity to others’ sufferings’, and states, with surprise and 
irony, ‘This was the terrible Shammat! This wonderful being who wept as the 
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rebels were led to execution!’ (12) Incent is carried away by Krolgul’s displays of 
emotions, caught in a reciprocating bond of political awareness, and begins to 
doubt Canopean truths: 
 
I spent the next few weeks with him. I was given a view of, first, 
Volyen, and then of the Volyen “Empire.” I put it in inverted commas 
as is our Canopean way – but does this not show arrogance on our 
part? (SA 12)  
 
Incent is questioning here the Canopean comparison; while Volyen ‘hardly 
stands in comparison with our Rule, or that of the Sirian Empire, […] from their 
point of view it is something, an achievement. I was quite ashamed to see 
Krolgul’s ironic but kind smile when I spoke of the Volyen Empire with what I 
am afraid I now see as something not far from contempt’ (SA 12).  Out of the 
Canopean sphere of influence, interacting with Shammat, Incent’s ideas are 
changing; the words ‘arrogance’ and ‘contempt’ replace the Canopean vocabulary 
of benevolence and tolerance. Incent’s words articulate an alternative to 
Canopus, a shadowed, anarchic world, where no leadership is significant, outside 
the limits of Canopean imperialism.  
While it is Incent’s contamination by Shammat which prompts Klorathy’s 
trip to Volyen, another reason is given alongside this humanitarian intervention. 
Volyen has become a planet of interest to Canopus with regard to imperial 
competition. Volyen has never been colonised by Canopus, because ‘it is in a very 
poor position for Harmonic Cosmic Development’; thus, Canopus ‘did not do 
more than maintain Basic Surveillance for thirty thousand Canopean years’ (SA 
13). During this time, the planet has been a peaceful planet mainly occupied with 
agriculture and local trading. Yet, following ‘a cosmic disturbance cause by the 
violent “soul-searchings” of the neighbouring Sirian Empire, the population 
increased rapidly, material development accelerated, and a ruling caste came to 
dominate the entire planet, making slaves of nine-tenths of its population’ (SA 
13). This gives rise to a phase of Empire-building, with neighbouring planets 
‘invading and settling one another, as short-lived and unstable ‘Empires’, for 
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twenty-one C[anopean]-years’ (SA 14). In Klorathy’s account, Volyen has gone 
from a stable agrarian society to the central regional player in a long-wave history 
of imperial decline and fall. Now an object of interest to Sirius as a possible site 
of expansion, the planet is also of interest to Canopus. Lessing deploys the spy 
novel genre to conjure a history of proxy wars in peripheral territories during the 
Cold War era. 
 In her memoir on her trip to Afghanistan in September 1986, The Wind 
Blows Away Our Words (1987), Lessing writes that she has been associated with 
‘the Afghan struggle for some years, through Afghan Relief’, which she describes 
as ‘an unusual charity, in that no money at all is spent on administration or 
distribution. Every penny gets to refugees’ (35). This description shows her 
awareness of the precarious and inconsistent loop dynamic between aid money, 
leaky governance and unreliable distribution of services and resources. Lessing 
refers to one of the stereotypes of foreign aid: it is customary to talk about money 
getting held up at various levels of administrative or distributive governance, and 
the money does not reach the people to whom it has been sent. This stereotype 
is another strategy of forgetting the historical deals made on ‘virgin’ lands with 
indigenous inhabitants – land in exchange for commodities, and the gradual 
extension of the global market through territorial acquisition and, later, 
commercial globalisation. The leakiness of global aid distribution as a result of 
local stockpiling does not signify a tendency towards corruption, but rather an 
attempt to ‘forget’ the continuation of territorial domination through satellite 
governance, prolonging the neo-imperial waiting game.  Lessing’s memoir 
documents continuous meetings with refugees, but also shows her concern with 
Russian expansion. The first words of the Author’s Note read: ‘Russia has been 
expanding southwards for centuries’ (33). Then, ‘“The Great Game” – that is, who 
was to dominate Afghanistan – was played out through the Nineteenth century 
between two Empires: Great Britain and Russia’ (33).  
 This long history of proxy wars is comparable to the one depicted in The 
Sentimental Agents in the Volyen Empire. Volyen is a long-overlooked sub-planet 
under observation by both Canopus and Sirius, which takes on a new importance 
to Canopus as soon as Sirius begins to make moves to conquer it. Klorathy’s 
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mission on Volyendesta to ‘save’ Incent is banked in a much larger project: to 
influence events in the Volyen sphere in a way that will benefit Canopean 
interests and help to sustain their dominance over (inter)global affairs. Despite 
Lessing’s non-partisan description of the situation in Afghanistan as the product 
of a competitive face-off between warring empires, the facilitation of her 
presence by an English-speaking international aid infrastructure points to the 
intervention of Western European and US forces through this network. 
Politically, she positions herself on the side of the national, anti-Soviet resistance 
force, the muhjahidin, writing with admiration of their stoic commitment to 
defend the borders of their land with a tone of naivety: ‘For most of [the war] the 
muhjahidin have fought without aid from outside, though very recently more 
arms have been reaching them; never enough, however, and never as much as 
the western powers, particularly America, have claimed’ (34). While wedging 
‘The Great Game’ of Afghanistan between two empires, attempting ostensibly to 
see both sides, Lessing is nonetheless fixed in a liberal notion of global dominion 
that takes ‘aid’ as a power for good (although problematised through bad or 
uneven management).  
 Read alongside the Canopus series, which parodies this style of colonial 
reporting, Lessing’s account of Afghanistan seems to be written within the 
costume of Klorathy. Lessing positions herself as sympathetic to the ‘Afghan 
struggle’, while also acting as an informant for her nation, perhaps unwittingly, 
through publishing her reports (in English). Lessing also forgets. 
 
 
 
 
Shock Therapy: Rehabilitation, Madness and Politics 
 
As soon as Klorathy can diagnose a disorder, he regains control over the 
situation, and can determine the future of the patient. In this section, I look at 
Klorathy’s intervention on Volyendesta as a self-declared rational agent on a 
humanitarian mission to rehabilitate Incent. Incent must prove himself mentally 
 206 
capable before being permitted to continue his work on the planet, and Klorathy, 
in effect, sequesters him to a mental hospital. If Incent cannot function according 
to Canopean reason, then he will be taken out of action. More broadly, this can 
be related to the aporia of representative democracy identified by Jacques 
Derrida in Rogues, as I outlined in my discussion of The Sirian Experiments: ‘How 
many voices, how many votes, for an unconscious’ (84)? How can the 
hierarchised multiplicity of psychic life be reconciled with the numerical 
equivalence required for democratic participation in public affairs? In order for 
a citizen to take part in a system of representative democracy, they must prove 
themselves mentally capable in a number of ways. In order for the one person-
one vote equivalence to stand, a citizen is expected to have the functions of 
reasoning to vote in the first place. Historically, the exclusion of residents of a 
nation from participating in this system on the basis of their status within social 
order – as woman, as slave – has been justified on the grounds that those 
excluded were not able to think and decide as rational agents. Thus, the ‘quality’ 
of the subject’s mental abilities – determined historically by divisions of gender 
and race – has been a deciding factor in whether or not that human subject can 
make the claim to be a political one.  
Sentimental Agents can be situated not only within the spy novel genre, but 
also within challenges to psychiatric practices – such as shock therapy the 
prescription of psychotropic drugs, and lobotomies – in critical, psychoanalytic 
and political theory in the 1960s and 1970s. Mark Fisher describes the anti-
psychiatry movement as follows:  
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, radical theory and politics (Laing, Foucault, 
Deleuze and Guattari, etc.) coalesced around extreme mental 
conditions such as schizophrenia, arguing, for instance, that madness 
was not a natural, but a political, category. (19) 
 
Lessing is one of a number of fiction writers of this period, such as Kurt 
Vonnegut, Ken Kesey and Andrew Burgess, who represent madness as a soci0-
political phenomenon rather than a natural one. Her writing of madness in The 
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Four-Gated City (1969) and Briefing for a Descent into Hell (1971) also shows the 
influence of R. D. Laing’s ideas.11 Marion Vlastos argues that Lessing and Laing 
share a social vision, which can be tied into a cultural moment of politicising 
madness: ‘[I]ndividuals become sick because the world is sick,’ and that engaging 
with madness can ‘reveal society to itself’ (246). While Klorathy understands this 
sickness as having an a-historical, absolute value – Shammat as pure evil – in fact, 
it is not that Shammat’s influence that has contaminated Incent, but rather his 
memory of Canopean history. Incent’s ‘madness’ is a symptom of Canopean 
repression, not the influence of Shammat. As in Briefing for a Descent Into Hell 
(1971), space fiction gives more narrative flexibility for depicting experiences of 
madness as – quite literally – journeys into other worlds, and through this, to 
critique some of the normative values of the ‘real’ world. In this case, these values 
are those held by Klorathy, in his conviction that Incent only needs to be 
‘shocked’ back into Canopean norms of behaviour, thought and memory.  
Yet Klorathy’s attempt to rehabilitate Incent is also a political mission, 
connected to a larger task: to prevent the colonisation of the planet by Sirius, 
which is undertaking an aggressive, end-of-empire campaign in a desperate 
attempt to return itself to its former glory. The role of Shammat is, for Klorathy, 
to cause another kind of disruption: whatever Canopus attempts to achieve, 
Shammat will attempt to destroy. From Klorathy’s perspective, Krolgul’s 
influence over Incent, and Incent’s succumbing to the Rhetorical Disease, is akin 
to a challenge to Canopean power. By attempting to de-contaminate Incent 
through psychological rehabilitation, to ‘cure’ him of the disease transmitted by 
Krolgul, Canopean influence over the future of Volyen and its neighbouring 
planets – Maken and Slovin – can be ensured. 
Klorathy works on the principle that Incent’s ‘disease’ is treatable. 
Individual treatment – in the form of talking or hypnosis or enforced 
sequestering – marks the limit of Klorathy’s intervention. He sends Incent to a 
                                                 
11 Laing was a personal friend of Lessing and ‘a guest a couple of times’ at Lessing’s London home 
in the early 1960s, where Jenny Diski recalls reading Lessing’s copies of Laing’s The Divided Self 
and The Self and Others (Diski, ‘Doris and Me’). 
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Canopean-run hospital for Rhetorical Diseases (the sonic echo of ‘tropical 
diseases’ looms) where Incent spends time in the ward for ‘Basic Rhetoric’:  
 
This ward is at the front of the building, on balconies built over 
continual crashing, moaning, or murmuring waves. The winds whine 
and roar all day and all night. To augment this we have arranged 
background music of the most deliberate kind, largely originating 
from Shikasta. (SA 18) 
 
The concept of this ward, the first phase of rehabilitation, is to bring to crisis the 
excesses of emotion induced by exposure to what seems like a late Romanticist 
aesthetic (the music played is filed in Canopean reports under ‘Nineteenth 
Century Emoters and Complainers’). This immersion in the Romantic Sublime is 
intended as a kind of system shock, equivalent to electric shock therapy, but with 
music and sound rather than electricity used to confound the mind and draw the 
subject out of their emotional reveries.  
Later, when various treatments in the hospital have failed, Klorathy takes 
Incent to what he describes as ‘the wonderful, all-artificial, cool, stimulus-free 
white room’ in an unnamed hotel, ‘silent as in a cave deep under the earth’, with 
‘a place of quiet light’ as the ceiling (SA 89). We might think also of the 
whitewashed rooms behind the walls in Memoirs of a Survivor, sites of active 
forgetting. In this ‘place of quiet light’, a light show of geometrical shapes takes 
place, designed to clear the mind of unwanted thoughts, a meditational space 
of abstract shapes, promising a transcendental understanding of an original 
meaning: 
 
At first you are allowed only glimpses of circles, triangles, squares, 
all a luminous white on flat white, and the shapes darken, turn grey 
and then duller grey on a white that begins to shine, though softly. 
These statements of order remain, so that the eye may travel, but 
resting, soothed, reassured; soon, however, the mind begins to 
protest against changelessness, longs for relief, and as you 
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understand that this is your thought – a hunger transmuted from a 
sharp need into the passionless stuff of the mind – the eye is in 
movement again because up there, at the very tip of the dim shaft, 
it is not polygons but polyhedrons that you are trying to encompass 
with your gaze. (SA 89) 
 
In this rehabilitative space, geometry comes to stand in for ‘truth’, an origin 
before verbal language. The implication is that in geometry, there are things that 
can be known definitively, which can be reproduced exactly and which transport 
to a beginning, which counter the slippery and contingent status of mere 
linguistics. As Jacques Derrida argues in Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: 
An Introduction, ‘the mathematical object is [considered as] ideal’, its being is 
‘thoroughly transparent’ and it is ‘absolutely objective, i.e. totally rid of empirical 
subjectivity’; ‘its being is, from the outset, to be an object for a pure 
consciousness’ (Introduction 27). In its idealisation, the mathematical object is 
considered to stand in for and obscure ‘true’ nature through imaginative 
abstraction. Husserl’s critique is to suggest that the origin of geometry – its 
material history, its structural invention – has been forgotten. It is absolute, 
rather than historical, existing independently of its history, a discovery, rather 
than an exploration, transcending regional difference. For Husserl, this 
substitution of ‘history’ with ‘origin’ represents a crisis of forgetting.  
I suggest that it is a comparable crisis of forgetting that runs throughout 
Sentimental Agents, with history working as an intoxicating force that 
continually disrupts Klorathy’s attempts to draw Incent ‘back’ into the 
imaginative sphere of abstraction and universals, away from the corruption and 
contingency of language, to the dwelling place of an amnesiac sovereign. 
Klorathy’s use of geometry as a therapeutic device is symptomatic of this effort: 
shocking Incent out of the Rhetorical Disease is analogous to an attempt to take 
Incent out of history, and indeed to deny the historical development of Canopean 
power. The symptoms of the rhetorical disease that both Incent and Ormarin 
suffer from are regurgitated phrases taken from previous ideological wars and 
applied to new battles. Klorathy’s attempt to cure them of this tendency places 
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the language, rather than events, at the centre of historical record. It is not 
Incent, but Klorathy, who is stripping the words of possible meaning. 
Klorathy’s fetish for abstraction is an undeclared strategy of imperial 
forgetting. Comay argues that a blueprint of forgetting, an amnesty of memory, 
has become a means of ensuring social stability in political states since Greece, 
as a way of beginning again: ‘Nothing short of enforced amnesia, an indelibly 
inscribed erasure, could break the traumatic hold of the past and suspend the 
deadlock of inter- and transgenerational violence’ (240). Yet this amnesty of 
memory (she cites, among others, the example of forgetting the names of Vichy 
collaborators in France after World War II) brings with it its own stasis, ‘stasis 
supervening on a previous stasis, […] a sudden standstill that interrupts 
stagnation precisely by intensifying and repeating it’ (240). This ‘legally 
mandated forgetfulness’ can be understood at the level of state intervention in 
individual psychoses, which Klorathy attempts to perform on Incent. Klorathy 
pre-supposes geometry as an original order before language – he remarks, ‘[N]o 
sooner had I decided that I could never be seduced from the fascination of the 
dance of the polyhedrons, than I knew that I could contemplate for ever a ceiling 
that had become flat and decorated luminously with the patternings and 
intricacies of the interlacing polyhedrons’ (SA 90). The reference to eternity 
suggests his crystallized comprehension of this an ideal space beyond his own 
existence, while it is also, for Klorathy, a literal reality: being immortal, he can 
contemplate the ceiling for ever. Klorathy’s immortality, only possible in a 
speculative realm, makes literal the idea of abstract, infinite sovereign power. 
Immortality, infinity, and some original order that transcends language are 
Klorathy’s ‘cure’ for Incent, the reminder of a place without words. The ‘dance of 
the polyhedrons’ is a closed system that he can enter and move around ‘at will’. 
It takes place above the realm of human communication, the manifestation of a 
transcendental operation that imperial gods such as Klorathy can participate in, 
going out of ‘himself’ into a realm of planes and other dimensions. Yet, following 
Comay, we can read this instead as an act of forgetting, suspending Incent’s 
questions about Canopean sovereignty, obliterating his attempted resistance 
against his own empire.  
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Klorathy is trying to restore an original whole, not through a proto-
Romantic Sturm und Drang aesthetic, but through mathematical absolutism and 
a resolutely Cartesian metaphysics. This logic allows him to forget Canopean 
history, which has gone through phases very similar to the one now undergone 
by Volyen and its surrounding planets. Rather than acknowledging 
responsibility, Klorathy takes on the role of a benevolent humanitarian, 
delivering neo-imperial aid to a struggling new nation. It can be compared to the 
UN’s response to the so-called ‘rise of Third World dictators’ in post-colonial 
African and South America; most notably for discussion here, Robert Mugabe in 
Zimbabwe. Such response, usually based in a Euro-US PR campaign of 
psychological profiling akin to Hitler and Stalin (but never Churchill), is 
characterised by the kind of amnesia and ‘curing’ of Klorathy to Incent. The idea 
of disease is laced into this work of forgetting, at once the image of dark tropics, 
and the remnants of an unconscious that has repressed the memory of colonial 
genocide. 
 Comay argues that this forgetfulness is a kind of ‘deep freeze’, ‘stasis 
supervening on a previous stasis – a kind of shock administered to an inert or 
emptily gyrating body politic’ (4). This ‘instantaneous and hyperbolic freezing’ 
of a traumatic past ‘interrupts stagnation precisely by intensifying and repeating 
it’ (4). That is, enforced amnesia changes nothing, and rather ensures that the 
cycle of trauma is repeated in some capacity, because social stagnation 
necessitates violent actions in order for some kind of ‘shock treatment’ to register 
as transformation in the body politic. This is noticeable in the repeated failures 
of humanitarian intervention (both governmental and non-governmental) made 
also through Euro-US-based aid agencies and international peace organisations, 
the UN and UNESCO. These interventions are generally to do with protecting 
the inscribed borders of national healthcare, and therefore the sovereignty of 
individual nation-states. Containing the excesses of ‘rogue states’ in refugee 
camps or detention centres, world powers – acting through humanitarian 
channels – sustain a precarity of existence for vast numbers of people, often (as 
is the case with Sudan currently) upholding an official non-interference policy 
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with regard to violent regimes, while influencing economic and fiscal policy 
through bilateral trade agreements.  
 The ‘cure’ of benevolent intervention, such as Klorathy’s mission to Volyen, 
supplements the work of forgetting an imperial past, de-historicising the uneven 
logic of a capitalist world-system and diagnosing Third World corruption and 
violence as pathology, as (in an analogous sense, genetic) inheritance, rather 
than the inheritance of European imperialism. In The Least of All Possible Evils 
(2011), Eyal Weizman discusses what he calls a ‘humanitarian present’ which 
facilitates a state violence, moderated and minimized through an ‘economy of 
calculations and justified as the least possible means’ (3). For Weizman, 
‘Humanitarianism, human rights and international law, when abused by state, 
supra-state and military action, have become the crucial means by which the 
economy of violence is calculated and managed’ (4-5). Far from benefitting the 
populations it swoops in to save,  
 
[S]patial organisations and physical instruments, technical 
standards, procedures and systems of monitoring – the complex 
humanitarian assemblage that Adi Ophir called ‘moral 
technologies’ – have become the means for exercising 
contemporary violence and for governing the displaced, the enemy 
and the unwanted. (4) 
 
Weizman’s concept of the ‘humanitarian present’ is forged out of collusion 
between two forces: the ‘technologies of humanitarianism, human rights and 
humanitarian law with military and political powers’ (4). The juncture at which 
humanitarian intervention functions most efficiently is not in the treatment of 
wounds – wounds of body, infrastructure, immunity – but in containing and 
thereby maintaining this vulnerability.  
 Out of this vulnerability, located at the peripheries of rogue states, comes 
an opportunity for deploying emergency powers through what Michael Agier 
calls ‘a distant and delegated form of management, a government without 
citizens’, creating and sustaining ‘waiting rooms on the margins of the world’ 
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(Weizman 56-7). Life itself is reduced to biological life, species survival confined 
to the suspension of political activity; following Hannah Arendt, this can be 
compared to the lives of slaves in Ancient Greece, excluded from property 
ownership and therefore from participation in public affairs (30-31). Weizman 
ends his book with a question: how to foster political agency in these camps 
among their residents, with reconstruction and improvement of housing and 
infrastructure in refugee camps carried out ‘not instead of but rather in order to 
support political rights and the continuous struggle to achieve them’ (147)? 
Following Weizman, Klorathy’s intervention seeks to contain and negate the 
political possibility of Incent’s contamination.   
 
 
Multicultural Imperialism as Biopolitical ‘Good’ 
 
As I argued in Chapter One, the discourse of multiculturalism often, 
misleadingly, suggests a post-colonial levelling-out of the world-system, but in 
practice sustains imperial hierarchies of scientific and cultural racism. 
Benjamin’s discussion of nineteenth century physiology coinciding with the 
censorship and ordering of everyday life – that is, as a strategy of control to 
produce bourgeois life as common sense, and to eradicate dissent – is useful for 
analysing the way in which Klorathy deploys multicultural discourse as a 
governing technique to maintain order, and effectively obliterate any deviant 
forms of difference. At the end of Sentimental Agents, a different political threat 
emerges, by chance. It is not Sirius that invades, but Maken, a subsidiary empire 
at a resource extraction stage of imperial expansion; in the analogy of North-
South global relations, Maken can be thought of as analogous to a nation-state 
of the global South. Its invasion of Volyen is not a proxy battle for the main war 
between Sirius and Canopus, and therefore does not carry the history of their 
imperial competition. While road-building and travel networks facilitate Sirian 
invasion, the government of Maken does not have the resources to carry out this 
kind of infrastructural re-organisation. Klorathy explains to the freedom fighter 
Ormarin that there is an opportunity, then, not to prevent or even resist their 
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invasion through warfare, but to ‘limit their influence here, their power’ (SA 212). 
The Makens have little use for most of Volyen’s resources, looking only for ‘birds 
and insects to take back and try out on Maken’ for the sake of breeding more of 
their pipisaurs (their animal companions) (SA 213). Their interest is not 
competitive expansion, as with Sirius, Shammat and Canopus, but is rather an 
experimental mission for resource extraction. Klorathy’s advice is to let them in, 
rather than risk losses. 
 This is not a way of permitting contamination, but of limiting disruption, 
and thereby holding off the threat of social change. As I have argued in Chapter 
One, the idea of multiculturalism – demarcated cultures existing together in the 
same social space – is a way of preventing the contamination of sovereign 
knowledge. By differentiating ‘culture’, a racial typology remains unchanged. 
Moreover, this is a strategy of sovereign power. The presence of minority groups 
does not threaten sovereign power, but enables the difference to be categorised 
under and subsumed into Canopean surveillance. This incorporation is merely an 
extension of sovereign power. In this representative democracy of differentiated 
racial-cultural ‘types’, Canopus can claim everything, a form of absolutism that 
must only acknowledge the other as other in its mechanisms in order to makes 
its claim to democracy. The abuse of power in this situation can always be 
justified, because difference has been incorporated, rather than excluded. 
Multiculturalism is a biopolitical good because it is both a strategy of preserving 
the bio-energy of citizens from war, and a way of tracking these citizens under a 
restricted set of civic freedoms. 
Klorathy suggests to Ormarin that rather than use the Volyen alliance 
forged by Ormarin’s political campaigning – composed of united ‘slaves and 
citizens, Volyendestans and former Volyens, refugees and Sirian officials who 
have settled here’ – to ‘fight to the last drop of everybody’s blood’ (211) against the 
invaders, to instead use their temporary collectivity to consider, 
 
[H]ow to invite some of [the Makens] to stay as your guests, how to 
give them what they want without depleting yourselves, how to 
change those that stay […] so that they become as flexible and open-
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minded as in fact you are, how to wait until they go, or, rather, until 
one day you realise you have not been visited for a long time by the 
Maken forces, and that those of them that are here are like you, that 
you have so absorbed them, that Volyendesta is in fact 
independent, though nominally a part of the Maken Empire. (SA 
213-14) 
 
This suggestion seems at first unfeasible. How to guarantee that the Makens will 
not swoop in and take over everything? Why should the Volyens yield some of 
their resources to another imperial power? What would ensure the adaptation of 
the Makens to the flexibility and open-mindedness that has been cultivated by 
the unifying of different social groups on Volyen?  
 There are two things to say about this moment in the text, the first about 
neo-imperial intervention and the second about the recommendation of non-
violent confrontation between invader and invaded for the sake of cross-border 
adaptation. First, despite perceiving the strength of a multiplicity of social groups 
coming together under the threat of invasion, Klorathy continues to treat the 
population as an anthropological object and collective subject over which he can 
continue to assert Canopean policy direction. His role as agent in regard to 
Ormarin is that of international peacekeeper in dialogue with a rebel leader, 
attempting to maintain Canopean influence by not allowing the Volyens to 
annihilate themselves ‘to the last drop of everybody’s blood’ (SA 211). This leads 
to his directive to Ormarin for a non-violent resistance to invasion, the purpose 
of which is not to prevent the invasion itself, but to prevent depleting the general 
life-stock of the interstellar system in the form of the Volyen population, and 
rather promote adaptation and integration of the Makens to the planet. In order 
to make this recommendation, an opposing figure of invasion is set up, far more 
threatening: that of total subjugation by another imperial force, presenting 
integration, adaptation and small losses against either total annihilation or 
totalising control by the enemy planet. Klorathy’s directive is biopolitical 
interventionist logic, presented as the alternative to these more radical and 
destructive possibilities.  
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 The more threatening option of total subjugation is made more palpable 
by the fact that this conversation takes place in a slave camp. Klorathy draws this 
contrast between small losses and total subjugation in a Sirian slave camp where 
‘slaves provide labour for the [Sirian] plantations’, harvesting a berry used ‘as a 
stimulating beverage’ (SA 208). The slaves are an endogamous population, ‘have 
never bred with any but their own kind’ (SA 209), selectively bred for the purpose 
of berry-picking: ‘their immensely long arms are of use in picking the berries’ (SA 
209). This is a strictly controlled environment of the kind Ambien II describes in 
The Sirian Experiments, resurrecting the memory of the Lombis and the Planet 
8ers, the biological cost of imperial expansion. The description of these camps 
can be read as echoing two forms of imperialist expansion: the gulag system in 
Soviet Russia, and the plantation slave system in pre-reconstruction US South. 
In the second instance, the biopolitical element is more clear: the state of slavery 
was determined along the line of phenotypic characteristics under the name of 
‘race’, and its perpetuation made necessary the reproductive labour of fertile 
black women. Mixing races would mean an epistemological devaluation of this 
bio-economy of labour, given that the enforced separation of groups on the basis 
of imperial ‘racial’ characteristics made this system possible. The slave camp 
resurrects a history of a global commonplace of slavery for the purposes of 
national interests as a necessary tool for expansion and development, a common 
denominator for expansionist political systems.  
 It is important to be suspicious however, of Klorathy’s implied promotion 
of liberal multiculturalism, in contrast with phenotypic uniformity, of ‘slaves and 
citizens, Volyendestans and former Volyens, refugees and Sirian officials who 
have settled [on Volyendesta]’ (SA 211). He takes variation as evidence of the 
‘infinite inventiveness of our galaxy’ (SA 209), and the possessive ‘our’ is crucial 
here. At first reading it suggests a kind of sharing, but the iteration is steeped in 
the logic of ‘us’ against ‘them’, the multiplicity of ‘our’ galaxy in contrast to the 
uniformity of Sirian social organisation. Observing the phenotypic uniformity of 
the slave labourers, Klorathy compares the slaves to the phenotypic variation in 
Volyendesta: 
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I reflected that in the streets of this planet’s cities you may watch its 
people passing for hours, and never see a face repeated or a bodily 
shape the same as another. So long has Volyendesta been invaded, 
settled, ‘protected,’ so long has it invaded other planets, so long and 
thoroughly have the genes been stirred and mingled and added to and 
inspired and excited by new material, that the natives have no general 
type or sort[.] (SA 209) 
 
This reads as the raptures of a liberal multiculturalist who considers empire to 
have been more or less beneficial for the development of human history, briefly 
nodding to the history of violent imperialist acquisition while also forgetting the 
cost of ‘invasion’, settlement and protection. Klorathy’s interest in the great 
variety of genetic mixtures as a result of imperial adventures ignores the human 
cost of miscegenation in the context of European colonialism. The division 
between small losses and total subjugation is, then, only a question of number, 
rather than suggesting any kind of radical alternative. 
 Klorathy articulates the benefit of what Spade and Willse call 
‘multicultural imperialism’ in their article, ‘Sex, Gender and War in an Age of 
Multicultural Imperialism’ (2014). They identify a troubling complicity between 
the promotion of the US as the centre of the ‘free world’ along the lines of 
progress made towards equal rights for racialised minorities, women and LGBTQ 
people, thereby justifying continued military intervention and imperialist 
expansion abroad. In a discussion of Chelsea Manning’s defection from the US 
army after releasing confidential military documents to Wikileaks in 2013, and 
her release of a statement coming out as a transgender woman the next day, 
Spade and Willse argue that the liberal defence of Manning along the lines of 
sexuality, rather than politics, ‘expose[s] how the production of feminist and gay 
politics aligned with militarism serves the projects of US neo-imperial war and 
imperialism [and] how women’s rights and LGBT rights fit right into the tool box 
of war-on-terror proponents’ (7). That is, rather than Manning’s political act of 
anti-war campaigning being at the centre of the liberal defence of her, her social 
identification as transsexual was deployed to excuse it. They describe a 
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‘multicultural imperialism’ which – in the name of ‘Western’ freedoms – reduces 
the complexity of experiencing the world to types of experience, and thus the 
rhetoric of liberated subjects can be deployed around gender and sexual politics 
to forge an ‘us’ against ‘them’. In the case of the construction of ‘the Middle East’ 
in post-9/11 Euro-US as a centre for terrorist training, in which women’s rights 
and LGBTQ rights are suppressed under a similarly monolithic Islamic, 
heteronormative patriarchy, the West is constructed as a site of liberated 
subjectivity. This ‘multicultural imperialism’ does not function outside the 
restrictions of sovereign typology, but puts a multiculturalism of ‘types’ in 
opposition to repressive uniformity, and uses this as a founding principle.  
 Relevant for the reading of Klorathy I propose in this chapter is Spade and 
Willse’s example of Hilary Clinton’s speech, ‘Remarks in Recognition of 
International Human Rights Day’, delivered at the UN Building in Geneva in 
Mary 2011. Citing the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights – which 
proposes that ‘human rights are the birthright of all people’ and transcend the 
organisation of individual governments – Clinton stated that ‘gay rights are 
human rights’ (‘Remarks’). Spade and Willse argue that Clinton’s citation of this 
declaration ‘obscures the actual geopolitical context of the reconfiguration of 
global power in the aftermath of World War II, the weakening of traditional 
European empire, the consolidation of the US empire as a dominant world 
power, and the divvying up of spheres of military influence and control along 
what would become Cold War battle lines’ (8). Similarly to my reading of 
Klorathy’s sovereign amnesia, they argue that Clinton’s reference represents the 
evacuation of this history, significant because, at the time, she was the US 
Secretary of State and therefore the US’s premier diplomatic agent for 
international affairs.  
 By evacuating this history rather than evaluating the implementation and 
international ordering of human rights along the lines of nation-states, Clinton 
casts ‘the classic social myth of representative democracy – that people come 
first, and governments serve them’ (Spade and Willse, 8). The hope of 
multiculturalism – that many differentiated ‘types’ of people (gendered, 
racialised, and so on) can come together to form a democratic public sphere, in 
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which the interest of each of these ‘different groups’ are represented, is then an 
extension of the myth of representative democracy’s efficacy in ensuring the 
equity and evenness of universal human rights. Spade and Willse suggest that 
Clinton’s citation of the 1948 UN Human Rights Declaration to say that ‘gay 
rights are human rights’, ‘bringing gayness from the particular to the universal’ 
and ‘enact[ing] a chain of equivalences drawing from the US context: women, 
African-Americans, and now gays’, obscures the way in which human rights have 
been deployed historically ‘as a technology for capital and empire’ (8; italics 
mine). By making this claim, placing the struggles of black emancipation, 
women’s suffrage and now LGBT rights into the past of US governance, Clinton 
can claim a ‘progress narrative’ for the US, ‘affirm[ing] the role of the United 
States as arbiter of the universal,’ ‘declar[ing] equality achieved at home and 
operat[ing] as a global leader on human rights’ (8). It also rebranded the Obama 
administration as pro-gay, and ‘imperial, racist state violence as somehow 
progressive’ (Spade and Willse 9).  
 Spade and Willse offer a useful way of reading Klorathy as representative 
of an imperial regime which takes its supremacy for granted, insofar as he 
positions himself as an (inter)global leader of a sovereign force that has learned 
from its (silenced) mistakes and has adapted itself along the lines of 
representative democracy. Yet this representation ends up figuring as a simple 
multiculturalism, with people reduced to particular subjective experiences of 
collective struggle. His comparison of (Sirian) uniformity with (Canopean) 
multiculturalism articulates something similar to Clinton’s appropriation of 
universal human rights as a specifically North American ideal. This ideal then 
becomes part of the implicit justification for neo-imperial intervention in nation-
states that have not yet incorporated these struggles into their governance, 
where ‘minority groups’ are not represented in democratic processes. Klorathy 
justifies Canopean intervention on the basis of its ‘multicultural imperialism,’ 
over and against an imperialism that seeks to cultivate a uniform citizen-subject 
as the primary source of labour power. He reduces the violence of imperialist 
expansion to the mixing of genes, articulating this history as a kind of 
inevitability while ignoring the losses incurred through invasion and settling. 
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When he advises Ormarin that approaching the Maken invaders as guests rather 
than enemies will prevent the loss of life, this should be read as a biopolitical 
strategy. He wants to prevent loss of life for biopolitical reasons, not for reasons 
of social justice or peace. This is life that the Canopeans have an interest in 
preserving because first, they already have influence over Volyendesta, and 
second, because they want to maintain this influence through successive 
reproduction. Klorathy gives this advice because the Makens are not a threat to 
Canopean imperialism. Through this non-violent strategy, the Makens can 
become part of Canopus’s neo-liberal inclusion of ‘minorities’ living under 
multicultural imperialism – resources for an interplanetary commonwealth – and 
Canopus can maintain their grasp on (inter)global leadership.  
 Sentimental Agents does not have a satisfactory ending with regard to 
emancipatory politics. Ormarin takes Klorathy’s advice, the Makens come to take 
some resources from Volyendesta, are surprised by the lack of direct resistance 
to their efforts, and end up leaving the planet fairly soon after, having left some 
Makens behind who soon enough adapt to the biological and social conditions 
of Volyendesta. The novel ends with Klorathy following Incent to Shammat, 
because Incent ‘has had a relapse’ (SA 220). The text gives Klorathy the final 
word, but it is marked with failure and the implication of repetition. From a 
narrative point of view, there has been no ‘progress’ in the sense of a successful 
freedom struggle. What Lessing is doing, rather, is staging the back-and-forth of 
the news-governance-intervention cycle of proxy wars during the Cold War, 
noting the declining influence and significance of the Soviet Union, as well as 
setting the stage for the continued domination of Western powers along the lines 
of Spade and Willse’s notion of ‘multicultural imperialism’.  
 
 
Intoxicated Subjects 
 
In this section, I look at how Lessing crosses the metaphor of physical or bodily 
contamination with that of mental illness in Sentimental Agents. I address how 
the narrative negotiates the three questions raised by the text to this point – 
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sovereign amnesia, psychiatric ‘cures’, and the binary of protectionism and 
multicultural imperialism – through the trope of intoxication. The ‘contagion’ of 
psychological disorder marks a site of potential change. Barbara Vlastos argues 
that there is a turn in Lessing’s writing with regard to her fictional rendering of 
social change from The Golden Notebook (1962) onwards, after leaving the 
Communist Party in 1957. Vlastos suggests that this turn involves the move from 
a Marxian hope for structural reorganisation, represented by George Orwell, to 
the role of ‘inner life’: empathy over treatment, reciprocation over diagnosis. 
Vlastos writes, ‘In both Laing’s and Lessing’s views the principle of 
compartmentalisation, applied to groups of people, usually takes the form of 
separating Them from Us in obviously spurious moral terms’ (Vlastos 249). For 
Lessing, the psychiatric ‘cure’ reinforces the sovereign-subject power relation 
through the doctor-patient relation. At no point does Klorathy enter a dialogue 
with Incent (or Volyendesta’s populist leader Ormarin) that does not in some 
way reinscribe himself – and through him, Canopus – as the ‘correct’ way. His 
exchanges with them are emptied of the potential for adaptation, because of their 
one-sidedness. As Weizman argues, the question raised by the enforced absence 
of political agency within refugee camps by humanitarian technologies – 
bordering, surveillance, medication, precarious housing and inconsistent and 
unstable food supplies – is not to deny the precarity of the residents’ livelihoods, 
or the difficulty of their position (that is, not to simply place a plus instead of 
minus, granting agency as if by magic), but for these spaces to be imagined 
differently.  
 Psychological disorder is a crossing-place in Lessing’s work from the 1960s 
onwards, with regard to disequilibrium making possible radical change. Vlastos 
suggests that Lessing is interested in exploring ‘madness as potential salvation 
for the contemporary world’ (246). I would shift this formulation to acknowledge 
Lessing’s resistance to binaries, of which madness-reason would be one. Her 
characters do not slip into madness as if into the opposite realm of existence. 
Lessing represents the effort of madness, what might be called the madness-work, 
and the semiotic reconfigurations made possible by movement through different 
manifestations of reality. In Sentimental Agents, life is conceived as already 
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contaminated, and this figure of contamination rises to disrupt the stability and 
sterile sanctity of sovereign power, throwing off or breaking up the constant 
attempt at coherence and equilibrium. She unmoors contamination from the 
question of individuals and groups (where it would too easily be reduced to 
anthropological claims of ‘hybridity’ or multiculturalism), and renders it as a 
force of interruption, destabilisation, and possible adaptation. 
 In Sentimental Agents, Klorathy repeatedly fails to make a difference, or to 
cure Incent fully of the disease of Rhetoric. By making the use of Rhetoric into a 
disease, Lessing plays with the permeability and interdependency of mind and 
body ‘contamination’. Contamination as a figure, involving the idea of the body 
being vulnerable to external influence, echoes Eugene Thacker’s description of 
the epidemic as a figure of ‘extrinsic life’ that escapes the individual as unit; it is, 
etymologically, ‘epi-‘ (around/upon) ‘demos’ (the people). Thacker writes,  
 
An epidemic cannot be limited to the individual organism, for its 
very nature is to pass between organisms, and increasingly, to pass 
across species borders (and national borders). What is the unit of 
analysis for an epidemic? (‘Biophilosophy’ 124) 
 
Thacker’s question is not about the ‘essence’ of an epidemic, but rather the 
difficulty of taking this figure into consideration while defining ‘life itself’. An 
epidemic takes place as a result of social relations: it is around and of the people. 
It echoes a historical moment; it is an aid to colonial territorial acquisition, as 
well as common experience – a gathering point – for previously disparate groups. 
The epidemic, escaping the individual, allows the formation of temporary 
collectivity that might explore and map out common interests in response to 
environmental demands, rather than attempting to form a new nucleus. The 
vulnerability implied by the epidemic does not make space for rigorous and 
totalising political transformation, but marks a site of psychobiological 
adaptation in response to an unforeseen contamination. This adaptation occurs 
not through strictly material configurations, but as a process; action comes 
before individuation – as in swarm intelligence, in the microbial life and bodily 
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interactions carrying the virus that creates an epidemic, ‘there is something akin 
to a fully distributed control’ (Thacker, ‘Biophilosophy’ 129).  
 The epidemic is characterised by what Thacker calls a ‘radical horizontality 
of molecules’ that does not depend on a genealogical transmission of 
information, but through which molecular life interrupts systems, forcing them 
into a defensive immune response, and attempting to break the stabilising 
dynamics of the organism into radical disequilibrium. This horizontality 
depends on external factors; it depends on the transmissibility of a disease 
through non-genetic channels: 
 
An epidemic is molecular, but it is also social, technological, 
economic, political. Networks of infection, yes, but also networks of 
contagion, transportation, vaccination, quarantine, surveillance. 
(‘Biophilosophy’ 131) 
 
An epidemic is not mobilised by a particular governing force in a given direction, 
but rather spreads unevenly, passing through different efforts of immunisation, 
dependent on social position or citizenship. National borders often mark the 
most comprehensive articulation of protection from this spread, but class 
borders within cities – the slum and the high-rise – also form boundaries of 
immunity, if public healthcare does not or cannot prevent outbreaks of disease 
in cramped quarters, exacerbated by malnutrition and poor sanitation. The 
epidemic is ‘upon the people’, but its distribution is also deeply uneven, with 
individual vulnerability to it dependent on a number of different environmental 
factors. 
 The epidemic is produced by socio-political relations, but it also produces 
new relations. In Sentimental Agents, Incent’s contamination forces a 
confrontation between Canopus and its enemies, while Klorathy’s attempts at 
rehabilitation fail repeatedly. This tension between the defecting spy and the 
loyal agent force Klorathy to speak ‘for’ Canopus, to articulate specifically what 
imperial interests he represents; he tells Incent, ‘You are not an agent of Canopus 
in this (I admit) not very attractive little planet in order to develop a taste for 
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historical anomaly’ (SA 148). This is Klorathy’s principal mission: to neutralise 
Incent’s increasing interest in what Klorathy calls ‘historical anomaly’. As 
opposed to the transforming but ultimately unchanging shapes of the 
geometrical spectacle, ‘historical anomaly’ is not calculable or predictable, taking 
place in what Benjamin’s notion of Jetztzeit – ‘time filled with the presence of the 
now’, bursting out of chronological progress to disrupt it (253). Canopus wants 
to cut Incent off from this, to restore him to a space of universal (Canopean) law, 
passed down as immutable structure from generation to generation. Incent’s 
contamination makes it necessary for Klorathy to show his hand; it is this 
confrontation that makes their relation a site of possible change.  
 
 
Pleasurable Melancholy: Interrupting Absolutes 
 
Contamination interrupts the diagnosis of disorder, making it difficult for the 
diagnostician to maintain the patient-doctor distance required for certain kinds 
of psychiatric rehabilitation. If the doctor is also affected, then treatment 
becomes more complicated. The characterisation of resistance in Sentimental 
Agents is moored in the possibility of being ‘carried away’. For this, Mel Chen’s 
theorisation of toxicity as both metaphor and material is useful. Chen argues that 
toxins can be thought of as ‘conditions with effects, bringing their own affects 
and animacies to bear on lives and nonlives’ (282). That is, the effects of toxins 
are social effects. Toxicity involves different kinds of sociality, ‘straddl[ing] 
‘boundaries of “life” and “nonlife,” as well as the literal bounds of bodies, in ways 
that introduce a certain complexity to the presumption of integrity of either lifely 
or deathly subjects’ (279). She gives the example of ‘labouring or literally 
intoxicated subjects’ – factory workers, agricultural workers surrounded by 
pesticides, residents in industrial and heavily-polluted areas of the city – who 
‘tak[e] into their bodies what their better-vested employers can avoid’ (276). The 
toxins inhaled and consumed by these bodies, as they destroy bonds of biological 
life (nerve endings, organ function, brainpower), produce other kinds of bonds 
that ‘link these groups, bonds that are recognized in the potent affinities of 
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labour and immigrant activism, have been laid there from without, to suture and 
reinforce multiple transnational systems of racialisation, labour hierarchy, and 
capital – and ultimately of affection or nonaffection’ (276). 
Klorathy’s narrative is repeatedly interrupted by affective intrusions, by 
atmospheric and psychological disequilibrium of the status quo. The first 
paragraph of the text, a report from Klorathy to Johor, ends with a description of 
Planet Volyen as, like Shikasta, one ‘whose populations seem permanently 
affected by self-destructive dementia’ (SA 11). This anxiety around being ‘affected’ 
continually comes out of Klorathy’s speech. He uses words to connote an original 
meaning that has been lost, unable to think outside the binary of contamination 
and invasion. His language always refers to a lost unity, a coherence of self and 
world and a pure form of existence that might be restored. For Klorathy, the state 
of ‘being affected’ equates to an invasion of one form of existence by another, a 
transgressed boundary. He understands adaptation as the transmission of 
typological characteristics as a result of an invasion or threat. This understanding 
of ‘self and world’ can be thought of as a political and economic one, based on 
the management of discrete social environments. Biological adaptation 
resembles an understanding of political or economic change as incremental and 
gradual over time. At the base of this conception is the static (statistical) ‘type’ 
as a unit of evolutionary change, apparent before the law as a fixed condition. 
 We see this in Klorathy’s encounters with Ormarin and Incent; a breaking 
point occurs when Klorathy himself admits to being affected by the ‘plu-super-
emotionality of recent events’ on Volyen, ending a report to Johor by saying that 
he is taking an opportunity ‘to “dry out”’ (205), again, the implication of an 
original or ideal state of being, an equilibrium that needs to be restored. When 
speaking about the oncoming invasion with Ormarin, Klorathy tries to persuade 
Ormarin to question the relevance of his use of fragments of quasi-Churchillian, 
protectionist and militant verbiage: ‘Rather than submit to the tyrannies of alien 
invaders I will pick up stones from the hillside if need be, and sticks from the 
forest, and fight until death overcomes me!’ (SA 34), a proposal of clannish 
warfare and a declaration of heroic martyrdom as a strategy of defence. 
Klorathy’s counter argument is to dispute the factual basis of Ormarin’s valiant 
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vision, noting the disparity between ‘the fine words’ about sticks and stones, in 
the face of reality of Volyen’s possession of ‘efficient modern weapons’ (SA 34). 
The moment is darkly comic, evoking a history of nationalist resistance to foreign 
invasion in England – ‘we will fight them in the streets’ – employing the gendered 
trope of male patriots as defenders of biological inheritance, economic resources 
and territory reminiscent of Ben Ata in Marriages. Directly addressing Johor, 
Klorathy writes, ‘I am afraid I must report that this was a bad attack’, and says 
that he has had Ormarin ‘confined to the hospital for a few days’ (34). Not only 
does Klorathy take it upon himself to form a diagnosis out of Ormarin’s words, 
but he also prescribes and administers the treatment he deems appropriate. The 
power relation of this exchange means that it is not an inter-responsive 
conversation, but a directed dialogue between patient and doctor in which 
Klorathy can only make one of two decisions: to treat or not to treat. This would 
be opposed to an exchange where both parties are able to listen.  
Klorathy’s treatment refuses to let in Ormarin’s words, to consider the 
significance of their emergence in this particular context, and to reduce his 
statements to catchphrases of history. His decision is not formed by the general 
climate of fear on Volyen, but by an effort to eliminate the possibility of violent 
retaliation as it manifests through Ormarin’s verbal declaration of intention. 
There is no possible outcome to this exchange other than one of the two options 
provided by Klorathy’s medical role. Despite his acknowledgement in the first 
paragraph of his first report that ‘the population’ at large on Volyen is ‘afflicted 
by self-destructive dementia’ (SA 11), this for him is a typological phenomenon – 
that is, a disorder affecting a population in the manner of an invasion – rather 
than atmospheric pressures forming particular characteristics of social relations, 
and a cultural inheritance of a kind of defense aesthetic, based on nation-state 
borders historically demarcated by Canopean expansion (which, as shown, is a 
history that Klorathy repeatedly forgets). He thinks through the invasion of a 
pure realm, rather than understanding this realm as constituted by and 
constituting its milieu. 
 While trying to shock his subjects out of the Rhetorical Disease, Klorathy 
repeatedly uses the rhetorical of external attack when describing what he 
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understands as mental disorder. The euphemisms and colloquialisms he uses to 
describe mental states reveal his assumption of an environment-mind binary. 
This comes through during a later conversation with Ormarin, when Klorathy 
finds him sitting at the top of the hospital ‘gazing out over the desert weeping, 
and in a severe attack of What Is the Point-ism, or the Futility of All Effort’ (SA 
68). The colloquial diagnosis creates an ironic distance that acts as a buffer to 
reciprocal dialogue, devoid of empathy. It prevents Klorathy from asking 
questions about cause by neutralising the implications of Ormarin’s devastation: 
for Klorathy, his behaviour is reducible to the manifestation of a particular 
ailment, and he dismisses any consideration of its cause. He tells Ormarin,  
 
‘Come, take hold of yourself, man!’ I exhorted. ‘Pull yourself together! 
You know quite well the Sirians, or somebody, will attack soon, and 
here you are in such a feeble condition.’ (SA 68) 
 
Striking here is the implied sense of a fractured, male self that requires gathering 
up, the responsibility Klorathy places on Ormarin to ‘take hold’ and ‘pull 
together’ ‘his’ ‘self’, and the dichotomy of feebleness and strength that Klorathy 
sets up in relation to the possibility of a foreign attack. Klorathy’s words gesture 
to a military ethos of stoicism, explicitly male – ‘man!’ Klorathy here plays 
lieutenant to Ormarin’s sergeant, deploying a tough-love morale boost, trying to 
shock Ormarin out of his depression by reminding him of his strategic 
importance while the planet prepares for an attack, correlating ‘taking hold of’ 
oneself with strong (not ‘feeble’) behaviour, and tying these to a reference to 
Ormarin’s gender; falling apart is not the luxury of rational men responsible for 
protecting the (female) territory from plunder and destruction. Klorathy is able 
to acknowledge a form of internal disorder, but for him this is a deviation from 
the status quo of a ‘man’ who takes hold of himself, pulled together, into a 
cohesive unit capable of acting on behalf of protecting sovereign borders.12  
                                                 
12 A number of British WWII propaganda phrases stressed psychological equilibrium as a strategy 
of defence: ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’, ‘Who’s Absent? Is it you?’, ‘Tighten Your Grip!’, ‘They’ve 
got the guts, back ‘em with more metal’, and so on. 
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 The phrase ‘feeble condition’ can be read as a eugenic category; ‘feeble-
mindedness’ was considered by early eugenicists to be a genetic disorder. While 
Klorathy does not describe it as such, his use of ‘feeble’ is still rooted in the sense 
that it is a deviant state from normative mental functioning. As I discussed in 
Chapter One, the promotion of so-called ‘feeblemindedness’ as a genetic trait 
that could be bred out of a population through negative eugenics (in this case, 
voluntary sterilization) split the Eugenics movement in Britain, with figures such 
as Julian Huxley and Lancelot Hogben in favour, and George Bernard Shaw and 
J. B. S. Haldane against it. Nonetheless, the backlash against taking such extreme 
measures to breed out ‘the feebleminded’ was founded not so much in 
questioning the genetic basis of this ‘condition’, but in the implications for 
individual free will. How would the unfit be judged? asked George Bernard Shaw. 
Klorathy’s invocation of a ‘feeble condition’ that might be overcome by ‘taking 
hold of oneself’ and ‘pulling oneself together’ can also be displaced into a wider 
eugenic concern about taking hold of the body politic, and eliminating 
‘feebleness’ for the sake of protecting the general healthcare of a population. That 
is, to have citizens capable of maintaining and defending national borders. There 
is no space in this public sphere of action for internal rupture, but rather only 
cohesion and coherence to general (Canopean) demarcation of sovereign 
territory. 
 By writing Klorathy’s attempted persuasion through what he understands 
as common sense, Lessing highlights the construction of mental stability 
through language, from the imperial centre to the periphery. This does not only 
take the expression of reason opposed to madness (although this is one example), 
but rather plurality opposed to holism. Klorathy perceives Ormarin’s words as 
fragments signifying a deviation or interruption of a prior cohesion. Ormarin 
justifies his depression: a sense of repetition and futility, realising the seemingly 
endless rhythms and logic of imperial expansion, and knowing that resistance 
will mark ‘another example for the history books of a failed enterprise, a 
uselessness, something accomplished in blood and suffering which would have 
been better never attempted’ (SA 68). Klorathy does not engage with Ormarin, 
but takes these declarations as evident of ‘a classic case of this condition’ 
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(namely, Undulant Rhetoric), ‘verbal formulations that are the most easily 
recognized symptoms’ of it (SA 68). He even records the interview for medical 
research, ‘for the use of doctors’ (SA 68). Klorathy’s position here is that of the 
medical observer, who can only read at the level of generality. He cannot risk the 
power relation between doctor and patient, or risk the possibility of treatment.   
 Nonetheless, Klorathy’s impermeability to this condition is not 
guaranteed. He recalls to Johor, having observed Ormarin, a time when ‘I myself 
suffered a prolonged and intense attack of this condition’, which we learn that 
Johor was responsible for treating him out of, and which caused ‘a lot of trouble’ 
(SA 69). We are reminded that between Johor and Klorathy there is a similar 
power relation of doctor and patient as the one that Klorathy keeps attempting 
to impose on his encounters with and treatment of Ormarin and Incent. This 
power relation seems to be a way of shoring himself against the possibility of 
contamination; it is not a situation that Klorathy wants to repeat, given his 
mission on the planet and his responsibility to Johor. At this point, the edges of 
the ideological structure to which Klorathy is also bound, out of which his 
language comes, begin to stand out. He identifies himself as ‘I myself’, echoing 
the repetition of double identification that comes out in his words to Ormarin; 
there is a sense that this condition is characterised by a split, which prompts a 
double articulation of selfhood. When Klorathy tells Ormarin, ‘pull yourself 
together’, the grammar of the sentence identifies the subject twice. The 
imperative, ‘pull [x] together’, is directed towards a ‘you’, and the noun, ‘yourself’, 
refers to both the object and the subject of the sentence. The grammar identifies 
a subject split by an implied distance between imperative and noun. ‘Ormarin, 
pull “Ormarin” together.’ Following this rule, Klorathy’s use of ‘I myself’ is 
similarly split; it is not an emphatic statement or even a confirming or 
confessional one, because Johor – the recipient of the report – already knows the 
tale.  
Klorathy rather is speaking to himself at this moment, or more specifically, 
to a memory of ‘a proud, locked-in melancholy that accompanies the 
contemplation of what must appear to the infant-mind as futility, which is really 
quite pleasurable’ (69). This is a key moment of the text: Klorathy remembers 
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deriving pleasure from this ‘locked-in melancholy’. There is no ambiguity in the 
admission of this pleasure; it exists by and for itself, not to progress the narrative, 
but to actually excuse Ormarin to Johor, on the grounds that Klorathy 
understands – even if he cannot admit it to Ormarin – the pleasure in ‘suffer[ing] 
a prolonged and intense attack of this condition’ (69), or the pleasure of suffering 
the weight of history. This means that when Klorathy admits to being affected 
by the atmosphere on Volyen, it is also a tacit signal of the return of this pleasure.  
 To invoke Benjamin’s description of the flâneur, the pleasure derived from 
‘locked-in melancholy’ also stands for a connection between atmosphere and 
individual, one based on the absorption of a collective state of being affected by 
a series of significant (sign-changing) events, or the psychological ruptures in a 
presumed equilibrium or stasis produced by social change. To respond to a 
realization of repeated traumatic events with a ‘locked-in melancholy’ is not just 
a symptom of self-loathing for one’s individual impotence and the inefficacy of 
resistance (although Klorathy implies this). It is also a translation of collective 
experiences into unconscious semiotic associations. This translation charges 
events of the present with the semiotic configurations of past events. The 
meaning of a collective experience as understood by an individual is felt through 
the affective traces of prior events. This ‘locked-in melancholy’ equates to a 
subject living out of chronological time. There is a pleasure here in the 
disturbance of this linearity. Is this an abdication of responsibility? This 
melancholy does not reduce history to predisposed events, but rather transposes 
the trauma of past horrors onto the present, connecting the individual with the 
weight of destructive forces as experienced by other groups. This is a form of 
experience that enables past events to interrupt the present, not as static blocks 
of time, but as apparitions that form and are formed by – cathected – by the 
affective associations of the individual. 
 When, towards the end of the text, Klorathy writes to Johor that he has 
voluntarily checked himself into the Hospital for Rhetorical Diseases to ‘dry out’, 
it is also an admission of being affected: 
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Since Ormarin is away, I am taking the opportunity to ‘dry out.’ It is 
no good pretending that I have been unaffected by the plu-super-
emotionality of recent events. Incent too feels in need of a respite. 
We shall become voluntary patients in Basic Rhetoric, Withdrawal-
of-All-Stimuli Department. The tall, dim, silent, isolated room in the 
hotel on Volyen is inspired by it. (SA 205) 
 
This is both a cry of desperation and an admission (‘no good pretending’) of 
having succumbed to the pleasure of yielding to pleasure itself (‘plu-super-
emotionality’), akin to the quiet tone of an Anglican missionary succumbing to 
the pagan influence of the tribes he has come to civilise. Klorathy is trying to 
diagnose himself into self-correction. Again, the use of a common colloquial 
phrase, ‘dry out’, draws an analogy between Klorathy’s being affected by ‘plu-
super-emotionality of recent events’ and alcohol addiction; the implication is 
that he is intoxicated with the atmosphere on Volyendesta, and that he needs to 
remove himself to an environment free from intoxicating stimulants.  
Yet Klorathy’s succumbing to the atmosphere on the planet creates a 
temporary connection between Incent and himself, not based on their shared 
Canopean-ness, but on their shared state of being affected. The doctor-patient 
relation is temporarily suspended, and the ‘he’ / ‘I’ dichotomy becomes ‘we’, a 
declaration of collective action and a common goal. This is not an obviously 
political statement in the sense of any simultaneous defection from Canopus, but 
it does signify the vulnerability of Canopean processes of diplomacy and 
intervention, and their susceptibility to environmental influence. Although 
Klorathy’s report suggests that he is trying to resist this, nonetheless this 
resistance is retrospective; being affected seems now to have been unavoidable. 
‘No good pretending’ signifies Klorathy being affected to the level of conscious 
action, shown by the identification and naming of his own lack of immunity to 
the planet’s atmosphere (the possibility of losing hold of ‘him’-‘self’), and his 
decision to check himself into his own rehabilitative facility. Ironic here is the 
certainty of the master-teacher in the transcendence of his lessons over 
individual weaknesses; the reference to the ‘tall, dim, silent, isolated room’ 
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restores the idea of a (Canopean) truth exceeding human frailty, and the a-
temporality of originary structures of the universe/universal. At this moment, 
Incent and he are drawn together by their respective intoxication, but the 
promise of long-term re-signification of this primordial truth is held off by 
Klorathy’s immediate self-correction, and the articulated restoration of 
Canopean universality. 
 
 
Alliances of Intoxication 
 
The toxicity of Shammatian influence interrupts the supremacy of Canopean 
sovereignty, creating temporary alliances that undermine the Canopean project. 
This is comparable to what I called the biosocial ambivalence Ambien II 
encounters in Koshi in The Sirian Experiments. Were Klorathy to take pleasure 
in being affected, he might come to a moment that Chen articulates in her essay 
on toxic animacies. Rather than dismissing, sterilising or abdicating 
acknowledgement of toxic effects on social relations, Chen suggests that 
‘thinking, and feeling, with toxicity invites a recounting of the affectivity and 
relationality – indeed the bonds – of queerness as it is presently theorised’ (265). 
Klorathy and Incent’s temporary alliance can be read here as a queer bond, taking 
‘queerness’ not just as a-heteronormative social relations and thus suspensions 
of the evolutionary-biopolitical imperative to produce offspring via male-female 
intercourse, but more broadly as a bond which disrupts the regular(ised) 
functioning of the public sphere. Their bond is based on the premise of their 
mutual submission to being affected, a submission which necessitates their 
mutual temporary withdrawal from the realm of public affairs, and thus their 
self-imposed temporary leave from Canopean service. They are no longer able to 
work as Canopean functionaries.  
 Chen discusses toxicity as a condition, rather than simply a property of an 
individual or group (272). The affection of and between Klorathy and Incent is 
what Chen calls a ‘queer love’ propelled by toxicity, a potential social relation 
that has been made possible – released – by their shared experience of 
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intoxication (273). This experience moves between them, neither subject nor 
object, but a condition of proximity, of breathing the same air, of exhibiting 
common symptoms. Chen argues that there is a sociality present in the 
‘antisocial’ effects of toxins, which she describes as a ‘reflection on extant 
socialities among us, the queer-inanimate social lives that exist beyond the 
fetish, beyond the animate, beyond the pure clash of human body sex’ (282). She 
understands this as deterritorialisation, threatening interiority or the supposed 
sanctity of a domestic bodily economy (of nation, population, family, individual) 
(267), connected to the threat of loss; toxicity threatens the regulation or stable 
management of the body, and by that measure, intoxicated subjects are allied – 
however temporarily – in the inability to perform self-regulation. This condition 
of toxicity – irreducible to group or individual – makes possible a ‘potentially 
queer exchange’ that ‘effectively risks the implantation of injury’ (Chen 275). 
These effects might be pleasurably harmful, even deathly; they might risk 
damage to the reproductive imperative, or they might circumvent it entirely.  
Klorathy and Incent’s alliance comes from their shared experience of a 
condition already affecting most of the planet; as Klorathy says in the first 
paragraph of the text, the planet is one ‘permanently afflicted by self-destructive 
dementia’ (SA 11), and it is this ‘affliction’ to which he has admitted, temporarily, 
to succumbing. Their shared intoxication marks an alliance – undeclared – with 
those ‘on the underside of industrial “development”’ most likely to be affected by 
the mechanisms of a society based on the maintenance of industrial capital 
supporting a colonial (inter)world system, as Volyen is. The queer bond of their 
intoxication extends out of a reciprocal exchange to a collective mode of being, 
of which they are briefly part. It is an experience of abjection, which brings with 
it the pleasure of affecting and realizing oneself as part of a general atmosphere 
of melancholy. Klorathy’s surface fears concern his potential inability to escape 
this condition; despite this, he knows at some level that ‘being afflicted’ is simply 
a matter of time: ‘no use pretending’, a phrase signifying resignation to the 
inevitable. 
The significance of this moment is further compounded by what 
immediately follows Klorathy’s admission of needing to ‘dry out’: a letter from 
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Ormarin to Klorathy, the only time in the text that a non-Canopean is granted 
direct speech, as opposed to being included in reported speech composed by a 
Canopean agent. Ormarin is writing about the possible invasion of Volyen by 
(Maken) soldiers arriving with wings (on pipisaurs), a species he does not know, 
and asking Klorathy for advice on how to defend themselves against them. By 
the time Klorathy comes to respond to Johor about this letter, an unspecified 
amount of time after his voluntary rehabilitation, it is to make another 
admission: ‘I have been careless, have not taken the trouble to reflect on how the 
PE 70 (Maken) armies must be experienced here’ (SA 206). This again is a crucial 
moment; Klorathy is admitting a lack of shared perspective, not in the sense of 
united vision, but by forgetting the privilege of his knowledge and categorical 
system. The words ‘reflect on’ and ‘experienced’ stand out; these are not 
empirical words, but vague terms relating to contingent social relations and the 
fragility of social equilibrium: a sense of an ethic of care around perception and 
reception, rather than simply a paternalistic set of directions for possible 
(re)action. Klorathy’s intervention so far has been, in his own words, ‘careless’: 
without care for the citizens of the planet, but only for the perpetuation of 
Canopean interest. His intoxication on the planet has disturbed his supposed 
immunity; his new status is not as rogue agent, as this would place too much 
emphasis on Klorathy’s individual psychology. More broadly, this shift in 
Klorathy is part of a general intoxicated labour on Volyen, collective and 
repeated experiences of threat, danger, destruction and displacement. He is 
forced to remember why he is here, and to address the troubling responsibilities 
of his position. 
In this chapter I have focused on the moments of Klorathy’s diagnostic 
interventions, and of interruptions to his sense of himself as a cohesive, ‘pulled 
together’ subject, arguing that his intoxication on Volyen is the implicit 
recognition of a forgotten legacy of Canopean colonial violence. Toxic bonds 
forge queer bonds, undermining the heteronormative imperative of Canopean 
biopolitical governance. This is not a direct process, and Klorathy is not the 
primary focus of the text. Rather, the repeated breaks in the momentum of his 
reports gradually pull away at their credibility, showing Klorathy experiencing 
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the effects of Canopean imperial violence, drawing out the contingency of 
recording history, and the threat of it. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
There are four thematic strands to this thesis which I will briefly reiterate, before 
considering possible routes to developing the triangular disciplinary framework 
developed throughout the thesis (critical theory, materialist history, and science 
and literature) into further research on post-genomic biology in literary and 
cultural studies. The first two themes identify the biopolitical problem 
represented in the novels, and the second two relate to their speculations on 
modes of resistance to this problem: what I have called ‘biosociality’. First, I 
situated the novels in a historical context of debates around the body as a 
biopolitical object, subject to various kinds of labour and energy extraction 
determined by socially-constituted identifications of gender, race, and sexuality; 
second, I identified a critique of post-colonial multiculturalism as continuing a 
system of racialised typology; third, I explored the idea of non-reproductive 
social relations, waste material and contamination as interruptions to the 
biopolitical interventions of a dominant world-system, tying this to 
manifestations of epigenetic change; and fourth, I put forward ‘epigenetic 
poiesis’ as a critical vehicle for considering the representation of biosocial 
complexity and adaptation in literary and cultural texts, as well as for moving 
between biopolitical and biosocial modes of living. Throughout, I maintained a 
conceptual distinction between a reductionist framework and one of emergence 
and complexity. This has enabled me to distinguish between epigenetic 
experimentation as an alternative essentialism, and epigenetic thinking as an 
epistemological interruption to the presumed immutability of coded or 
expressed DNA as a fixed blueprint for life itself.  
 A central question that I have explored alongside these four themes is how 
the novels represent inheritance as an activity of continual interpretation. How 
does memory function differently according to a character or group’s position in 
the world-system? How are anomalies, errors, losses, and waste material 
incorporated into or silenced from the everyday functioning of the body, 
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population or society? How do seemingly immutable inheritances (DNA code, 
socio-political organisation) become altered by moments of crisis? Does 
adaptation mean that new elements come into the system, or is it based on a 
continuous process of interpretation in response to changed environments, 
which – in both a genetic and cultural sense – can extend past the death of the 
individual (whether this is social or physical death)? How does a cultural 
inheritance inflict violence on bodies whose bio-energy is extracted through 
social conventions, enabling the smooth functioning of governance, and how 
does this violence affect biological inheritance? How can states of ambivalence, 
intoxication and contamination interrupt, negotiate with, or resist an imperial 
legacy, and the eradication of memory as a technique of maintaining sovereign 
supremacy? These are questions I have addressed in my readings of the novels. 
 In Chapter One, I laid out a history of eugenics alongside imperial racial 
typology in readings of Memoirs of a Survivor and Shikasta. I argued that reading 
these novels together makes it possible to plot a historical transition from a 
colonial project of racial purity based on disciplinary techniques of enclosing 
‘race’ as genetic, to a post-colonial multiculturalism in the core that aids the 
institution of neo-imperial white supremacy, and that this goes across the 
political spectrum. This set up the political stakes of the thesis, in the sense that 
biopolitical violence and extraction cannot be isolated to one system or social 
vision, but that instrumentalising the body as a tool for general improvement 
(whatever ideology, whatever the end-goal) ultimately refers not to a projected 
future, but to an idealised origin. Just as J. B. S. Haldane envisioned a society of 
little Haldanes, so too do the Canopeans and Sirians wish to mould the 
inhabitants of their territories in their own image.  
In Chapter Two, I read The Sirian Experiments as a critique of Soviet 
biological experiments conducted in the name of social progress and resource 
extraction. I argued that Lessing extends Trofim Lysenko’s vernalisation 
technique for conditioning plants’ inheritance to experiments on ‘animal’ 
subjects, focusing on the Lombi experiment. I introduced ‘epigenetic poiesis’ as 
a term for the representation of emergent forms of biological inheritance in 
literary and cultural texts, arguing that this can be used to describe the Lombis’ 
 238 
resistant bodily ambivalence to the Sirians’ attempted instrumentalisation of 
them. I moved away from the Soviet example to draw a connection between 
Ambien II’s description of poverty and survival among the trading community of 
Koshi, and contemporary scholarship on living ambivalently in contemporary 
world cities. Through this example, I showed how chance encounters and 
unforeseen events do not just disrupt but also define modes of reproduction and 
survival through the biosocial ambivalence of migrant residents in Koshi, pulling 
away from the determinism of Sirian (and Canopean) biopolitical governance.  
In Chapter Three, I developed the theme of ambivalence as an 
interruption to direct biopolitical imperatives in my reading of The Marriages 
Between Zones Three, Four and Five, arguing that a queer critique of Foucault’s 
writing on biopolitics and Marx’s theory of labour makes visible the specific 
violence of reproductive labour under capitalism. Following Al Ith’s estranged 
movement between the zones, I argue that Al Ith’s queer arc destabilises the 
founding premise of reprosexuality across both zones. Rather than reading Zone 
Three as a progressive feminist utopia, I suggest instead that it resembles a 
Spencerian utopia reliant on endogamous reproduction, neo-Fascist in its border 
controls. Lessing subverts the ruse of female leadership, showing how this is 
always subject to implicitly patriarchal imperial governance. A queer reading of 
the text makes perceptible the way in which, in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s 
words, ‘the female body is seen as permeable [in] perhaps the most basic gesture 
of violence’ (26), and, to follow Silvia Federici, how ‘new reproductive 
technologies […] reduce women to wombs’ (Caliban 17), making the conventions 
of heteronormativity strange and revealing their violence. This happens through 
the reconfiguration of social conventions, or signs, which produce moments of 
runaway or disequilibrium, from which Al Ith stops returning. Lessing uses the 
speculative possibility of sf to throw Al Ith out of the societies of the novel, into 
an unknown realm. I developed the concept of epigenetic poiesis as a biosemiotic 
event, in with biosocial relations are rearranged through the requirement of 
interpretation, through what Szasz calls protolanguage.  
In Chapter Four, I read The Making of the Representative for Planet 8 as a 
fable of peasant survival, and a narrative of peripheral speculation on the 
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response of a genetically-engineered population to extreme climate change. I 
suggested that the Planet 8ers’ adaptation to their changed environment 
encompasses processes of biological, perceptual and social change, placing 
epigenetic poiesis alongside Eugene Thacker’s notion of ‘extrinsic’ or ‘peripheral 
life’: ‘life that is perpetually going outside itself’ (‘Biophilosophy’ 134). Reading 
the ice age as an analogy for the effects of a global economic crisis on peripheral 
nations, I connected this ‘vital politics’ of extrinsic life to the so-called African 
Crisis during the 1970s, after the abandonment of development initiatives in 
decolonial African nations following the Nixon Shock. In a speculative key, 
Planet 8 imagines possible responses to such shocks, translating them as what I 
identified as epigenetic changes.  
In Chapter Five, I shifted the axis between biology, history and metaphor 
to consider the function of interruptions in The Sentimental Agents of the Volyen 
Empire. By setting up a conflict between imperial intervention and chance 
interruption, Sentimental Agents explores the effects of modernity through its 
characters’ intoxication with repressed imperial histories of violence. Preventing 
the spread of contamination involves the capture and quarantine of intoxicated 
subjects, which I read alongside Lessing’s interest in the anti-psychiatry 
movement, and the representation of madness as a condition of modernity in 
her novels from this period. Sentimental Agents continues the critique of 
multiculturalism begun in Shikasta, by showing how what Dean Spade and Kevin 
Willse call ‘multicultural imperialism’ works to justify neo-imperial surveillance 
and control on the grounds of humanitarian intervention. The final novel shows 
Canopean power slip away, not through any radical overturning, but through the 
incremental manifestation of imperial decay. In this sense, Sentimental Agents 
ends where I began my analysis: in the rooms of wasted empire on the other side 
of the wall in Memoirs.  
By the time Lessing writes Canopus in Argos, the Soviet Union has long 
ceased functioning for her as the manifestation of a desirable political alternative 
to the West. I have argued that the competitive relationship between Canopus 
and Sirius, with Sirius repeatedly positioned as a developmentally lacking, 
echoes Cold War competition between the Euro-US and the USSR throughout 
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the course of the twentieth century. Given that the texts appear in the final 
decade of the Soviet regime, I read the dissolution of Sirian oligarchy in The 
Sirian Experiments, and their unfulfilled, last-ditch proposal to invade 
Volyendesta in Sentimental Agents, trying to initiate a proxy war with Canopus, 
as an analogy for the breakdown of the Soviet Union. However, the real object of 
interest for her is Canopus, which I have argued is a fictional rendering of post-
colonial Western imperialism in the guise of liberal multiculturalism, which 
adheres to nineteenth century racial typology.   
I have argued that tackling this history in speculative fiction, rather than 
realism, allows Lessing to extend the scale of spatio-temporal global politics into 
a long history, not reducible to hundreds but to millions of years, as well as to 
represent the magnitude of the cost of life that the machinations and 
manipulations of Canopean and Sirian imperialism involve. This is also a way of 
contrasting socio-political, generational or genealogical time with geological and 
evolutionary time. It enables an exploration of the possibility of new and adapted 
forms coming into these speculative worlds, and to suspend the category of 
human experience in favour of a complex and flexible rendering of interactions. 
Other novels, such as Briefing for a Descent into Hell (1971), The Fifth Child (1988) 
and Ben, in the World (2000), also explore themes of pre-historical forms 
emerging in the present, psychological ‘space’ and the question of social 
determinations of normal physiological and psychological criteria, but I have 
focused on Memoirs and Canopus in Argos because they mark Lessing’s move 
into parallel worlds – dystopian, futuristic, utopian, extraterrestrial – as a way of 
understanding and reimagining some of the dynamics of our own.  
By constructing the series as a collection of archives, Lessing plays with 
the ‘realism’ of the historical text. The reports of Johor, Klorathy and Ambien II 
(and, peripherally, Incent) are supposed to function as a ‘fact’ for the implied 
Canopean reader – specifically, ‘first-year students of Canopean rule’ (12). The 
contingency of historical record is staged here, represented as immutable 
documentation, while being repeatedly undermined and contested by the events 
of the narrative outside the control of the colonial agents. I have read this 
speculative representation of materialist history as analogous to debates in 
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genetics contemporary to the novels about the supposed immutability of DNA 
as a blueprint for the organism, itself a kind of archive, and the way in which 
epigenetics and post-genomic research offer a view of the genome as much more 
responsive and flexible than the Central Dogma allows. Weaving historical 
analogy and biological metaphor, Lessing explores attempts to catch and capture 
the archive of ‘life itself’ by governing powers – through experiments and eugenic 
practices – and their repeated frustration. In her space fiction, Lessing seems 
more concerned with how – in an uncertain world, far more unpredictable than 
humans might like – the vast complexity of life itself might offer potential 
responses far more intricate and obscure than current thought might allow.  
Throughout Lessing’s space fiction, the metaphysical question of origin is 
decentred into the field of interpretative activity. The Canopeans have based 
their cosmic ontology on a source, from which the rest should follow, but the 
fact that – in practice – it does not, and that life itself cannot be reduced to an 
origin from which everything else is built, is reiterated repeatedly by the ongoing 
activity of interpretation. Despite their attempts to institute utopia, both socially 
and biologically, they are constantly beset by unforeseeable events with 
incalculable consequences. They appear to be fighting a losing battle. Moreover, 
in Shikasta, The Sirian Experiments and Sentimental Agents, the form of the 
novels shifts the reader’s attention away from the imperial narrators to 
alternative discourses, often in the silences of others, which show up the 
unreliability of the agents’ attempts to represent ‘fact’. Along these lines, I have 
argued that the series builds up to and away from The Making of the 
Representative for Planet 8, speculative fiction making possible the recording of 
an alternative discourse – or what I have called a peripheral speculation, 
constructed at the limits of life itself. 
I have analysed epigenetics in Lessing’s space fiction in two ways: first, as 
an epistemological alternative to genetic reductionism, and second, as an 
analogy for considering the roles of chance and creativity in life itself. The 
principle vehicle of my critique has been what I have called ‘epigenetic poiesis’, 
which I defined as the representation of emergence out of the habitual and 
coded, while at the same time destabilising ‘the biological’ as a purely material 
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category or observable effects. Epigenetic poiesis makes it possible to discuss a 
theory of living laid out in literary and cultural texts that is not restricted to 
differentiated spheres of the political, social, economic and biological, but in 
which all of these realms of experience can be seen as altering and affecting 
change and inheritance. It is a way of describing the estrangement from one state 
to another. The particular innovation of Lessing’s space fiction is that she works 
through this estrangement – a general characteristic of sf, and fiction more 
generally – by both estranging her readers from a cultural dogma around genetic 
inheritance and its attendant racisms, and by writing (genetic) change as itself a 
continual process of estrangement, the work of interpretation that continues 
past the point of conception, through which – by chance – other ways of being 
emerge.   
 Future work would develop this critical vehicle more broadly, in a 
comparative study of evolution by chance in modern literature and culture, and 
outline a transnational perspective. Starting with contextualising Jean Baptiste 
Lamarck’s development of his theory of the inheritance of acquired characters in 
the emergence of public science in the early years of the French Republic, it 
would trace a literary and cultural history of ‘creative evolution’ as a belief-
system, retaining Henri Bergson’s insistence on the agency of living beings 
(rather than their passive evolutionary role), while suspending Lamarckian and 
Bergsonian teleology for Darwinian stochism. It would incorporate studies of the 
writing of biology in Soviet sf, and in Afrofuturism. It would offer a more 
thorough account of Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic semiotic in literature and 
culture, and its current popularity through biosemiotics, drawing on scholarship 
on pragmatism and literature. This would, in Giles Gunn’s words, ‘explor[e] the 
place that each similarly accords the imagination as an instrument both of 
knowing and of making’ (41). Pragmatism, in the vein of Peirce, offers a 
philosophical engagement with the natural and physical sciences – that is, with 
material culture – that provides tools for developing an interdisciplinary 
framework for working between literary and material culture. This framework 
would enable analysis on the imaginative and unpredictable formation of belief-
systems across disciplinary boundaries of philosophy, literature and the sciences, 
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rather than seeking to determine a general and reducible truth common within 
all of them.  
 A point of critical intersection for future work would be climate change 
literature, or ‘cli-fi’. Some of my arguments here have been based around the 
question of adaptation in moments of rapid climate change, which I have 
analysed as an analogy for economic and political crises. However, taking the 
prevailing concern with climate literally, Lessing’s space fiction can be read as an 
early intervention on the question of what is to be done in a rapidly-changing 
world ecology, where uneven socio-political development sets a precedent for 
the uneven way in which climate change is affecting different populations. How 
is biological adaptation registered in texts on climate change? Is there a 
catalogue of survival not just restricted to changing practices, but which also 
considers biological responses?  For the sake of developing the theoretical 
argument about epigenetic poiesis through these texts, there has not been space 
to engage more fully with ecocritical theory, such as Michel Serres’s concept of a 
‘natural contract’ (1990) and Jason W. Moore’s formulation of ‘world-ecology’ in 
Capitalism in the Web of Life (2015). This would be particularly relevant for my 
reading of Planet 8 in Chapter Four. Future work would include and build on this 
field of study, drawing together epigenetic arguments about adaptation and 
environment made here to ecocritical perspectives.  
 Contemporary writing on biology in sf registers anxieties around new 
biotechnologies of eugenics, surveillance and warfare. Joan Slonczewski and 
Michael Levy note, 
 
In post-millennial sf, the band plays on for genetic engineers, with our 
breakthroughs in human cloning and stem cell research. Yet it also 
leaves us fearful of biological warfare, and wondering how our moral 
traditions of the past millennia will survive the technological 
challenges of this one. (185) 
 
To take one example, genetic mapping as a security measure uses imperial 
cartography to identify and map groups distinguished as populations via 
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geography and anthropology. Genetic mapping promises to make invisible 
threats transparent, so that, for example, an Iraqi claiming to be a Syrian can 
show up at an EU border crossing. The quiet, decade-long hoarding of biometric 
data in Afghanistan and Iraq by the US military, which Iraqis ‘may be able to 
access via the US embassy in Baghdad’, but which may or may not have been 
gifted/sold to national and international security institutions around the world, 
is one example. Healthcare and security are bound through biological idealism 
to what Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas call ‘political economies of hope’. They 
argue that biological citizenship is ‘a hopeful domain of activity, one that 
depends upon and intensifies the hope that the science of the present will bring 
about cures or treatments in the near future’ (452). In the case of genetic 
mapping, hope manifests through a general promise to secure an ostensibly 
transparent, legislated globe against hidden sources of contamination by making 
it visible and hoarding its information. Another theoretical intervention here 
would be Bruno Latour’s writing on the production of scientific knowledge in 
modernity, with regard to contemporary warzones and border crossings as new 
frontlines for the scientific laboratory. 
 These economies of hope are speculative, relying on the promise of a 
future that may or may not arrive, and the faith that new technologies will be 
used to benefit human life, rather than cause further problems. By exploring how 
scientific knowledge and biotechnologies have crept into governance during the 
modern period, Lessing’s space fiction stands as a caution against this hope, 
insisting on the way in which life itself tends to escape the boundaries assigned 
to it by technology. Exploring speculative technologies in the realm of 
speculative fiction, Lessing is able to show how, often, scientific knowledge 
becomes irrelevant, part of its own waste material. This is neither to negate the 
imaginative possibilities of science, or its importance, and nor is it symptomatic 
of a Luddite technophobia. Rather, Lessing draws us to the question of anomaly: 
how does the reduction of experience to the merely calculable fence off 
difference as exception, and how is this reduction continually interrupted by the 
vast flexibility of living systems? 
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To invoke a vital question asked by Hillary Rose and Stephen Rose, ‘who 
benefits’ from overlooking, not looking into, or ignoring the complexity of life 
itself, in favour of a reductionist account of DNA metaphors, ‘hard-wiring, 
Darwinian natural selection and evolution’ (276)? They write, 
 
This deference to the determining authority of the life sciences 
spreads [to] philosophy, art, ethics, sociology, politics and law 
[which] all feel the need to position themselves for or against its 
claims. Does identity lie in the genes, the neurons, or the Pleistocene 
parts? Has the neoliberal self arrived, demanding that that 
Promethean promises of regenerative medicine deliver? (278) 
 
Lessing’s space fiction anticipates the arrival of the neoliberal subject as a 
speculative biopolitical construction, and a contemporary manifestation of 
interwar transhumanism. The novels situate this history in the modern legislation 
of humanity according to racial typologies, in which the progress of the liberal 
subject is conditional on the exclusion, subjugation and exploitation of others. 
Complicity in these transhumanist ambitions is far-reaching, by no means 
restricted to contemporary conservative and fascist ideology of racial and/or 
national purity. Privatised systems of healthcare have become a transnational 
standard, which will continue to exacerbate the uneven course of global 
development into the twenty first century.  
 Lessing’s space fiction offers an alternative economy of hope. Canopus 
rises, but it also falls. The Planet 8ers come to a new understanding of themselves, 
unmoored from their epistemological and genetic programming by Canopus. Can 
engaging creatively with vital politics engender new kinds of ethical relations 
between humans and non-humans? Is a different version of the subject arising 
out of post-genomic knowledge, and how do literary and cultural texts register 
this shift, across art, media, film and TV? Crucially, how might the possible state 
regulation and legislation of challenges to reductionism be anticipated and 
circumvented? These are some questions that a broader consideration of 
bioeconomies and their challenges in the post-genomic context would address. 
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 I have offered a series of readings on Lessing’s space fiction – from 
Memoirs to Sentimental Agents – by suspending together what I read as their 
materialist history, theoretical and philosophical considerations, and their 
translation of scientific debates around evolution and inheritance in literary form. 
These readings have focused on the novels’ speculative constructions of the 
‘human’ subject out of the complexity of life itself. These readings are an 
intervention in previous scholarship on the novels, and Lessing studies more 
broadly, and I hope will contribute to an emerging field of research on epigenetics 
and literature. 
 247 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
DORIS LESSING 
 
A Small Personal Voice: Essays, Reviews, Interviews, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1974. 
Ben, in the World. London: Flamingo, 2000. 
Briefing for a Descent into Hell. London: Panther, 1971. 
Memoirs of a Survivor. London: Vintage, 1988 [1974]. 
Prisons We Choose To Live Inside. London: Jonathan Cape, 1986. 
Shikasta. London: Granada, 1980 [1979]. 
The Fifth Child. London: Flamingo, 1993. 
The Four-Gated City. London: Granada, 1969. 
The Golden Notebook. London: Fourth Estate, 2013 [1962].  
The Good Terrorist. London: Fourth Estate, 2013 [1985]. 
The Grass is Singing. London: Fourth Estate, 2013 [1950]. 
The Making of the Representative for Planet 8. London: Flamingo, 1981. 
The Marriages Between Zones Three, Four and Five. London: Flamingo, 1981. 
The Sentimental Agents in the Volyen Empire. London: Flamingo, 1983. 
The Sirian Experiments. London: Flamingo, 1980. 
The Wind Blows Away Our Words. London: Picador, 1987. 
Walking in the Shade: Volume Two of my Autobiography, 1949-1962, London: 
Flamingo, 1998. 
 
OTHER WORKS 
Acar, Murat, Mettetal, Jerome. T. and van Oudenaarden, Alexander. ‘Stochastic 
Switching as a Survival Strategy in Fluctuating Environments.’ Nature 
Genetics 40 (2008): 471-475. 
Adams, Mark B. ‘Last Judgment: The Visionary Biology of J. B. S. Haldane,’ 
Journal of the History of Biology 33 (2000): 57-491. 
 248 
Allen, Elizabeth, et al. ‘Against “Sociobiology.”’ The New York Review of Books. 
August 1975. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1975/11/13/against-
sociobiology/ Accessed April 18 2017. 
Apter, Emily. Against World Literature: The Politics of Translatability. New York: 
Verso, 2003.  
Aranova, Elena, Baker, Karen, and Oreskes, Naomi. ‘Big Science and Big Data in 
Biology: From the International Geophysical Year through the 
International Biological Program to the Long Term Ecological Research 
(LTER) Network, 1957-Present.’ Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 
40.2 (2010): 183-224. 
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1998 [1958]. 
Arrighi, Giovanni. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of 
Our Time. London: Verso, 2009. 
---. ‘The African Crisis: World Systemic and Regional Aspects.’ New Left Review 
15 (2002): 5-36. 
Avery, John. Progress, Poverty and Population, London and Portland, Or.: Frank 
Cass, 1997. 
Ball, Philip. ‘In Retrospect: Brave New World.’ Nature 503 (2013): 338-339. 
Barbieri, Marcello. ‘Life is Semiosis: The Biosemiotic View of Nature.’ Cosmos 
and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 4.1-2 (2008): 29-
51. 
Barnard, Alan. Anthropology and the Bushman. Oxford: Berg, 2007. 
Baruch, Elaine Hoffman. Women, Love, and Power: Literary and Psychoanalytic 
Perspectives. New York: New York University Press, 1991. 
Bashford, Alison, and Levine, Philippa. [eds.], The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Eugenics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Bateson, Gregory. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballantine, 1972.  
 249 
Bauer, Susanne. ‘Mutations in Soviet public health science: post-Lysenko 
medical genetics, 1969-1991.’ Studies in the History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 47.1 (2014): 163-72. 
---. ‘Population Genetics, Cybernetics of Difference, and Pasts in the Present: 
Soviet and post-Soviet maps on Human Variation.’ History of the Human 
Sciences 28.5 (2015): 146-167. 
Benjamin, Andrew (ed). Walter Benjamin and Art. London: Continuum, 2005. 
Benjamin, Walter. Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. 
Trans. Harry Zohn. London: Verso, 1997. 
---. Illuminations. Trans. Harry Zohn. London: Pimlico, 1999.  
Bennett, Jane. ‘The Agency of Assemblages and the North American Blackout.’ 
Public Culture 17.3 (2005): 445-465. 
Beran, Dale. ‘4Chan: The Skeleton Key to the Rise of Trump.’ Medium. Feb 14 
2017. https://medium.com/@DaleBeran/4chan-the-skeleton-key-to-the-
rise-of-trump-624e7cb798cb Accessed March 4 2017. 
Berger, John. ‘Historical Afterword to the Into Their Labours Trilogy.’ In: 
Landscapes. Tom Overton (ed.). London: Verso, 2016. 186-202. 
Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. London: Dover, 2003 [1907]. 
Bethell, Tom. ‘Against Sociobiology.’ First Things. January 2001. 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2001/01/against-sociobiology 
Accessed April 18 2017. 
Birney, Ewan. ‘Why I’m sceptical about the idea of genetically inherited trauma.’ 
Guardian. September 11 2015. 
www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2015/sep/11/why-im-sceptical-about-
the-idea-of-genetically-inherited-trauma-epigenetics Accessed March 27 
2017.  
Butler, Judith. Frames of War. London: Verso, 2009. 
---. Precarious Life. London: Verso, 2003. 
Cacho, Lisa Marie. Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization 
of the Unprotected. New York: New York University Press, 2012. 
 250 
Caplan, Alfred. The Sociobiology Debate: Readings on Ethical and Scientific 
Issues. New York: Harper and Row, 1985.  
Césaire, Aimé. Notebook of a Return to a Native Land. Trans. and Ed. Clayton 
Eshleman and Annette Smith. Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan Poetry, 2001 
[1939]. 
Chattopadhyay, Kunal. ‘The Rise and Fall of Environmentalism in the early Soviet 
Union.’ Climate and Capitalism. November 2014. 
http://climateandcapitalism.com/2014/11/03/rise-fall-environmentalism-
early-soviet-union/ Accessed January 20 2017.  
Chen, Mel. ‘Toxic Animacies, Inanimate Affections.’ GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian 
and Gay Studies 17.2-3 (2011): 265-286. 
Chennells, Anthony. ‘Lessing’s Rhodesian Stories.’ In: Sprague, 1990. 17-40. 
---. ‘Postcolonialism and Doris Lessing’s Empires’. Doris Lessing Studies, 21:2 
(2001): 4-11.  
Clinton, Hillary. ‘Remarks in Recognition of International Human Rights Day’. 
Speech. Geneva, Switzerland, December 6, 2011.  
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/belize/231771/PDFs/Remarks%20in%20Reco
gnition%20of%20International%20Human%20Rights%20Day.pdf 
Accessed online April 10 2017. 
Coleman, Nathaniel. ‘Eugenics: The Academy’s Complicity.’ Times Higher 
Education. October 2014.  
 https://www.timeshighereducation.com/comment/opinion/eugenics-the-
academys-complicity/2016190.article Accessed April 18 2017. 
Comay, Rebecca. ‘Resistance and Repetition.’ Research in Phenomenology 45.2 
(2015): 237-266. 
Cox, Murray, and Theilgaard, Alice. Mutative Metaphors in Psychotherapy: The 
Aeolian Mode. London: Tavistock Publications, 1987. 
Darwin, Charles. The Origin of Species, and The Voyage of the Beagle. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2003 [1859].  
Dawkins, Richard. The Blind Watchmaker. New York: Norton & Company, 1986.  
---. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990 [1976]. 
 251 
De Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics. Trans. Wade Baskin. Ed. 
Perry Meisel and Haun Saussy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011 
[1959].  
DeJong-Lambert, William. The Cold War Politics of Genetic Research: An 
Introduction to the Lysenko Affair. New York: Springer, 2013.  
Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987. 
Deleuze, Gilles. ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control.’ October 59 (1992): 3-7. 
Derrida, Jacques. Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction. Trans. 
John P. Leavey. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1978 
[1962].  
---. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976.  
---. Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Nass. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 
Di Pippo, Alexander. ‘The Concept of Poiesis in Heidegger’s An Introduction to 
Metaphysics.’ Thinking Fundamentals, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows 
Conferences, Vol. 9. Vienna 2000  
 
Diski, Jenny. ‘Doris and Me.’ London Review of Books 37.1 (2015): 21-23.  
Dronomraju, K. R. Haldane’s Daedalus Revisited, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995. 
Düttmann, Alexander. The Memory of Thought: An Essay on Heidegger and 
Adorno. London: Continuum, 2002. 
Eldredge, Niles, and Gould, Stephen Jay. ‘Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative 
to Phyletic Gradualism.’ In: T. J. M. Schopf (Ed.) Models in Paleobiology. 
San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper and Co., 1973. 82-115. 
Eliot, T. S. Collected Poems 1909-1962. London: Faber and Faber, 2002. 
Fahim, Shadia. Doris Lessing: Sufi Equilibrium and the Form of the Novel. London: 
St. Martins Press, 1994. 
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Trans. Richard Philcox. London: 
Penguin, 2001 [1963]. 
 252 
Federici, Silvia. Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive 
Accumulation. New York: Autonomedia, 2004.  
Fisher, Mark. Capitalist Realism. London: Zero, 2009. 
Fisher, Ronald A. The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013 [1930]. 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan 
Sheridan. London: Penguin, 1977.  
---. Society Must Be Defended. Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003. 
---. The History of Sexuality, Vol. I. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon, 
1978. 
Fox Keller, Evelyn. A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara 
McClintock. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1983.  
---. ‘From Gene Action to Responsive Genome.’ Nurturing Genetics Symposium. 
University of Leeds, Leeds (2014). Public Lecture. 
---. The Century of the Gene. Harvard, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000.  
---. The Mirage of a Space between Nature and Nurture, Durham & London: Duke 
University Press, 2010. 
Fracchia, Joseph, and Lewontin, Richard. ‘Does Culture Evolve?’ History and 
Theory 38.4 (1999): 52-78. 
Gaonkar, Dilip P (ed.). Alternative Modernities. Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
University Press, 2012. 
Galton, Francis. ‘Eugenics, its definition, scope and aims.’ Sociological Papers 1 
(1904): 43-99. 
---. Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and its Consequences. New York: 
Amherst, 2006 [1869]. 
Garner, Steve. ‘A Moral economy of whiteness: behaviours, belonging and 
Britishness.’ Ethnicities 12.4 (2012): 445–464 
Gilroy, Paul. There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack. London: Routledge, 1987. 
Glover, Jayne. ‘The Metaphor of the Horse in Doris Lessing’s The Marriages 
Between Zones Three, Four and Five: An ecofeminist question?’ Current 
Writing: Text and Reception in Southern Africa. April 2006. 
 253 
Godwin, William. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on 
General Virtue and Happiness, Vol. I, London: G. G. J. and J. Robinson, 1793. 
Gould, Stephen Jay. The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Gould, Stephen Jay, et al. ‘The Politics of Sociobiology.’ The New York Review of 
Books. May 1979. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1979/05/31/the-
politics-of-sociobiology/ Accessed April 18 2017. 
Gould, Stephen Jay, and Lewontin, Richard. ‘The Spandrels of San Marco and the 
Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme.’ 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B 205.1161 (1979): 581-598. 
Graham, Loren. Lysenko’s Ghost. Harvard University Press, 2016. Kindle Edition. 
Gunn, Giles. ‘Is There a Pragmatist Approach to Literature?’ Complutense Journal 
of English Studies 22 (2014): 41-49. 
Hacking, Ian. The Taming of Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990. 
Hague, Angela. Fiction, Intuition, and Creativity: Studies in Brontë, James, Woolf 
and Lessing. Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
2003. 
Haldane, J. B. S.  ‘A Mathematical Theory of Natural and Artificial Selection, Part 
I: Of Natural and Artificial Selection.’ Transactions of the Cambridge 
Philosophical Society 23 (1934): 19-41. 
---. ‘A Mathematical Theory of Natural and Artificial Selection, Part X. Some 
Theorems on Artificial Selection.’ Genetics 19.5 (1934): 412-429. 
---. ‘Possibilities of Evolution.’ In: The Inequality of Man. London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1932. 78-96.  
---. Possible Worlds. London: Chatto and Windus, 1929. 
---. Science and Everyday Life, Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, 1945 [1939]. 
Hamilton, Andy. ‘Against the Belief Model of Delusion.’ In: Reconceiving 
Schizophrenia. Man Cheung Chung, K. W. M. Fulford & George Graham 
(eds.).  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 217-234. 
Hanson, Clare. ‘A Catastrophic Universe: Lessing, Posthumanism and Deep 
History.’ In: Brazil, Sergeant and Sperlinger, 2016. 164-180. 
 254 
---. Eugenics, Literature and Culture in Postwar Britain. London: Routledge, 2013. 
Print. 
---. ‘Epigenetics, Plasticity and Identity in Jackie Kay’s Red Dust Road.’ Textual 
Practice 29.3 (2015): 433-452. 
---. ‘Reproduction, Genetics, and Eugenics in the Fiction of Doris Lessing.’ 
Contemporary Women’s Writing 1:1/2. December 2007. 171-184. 
Haraway, Donna. When Species Meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2008. 
Heidegger, Martin. Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1971. 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life 
of Signs. Trans. Jesper Hoffmeyer and Donald Favareau. Ed. Donald 
Favareau, Scranton, PA.: University of Scranton Press, 2008. Print. 
Huxley, Aldous. Brave New World. London: Longman, 1991 [1932]. 
Huxley, Julian. ‘Knowledge, Morality, and Destiny.’ Psychiatry 14.2 (1951): 129-151.  
---. Memories: Vols I & II, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978. 
Ignatiev, Noel. How the Irish Became White. London: Routledge, 1995. 
---. ‘The Point is not to Interpret Whiteness but to Abolish It.’ Racetraitor.org. 
April 1997. http://racetraitor.org/abolishthepoint.pdf Accessed April 10 
2017. 
Jablonka, Eve, and Lamb, Marion. Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, 
Behavioral, Symbolic and Epigenetic Variation in the History of Life. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005.  
James, Edward (ed). The Cambridge Companion to Science Fiction. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Kevles, Daniel. J. In the Name of Eugenics, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. 
Kingston, Christina, Irikana, Jackson, Kingston, Kato Gogo. ‘The Impacts of the 
World Bank and IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes on Africa: The 
Case Study of Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.’ Sacha 
Journal of Policy and Strategic Studies 1.2. 110-130.  
Kirksey, S. Eben, and Helmreich, Stefan. ‘The Emergence of Multispecies 
Ethnography.’ Cultural Anthropology 25.4. 545-576. 
 255 
Laclau, Ernesto. and Mouffe, Chantal. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards 
a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso, 2001 [1985]. 
Laing, R. D. The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness. London: 
Penguin, 2010 [1955]. 
Laughlin, Robert. A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom 
Down. New York: Basic Books, 2005. 
Le Guin, Ursula. ‘Doris Lessing’s First Sci-Fi Book Reads Like a Debut Novel.’ New 
Republic. October 1979. https://newrepublic.com/article/115631/doris-
lessing-shikasta-reviewed-ursula-le-guin Accessed April 18 2015. 
---. ‘Doris Lessing’s Parochial Science Fiction.’ New Republic. March 29 1980. 
https://newrepublic.com/article/115629/doris-lessing-marriages-between-
zones-three-four-and-five Accessed April 18 2017. 
Levine, Philippa. ‘Anthropology, Colonialism and Eugenics,” in: Bashford and 
Levine. 43-61. 
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1689]. 
Lotman, Mihhail. ‘Peirce, Saussure and the Foundations of Semiotics.’ Sun-Yat 
Sen Journal of Humanities 16 (2003). Print. 
Lowe, Celia. ‘Viral Clouds: Becoming H5N1 in Indonesia.’ Cultural Anthropology 
25.4 (2010): 625-649. 
Lynch, Tom, Glotfelty, Cheryl, Armbruster, Karla. The Bioregional Imagination: 
Literature, Ecology and Place. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 
2012. 
Lysenko, Trofim D. Heredity and Its Variability. Trans. Theodosius Dobzhansky. 
London: King’s Crown Press, 1946. 
Malthus, Thomas R. An Essay on the Principle of Population, or, A View of Its Past 
and Present Effects, Volume II, Fourth Edition, London: J. Johnson, 1807. 
Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich. ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party.’ In:  
Tucker Robert M (ed). The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: Norton, 1978. 469-
500. 
Marx, Karl. Capital: Critique of Political Economy Vol. I. Trans. Ben Fowkes. 
London: Penguin, 1990 [1867]. 
 256 
Maslen, Elizabeth. Doris Lessing. Plymouth: Northcote House, 1990. Print. 
Mayr, Ernst. ‘Haldane’s Daedalus.’ In: Dronomraju (ed.). 83-4. 
Massey, Doreen. Space, Place, and Gender. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1994. 
Mazumdar, Pauline. Eugenics, Genetics and Human Failings, London: Routledge, 
1994. 
McClintock, Barbara. ‘The Significance of Responses of the Genome to 
Challenge.’ In: Nobel Lectures, Physiology or Medicine 1981-1990. Tore 
Frängsmyr and Jan Lindsten (eds). Singapore: World Scientific, 1993: 180-
199. 
McKittrick, Katherine. Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human As Praxis. Durham, N. 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 2014. 
Merrell, Floyd. ‘Semiotics and Literary Studies.’ The Commens Encyclopaedia: 
The Digital Encyclopaedia of Peirce Studies, New Edition. Ed. M. Bergman 
and J. Queiroz (2002). Web. 1 June 2015. 
Mkandawire, P. Thandika, and Soludo, Charles C. (eds). African Voices on 
Structural Adjustment. Dakar: Africa World Press, 2003.   
Modood, Tariq. ‘The Indian Economic Success: A Challenge to Some Race 
Relations assumptions.’ Policy and Politics 19.3 (1991): 177–190. 
Moore, Jason W. Capitalism in the Web of Life. London: Verso, 2015. 
Morris, William. News From Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Novas, Carlos, and Rose, Nikolas. ‘Biological Citizenship.’ In: Global 
Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems 
Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2007. 439-463. 
Paul, Diane B. ‘A War on Two Fronts: J. B. S. Haldane and the Response to 
Lysenkoism in Britain.’ Journal of the History of Biology 16.1 (1983): 1-37. 
Paul, Diane B. and Moore, James. ‘The Darwinian Context: Evolution and 
Inheritance,” in: Bashford and Levine. 27-42. 
Pearson, Wendy. ‘Science Fiction and Queer Theory.’ In: Edward James. 149-160. 
Peirce, Charles Sanders. Collected Papers Vols. 1-6. Ed. Charles Hartshorne and 
Paul Weiss. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935.  
 257 
---. The Essential Peirce, Volume I: Selected Philosophical Writings. Ed. Nathan 
Houser and Christian J. W. Kloesel. Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University 
Press, 1992.  
---. The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings. Ed. Justus Buchler, New York and 
London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1940.  
Peterson, Erik L. ‘The Excluded Philosophy of Evo-Devo? Revisiting C. H. 
Waddington’s Failed Attempt to Embed Alfred North Whitehead’s 
“Organicism” in Evolutionary Biology.’ History and Philosophy of Life 
Sciences. 33.3 (2011). 301-320. 
Peterson, Lorna M. ‘A Case of Chronic Anachronisms: Doris Lessing and the 
USSR.’ In: Sprague. 142-157. 
Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. ‘Hybridity, So What? The Anti-Hybridity Backlash and 
the Riddles of Recognition.’ Theory, Culture & Society 18.2-3 (2001): 219-245. 
Pray, Leslie. ‘Transposable Elements, or Jumping Genes: Not Junk DNA?’ Nature 
Education 1.1 (2008): 32. 
Punter, David. ‘Lessing and Time Travel.’ In: Brazil, Sergeant and Sperlinger. 129-
136. 
Rabinow, Paul. ‘Artificiality and Enlightenment: From Sociobiology to 
Biosociality.’ In: Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, 
and Life Politics. Jonathan Xavier Inda (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell, 2008. 181-
193. 
Rando, Oliver J., and Verstrepen, Kevin J. ‘Timescales of Genetic and Epigenetic 
Inheritance.’ Cell 128.4 (2007): 655-68. 
Rechavi, Oded. ‘Guest List or Black List: Heritable Small RNAs as Immunogenic 
Memories.’ Trends in Cell Biology 24.4 (2014). 212-20. 
Reynolds, Andrew. Peirce’s Scientific Metaphysics: The Philosophy of Chance, Law 
and Evolution. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002.  
Richardson, Angelique. Love and Eugenics in the Late Nineteenth Century: 
Rational Reproduction and the New Woman, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
Roll-Hansen, Nils. Eugenics and the Science of Eugenics.’ In Bashford and 
Levine. 80-97. 
 258 
Rose, Hilary, and Rose, Steven. Genes, Cells and Brains. London, Verso: 2013. 
Rose, Nikolas. ‘The Politics of Life Itself.’ Theory, Culture, Society 18.6 (2001): 1-
30. 
---. The Politics of Life Itself. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
Rudling, Pers Anders. ‘Eugenics and Racial Biology in Sweden and the USSR: 
Contacts Across the Baltic Sea.’ Canadian Bulletin of Medical History. 31.1 
(2014). 41-75. 
Ruse, Michael. Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense? Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979.  
Sagan, Dorion. ‘Introduction.’ In: Jakob von Uexküll, Marina von Uexküll, Joseph 
D. O’Neil (trans). A Foray Into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With a 
Theory of Meaning. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010. 
Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. Expanded Edition (1932). Trans. G. 
Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
Schneider, Laurence. Biology and Revolution in Twentieth-Century China. 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
Sebeok, Thomas A.  Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs. Lisse, Netherlands: 
Peter de Ridder Press, 1976. 
Sebeok, Thomas A. ‘Foreword.’ Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs. Lisse, 
Netherlands: Peter de Ridder Press, 1976. 
---. Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2001 [1994]. 
Serres, Michel. The Natural Contract. Trans. Elizabeth MacArthur and William 
Paulson. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995. 
Shapiro, Stephen, and Barnard, Philip. Pentecostal Modernism: Lovecraft, Los 
Angeles and World-Systems Culture. London: Bloomsbury, 2017. 
Simone, AbdouMaliq. ‘The Urban Poor and Their Ambivalent Exceptionalities: 
Some Notes from Jakarka.’ Current Anthropology 56.11 (2015): 15-23. 
---. ‘What You See is Not Always What You Know: Struggles against Re-
containment and the Capacities to Remake Urban Life in Jakarta’s Majority 
World.’ South East Asia Research 23.3 (2015): 227-244. 
Slonczewski, Joan, and Levy, Michael. ‘Science Fiction and the Life Sciences.’ In: 
Edward James. 174-185. 
 259 
Smith, Frederick E. ‘The International Biological Program and the Science of 
Ecology.’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America. 60.1 (May 1968). 5-11. 
Smith, J. M. “Genetics, Evolution and Haldane,” The Quarterly Review of Biology 
Vol. 67, No. 2, June 1992, pp 187-189. 
Solzhenitsyn, Alexander. The Gulag Archipelago. London: Harvill, 1986 [1973]. 
Souvlis, George, and Čakardić, Ankica. ‘Feminism and Social Reproduction: An 
Interview with Silvia Federici.’ Salvage. October 2016. 
http://salvage.zone/online-exclusive/feminism-and-social-reproduction-
an-interview-with-silvia-federici/ Accessed Jan 10 2017. 
Spade, Dean, and Willse, Craig. ‘Sex, Gender and War in a Age of Multicultural 
Imperialism.’ QED: A Journal in GLBQT Worldmaking 1.1 (2014): 5-29. 
Spencer, Herbert. Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution (ed. J. D. Y. Peel). Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1972. 
Spencer, Herbert. Principles of Biology. London: Williams and Norgate, 1864. 
Print. 
Sperlinger, Tom. ‘Lessing’s Interruptions.’ In Brazil, Sergeant and Sperlinger. 137-
151. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. Readings. Calcutta: Seagull, 2014. 
 
Sprague, Claire, and Tiger, Virginia. Critical Essays on Doris Lessing. Boston: G. 
K. Hall & Co., 1986. 
Stapledon, Olaf. Last and First Men, London: Hatchette, 2012 [1930]. 
Stengers, Isabelle. Cosmopolitics I. Trans. Roberto Bonnono. Minneapolis: The 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010.  
Suvin, Darko. Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a 
Literary Genre. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979. 
Taylor, Jenny (ed). Notebooks/Memoirs/Archives: Reading and Re-reading Doris 
Lessing. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982.  
Thacker, Eugene. ‘After Life: De anima and unhuman politics.’ In: Radical 
Philosophy 155 (May/June 2009): 31-40. ‘ 
 260 
---. Biophilosophy for the 21st Century.’ in: Critical Digital Studies: A Reader Ed. 
Arthur Kroker and Marilouise Kroker. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2013. 132-142. 
United Nations, Sustainable Development Commission. ‘Sustainable 
Development Commission Hears Call For Reversing Trend Towards 
“Sustainable Underdevelopment”.’ ENV/DEV/410. 8 April 1997. 
http://www.un.org/press/en/1997/19970408.endev410.html. Accessed 
online 15 June 2016. 
Vidal, Gore. ‘Paradise Regained.’ In: Spague and Tiger, 200-204. 
Vlastos, Marion. ‘Doris Lessing and R. D. Laing: Psychopolitics and Prophecy.’ 
PMLA 91.2 (1976): 245-258. 
Waddington, Conrad Hal. The Strategy of the Genes. London: Routledge, 2014 
[1957].  
Warner, Michael. ‘Introduction: Fear of a Queer Planet.’ Social Text 29 (1991), 3-
17. 
Warwick Research Collective. Uneven and Combined Development. Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2015. 
Watkins, Susan. Doris Lessing. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010. 
Weismann, August. Essays Upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems. Ed. 
Edward B. Poulton, Selmar Schönland and Arthur E. Shipley. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1889.  
Weizman, Eyal. The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from 
Arendt to Gaza. London: Verso, 2011. 
Wells, H. G. The Island of Doctor Moreau. London: Penguin, 2005 [1896]. 
Wheeler, Wendy. The Whole Creature: Complexity, Biosemiotics and the 
Evolution of Culture. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2006.  
Whittaker, Ruth. Doris Lessing. London: Macmillan, 1988. 
Williams, James. ‘Barthes, Deleuze, and Peirce: Pragmatism in Pursuit of the 
Sign.’ Deleuze and Pragmatism. Simone Bignall, Sean Bowden and Paul 
Patton (eds.). London: Routledge, 2015. 38-54. 
Wilson, Edward Osborne. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard  
 261 
Yehuda, Rachel, et al. ‘Holocaust Exposure Induced Intergenerational Effects 
on FKBP5 Methylation.’ Biological Psychiatry 80.5 (2016): 373-380. 
 
